CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A005100260001-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 18, 2002
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 31, 1960
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79T00975A005100260001-6.pdf | 829.84 KB |
Body:
Approved Fo leaselb'p/21S 9009 005100260001-6
31 May 1960
Copy No. C
01
State Dept. review completed
DOCUMENT NO. --^
NO IhiRrlHtsE IN CLASS.
13 DLCLASSII"IED
CLASS. C !ai. Minister Okala recently told the \
American charge in Yaouunde thaJFelix Moumie, exiled terror
ist leader, is planning to overthrow the Cameroun Government
following expiration of the country's present security agreement
with France on 30 June. American and British representatives 25X1
in Yaounde consider it "fairly plausible" that Moumie's rebels
o might make a last=ditch effort, he Cameroun Government
hopes this threat,
probably, ~a.which the Camerounians may be
exaggerating,. will increase support for President Ahid'o's re-
25X1 cent plea for US military ai 25X1
III. THE WEST O
25X1 \
France: 'Despite De Gaulle's solidarity with the United States
on East-West issues, he will never be satisfied if consultation
among Britain, France and the United States is limited to the
German problem and Western tactics toward the USSR, accord-
ing to Premier Debre. In particular, he said, De Gaulle wants
"real".. consultation on African problems with a view to working
out a common line and considers cooperation on nuclear weapons
an integral part of three- power coo eration 25X1
25X1
Cuba: The Peiping opera company which has been touring
\
\ LatiAmerica will spend most of June in Havana. The Cuban
Government is emphasizing cultural ties with Communist China
and may soon proceed with the long-foreseen establishment of
diplomatic relations. A group of students arrives in Peiping from
Cuba on 25 May, the latest of numerous Cuban visitors there, and
Cuba seems to be a key target of Pei in 's stepped-up propaganda
activities in Latin America. 25X1
31 May 60 DAILY BRIEF' ii
25X
Approved
For- F pI
F00974005100260001-6
LATE ITEM
a M
ENE
ggg\
,go
*Malinovsk y Speech: The tough speech by Soviet Defense
Minister Marshal Ma inovsky on 30 May before the Moscow Con-
ference of Communist Labor Shockworkers, to which Khru-
shchev spoke only two days earlier, was designed to reinforce
the general lines of the premier's address and to underscore
both the 'USSR's sensitivity to any future overflights and its mil-
itary capabilities to prevent them. A TASS summary of his
speech included his "warning" that he personally has ordered
the commander in chief of the rocket forces to strike at the base
from which any future "intruder plane comes" Malinovsky did
not attribute this order to a decision of the Soviet Government or
party central committee, as is Khrushchev's usual custom, but
justified it on the grounds that such a plane might be carrying a
hydrogen bomb. He followed Khrushchev's description that "mod-
ern war... would be a virtual catastrophe for some countries," but
he then nodded in the direction of the more truculent Chinese posi-
tion on the aggressive intentions of the West by adding, 'We do not
trust the imperialists," and, 'We are convinced they are waiting
only for an opportunity to attack.. the socialist countries and that
they are checked only by fear of the complete rout of imperialism
as a system."
VON%
Approved For Reie se - T00975A005100260001-6
\~ 25X1
DAILY BRIEF iii
Approved
005100260001-6
9wer
THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Khrushchev's Foreign Policy Speech
In his. first speech after returning to Moscow, Khrushchev
on 28 May elaborated on his statements in East Berlin on the
future course of Soviet ;policy and continued his effort to explain
and justify the contradiction -between his policy of detente and
his performance in Paris. Although he ridiculed President
Eisenhower and again attacked the United States on the U-2 inci-
dent, Khrushchev apparently is beginning to work back toward
his pre-summit position, which drew a distinction between the
President and "cold war forces" in the US.
. While pointing out the contrast between the President's
"good intentions" and USS foreign policy, Khrushchev said,
"I still believe President Eisenhower himself wants peace,"
In this manner the Soviet premier is apparently seeking to fore-
stall charges that he was mistaken. in his judgment and had al-
lowed himself to be deceived by the President. As part of his
effort to justify his course over the past seven months and min-
imize the effects of .the Paris breakdown on Soviet policy, Khru-
shchev asserted that Soviet policy was "correct and just" and
asked, "Why should it be changed?"
Khrushchev's awareness of the contradictions in criticiz-
ing US intentions while portraying his past policy as correct
is reflected in his sensitivity to Western reports that internal
opposition or pressure from Communist China was responsible
for his behavior in Paris. He took the unusual. step of specific-
ally denying these reports and Western speculation that Mikoyan
is in trouble.
Although he again expressed hope that a new summit meet-
ing would take place in six to eight months, Ihrushchev added
that. he would not be surprised if this did not occur. His call
for the inclusion of Communist China, India, and Indonesia and
other countries in future meetings may be the first step toward
freeing his hand should he decide to back off from the commit=
ment he made in his 20 May speech in Berlin to maintain the
status quo there until a new summit. He again counseled pa-
tience until a new meeting and reaffirmed his intention to strive
in the meantime for negotiated settlements of outstanding prob-
lems, including the German and Berlin questions.
25X1
31 May 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved Fo
Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T0097 005100260001-6
II. ASIA-AFRICA
New Government Formed in Turkey
A provisional government of 15 civilians and three mil-
itary cabinet members has been formed in Turkey. Retired
General Cemal Gursel, who headed the coup against the for-
mer government, is prince minister as well as commander in
.chief of the armed forces. General officers also head the in-
terior and communications ministries. The cabinet appears to
be composed of nonpartisan personalities with a reputation for
integrity and ability.
A seven-man committee of law professors from Ankara
and Istanbul universities ;ar&,beginning work on the draft of a
new constitution and electoral law which will be reviewed be-
fore adoption by a larger committee representing a wide seg-
ment of Turkish opinion.. One report suggests that a bicameral
legislature will replace the present unicameral one and that a
court with power to review the constitutionality of all legislation
will be formed.
Prime Minister Gursel has told American officers that he
will require one to three months to restore the situation to normal
before elections, but that he is firmly determined to hand over
power to the new parliament as soon as it is elected. Early elec-
tions seem mandatory, ]Lest there be consolidation of military
control which would then be difficult to give up. While the elec-
tions might be free in general, it seems clear that the present
government will not permnait members of the previous administra-
tion to win positions of influence.
Approved
25X1
31 May 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved Fc
25X1
Ethiopia Expects Additional American Military Aid
tEmperor Haile Selassie is interpreting the forthcoming visit
of two high-ranking American military officials as a favorable
answer by the United States to Ethiopia's recent request for ad-
ditional military assistance,
As a result, the Emperor planned.
to call in the official representative of the Soviet Ministry of Trade
on 28 May and advise him that Ethiopia would not accept Soviet
aid at this time for military and security needs. On 30 April the
USSR offered Ethiopia arms and equipment to supply about 40,000
men, but the Emperor has been reluctant to become dependent
on Moscow for such equipment]
The Ethiopians, elated over the visit by US military officials,
apparently are convinced, that the United States will provide arms
for at least an additional.. 8,000 men, although Addis Ababa had re-
quested assistance for the 26,000-man police force as well.
Un view of. the Emperor's heightened expectation of additional
aid and Ethiopia's growing fears of Somali nationalism, any pro-
gram not promising more arms aid is likely to be rejected in
r Release 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79TO09ZSA005100260001-6
25X1
25X1
favor of some of the USSR's proferred assistance.,
Approved
5AO05100260001-6
Page 3
31 May 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25X1
Approved Fo
Cameroun Government May Face Coup Attempt
[Foreign Minister Ok:ala has told the American charge in
Yaounde ththe Cameroun Government has documentary evi-
dence that Felix Moumie= -exiled extremist leader now residing
in Guinea--is planning a coup against the government in July.
While the US and British representatives in Yaounde believe a
last-ditch effort by Moumie's rebels is "fairly plausible;" it
appears doubtful that Moumie can attract sufficient support
from among the dissident Bamileke tribal elements to chal-
lenge the authority of the, local security forces.
[According. to OkalaaJ the coup will not be launched until
after the expiration of Cameroun's present security agreement
with France on 30 June in an effort to avoid intervention by
French security units stationed there. Moumie, apparently be-
lieving the existing agreement with France will not be extended
or renegotiated, will seek to exploit what he believes will be a
gap in the government's security defenses. The foreign minis-
ter, however, has conceded that circumstances may force the
negotiation of new agreements with France.
T-Okala added th t~Moumie has plans to augment his forces,
if necessary, by flying in small bands of armed Chinese Com-
munists from Guinea. However, there is no evidence that there
are Chinese guerrillas in Guinea.
he foreign minister may be exaggerating the gravity of the
situation in an effort to support his country's case in requesting
US military aid. President Ahidjo realizes that Cameroun's prose-
perity is dependent on external assistance, but he also is aware
that continued exclusive reliance on French aid makes his govern-
ment vulnerable to charges of being a French puppet regime. He
may believe, therefore, that by obtaining aid from the US or West-
ern European sources other than France, he will be able to refute
such charges without endangering present economic programs.
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 - CIA-RDP79T00975A0051002R0001
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
31 May 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
Approved For R lease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T0097 AO05100260001-6
]III. THE WEST
De Gaulle oncerned Over Policy Differences With US
O Premier Debra is "still quite grave" concerning French-
American relations in Africa and on nuclear questions, ac=
cording to a State Department official recently visiting Paris.
Debra said he was gratified at the progress made in recent
talks by Western leaders in Paris on US-British-French co-
operation, but he stressed that in order to satisfy De Gaulle,
tripartite discussions must have broader scope than Germany
and tactics vis-a-vis the USSR.
zebra said De Gaulle would not be satisfied until there is
"rea consultation among the three powers on the substance of
African problems with a view to working out a common line"
He said De Gaulle is "hurt" by US-French policy divergences,
particularly in Morocco, and is "haunted" by the fear that the
United States would undertake a policy unfavorable to France
in Black Africa
'pescribing De Gaulle as "profoundly hurt over US non-
cooperation" in the nuclear field, Debre cited difficulties aris-
ing out of current attempts to amend the French-US bilateral
agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and noted that
De Gaulle considers cooperation on nuclear weapons an integral
part of three=power cooperation
1The premier said De Gaulle himself would never ask his al=
lies for anything but was glad to have Debra make his views known.
Debre stressed, however, that despite differences of opinion, sol-
idarity with the United States on East-West issues is the most
fundamental of De Gaulle's policies.'
Apprnv d For RPIPanp 7007/10/91 ? CID-RfP79TM9750M51007R0001-R
r-r
31 May 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
25X1
Approved For 1W please 2002/10/21 - CIA-RDP79TO0975AO05100260001-6
Cuba Increases Ties With Communist China
The Peiping opera company which is touring Latin America
will spend most of June in Havana. Its visit will highlight a pro
gram which the Castro regime has been planning for several months
emphasizing Cuban-Chinese cultural ties- The newly formed
Cuban-Chinese Friendship Association, headed by pro--Commu-
nist Cubans who have recently visited Peiping, will probably play
a prominent role, and the campaign may be a prelude to the ex-
pected establishment of diplomatic relations between the two coun-
tries.
The New China News Agency-which reports extensively
on Cuban affairs and is believed to contribute financially to the
Chinese--language Communist newspaper in Cuba and to Castro's
Prensa Latina news agency--reported on 26 May that a Cuban
student delegation had been welcomed to Peiping the previous day
At least one other student group, a labor delegation, a number of
Castro officials, and Cuban Communist leaders have also visited
Communist China in recent weeks. Thirty Cuban Communist stu-
dents are attending a six-month training
course in China.,
Peiping has demonstrated particular sympathy for Castro's
revolution, and Cuba seems to be a key target in plans for stepped-
up Chinese Communist propaganda activities in Latin America.
Peiping has probably been encouraged in its effort by recent signs
of increased Cuban willingness to establish diplomatic relations
with bloc countries.
Approve r.1A_RnP7qTQQq 5A005100260001-6
31 May 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Approved For] Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975Af 05100260001-6
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National. Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council.
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Politic a. Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International. Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United' States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United. States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T009754 005100260001-6
Approved For Release"9~10/2'I~ ~1A--RDP79T00975AO05100260001-6
0
0.0
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005100260001-6
TOP SECRET