CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005100160001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 19, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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19 May 1960
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the U-2 issue, he does not intend to make any shar reversals
In the other major lines of his foreign policy.
Soviet spokesmen in Paris are designed to give the impres-
sion that while the Soviet premier, for the foreseeable future,
will vigorously press his bitter anti-American campaign on
CENTRAL INT
ELLIGENCE BULLETIN
1.9 May 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
U: Khrushchev's final press conference on.18 May
and the line being taken both publicly and privately by other
*This point was echoed by Yuriy Zhukov, chairman of e
State Committee for Foreign Cultural Relations. Khrushchev,
Gromyko and Zhukov all seemed to assume that negotiations
on. disarmament and a nuclear test ban would continue. Zhu-
kov indicated that Khrushchev had played "this one by ear,"
that. even those in. his own retinue did not know what he might
do from one minute to the next, and that a central committee
meeting and a subsequent bloc conference were virtual cer-
tainties.]
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Turkey : The prestige of Prime Minister Menderes is at an
all-timw in Istanbul, and opposition elements there have gained
]a new sense of confidence.
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South Africa: The South African Government apparently intends
o maintain its present authoritarian policy, despite mounting crit-
icism within the country's white community. In parliament on. 16
May, Justice Minister Erasmus refused to yield to.vociferous oppo-
sition demands that the! seven-week-old state of emergency be lifted,
stating that the emergency regulations must remain in force at least
19May60
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III. THE WEST
Cuba a Communist China: Castro's former minister of finance
is reporte to have commented privately on 16 May that the Cuban
Government is "under heavy pressure" to recognize Communist
China immediately and that he felt the move is imminent. Many
regime officials are sympathetic to the Chinese Communists. Cu-
ban Armed Forces Inspector General William Galvez Rodriguez
recently had two audiences with Mao Tse-tung. According to the
New China News Agency, Galvez said in Peiping on 12 May that the
Cuban people want to intensify their "intimate relationship" with the
Chinese people and to unite with them "in o ositon to the im eri-
alists of the US:'
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until 20 alleged Communists who are fugitives in neighboring
British- controlled territories are returned to the Union. The
American Embassy in Cape Town notes an increasing govern-
ment tendency to blame the recent disturbances on Communist
agitation.
New Zealand: [Prime Minister Nash's 13 May statement
that he Commonwealth conference in London generally recog-
nized "the early need for Chinese participation in. disarmament
measures" suggests that he may be contemplating recognition o
Communist China, partly to fulfill a pledge of the Labor party
1957 platform, before the next elections in November. Nash,
however, would presumably seek some prior consultation with
New Zealand's principal allies, inasmuch as he considers recog-
nition a question of timing, and would seek to avoid any timing
damaging. to Western prestige.]
(Page 7)
South Vietnam: The Diem regime, while outwardly ignoring
the much- pumuch-publicized "manifesto" for democratic reforms issued
in Saigon recently by a group of former officials, is maneuvering
L to head off more serious criticism. The government is taking pain
to retain the loyalty of student elements, and has instigated a smear
campaign in the press against the opposition group, labeling it "for-
eign inspired:' Diem apparently plans more direct repression, but
is withholding action until he can calculate international re ctioj
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IV. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
[On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Unite
States Intelligence. Board concludes that:
tilities against, the UnitedStates or its possessions
in the immediate futures
in the immediate future.]
LApplicable to both above conclusions
(With respect to the. breakup of the summit conference,
no Soviet bloc military activity has been detected which
conveys threatening implication
Co (the following developments are susceptible of direct
exploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which
could jeopardize the security of the.US In the .imme-
diate future
The Situation Regarding Berlin and East Germane
l_Whil.e there acre no indications that the Soviet Union. in-
tends in the immediate future to turn over Berlin access
controls to the East German regime, there are .indica-
tions that the 'USSR will increase pressure on the West
with regard to the Berlin issue, including specific steps
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19 May 60 DAILY BRIEF Iv
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I. TH::E COMMUNIST BLOC
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Khrushchev's Post iilh it Ply
1Khrushchev's 18 May press conference suggests that he
will vigorously press his bitter anti-American campaign in
an attempt to brand the. United States as responsible for pre-
venting a summit meeting. Moscow has already requested an
urgent meeting of the UN Security Council and will probably
also keep the issue alive with the trial of the American pilot]
other East-West issue
are designed to give the impression that
Moscow does not intend to make any sharp reversals in the
other major lines of its foreign policy.
F dealt with the disarmament and nuclear .es an con-
erences in a manner which implied that they expected the nego-
tiations to continue. Khrushchev warned, however, that the
USSR would resume nuclear testing if the United States did so
and that Moscow would not tolerate "procrastination" on dis-
armament
LYuriy Zhukov, Soviet cultural relations leader, con-
firmed the general line taken by Khrushchev
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[on future Soviet policy, saying that "neither side would wish
to push tension to a point which would make a later meeting
impossible," and that the disarmament and test-ban confer-
ences and the cultural exchange program should "go forward.")
Zhukov said the ?USSR had felt even before the U-2 inci-
dent that the Americans were reneging on "previously given
assurances of a desire to achieve a mutually satisfactory
Berlin settlement." Ile, maintained ;that in the.U-2 incident
the USSR 'had given the United States "several possible outs"
but American statements closed these "escape,hatches" one
by one
Both Zhukov and a Pravda correspondent expressed doubt
thatThe USSR now would act unilaterally on Berlin, but Zhukov
added, "I'm not a gypsy." Zhukov gave the impression that
the USSR had been led to expect greater, flexibility in the US
position in Berlin.'. )
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Soviet=Iraqi Relations Continue Slow Decline
The USSR and Iraq are "not as close as they were a few
months ago" and Soviet leaders are increasingly less well dis-
osed toward Qasim,
is
conclusion is in line with growing signs that; while Moscow and
Baghdad remain officially on good terms ana bloc aid programs
have not been affected, relations have slowly declined as a re-
suit of the Qasim regime's moves against Iraq's Communists and
indications that Baghdad would like to improve its ties with the
West. The visit to Iraq of First Deputy Premier Mikoyan in
early April failed to counter these trends.
Moscow is particularly irritated over Qasim's efforts to split
Communist ranks by his continued backing of a splinter group
which was licensed in February as the "Communist party of Iraq."
This group, which is having difficulty in developing even a rudi-
mentary political machine, was recently given a six-month ex-
tension to fulfill Iraqi legal requirements for calling a party con-
vention. The Qasim government has also continued to refuse to
give recognition to the Moscow=backed Communists as a legal
party.
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During the past few weeks Qasim has placed anti---
Communist officers in command of several air force squadrons, and
the influence of the pro-Communist commander of the air force,
Brig. Jalal. al-Awgati, has been curtailed. Baghdad has also re-
cently allowed two anti.-Communist papers, which had been previ-
ously closed down, to resume publication. Both are strenuously
attacking Communists.
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I I. ASIA -AFRICA
Turkish Internal Situation
The prestige of Tuirkish Prime Minister Menderes' regime
is reported at an all-time low in Istanbul, and articulate opin-
ion now is described as "universally anti-Menderes." Opposi-
tion elements in the Republican People's party (RPP), the press,
and the universities, according to the American consul general
in Istanbul, are confident of their ability to resist and ultimate-
ly defeat the government.
Meanwhile, business is reported at a standstill in Istanbul,
with businessmen uncertain about the future and general services
totally dependent on continuation of martial law. The city's re-
turn to normal police control, the reopening of the universities,
or the re-establishment of a relatively free press would result
in new and probably more violent disorders, according to the
consul general.
The army on the surface.is maintaining its traditional role
of aloofness from internal politics, but there are increasingly
frequent reports of intervention by senior army officers to
restrain the police or government from excessively repressive
measures. Many junior and middle-grade army officers, de-
scribed as economically dissatisfied are believed sympathetic
to the opposition.
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South Africa to Continue Authoritarian Policies
The South African Government apparently intends to main-
tain its present authoritarian policy, despite mounting criticism
within the country's white community. In parliament on 16 May,
Justice Minister Erasmus refused to yield to vociferous opposi-
tion demands that the seven-week-old state of emergency be
lifted. He said that 157 Communists were behind the recent dis-
turbances and that 20 of these leaders had escaped to neighboring
British- controlled territories. He said that the emergency regu-
lations would remain in effect at least until the agitators were re-
turned to the Union for trial.
Conservative members of the ruling Nationalist party have
renewed their campaign to establish closer control over the op=-
position press. A leading Nationalist member of parliament
warned on 16 May that the government "will have to be prepared
either to close down newspapers or at least summon those re-
sponsible for them and tell them what is expected of them a' This
statement brought an immediate denial. from Interior Minister
Naude, a relatively moderate Nationalist.
Although Prime Minister Verwoerd may move to moderate
some of the harsher aspects of apartheid when he resumes lead-
ership of the government, the Nationalists have shown no indica-
tion of letting up in their drive to suppress the "agitators and
gangsters" whom they consider responsible for the riots last
March. Since conservative Nationalists usually characterize
the opposition press and relatively liberal political parties as
"agitators," pressure on these groups may be increased. In ad-
dition, the American Embassy in Cape. Town notes an increasing
tendency-typified by Erasmus' 16 May statement.- to blame the
recent disturbances on Communist agitation.
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New Zealand Prime Minis er Possibly Considering Recognition
Of Red China
[New Zealand Prime Minister Nash's 13 May statement that
the Commonwealth conference in London generally recognized
the need for Communist China's participation in disarmament
measures suggests that he may plan, before New Zealand's na-
tional election in November, to fulfill a pledge in the labor
party's 1957 platform to recognize the Peiping regime. He
stated that the policy of keeping China "at arms length is one
of diminishing returns and may not be in the best interests of
our peace and security..... "
[Nash may feel that such a move would lessen current East-
West tensions, at least in the disarmament field. During his
visit to the USSR in April, Nash praised Khrushchev's disarma-
ment policies, and his generally laudatory comments on the
Soviet internal situation, raised considerable speculation in
Wellington that he might follow up his trip with a policy shift
toward :Peiping]
Although there is comparatively little opposition in New
Zealand. toward either recognition of Communist China or its
admission to the UN, Nash has justified postponement of the
move as a. question of timing and in deference to the United
States' position. Responsible New Zealand officials have re-
peatedly asserted that Nash would take no steps without prior
consultation with New Zealand's principal allies, and the prime
minister presumably would be reluctant to take. action damag-
ing Western prestige following upon the collapse of the summit
conference.
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 cal Critics
South Vietnam
[The Diem regime, despite a show of unconcern, realizes
that the much-publicized "manifesto" for democratic reforms
issued in Saigon last month by a group of former officials and
civic leaders could lead to more serious criticism. The gov-
ernment accordingly is taking. immediate steps to bolster its
prestige, while seeking; to stigmatize its critics before popu-
lar opinion. Thus far, however, the widespread public dis-
content over the government's authoritarian excesses has
taken no organized fornh
[With the recent events in South Korea in mind, the govern-
ment is turning particular attention to student elements, and
has decided on an organizational program designed to assure
their loyalty. At the same time, under the pretense of protect-
ing the public against hoodlums, authorities reportedly have
already arrested a number of youths suspected of antigovern-
ment sentiment
IThe Vietnamese press, apparently at government instiga-
tion, is characterizing the small opposition group as "foreign
inspired." Stressing that the group's press conference was
held before "foreign journalists" in a "foreign hotel"--Air
France's elegant Caravelle in Saigon--editorials in progovern-
ment papers have warned that this reliance on foreigners
would lead to loss of Vietnamese sovereignty if the group had
power Ji
The government apparently is considering more direct re-
pression of the group, 'which has just applied for registration
as a legal opposition party. Ngo Dinh Nhu, President Diem's
brother and political adviser, has described the group's pub-
lic criticism as illegal, and has stated that the government has
little choice but to app]ly the law. Thus far, however, the gov-
ernment has maintained an official silence on the matter, with
Diem taking stock of international reaction- -particularly Ameri-
can- -before showing his hand. In a rare presidential press
conference held recently, Diem stated that "critics are always
acceptable provided they are fair and impartial,"
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the! White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The! Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Jroint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief', Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic: Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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