CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005100330001-8
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 18, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 8, 1960
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005100330001-8.pdf774.74 KB
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Approved For leaseTOR/2SE JT0095,005100330001-8 / 25X1 8 June 1960 2 Copy No. C j ; / /,000 loan 0 M 4 DOCUMENT NO. / / no ?i AGE :ii CLASS / CLAfi.s. CWI' ` ziz; TOl S $ C / / 1100. ALTH. Iii 1; 4 9 JUN 1980 2 / DAM - REVILWEa1 I 25 State Dept. review completed / Approved For Releaselop/21S ECKFET00975AO05100330001-8 / V~r 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100330001-8 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100330001-8 25X1 Approved F rce ease 2002/10/21 :CIA-RDP79T00 5005100330001-8 \ q RE ,04117 with, Turkey to strengthen Ankara's hand in dealing with Moscow. during the Menderes regime for improving Soviet=Turkish relations. Khrushchev has sent a personal letter to General Gursel, presumably urging him to visit the USSR as Menderes had planned to do. Soviet Ambassador Ryzhov on 4 June em- phasized to Foreign Minister Sarper the USSR's willingness to extend economic assistance. In conversation with the US am- bassador on 5 June, Sarper expressed concern over Khru- shchev's recent public Statements and Soviet criticism of Tur= key's announced intention of maintaining its defense. ties with the-West, and he asked, for a public US statement of solidarity \\ 25X1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 8 June 1960 DAILY BRIEF I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC Communist China - USSR: In their dispute with the USSR over tactics toward the US, the Chinese Communists have directly attacked Moscow's justification for its policy as presented in the Soviet disarmament proposals of 2 June. The Peiping People's Daily of 7 June, although it generally supported the Soviet as an effort toward "consol- idating world peace," sitated flatly that. the Chinese cannot jr agree. that war now can be "fundamentally eliminated"--a I` paraphrase of the text of Moscow's proposals. In attacking the Soviet view as an "unpractical illusion about peace," the Chinese leaders are making it clear that they have no inten- 25X1 tion of altering their bitter hostility toward American olic in the Far East. [ *USSR-Turkey Moscow is encouraging the present pro- visional in Ankara to continue the steps begun EMEN smo 25X1 Approved F r f e ease 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79T00 7 005100330001-8 In, provide scholarships for Guinean students. .(Page 3) akry signed a cultural agreement in which the Chinese agreed to Communist China - Guinea: The arrival of at least 40 Chi- nese Communist ?agriculturists" in Guinea to help improve rice cultivation is another step in Peiping's effort to prove its ability and willingness to aid underdeveloped areas. The Chinese, who cannot match the more extensive Western and Soviet financial aid to underdeveloped countries, apparently feel their help in improv- ing food productivity will have considerable impact in Guinea, where rice. is a staple often in short supply. On 3 June, Peiping and Con- able to accomplish ratification as planned, although his prospects IL ASIA=AFRICA Japan: Extreme leftist elements, encouraged by the lack of much a v rse public reaction to the large-scale work stoppages and other demonstrations on 4 June against Prime Minister Kishi and the new. US-Japan security treaty, are planning even larger demonstrations. The leftist campaign, however, has prompted most members of the governing Liberal-Democratic party to sus- pend factional rivalries and rally to Kishi's plan for completing ratification of.the treaty before President Eisenhower's arrival on 19 June. Even if the Socialists go through with their plan to resign en masse from the lower house of the Diet, Kishi probably will be for retaining office for long thereafter remain uncertain, 8 June 60 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 Approved For b75AO05100330001-8 A roved F eI ase 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00 75A005100330001-8 pp 25X1 UAR (S ria): The UAR is seeking private West German financ :ate ing for the Syrian Region's five-year industrialization plan. The head of the Syrian Central Bank, on orders from UAR Vice Pres- ti~\ ident Amir, asked a West German official on 1 June to request German bankers to form a consortium for this purpose. Three successive poor crop years have greatly reduced Syria's ability to finance its share of projects planned for construction under the $150,000,000 Soviet credit granted in 1957 and utilization of the Soviet credit has thus :far been modest. \;\ 25X1 MOM g M MEN MON I 8 June 60 DAILY BRIEF iii MEN 25X1 Approved For (ease 2002/10/21 CIA-RDP79T00 75A005100330001-8 Approved FJ Release 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79T00975A00 100330001-8 Peiping Directly Attacks Justification of Soviet Foreign Policy The Chinese Communists in their dispute with the USSR over tactics toward the United States, have directly attacked Moscow's justification for its policy as presented in the So- viet disarmament proposals of 2 June. An editorial in the Peiping People's Daily on 7 June, while generally supporting the Soviet proposals as an effort toward "consolidating world peace," flatly stated that the Chinese cannot agree that war now can be "fundamentally eliminated"--a. statement taken from the text of Moscow's proposals, In attacking this state- ment as an "unpractical illusion about peace," the Chinese are making it clear that they have no intention of altering their bitter hostility toward American policy in the Far East. The Chinese are also stepping up their criticism of the concept of East-West negotiations as a means of reducing American strength and influence. Peiping's delegate to the World Peace Council meeting in Stockholm stated on 29 May that "if one relies on negotiations alone rather than re- lying mainly on the struggle of the people, then imperialists can never be. compelled to accept negotiations and conclude agreements with us." Regime chairman Liu Shao-chi stated on 3 June that the "imperialists.. . will not accept negotia- tions unless hard pressed by circumstances"- -a line that is consistent with the Chinese position that American hos- tility toward Peiping has not changed despite talks at Pan- munjom, Geneva, and Warsaw. The Chinese are clearly concerned about Khrushchev's apparent desire not to close the door on the possibility of future summit meetings. Since the Paris meeting, Peiping has not commented on any of Khrushchev's remarks on summit negotiations and has endorsed only his 16 May out- burst in Paris. At the same time, it has stepped up its effort to justify hostility toward the United States by citing American "intrusions" into waters and air space claimed by Communist China as "proof " that Peiping is not responsi- ble for tension in the Taiwan Strait. Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100330001-8 8 June 60 CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 05100330001-8 25X1 USSR Urges Closer Relations With New Turkish Regime The USSR is apparently encouraging the provisional Turkish Government to follow through on the steps agreed to by former Premier Menderes to improve Soviet-Turkish relations. Soviet Ambassador Ryzhov, in a talk on 4 June with Foreign Minister Sarper, emphasized Moscow's will- ingness to extend economic assistance. Ryzhov also re- quested a quick response to a letter from Khrushchev to General Gursel which presumably urged the new Turkish leader to carry out the exchange of visits and to conclude economic and cultural agreements with the USSR as pro- jected by the Menderes regime. Menderes had planned to visit the USSR in: July,, and Khrushchev was to have made a return trip at a later date. Moscow's public attitude toward the Gursel government, as shown by Khrushchev's recent statements and Soviet propaganda, has been. characterized by cautious optimism that Soviet-Turkish relations will become as good as they were under Kemal Ataturk in. the 1920s and by warnings of the "danger" to Turkey from. Western bases on its territory. Radio Moscow on 5 June especially criticized Sarper's recent statement that Ankara intends to continue.its NATO and CENTO membership. . L On 6 June Sarper expressed concern to Ambassador Warren over what he termed "Russian pressure" on the Gursel government since the coup. Stressing that he has a free hand in conducting. Turkey's foreign policy and that he would like to hold the line against Moscow, Sarper re- quested that the United States issue a statement of solidari- ty with Turkey in order to strengthen the Gursel regime's hand in coping with Soviet overtures and pressure tactics. Sarper's request was also apparently prompted by his con- cern over maintaining popular support for the provisional government and by the vulnerability of his own position in the interim cabinet. 25X1 25X1 8 June 60 CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved For elease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975 005100330001-8 Chinese Communist Agricultural Aid to Guinea The arrival of Chinese Communist "agriculturists'-' iii Guinea to help improve rice cultivation is another step in Peiping's effort to prove its ability and willingness to aid under- developed areas. About 40 Chinese were seen by a US Em- bassy official in. Conakry on 2 June, and he was. subsequently told they weld be engaged in a rice-growing project. There have been persistent rumors in the Guinean capital that addi- tional Chinese workers have or will come to set up rice and livestock farms near ]Boke, in northwest Guinea. There have been no official announcements from either Peiping or Conakry indicating that Communist China has ex- tended an economic credit or grant to Guinea, but the arriv- al of the Chinese workers suggests some sort of economic cooperation agreement has been reached. The Chinese, who cannot: match the more extensive Western and Soviet finan- cial aid to underdeveloped countries, are taking advantage of the emphasis which Guinea's President Tour4 places on agricultural development and apparently feel their help in improving food productivity in Guinea will have considerable impact. Rice is a Guinean staple often in short supply and the Chinese have used it previously to further political objec- tives. A gift of 5,000 tons was made in 1959 and another of 10,000 tons during the critical food shortage this year. For the most part, however, bloc economic aid to Guinea has emanated from the Soviet Union. Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100330001-8 8 June 60 CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05 00330001-8 140 1 Japanese Leftists Continue Antitreaty Demonstrations Japan's largest postwar demonstrations and work stop- pages were staged on 4 June to protest the new US-Japanese security treaty and Prime Minister Kishi's refusal to re- sign. Although the turnout was smaller than extreme left- ist sponsors had predicted, the relative orderliness of the participants and the lack of adverse public reaction--even to the railway strike, which actually was illegal--have en- couraged the leftists to plan even larger performances. Kishi's argument that a government surrender to vio- lence and illegal tactics would be a serious blow to democracy in Japan has had considerable effect, however. The press, which has been vilifying him, now is showing uneasiness over the leftist attacks. All but a small minority in the ruling Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) have suspended the intraparty move to oust K1shi and are rallying to his plan to complete ratification of the treaty in time for President Eisenhower's arrival on 19 June. Whether or not the Social- ists implement their decision to resign en masse from the lower house of the Diet, passage is expected to be completed as planned. I ishi's prospects for retaining office for long thereafter remain uncertain. Intraparty rivals, tacitly backed by busi- ness-interests who finance the LDP, are certain. to intensify their revolt against him because of his handling of the treaty issue and because he stands in the way.of their aspirations for power. Most informed observers doubt that Kishi will be able to withstand the pressure. Meanwhile, the three major leftist groups--the radical Zengakuren students' federation, the Sohyo labor federation, and the Japanese Communist party--are planning demonstra- tions during the Presidential visit. All three, however, apparently have recognized the overwhelming public opinion in. favor of the trip and have withdrawn threats of violence. Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100330001-8 8 June 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100330001-8 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100330001-8 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05 00330001-8 25X1 Syrian Monetary Situation Becoming Increasingly Critical The cumulative impact of heavy military expenditures and three successive poor crop years, primarily due to drought but also due partly to the land reform program, has resulted in a critical monetary situation in. the Syrian Region of the UAR. The Syrian secretary general of. industry told the US Consulate General a week ago that the government had "not a, penny left." Officials have been. sounding out US will- ingness to provide free wheat, alleging that the Soviet Con- sulate General had made such an offer on 1 June. Little progress has been made on the country's five-year industrialization plan despite a Soviet credit of about $150, - 000,000. Damascus has been unable to finance its share of projects to be built under the Soviet credit, and only a modest amount has been used thus far. The recent visit of Soviet officials attempting to step up construction activity apparent- ly was only partially successful. In an effort to speed imple- mentation. of the industrialization plan, the governor of the Central Bank on orders from UAR Vice President Marshal Amir asked West German officials on 1 June to seek to form a consortium of German bankers to finance the plan. During the first half of May the International Monetary Fund made available 117,500,000 to help ease the Syrian for- eign exchange shortage, but apparently these. funds were quickly committed without appreciable effect. Recent efforts by Syrian officials to conserve foreign exchange and re- strict domestic credits probably will prove ineffective, and the. financial situation is likely to worsen. The institution, of such controls in Syria, however, tends to bring about condi- ?tions which favor closer economic union with Egypt, includ- ing the long-heralded but much-postponed issuance of a sin le UAR currency. Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100330001-8 8 June 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved Fot Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AP THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant :for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of ]Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International. Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved I{ or Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T009T5A005100330001-8 Approved For Release P2T10/2~~1cRDF79T00975A005100330001-8 'r, or X Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005100330001-8 X TOP SECRET /irirrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr.irrrrrrrrrrrii//r////////////////.