CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005100280001-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 18, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 2, 1960
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005100280001-4.pdf863.67 KB
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/i ~i ~ i ~ i ~ i ~ is i i iii i i i~ i i ii iiii i i i i i i i i i i ii i i iiiiiiiiii/ / ~- ?~ - Approved For~lease~@l~/2'~6~T00975~A 05100280001-4 / / 25X1 / ~ / / 2 June 1960 1 Copy No. C State Dept. review completed ~~ / @QCtiMt:~T N0. / MO i'dMAtvCe {M tlt.A$$. [~ DI~l;IfiSStFtED 41.AS3. CN~{7GED fi0~ T$ S @ MExT PlkYtlW DATL~ ,_,. ~U ~ ~ .~~~ ~9~ owr~t _.~......,,,,..... r{tvrfiwtt~t Approved For Releas~~~/2~~~~~00975A005100280001-4 ~~~~~~~~~~~i~~~~~~~~~I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~i~~~~/ 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005100280001-4 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005100280001-4 ' Approved For Re Peiping and Moscow make several new economic overtures to Burma following U Nu's return to premiership. Japanese Socialists, in new effort to block ratification of US-J:~.panese treaty, announce decision to resign en masse from Diet lower house. Despite the demonstrations protesting Iihee's departure from South Korea, most politicians and bulk of public there appear to support provisional Huh gov- ernment. Afghan Government reportedly has de- cided to accept large-scalle Soviet aid for Second FYve-Year Plan. Iranian officials, concerned over impact of TY~rkieh coup, reportedly are trying to warn Shah to start political reforms or face possible outbreaks in Iran. 7wrkish foreign minister indicates trials of Menderes regime officials may be held under present provisional govern- ment. ease 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T0097~05100280Q01-4 Approved For R - 5A005100280001-4 ~~~~\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\O\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\0~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\~ ~\ 25X1 ~\ \,~ ..~ .\ \\ 25X1 ~\ \\ ,~\ ~\ ~~ ~\ ~~. :Approved Forlease 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE- BULLETIN 2 June 1960 C)AILY BRIEF ~. THE COMMUNIST BLOC Bu~, r;ma: The- Sino-:soviet bloc has made several eco- nomic .overtures to Burmna since U Nu's recent ireturn to the prex~iiership where. During. the past- month, Peiping has proposed an expansi~~n of trade and aid for small in- dustry, and the USSR. hays offered to help construct. the Burmese portion. of a proposed Southeast Asian road net and to staff the. Soviet-built hospital and technological in- stitute iri Burma. U Nu probably will be more receptive than -the previous Ne Win. government to Communist aid . offerso The Ne. Win- reg~tme did not stop the $12,000,000 worth_o# bloc projects under construction but did cancel, 25 000 000. worth of bloc r IIo ASIA-AFRICA J~o The Sociali~.t party's announced decision to .resign en masse from the lower house- of the. Diet is the opposition's latest; effort: to block ratification of the new US-Japanese. security treaty by forcing, Prime Minister Kishi to dissolve the ps.rliament or resign, Kishi has the constitutional- right to use his party's: sizable majority in the upper house to proceed with ratification of the treaty. His decision. to do so, h~c~wever, .may depend on the extent to which the press and p~~blic opinion support the Socialist demand far dissolution. of the Diet, or :heed Kishi's warn- ing. that a government surrender- to unparl,iamentary leftist pressures would pose a .3erious threat to democracy in Japano Although the Japanese press has recently become increasingly critical of :E~.shi for his handling of the treaty: 25X1 25\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\`\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ ~~ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\`\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\O\\\\\\~\ " _. Approved For? Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T0097 05100280001-4 ~` 25 25X1_ 25X1 issue, it has also shown ,signs of increasing uneasiness over the extreme ositioYi assumed b the leftistse South Korean The initial reactions in South Korea to the flight of brmer? Preside;o-~t Rhee to Hawaii have ranged from simple. expressions of "g~~od riddance" to demonstrations de- manding. the resignation cif the- Huh. Chung government and the recall of US Amba.ssE~,dor McConaughy for permitting him to depart.o .These extremist demands, however, appear limited to a minority of ;~~tudents9 possibly under the influence of demogogues who have appeared since- Rhee's ouster, While thex?e may be further px?c-itest demonstrations, most politicians. and the bulk of the public: appear to decry them and to support the provisional Huh ~ove~?nment and its pr?gram of reformsa Afghanistano The Ai'~;han Government reportedly has de- cided to accept large-scale Soviet aid for its Second Five- Year Plan X1961-66); and plans to send a delegationto Moscow later this month to sign .~, formal agreements Although the Afghan royal family has been wary of excessive Soviet par- icipation in the country';3 economic development, Prime ister Daud probably la.as decided that the need for large, long-term commitments ifor the foreign-exchange components of the plan justifies the x~:isks involvedA Daud has also asked for substantial US aid for the Plano dPage 4) -' ~Irano Some top Iranian officials, alarmed over the possible effects in Iran. oiF .the- Turl~ish coup, are attempt- ing to warn. the Shah. that unless he starts political reforms. .soon, there may be outbreaks directed against him `Activi- ty by political opposition groups, .noted even before- the kish Army?s action, reportedly has since increasedo..he Shah returned to Tehran from Europe on 29 May, a arent- 25X1 25X1 ly .several da s earlier titan reviousl lannedm 2 June 60 25X1 DAILY BRIEF Page ii Approved Fo a ease - 75A005100280001-4 ~\ `~ Approved For,,,F elease 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A0 ~. .,.pn the basis. of f indiungs by its watch. Committee9 the .United States Intelligence Board concludes thato ', No Sinn-.Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hos- tilities against iahe United States or its possessions in the immediate future. Approved Fo Page iii 25X1 ~\ Turkeyo The provisional government has named a com- mittee of magistrates to investigate persons responsible for unconstitutional acts of t;he Menderes regime. Foreign Min- ister Salim ~.rper state; th~.t it was originally planned that trials of for-mar government of#icials would be postponed un- til sfter a new constitutional government comes into over but he naw believes they may be held soonero 25X1 I III, w.~TC1~[ COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS ,B? No Sino-Soviet U~loc country intends deliberately to 25X1 initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, LTS allies, or ar~~eas peripheral to the orbit in the im- mediate future. ~. 'The-following developments are susceptible of direct exploitation by :io~et/Communist hostile action which could jeopardizE> the security of the US in the immedi- ate future? 2 June. 6d DAILY BR.iEF Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975 05100280001-4 Japanese Political Cripois Worsens An announcement that Socialist members of the lower house of the Diet will ~?esign en masse is the latest move by Japanese leftists to force Prime Minister Kishi either to re- sign or to dissolve the Diet and thereby halt ratification of the new US-Japanese security treaty. The. Socialists, how- ever, are delaying the submission. of their resignations until after mass leftist demonstrations scheduled for 4June--which are expected to exceed the turnout of 160,000 persons on 26 May--and are allowing; themselves time to gauge press and public reaction before :a.ctually implementing. their decision. If the. resignations are submitted, Prime Minister Kishi has `twa alternative-s fo:r handling them, other than resigning or dissolving the Diet. The Diet can refuse to accept them and proceed with final :ratification of the treaty in the upper house, whether or not the opposition parties maintain their boycott. of the Diet sessions. A second, less likely, possi- bility .is for I~ishi to cE~.rry out his earlier .threat to hold by- elections for any vaca>.cies created by Socialist resignations, but this would probable~~ be denounced by the press as another of his "dictatorial" tactics. Kishi?s prospects for retaining office following completion of the President's visit are uncer- tain. but appear to be d.i.minishing. Indications are th;a,t ~i.shi will-continue his efforts to com- plete ratification, with or without Socialist participation, by -the time President Ei,;enhower arrives on 19 June. His deci- sion may depend on the. extent to which- the press and public opinion continue to denounce Kishi for- his handling of the se- curity treaty issue or ;bleed his warning that a government sur - render to demonstrations and unparliamentary tactics would constitute a serious threat to democracy in Japano The latter argument is inducing some members of the ruling Liberal-Democ:r?atic party to work somewhat more aggressively for passage of the treaty and to de-emphasize their attacks on lKishi until this is achieved. Approved- ~ or Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975AQ 2 June 60 CENTRAIL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved Fo Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975 005100280001-4 Government offici.a~ls. continue to believe that the present crisis. and demonstrations will subside before the President's arrival. ~sahi Shimbun, Japan's largest and most, influential new paper b eves tiie crisis will not abate, however, and has called on Kilshi to request that the visit be postponed until "a more suitable .time..''' ~ spokesman for iahe radical ~engakuren students' federa.- tion, whose. two princi~~al leaders were arrested on 31 May, has said that the group is withdrawing its threat to stone the Pr-esi~d~nt and to engage in other violent acts, but. he cautioned that aCommunist-dom~:inated faction within. the federation has orders-from Moscow to stake violent demonstrations. Approved Fdr~?~e~ease 2A^Q2~1~2a :ter','," ono~nTnnn~aA005100280001-4 2 June 60 CENTRAIL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975 05100280001-4 South Korean Reaction to Rhee's Flight The initial reactions in South Korea to the flight of former President Rhee to Hawaii on 29 May have ranged from simple expressions of "good riddance". to demonstra- tions demanding. the r~e~signation of the government of acting chief. of state. Huh Chuung and the. recall of American Ambas- sador McConaughy foar. permitting him to departo Extremist demands, however, appear limited to a minority of students, possibly under the influence of demagogues who have appeared since Rhee's oustero Leftist groups seem unlikely to become a major political influence in the near future, although they may eventually emerge as an influential minorityo ~"_ While-there may.'be further protest demonstrations, most politicians and t:kie bulk of the public appear to decry them and to support H~uh's provisional government and its program of reforme .Ambassador McConaughy has noted that the National Asse:~mbly's interpellation of Huh regarding Rhee's departure vvas not hostile and appeared more for the record than to harass Huhn On .31 May antigovernment student demonstrators were dispersed by other student elements, and: a mumber of schools reportedly-have refused to take. part in demonstrations planned for later this weeko Meanwhile, General Paek Son~yop has submitted his resign.atxon as chairmuan.of the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff o This action _ha~~ been expected for some time and follows the ouster of ~~~ther top army leaders tainted by as~ sociation with the Rhee .regimen Althoughthe replacement of othE:r officers appe~irs likely, the government has given strong indication of desiring to control. such changes so that the mi.litary's capabilities are not adversely affectedo 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005100280001-4 2 dune 60 CENTRAII INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 25X1 25X125X1 25X1 25X1 Kall~ul. Reportedly Accepting Soviet Aid for Second Five YearYear flan - _~`~~ K9,b~l has decided. to send a delegation to Moscow on 19 June to sign a formal a.greem~nt on Soviet aid for its Second The new a.ic is apparently expected to cover a major part of the foreign. exchange com}~~onents of the-plan and is likely to be substantial~~Soviet offers of loans ranging from $200, 000, 000 to $300, 000, 000 have. la~een rumored in Kabulo Afghanistan has already received albout $240, 000, 000 in Soviet credits and grants, of which ak~out $8Q, 000, 000 has been drawno '~~.The royal family has been wary of overdependence.on Soviet did--Kabul had earlier asked for substantial US sup port for the plane Priume Minister Daud, who recently re~ turned from afive-week vacation in the USSR, however, has probably decided that taze .need for large scale, long-term commitments for the fcireign exchange components of the plan justifies acceptin?; a new loans In addition he may feel that with the discovery of oil in Afghanistan his government will be better able to repay additional loans and can afford to relax its policy of ac;cepting only grantso Fve~Year Plan (1961=~~66), ~ Approved For ~2elease 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975l~ 2 June tji0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For~2elease 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00979~ i Key Iranian Officials At.tempting~ to Warn Shah to Make ~, _ Political Reforms The S~a)h, who returned to Tehran from Europe an May, app~.rently several days earlier than he previously had planned, now must decide on the degree of freedom to per- mit in the parliamentar~;y elections scheduled for Julyo In a speech: to parliament on his return: he declared, ''Democracy.: is the strongest guarantee of a regime's. perpetuityo" There are no.indications, however, that- he is prepared to relinquish his dominance o ~~ 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 '_Any successful cauga in Iran must have the support or ac- quiescence of a considerable part of the. military forces in Tehrano .Most of the higher ranking officers have vested interests in the status quo, and the- Shah has encouraged the rivalry among am- - bitious officers as a means of enhancing his own power. e con ions iar a coup a emp eve existed .or severe years, .but govern- ment: surveillance a.nd lack of common purpose among opposi- tion .groups have prevented develo ment of an effective. antire- gime movemento Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005100280001-4 2 June BO CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page, 5 25X1 25X1 Approved For elease 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T0097 05100280001-4 Turkish Internal- Situation '1"he new government. of Turkey has established a special camm~ttee to investigate the activities of former. Pre- mi`er 1Vlenateres~ and th~e~ ?members of his regimen If this in~. vestigation reveals eviidence of misdeeds in office, the office cals involved will stand trial and be barred from future polit- `ica:l activity, accordin?; to the present dead of government, General Cenral Gurselo An aide to Gursel has indicated that the? charge against therm would be "acting against the constitu- tion," Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports continue- to circulate in Turkey that the dep~~~sed officials were. plotting to destroy the effEYctive opposition. of dissatisfied elements in the army and universitieso Reports of corruption in the highest levels of the cald regime are also being disseminated. by spokesmen for the new governmentt, ~SeXim Sarper, foreign minister in the new government but a longtime acquaintance. of the highest- ranking rnemb ers of the old regime,. informed the American ambassador in Ankara that he recently visited the military academy where the Demo cratic party leaders are in custody, Menderes, ex-President Bayar, and former Foreign Minister Zorlu reportedly are in good healthe According; to Sarper, the trials of these. men, originally to be postponed until after election of a new govern merit, may be held mu~~.h sooner in order to prevent loss of evidence of misdeeds and to reduce .the excessive nervous strain. c~ni the. accuseda -This decision appears to have followed the- suicide'. of former 1Niinister of Interior Nemik Gedik after he suffered-what the gove:r~nment described as a "nervous break- downa "K Sarper also indicated that there is a division within the cabinet between -moderate and extremist wings, with Sarper among the. formero The moderates will. be encouraged by Repubii.can Feople's pa~:rty (RPP) leader Ismet Inonu's promise during ;a, press conference. on 1 June to take no vindictive meas- ures against the ousted leaderso In case. of .RPP victory in the forthcoming elections, Inonu-would become nremiera ~ D,p~ rnvcrl Fnr Rclcacc 9f1f19/1f1/91 (_IA_RIlP7QTf1f1Q75AM51f1f19Rflflfll_d 2 June li0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 25X1 Approved For,~elease 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975A~05100280001-4 25X1 TYE PRESIDENT The Vice I?resident Executive Offices of. they White house Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Bud3;et Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilisation Director, National .Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board oif Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretar3~, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of Si;;ate The Under Secretary of State Tl~e Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Uncter ~'~~ecretary of State for Palitic:a~ Affairs The Deputy Unc'er I~lecretary of State for Ac?tninistration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Researcr The Del}artrnent of Defense Th.e Secretary of D~e~fense The Deputy Sec.reta.ry of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International. Security Affairs The Secretary of th.~; Army The Secretary of th.f~ Navy The Secretary of tle Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Arzny Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Inte~lii;ence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of ~>~taff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of ~>>taff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Corr-mander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Inve~~itigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Cenci;er The Director Approved~For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00975~005100280001-4 ~' Approved For ReleasT~~2/10/TI ~C~=R~P79T00975A005100280001-4 ~ff /~ !!!!!!r?,,/e ///~,~ ~' ~'~~ Approved For Release 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79 0975A005100280001-4 'TOP SECRE