CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A005100330001-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 18, 2002
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 8, 1960
Content Type:
REPORT
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8 June 1960
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with, Turkey to strengthen Ankara's hand in dealing with Moscow.
during the Menderes regime for improving Soviet=Turkish
relations. Khrushchev has sent a personal letter to General
Gursel, presumably urging him to visit the USSR as Menderes
had planned to do. Soviet Ambassador Ryzhov on 4 June em-
phasized to Foreign Minister Sarper the USSR's willingness to
extend economic assistance. In conversation with the US am-
bassador on 5 June, Sarper expressed concern over Khru-
shchev's recent public Statements and Soviet criticism of Tur=
key's announced intention of maintaining its defense. ties with
the-West, and he asked, for a public US statement of solidarity
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
8 June 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I, THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Communist China - USSR: In their dispute with the
USSR over tactics toward the US, the Chinese Communists
have directly attacked Moscow's justification for its policy
as presented in the Soviet disarmament proposals of 2 June.
The Peiping People's Daily of 7 June, although it generally
supported the Soviet as an effort toward "consol-
idating world peace," sitated flatly that. the Chinese cannot
jr agree. that war now can be "fundamentally eliminated"--a
I` paraphrase of the text of Moscow's proposals. In attacking
the Soviet view as an "unpractical illusion about peace," the
Chinese leaders are making it clear that they have no inten-
25X1 tion of altering their bitter hostility toward American olic
in the Far East.
[ *USSR-Turkey Moscow is encouraging the present pro-
visional in Ankara to continue the steps begun
EMEN
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provide scholarships for Guinean students.
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akry signed a cultural agreement in which the Chinese agreed to
Communist China - Guinea: The arrival of at least 40 Chi-
nese Communist ?agriculturists" in Guinea to help improve rice
cultivation is another step in Peiping's effort to prove its ability
and willingness to aid underdeveloped areas. The Chinese, who
cannot match the more extensive Western and Soviet financial aid
to underdeveloped countries, apparently feel their help in improv-
ing food productivity will have considerable impact in Guinea, where
rice. is a staple often in short supply. On 3 June, Peiping and Con-
able to accomplish ratification as planned, although his prospects
IL ASIA=AFRICA
Japan: Extreme leftist elements, encouraged by the lack of
much a v rse public reaction to the large-scale work stoppages
and other demonstrations on 4 June against Prime Minister Kishi
and the new. US-Japan security treaty, are planning even larger
demonstrations. The leftist campaign, however, has prompted
most members of the governing Liberal-Democratic party to sus-
pend factional rivalries and rally to Kishi's plan for completing
ratification of.the treaty before President Eisenhower's arrival on
19 June. Even if the Socialists go through with their plan to resign
en masse from the lower house of the Diet, Kishi probably will be
for retaining office for long thereafter remain uncertain,
8 June 60
DAILY BRIEF
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UAR (S ria): The UAR is seeking private West German financ
:ate
ing for the Syrian Region's five-year industrialization plan. The
head of the Syrian Central Bank, on orders from UAR Vice Pres-
ti~\
ident
Amir, asked a West German official on 1 June to request
German bankers to form a consortium for this purpose. Three
successive poor crop years have greatly reduced Syria's ability
to finance its share of projects planned for construction under the
$150,000,000 Soviet credit granted in 1957 and utilization of the
Soviet credit has thus :far been modest.
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8 June 60 DAILY BRIEF iii
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Peiping Directly Attacks Justification of Soviet Foreign Policy
The Chinese Communists in their dispute with the USSR
over tactics toward the United States, have directly attacked
Moscow's justification for its policy as presented in the So-
viet disarmament proposals of 2 June. An editorial in the
Peiping People's Daily on 7 June, while generally supporting
the Soviet proposals as an effort toward "consolidating world
peace," flatly stated that the Chinese cannot agree that war
now can be "fundamentally eliminated"--a. statement taken
from the text of Moscow's proposals, In attacking this state-
ment as an "unpractical illusion about peace," the Chinese
are making it clear that they have no intention of altering
their bitter hostility toward American policy in the Far East.
The Chinese are also stepping up their criticism of the
concept of East-West negotiations as a means of reducing
American strength and influence. Peiping's delegate to the
World Peace Council meeting in Stockholm stated on 29
May that "if one relies on negotiations alone rather than re-
lying mainly on the struggle of the people, then imperialists
can never be. compelled to accept negotiations and conclude
agreements with us." Regime chairman Liu Shao-chi stated
on 3 June that the "imperialists.. . will not accept negotia-
tions unless hard pressed by circumstances"- -a line that
is consistent with the Chinese position that American hos-
tility toward Peiping has not changed despite talks at Pan-
munjom, Geneva, and Warsaw.
The Chinese are clearly concerned about Khrushchev's
apparent desire not to close the door on the possibility of
future summit meetings. Since the Paris meeting, Peiping
has not commented on any of Khrushchev's remarks on
summit negotiations and has endorsed only his 16 May out-
burst in Paris. At the same time, it has stepped up its
effort to justify hostility toward the United States by citing
American "intrusions" into waters and air space claimed
by Communist China as "proof " that Peiping is not responsi-
ble for tension in the Taiwan Strait.
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USSR Urges Closer Relations With New Turkish Regime
The USSR is apparently encouraging the provisional
Turkish Government to follow through on the steps agreed
to by former Premier Menderes to improve Soviet-Turkish
relations. Soviet Ambassador Ryzhov, in a talk on 4 June
with Foreign Minister Sarper, emphasized Moscow's will-
ingness to extend economic assistance. Ryzhov also re-
quested a quick response to a letter from Khrushchev to
General Gursel which presumably urged the new Turkish
leader to carry out the exchange of visits and to conclude
economic and cultural agreements with the USSR as pro-
jected by the Menderes regime. Menderes had planned to
visit the USSR in: July,, and Khrushchev was to have made
a return trip at a later date.
Moscow's public attitude toward the Gursel government,
as shown by Khrushchev's recent statements and Soviet
propaganda, has been. characterized by cautious optimism
that Soviet-Turkish relations will become as good as they
were under Kemal Ataturk in. the 1920s and by warnings of
the "danger" to Turkey from. Western bases on its territory.
Radio Moscow on 5 June especially criticized Sarper's recent
statement that Ankara intends to continue.its NATO and
CENTO membership. .
L On 6 June Sarper expressed concern to Ambassador
Warren over what he termed "Russian pressure" on the
Gursel government since the coup. Stressing that he has
a free hand in conducting. Turkey's foreign policy and that
he would like to hold the line against Moscow, Sarper re-
quested that the United States issue a statement of solidari-
ty with Turkey in order to strengthen the Gursel regime's
hand in coping with Soviet overtures and pressure tactics.
Sarper's request was also apparently prompted by his con-
cern over maintaining popular support for the provisional
government and by the vulnerability of his own position in
the interim cabinet.
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Chinese Communist Agricultural Aid to Guinea
The arrival of Chinese Communist "agriculturists'-' iii
Guinea to help improve rice cultivation is another step in
Peiping's effort to prove its ability and willingness to aid under-
developed areas. About 40 Chinese were seen by a US Em-
bassy official in. Conakry on 2 June, and he was. subsequently
told they weld be engaged in a rice-growing project. There
have been persistent rumors in the Guinean capital that addi-
tional Chinese workers have or will come to set up rice and
livestock farms near ]Boke, in northwest Guinea.
There have been no official announcements from either
Peiping or Conakry indicating that Communist China has ex-
tended an economic credit or grant to Guinea, but the arriv-
al of the Chinese workers suggests some sort of economic
cooperation agreement has been reached. The Chinese, who
cannot: match the more extensive Western and Soviet finan-
cial aid to underdeveloped countries, are taking advantage
of the emphasis which Guinea's President Tour4 places on
agricultural development and apparently feel their help in
improving food productivity in Guinea will have considerable
impact.
Rice is a Guinean staple often in short supply and the
Chinese have used it previously to further political objec-
tives. A gift of 5,000 tons was made in 1959 and another of
10,000 tons during the critical food shortage this year. For
the most part, however, bloc economic aid to Guinea has
emanated from the Soviet Union.
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Japanese Leftists Continue Antitreaty Demonstrations
Japan's largest postwar demonstrations and work stop-
pages were staged on 4 June to protest the new US-Japanese
security treaty and Prime Minister Kishi's refusal to re-
sign. Although the turnout was smaller than extreme left-
ist sponsors had predicted, the relative orderliness of the
participants and the lack of adverse public reaction--even
to the railway strike, which actually was illegal--have en-
couraged the leftists to plan even larger performances.
Kishi's argument that a government surrender to vio-
lence and illegal tactics would be a serious blow to democracy
in Japan has had considerable effect, however. The press,
which has been vilifying him, now is showing uneasiness
over the leftist attacks. All but a small minority in the
ruling Liberal-Democratic party (LDP) have suspended the
intraparty move to oust K1shi and are rallying to his plan
to complete ratification of the treaty in time for President
Eisenhower's arrival on 19 June. Whether or not the Social-
ists implement their decision to resign en masse from the
lower house of the Diet, passage is expected to be completed
as planned.
I ishi's prospects for retaining office for long thereafter
remain uncertain. Intraparty rivals, tacitly backed by busi-
ness-interests who finance the LDP, are certain. to intensify
their revolt against him because of his handling of the treaty
issue and because he stands in the way.of their aspirations
for power. Most informed observers doubt that Kishi will
be able to withstand the pressure.
Meanwhile, the three major leftist groups--the radical
Zengakuren students' federation, the Sohyo labor federation,
and the Japanese Communist party--are planning demonstra-
tions during the Presidential visit. All three, however,
apparently have recognized the overwhelming public opinion
in. favor of the trip and have withdrawn threats of violence.
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Syrian Monetary Situation Becoming Increasingly Critical
The cumulative impact of heavy military expenditures
and three successive poor crop years, primarily due to
drought but also due partly to the land reform program, has
resulted in a critical monetary situation in. the Syrian Region
of the UAR. The Syrian secretary general of. industry told
the US Consulate General a week ago that the government had
"not a, penny left." Officials have been. sounding out US will-
ingness to provide free wheat, alleging that the Soviet Con-
sulate General had made such an offer on 1 June.
Little progress has been made on the country's five-year
industrialization plan despite a Soviet credit of about $150, -
000,000. Damascus has been unable to finance its share of
projects to be built under the Soviet credit, and only a modest
amount has been used thus far. The recent visit of Soviet
officials attempting to step up construction activity apparent-
ly was only partially successful. In an effort to speed imple-
mentation. of the industrialization plan, the governor of the
Central Bank on orders from UAR Vice President Marshal
Amir asked West German officials on 1 June to seek to form
a consortium of German bankers to finance the plan.
During the first half of May the International Monetary
Fund made available 117,500,000 to help ease the Syrian for-
eign exchange shortage, but apparently these. funds were
quickly committed without appreciable effect. Recent efforts
by Syrian officials to conserve foreign exchange and re-
strict domestic credits probably will prove ineffective, and
the. financial situation is likely to worsen. The institution,
of such controls in Syria, however, tends to bring about condi-
?tions which favor closer economic union with Egypt, includ-
ing the long-heralded but much-postponed issuance of a sin le
UAR currency.
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8 June 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant :for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of ]Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International. Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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