CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A005100500001-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 4, 2002
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 28, 1960
Content Type:
REPORT
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CIA-RDP79T00975A005100500001-9.pdf | 710.11 KB |
Body:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
28 June 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: In deciding to break off the disarmament talks at this
time, 1 1 oscow may have calculated that the modified Western
plan, scheduled for presentation this week, would undercut
Soviet attempts to portray the West as opposed to any program
for general disarmament. The Soviet Government may have
been concerned that the Western plan would lead to prolonged
negotiations and make it more difficult to maintain Moscow's
pose as the sole champion of complete and general disarmament
when the issue is debated before the UN this fall.
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Communist China -? USSR.: Despite the opportunities.for private
talks and compromise atbucharest, the exchange of polemics between
Khrushchev and the Chinese Communists has continued. Peiping on
25 June implicitly charged Moscow with exaggerating the destructive-
ness of nuclear war and 'begging imperialism for peace at any cost. "
Khrushchev on the same day declared at a Bucharest reception that
he could be put "in a strait jacket" if he were to advocate a war in
which "half will die and half survive. " However, a newspaper ar-
ticle by a Chinese officiial--broadcast by Peiping on 26 June--gives
what may be a hint of a Chinese Communist effort to lessen the de-
gree of public quarreling. Although the article states that China is
willing to coexist peacefully "even with imperialism, " the line taken
in the article does not represent any substantive change in Peiping's
views but may get increasing propaganda emphasis in order to reduce
Western speculation about Sino-Soviet discord and to allay neutralist
fears of Chinese intentions.
*The foregoing was prepared prior to Moscow's release yester-
day evening of a communique signed at Bucharest by representatives
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Hpprovea ror rtes
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of all the bloc Communilst parties. The communique, reported
as signed on 24 June, reaffirms support for the "Declaration and
Manifesto of Peace" adopted by the bloc parties in November
1957 at the USSR's 40th anniversary celebrations. In recent weeks
Moscow and Peiping have each cited the 1957 Declaration to sup-
port its own position on issues in dispute. To assess the full
significance of this latest development in Sino-Soviet relations will
require further study, and we will comment further on the Bucharest
communi ud and related developments in tomorrow's issue.
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II, ASIA-AFRICA
Lzanzibar: A leftist: trend among Arab and African nation-
alists in the British protectorate of Zanzibar may lead to
demonstrations against US. space-tracking installations under
construction there. Briitish officials report that leftist senti-
ment has been fanned by bloc propaganda in the wake of the
U-2 incident, and that a major demonstration against the US
installations is planned for 10 July. The American Consulate
in Tanganyika reports that Communist China has lately stepped
up propaganda directed to Zanzibar.
UAR-Syria; A bread riot in Damascus on 21 June, quelled by
troops, is the first overt reflection of the widespread discontent
among the Syrian lower classes which has been brought to a focus
by drought and the worsening economic situation and blamed on
Egyptian domination of the country.
antagonism toward Cairo s control among all classes
downerst peasants, army officers, and commercial circles--
has reached a point where general anti-Egyptian demonstrations
could break out,J There is no sign yet, however, of any orzanized
effort to split the UAR.
28 June 60 DAILY BRIEF
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ZMEMS
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CIt. THE WEST
shchev's 30 June - 8 July visit.
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Austria; The government has indicated to the American Em-
bassy that it is considering the purchase of MIG-l7 aircraft from
Poland. The foreign minister implied his approval of the move,
saying he wanted to improve trade and general relations with Po-
land. Defense Minister Graf has said he will defer action until
next fall in an attempt to avoid any apparent connection 'with Khru-
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28 June 60 DAILY BRIEF
iii
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Moscow Breaks Off Disarmament Negotiations
The main factor in Moscow's decision to break off the dis-
armament talks in Geneva before the West could present its
revised proposals may have been the calculation that the West-
ern move would entail prolonged negotiations which would un-
dercut the Soviet effort to portray the West as opposed to any
program \fcr total-disaarrhament3
Soviet tactics since the publication of the 2 June revisions
of Khrushchev's plan have been aimed at establishing a record of
Western opposition. in anticipation of a disarmament debate when
the UN reconvenes this, fall. In the covering letter transmitting
the proposal to the West, Khrushchev established this theme by
asserting that the West was not prepared to implement the plan.
In his closing remarks at Geneva, Soviet delegate Z orin declared
that the Western powers had refused to work. out a disarmament
program and had reduced the negotiations to an "arid discussion
of controls'
While Soviet statements and actions had clearly foreshadowed
an eventual breakoff in the negotiations, the timing of the move
also reflects increased Soviet readiness to adopt a more negative
attitude on specific issues following the collapse of the summit
and to accept probable adverse free-world reactions.
In a conversation with the chief American delegate to
the nuclear test talks, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin expressed "ex-
treme skepticism" as to US intentions to conclude a test ban agree-
ment. He is apparently under instructions to table proposals on
each outstanding issue, probably as a prelude to insisting that the
West commit itself on the duration of the moratorium on small
underground tests or agree to a long recess. Tsarapkin created
the impression that the Soviet Government has strong doubts that
anything will be accomplished until a new administration takes
office in Washington--"and possibly not even then"
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rj Leftist Agitation in Zanzibar
A leftist trend among Arab and African nationalists in
the British protectorate of Zanzibar may lead to demonstra-
tions against US space-tracking installations under construc-
tion there. British officials report that leftist sentiment has
been fanned by bloc propaganda since the U-2 incident, and
that a major demonstration against the US installations is
planned for 10 July. The Zanzibar Nationalist party (ZNP)--
the leading party among Zanzibar's population of. 300, 000--
held public meetings in mid-June to protest the agreement
which permitted the construction of tracking stations there.-I
The anti -US manifestations coincided with evidence of
increased Chinese Communist activity in the protectorate.
The American. Consulate in Tanganyika observed on 17 June
that Peiping was sending "considerable" propaganda material
to Zanzibar, and that its broadcasts emphasized the "military
dangers" to Africa of "bases" such as the US tracking stations.
Peiping has also sponsored trips to China for at least 15
Zanzibar Arabs.
.Although the ZNP leadership is Communist inclined, its
campaign against the,bases reflects in part the stresses of
the. local political scene. AUK commission has responded
to recent nationalist agitation with a series of proposals de-
signed to make Zanzibar, like Singapore, internally self-gov-
erning. The current agitation appears directed in part by a
desire to manufacture issues for elections expected to be
held in the fall.
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Syrian Resentment of '[JAR Near Danger Point
A :riot in Damascus on 21 June protesting the lack of cheap
'bread is the first overt; reflection of widespread discontent among
the Syrian lower classes which has been brought to a focus by
drought and the worsening economic situation and blamed on Egyp-
tian domination. One person was killed when troops were called
in, and suppression of any mention of the incident in the press has
resulted in exaggerated rumors which are spreading rapidly. There
were open complaints (luring the incident concerning the money be-
ing spent on Nasir's political organization, the National Union, at
a time when Syria is suffering from a serious wheat shortage.
I antagonism toward Cairo's con-
trol exists among all classes of the Syrian populace--landowners,
peasants, the army, commercial and white-collar classes, Com-
munists, and anti-Communists--and that it has reached the point
where anti= Egyptian rioting could easily break out. While there is
considerable resentment over Egyptian domination in the adminis-
tration and army as such, much of the present unrest stems from
the poor economic conditions that followed the Syrian-Egyptian un-
ion to form the UAR in 1958. Crop failures, import restrictions,
the threat of nationalization, and the lack of foreign exchange have
all contributed to the alienation of every major section of Syrian
society.
Suppression of anti=Egyptian, demonstrations by Cairo-controlled
security forces could lead to a general strike throughout Syria--sev-
eral of which in the past have paralyzed nearly all. activity--and per-
haps the assassination of a prominent UAR or pro-UAR figure such
as Vice President Marshal Amir or the much=hated Minister of
Interior Sarraj. It is doubtful that there is any group or party in
Syria with the strength and organization to overthrow the Nasir re-
gime there. However, although the Egyptians control the. armed
forces, it is questionable whether Syrian troops would obey the
orders of Egyptian or ippro.-Egyptian officers to fire on Syrian crowds,
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Austria Considers Purchase of MIG-17 Aircraft From Poland
Defense Minister Graf has indicated to the US Embassy
in Vienna that he is considering the purchase of MIG-17 air-
craft from Poland. Foreign Minister Kreisky and Trade Min-
ister flock are reported as supporting this project out of . a -
desire to improve trade and general relations with Poland.
Graf, however, has said he will make no move until fall in
an attempt to avoid giving the appearance of a connection be-
tween the purchase and 1 rushchev?s visit, 30 June - 8 July.
Austria, which likes to make occasional gestures in sup-
port of its professed neutrality under the 1955 state treaty,
has in the past obtained some military equipment from the
bloc - -notably tanks from the USSR and light training aircraft
from Czechoslovakia. The Austrian Air Force, with 80 air-
craft, has practically no combat capability. Poland has sold
MIG-17s .to Indonesia, Iraq, and the UAR.
There is -a widespread belief within the Austrian business
community and in highest government circles that bloc trade
could be increased to 20-25 percent of total trade without sub-
jecting Austria to serious blocpressure or endangering its
independence. In 1959 bloc trade constituted about 11.5 per-
cent of total Austrian imports and 14.8 percent of total ex-
ports, and Austrians hope to increase this substantially in
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive. Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United .States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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