CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005100040001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 5, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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5 May 1960
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
5 May 1960
inffil
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Poland: @eneral Kazimierz Witaszewski, a greatly
f eare actin despised Stalinist who was virtually exiled after
the victory of the Gomulka forces in 1956, has reportedly beer
appointed to a high party post which exercises major influen
41
d f th 1' d 4.1% t
t
Affiffi
ssxa_-
y orces, a po ice, an a cour
::vex m
nary an securi
The report of his appointment has provoked alarm among
Polish intellectuals and party moderates, and may reflect
the growing ascendancy of hard-line elements within the
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\ party. it wvula atso renecL Lue re6ime-s amerminaLlon to
\`
deal firmly with any future expressions of popular discontent;
10
the demonstrations at Nowa Huta and Olsztyn last week and at
Poznan.in February revealed the ease with which popular feel-
ings can be aroused 25X1
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aMEMONE
II. ASIA-AFRICA 25
1\001\11~ Turke : Sporadic student demonstrations continued
in Turkish cities through 4 May. Many. students have been
arrested in Istanbul, but morale apparently remains high and
F more demonstrations are possible.. Members of the opposi-
tion Republic People's party expect the party to be proscribed
and its leaders arrested now that, the NATO Ministerial. Coun-
cil meeting has ended. 25X1
South Korea: LRheels Liberal party, after virtually abdicating
its leadership in the National Assembly following the overthrow of
the regime, now may be moving to reassert itself in the highly
fluid political situation. There are also indications that a Liberal)
minority may be maneuvering for a.return of Rhee, possibly as
president under the new parliamentary system which the assembly
has taken the lead in developing. The student protest movement
has not, as yet evolved a unified organization or leadership, and
an unstable multiple-party situation might emerg
South Vietnam: [The Diem regime is coming under increas-
ingly open criticism in the relatively small circles of informed
Blame for maladministra-
Vietnamese for its authoritarianism.
,
tion, corruption, and dictatorial practices has centered in the pas O
5 May 60
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Ps close entourage, particularly on his brother
on the President
Nhu, but now is shifting more directly to Diem himself. Nhu
hand-z the rpSrimP's chosen political instrument. the corrupt Can
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ing, at least until there is a refinery in the area. Nairn has al-
ready shown concern that exploitation of the oil may increase
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Afghan dependence on the USSR. .
" LATE ITEM
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*USSR: The Soviet leadership has undergone the most ex-
\
tensive personnel shift since the defeat of the Male nkov- Molotov
"anti-party" group in 1957. The evidence indicates that the 25X
changes were made at Khrushchev s direction. The net result
is that the Khrushchev-Mikoyan-Kozlov team is still prominently
in the forefront and that Kozlov's position as Khrushchev's de-
si
thened
nate d successor has been stren
g
g
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Lao organization, ana 15 also a jJ1'1ncljJU1 41_L;1111.ct u1 -avuuu
OEM
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Vietnam's ventures against Cambodian leader Sihanouk.
Af hanistan-USSR,. he Afghan Government has confirmed
that substantial oil deposits have been discovered in northern
Afghanistan near the Soviet border by the Soviet team exploring
the area under the January 1958 assistance agreement. Although
Foreign Minister Naim has expressed an interest in finding oil
markets in the.West, transportation difficulties make it almost
certain that the crude oil will be exported to the USSR for refin-
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IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS 25X1
IM
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United
.States Intelligence Board concludes than
M
'EMENIN'
ass
A. CNo Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hoS
tilities against the continental US or its possessions NNESEEN
in the immediate future
Ism
B. To Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately
to initiate direct military action against US forces
abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the orbit
in the immediate future
INE
C. IT he following developments are susceptible of direct
\ exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which
I could jeopardize the security of the US in the imme-
diate future Q
N ne
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 Appr4
Stalinist Appointed High party iost in
General KazimierzWitaszewski reportedly has been ap-
pointed director of the recently reactivated administrative
section of the Polish party central committee, which controls
party cadres in the government. Such an appointment would
give him a role in the execution of policy relating to Polish
military and security forces, the police, and. the court)
LWitaszewski is a well-known Stalinist who was "exiled" to
Czechoslovakia as military attache following Gomulka's return
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to Power in 1956 but recalled F
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I uin the fall of 1959? The transfer of W itaszews
to is powerful position in the party apparatus may reflect..
a growing ascendancy of hard-line elements within the party
hierarchy and the regime's intention to deal firmly with all
manifestations of antiregime attitudes. Gomulka--either of
his own volition or as the result of prodding by elements of
the party or the USSR--may have thought it necessary to re-
activate the administrative section of the central committee
apparatus and place a strong man at its hea
LThere appears to be a definite lack of strong, decisive
leadership in the Polish party and government, and the popu-
lace is becoming demoralized by the regime's inability to
cope, with the country's many problems. The clashes with
police over religious issues in Nowa Huta and Olsztyn last
week and worker demonstrations in Poznan in. February il-
lustrate how easily popular feelings can erupt, even over
purely local matter
itaszewski, who received his nickname "Gaspipe" as a
result of his advocacy of brutal suppressive measures during
.the Poznan riots of June 1956, is generally regarded by the
Polish people, particularly the intellectuals as the symbol
of the tough line in. internal matters 7
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I I. ASIA-AFRICA
Turkish Demonstrations
Sporadic student demonstrations continued in Turkish
cities through 4 May, but security forces now appear to have
control of the situation. Student leaders have b en arrested
in Istanbul,where the major rioting took place.
While their numbers have been reduced by
arrests an me police appear to have successfully penetrated
their ranks, the students seem determined to continue their
struggle; new incidents are possible.
There are indications that the government is about to take
new and possibly drastic action against its political opposition.
Premier Menderes has denounced the Republican People's par-
ty (RPP) for sponsoring "open rebellion"--despite denial of
13 ,PP involvement in the riots by both party spokesmen and stu-
dent leaders. Important press organs of the RPP have been
closed, and opposition newspapermen have been taken into
custody. Several local leaders of the RPP reportedly have
been arrested, and other RPP spokesmen have been interro-
gated by the Grand National Assembly's "Committee of Fifteen"--
created in mid-April to investigate the party's "illegal and
subversive" actions.
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While no national RPP leader has yet been arrested, op-
position spokesmen believe such arrests are imminent and ex-
pect the government to ban the party.
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In the
event of severe reprisals, opposition lea ers may for
political asylum in foreign embassies.
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'Rhee's Party May Be Seeking, to Reassert Control. in South Korea
[Syngman Rhee' ibera par y, er vir wally abdicating its
leadership in the National Assembly immediately following the
overthrow of the regime, may be moving to reassert its major-
ity position in?the, highly fluid political situation in South Korea.
At. the same time, the party is resisting student demands for im-
mediate dissolution of the assembly and the holding of general
elections, and is attempting instead to devise a constitutional pro-
vision for a government system--with a premier and cabinet re-
sponsible to the assembly-which would preserve Liberal control.
The opposition Democrats, equally unwilling to surrender the as-
sembly's newly acquired power and hesitant to face elections under
present circumstances, are also supporting constitutional amend-
ment as a prior step
LThere are also indications that a minority group in the Liberal
party may be maneuvering to make possible Rhee's return as pres-
ident under a new cabinet system. Vice President and Democratic
party leader Chang Myon, while not indicating support for such a
move, favors indirect election of the president by the assembly.
Some loyal Rhee supporters, apparently impressed by the strong
public affection shown for Rhee following his resignation, are ad-
vocating an immediate presidential election to test popular feeling
(it is not clear which course public opinion favors. A majority
of the press is supporting constitutional revision as the first step,
but student demonstrators in major cities continue to demand the
assembly's immediate dissolution. The student movement is at-
tempting to evolve a unified organization and leadership, but has
not yet succeeded.]
Preparations already are under way for the formation or re-
vival of a number of minor parties from the Progressive party on
the left to the militant National Youth Corps on the right. An un-
stable multiple-party situation may develop. The army seems in-
tent on adopting stiffer measures than heretofore to cope with
demonstrations .-7
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Growing Criticism of Diem Re ime. in South Vietnam
The Diem regime i u Vietnam, An a ion to facing a
serious challenge from resurgent Communist guerrilla forces,
is also under increasingly open criticism in the relatively
small circles of informed Vietnamese for its authoritarianism.
Resentment over various malpractices is felt throughout the
country's political and military substructure. Various Viet-
namese officials, including several cabinet members and
Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho, have expressed apprehen-
sion about the government's future stability unless political
reforms are speedily effected]
[Igo Dinh Nhu, the President's ,brother and chief political
adviser, is a major cause of resentment. As leader of the
semicovert, corrupt, and pervasive Can Lao organization,
Nhu has gradually fashioned over the years a commissar-like
network which, on Diem's behalf, exercises the real power and
control in the government. He also is a principal architect of
I I efforts to unseat Cambodian leader
Sihanouk, who, as a result, has become suspicious of the
West and is looking increasingly to Peiping for support)
[blame for maladministration, corruption, and dictatorial
practices has centered in the past on the President's close
entourage, but now is shifting more and more to Diem him-
self. Diem is taking some steps to curb the excesses of pro-
vincial officials so. as to undercut Communist subversion in
rural areas. Thus far,' however, he has refused to disavow
his inner circle of advisers, and tends to attribute criticism
of his regime to the work of Communists or disgruntled polti-
cal "outs." Despite signs of increasing opposition to his
narrowly based government, such as the petition for political
reforms made public in Saigon a few days ago by a group of
former Vietnamese officials, Diem probably will maintain
his position. that the exi preclude more
democratic racticesJ
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5 May 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page. 6
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Oil Discovered in Afghanistan
he Afghan - ove --men nas con at substantial oil
deposits have been discovered at Shibargan in north-central
Afghanistan some 40 miles from the Soviet border. A team of
more than 200 bloc technicians has been exploring in the area
under the terms of the $15,000,000 Soviet oil exploration assist-
ance agreement. signed in January 1958. The Afghan minister
of commerce says the area now being tapped is estimated to con-
tain.45,000,000 tons of high-quality oil. The total extent of the
field is believed much broader. but is still unknown. A senior
member of the Soviet team estimates the field also contains 22
billion cubic meters of gas under pressure
LKabul.presumably hopes that oil exports will greatly improve
its international trade position in general and will increase its
capacity to discharge its debts to the USSR in particular. Foreign
exchange previously used to pay for imported petroleum products
imports will probably be diverted to purchase more machinery
and other capital goods abroad to develop the national economy.
Prime Minister Daud, who has been visiting the USSR since 14
April, will almost certainly include oil exploitation in his discus-
sions, with Soviet officials about assistance for Afghanistan's Sec-
ond Five-Year Plan (1961-1966). He now may feel that Afghan-
istan will be better able to repay additional loans, and relax his
policy of accepting only grants
Although Foreign Minister Naim has expressed an interest in
finding markets in the West, transportation difficulties make it
virtually certain that Western companies will not be interested
and that the crude oil will be exported to the USSR for refining, at
least until.the Afghans are able to have a refinery constructed
in the area. The USSR in the past has objected to free-world ac-
tivity in northern Afghanistan near its borders, and it may offer
to build a refinery for the Afghans. The USSR does not need the
Afghan oil exports, but may accept them for political reasons.
Naim has. already shown concern. that exploitation of the oil may
increase Afghan dependence on the the USSRJ E:
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LATE ITEM
Khrushchev Shakes Up Top Soviet Leadership
The Soviet party central committee, meeting on 4 May,
made extensive changes in the top party and government
leadership. The evidence indicates that'thechanges were
made at Khrushchev's direction.
Frol Kozlov, whom Khrushchev said last year would
be his' successor, has been moved into the party secre-
tariat and has relinquished his job as a first deputy premier.
This move will give Kozlov the opportunity to gain control
over the hard core of party professionals. In addition,
the secretariat has been reduced from a 10-man body to
a tight group of six,. a size reminiscent of. the -Stalin era..
Four old members of the party secretariat have been
transferred out, but remain on the party presidium. With
the obvious exception of Khrushchev, Suslov appears to be
the only remaining party secretary who might have the
semblance of an independent voice.
The net result is that the Khrushchev-Mikoyan-Kozlov
team appears to be stronger than ever,
In other significant changes, three presidium candidates-
Aleksey Kosygin, Nikolay Podgorny and Dmitry Polyansky--
were promoted to full membership in the presidium. Kosygin
and Polyansky particularly had been mentioned frequently as
rising stars on Khrushchev's team.
The central committee also fired Aleksey Kirichenko and
Nikolay Belyayev from the presidium, thus formalizing their
demotion earlier this year when they were assigned to remote
provincial posts.
The principal shifts in the government were the promotion
of Kosygin from Deputy Premier and USSR economic planning
chief to. Kozlov's old job as one of the two First Deputy Premiers.
Mikoyan remains the other First Deputy Premier. Kosygin in
turn was succeeded by Vladimir .Novikovwhoworked for a time
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in Leningrad, Kozlov's old bailiwick. For the past year he
has been the chief economic planner in the Russian re-
public (RSF.SR).
The Soviet announcement also stated that the central
committee had discussed matters pertaining to today's
Supreme Soviet session. Khrushchev has told a group of
foreign ambassadors that he will make a major speech at
this session.
Khrushchev also told the foreign diplomats that the
central committee would consider "constitutional questions"--
which would then have to be formalized by the Supreme Soviet--
and there has been talk in Moscow that the office of President
of the USSR would be created. Khrushchev may desire the
constitutional change so he could become chief of state, of-
ficially, as a demonstration that the Soviet people were solidly
behind him as he goes into the Summit meetings.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research.
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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