CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005000500001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 31, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 27, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved F, or_Release L(~Irl127, FQ~f00975AO05000500001-0
27 April 1960
Dept. review completed
IN
DI3GUMENT N.
#0 COANGE IN CLASS.
F] DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
WLXT RLVIEW DATE. -0------------
kt TH. Hit 10-2
0 JUN 79$0
PATE: -.- REVIEWER:
Approved For Release QW%V27 00975A005000500001-0
/
Copy No. C
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000500001-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000500001-0
 A005000500001-0
E25X1 Approved -
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
m
-aril
27 Aril 1960
ggga
1\
0 ASIA-AFRICA
I1
25X1
Japans The Kishi government, in an effort to forestall a par-
liamentary crisis and possible public furor, has delayed any move
to secure lower house ratification of the new US-Japanese secu-
rity treaty until 15 May at the earliesta The government's deci-
sion was brought about primarily by the actions of the Socialists,
who backed up their demands for additional time for debate by re-
sorting to force to block committee deliberations on the treaty.
14, Leftist-sponsored, antitreaty demonstrations in front of the Diet
25X1
the Nehru-Chou conversationsy the publicizing of Peiping's claim
W
to Mount Everest, and Katmandu's belief that the Chinese and.the
Russians have supported recent civil disturbances inside Nepal,
25X1
\0
N.
001
on 26 April. led to a violent outbreak by the radical students' asso-
ciation, which is also threatening violence during President Eisen-
bower's visit in Junea
Nepal-China. Nepalese officials have told the American am=
bassador. that the treaty of peace and friendship which Katmandu
.expects to 'sign with Peiping during the current Chou En-lai visit
will not contain a nonaggression clause barring Nepal from making
defensive arrangements with third countries. Prospects for the
talks as a whole have been dimmed by the inconclusive results of
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
 AIN
25X1 Approved I elease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T0097 A005000500001-0
g w par y s suppor wou ~~\~
limit Qasim's support almost entirely to the military. The most im- 25X1
portant cabinet positions now are held by military officers picked by SIMON\
no c i rv
X ., Finance Minister Muhammad Hadid, head of National
Democratic party (NDP) and one of the most influential and conserva-
tive members of Qasim's cabinet, has submitted his resignation from
both the cabinet and the party. Hadid has been at odds with other
key NDP leaders who have been demanding the withdrawal of the par-
ty's support for the Qasim regime. His resignation may be intended
to bring the issue to a head prior to the party's conference scheduled
for the end of April. Qasim has not yet accepted the resignation.
The loss of Hadid to the cabinet alon U-11 the t h n IA
V
*South Korea., President Syngman Rhee's formal resignation,
submitted to the National Assembly on 27 April in the wake of re-
newed rioting in the country, is expected to be accepted immediately
and to transfer to that already seriously divided body responsibility
for solving the deepening political crisis. A caretaker government
headed by Ho Chong, newly-named by Rhee to be foreign minister,
is likely to oversee new elections but not before a struggle in the
Assembly over Rhee's proposed constitutional amendment which
iould establish a parliamentary system of government. The ruling
Liberal party is reported seeking to empower the Assembly to elect
he president, while the opposition Democrats are insisting on a
opular election. Rhee may attempt to succeed himself as president.
27 Apr 60
Approved For Re ease 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP79T00975A00 000500001-0 25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000500001-0
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000500001-0
 Approved F
H. ASIA-AFRICA
Tokyo Delays Plans to Ratify US-Japanese Security Treaty
The government of Japanese Prime Minister Kishi, attempt-
ing to forestall a parliamentary crisis similar to the one which
nearly caused its downfall in late 1958, has deferred until 15
May at the earliest its plan to seek lower-house ratification of
the new US-Japanese security treaty. The government's decision
derived primarily from rising public and press criticism that it
was acting dictatorially in ramming the treaty through the Diet.
The Socialists, reinforced by this criticism of the govern-
ment, have used force in the Diet to block committee hearings on
the treaty since 22 April. Although the government's decision
avoids a showdown with the Socialists for the time being, Kishi
still intends to secure ratification prior to President Eisenhower's
visit in June. To do so will necessitate an extension of the cur-
rent Diet session, a move the Socialists oppose as strongly as
the treaty vote itself. There is a strong possibility of violence
within the Diet on both issues.
Meanwhile, the extreme left-wing Zengakuren students' fed-
eration on 26 April turned an orderly leftist demonstration against
the treaty into a riot in front of the Diet building and is threatening
further acts of violence during the Eisenhower visit. Other leftist
organizations, presently united in the antitreaty campaign , are
planning to mobilize more than 100,000 persons for peaceful demon-
strations during the visit]
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved ~
27 Apr 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
 Approved For 4elease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T009754005000500001-0 25X1
Prospects of Current Chou En-lai Visit to Nepal
The treaty of peace and friendship which Nepal expects
to sign with China during: Premier. Chou En-lai's visit between
26 and 29 April will. not contain a clause barring Nepal from
making defensive arrangements with third countries, accord-
ing to Nepalese officials, The formal signing. of this treaty and
of a border. agreement, already agreed upon during Nepalese
Prime Minister Koirala's recent trip to Peiping, is the prin-
cipal item of business during the Chou visit. As part of the
Katmandu government's desire to limit the Chinese premier's
contact with the Nepalese public, arrangements have been
made for the two premiers to meet for private conversations
outside the capital.
The over-all prospects for the success of the Chou visit
have been. dimmed by the failure of the Nehru-Chou conversa-
tions in New Delhi, the Chinese claim to Mount Everest, . and
the Katmandu government's belief that both Chinese and Russian
personnel in Nepal lent support to recent antigovernment. dis-
turbances. Sixteen members of the Nepalese Communist party
have already been jailed for their part in the disturbances, and
the government remains alert to further signs of Sino-Soviet
complicity with the Nepalese Communists.
Chou is well aware of Nepalese views and may try to dispel
a major source. of Sino-Nepalese friction arising from the recent
talks with Koirala in Peiping by suggesting that the border com-
mission. to be established should discuss the feasibility of draw-
ing the boundary through the summit of Everest. If he is rebuffed
on the clause prohibiting third- country defense arrangements, he
will probably insist on a statement of "principle" against partici-
pating in military alignments.
25X1
25X1
Approved Fo - 5A005000500001-0
27 Apr 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
 Approved F Felease 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T0097gA005000500001-0
Rhee Resignation Extends South Korean Political Crisis
President Syngman Rhee's formal resignation, submitted
to the National Assembly on 27 April in the wake of new riots
in the southern city of Pusan, is expected to be accepted im-
mediately. Rhee's surrender of power transfers to the al-
ready seriously divided Assembly responsibility for solving
the deepening political crisis. A caretaker government headed
by Ho Chong, the new foreign minister named by Rhee on 26
April, is likely to oversee new elections following a move by
the Assembly to implement Rhee's proposal for a constitution-
al amendment re-establishing the parliamentary system .of
government which was abolished in 1954.
A serious struggle looms in the Assembly on this issue.
The ruling Liberal party is reported seeking to empower the
Assembly to elect the president, while the opposition Demo-
crats are insisting on a popular election. The outcome of
this struggle may determine whether Rhee attempts to suc-
ceed himself, Additional difficulties may arise over the
question of new elections for the Assembly as well.
The student-led demonstrations have not produced a
candidate for national leadership, but Ho Chong, as acting
head of state, may be emerging as a new power. He is a
former Rhee lieutenant who was acting prime minister in
1951-52. More recently, as a political independent, he has
enjoyed considerable prestige in Seoul where he served as
mayor in 1958 and 1959. He is not in favor with the present
leadership of the majority Liberal party but has been as-
sociated with Yi Ki-pung, the controversial vice president-
elect whom Rhee relieved of all posts on 26 April,
Meanwhile, the possibility of reprisals against the po-
lice for their record of brutality has resulted in the dis-
appearance of uniformed police from the streets in Seoul.
General Song Yo-chan, chief of staff and martial law com-
mander, reportedly believes that the police will be unable
to maintain order, even in a less tense atmosphere, unless
the major police officials in Seoul are removed and reforms
instituted.
By contrast, relations between the demonstrators and the
army troops enforcing martial law have been good. General
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05000500001-0
27 Apr 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
 Approved Fir.
Song has pursued a policy of restraint against the demon-
strators, while ;at the same time attempting to influence the
government toward concessions. Further unrest, possibly
generated by the anticipated political struggle in the Assembly,
could induce the military establishment. to undertake a more
active political role.
Approved or Release - 75A005000500001-0
25X1
25X1
27 Apr 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Face 5
 25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00Sj6A005000500001-0
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary. of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005000500001-0
 C
Approved For Release 20M/P212 A RUP00975A005000500001-0
Approved For Release0p/2 Eft*r'T00975A005000500001-0