CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005100500001-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 4, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 28, 1960
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005100500001-9.pdf710.11 KB
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- ~l Approved F elease'F OP/25j 16?~TOO A005100500001-9 `- / / 25X1 / 28 June 1960 / 2 N Copy No. C DOCUMENT NO. __._J Q NQ W.4GI IN CLASS. FI LLCLAS5iNEB Gt*,c"s. P,9E;,UCLU TO., TS S C 'Ii_XT R-VLW GATT. AL1'FN 7i~ 2 ? JUN 1980 DATE2 REVIEWERI State Dept. review completed Approved For Releas /2 00975A005100500001-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100500001-9 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100500001-9 \\ zzzz zzzzzz~ Approved F 1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 28 June 1960 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR: In deciding to break off the disarmament talks at this time, 1 1 oscow may have calculated that the modified Western plan, scheduled for presentation this week, would undercut Soviet attempts to portray the West as opposed to any program for general disarmament. The Soviet Government may have been concerned that the Western plan would lead to prolonged negotiations and make it more difficult to maintain Moscow's pose as the sole champion of complete and general disarmament when the issue is debated before the UN this fall. 25X1 Communist China -? USSR.: Despite the opportunities.for private talks and compromise atbucharest, the exchange of polemics between Khrushchev and the Chinese Communists has continued. Peiping on 25 June implicitly charged Moscow with exaggerating the destructive- ness of nuclear war and 'begging imperialism for peace at any cost. " Khrushchev on the same day declared at a Bucharest reception that he could be put "in a strait jacket" if he were to advocate a war in which "half will die and half survive. " However, a newspaper ar- ticle by a Chinese officiial--broadcast by Peiping on 26 June--gives what may be a hint of a Chinese Communist effort to lessen the de- gree of public quarreling. Although the article states that China is willing to coexist peacefully "even with imperialism, " the line taken in the article does not represent any substantive change in Peiping's views but may get increasing propaganda emphasis in order to reduce Western speculation about Sino-Soviet discord and to allay neutralist fears of Chinese intentions. *The foregoing was prepared prior to Moscow's release yester- day evening of a communique signed at Bucharest by representatives Approved For Rele se 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975 005100500001-9 2 25 "S `N\\\\\\\ "M \\1"\`M ME 25X1 25X1 25X1 25L Hpprovea ror rtes Approved F of all the bloc Communilst parties. The communique, reported as signed on 24 June, reaffirms support for the "Declaration and Manifesto of Peace" adopted by the bloc parties in November 1957 at the USSR's 40th anniversary celebrations. In recent weeks Moscow and Peiping have each cited the 1957 Declaration to sup- port its own position on issues in dispute. To assess the full significance of this latest development in Sino-Soviet relations will require further study, and we will comment further on the Bucharest communi ud and related developments in tomorrow's issue. 25X1\ II, ASIA-AFRICA Lzanzibar: A leftist: trend among Arab and African nation- alists in the British protectorate of Zanzibar may lead to demonstrations against US. space-tracking installations under construction there. Briitish officials report that leftist senti- ment has been fanned by bloc propaganda in the wake of the U-2 incident, and that a major demonstration against the US installations is planned for 10 July. The American Consulate in Tanganyika reports that Communist China has lately stepped up propaganda directed to Zanzibar. UAR-Syria; A bread riot in Damascus on 21 June, quelled by troops, is the first overt reflection of the widespread discontent among the Syrian lower classes which has been brought to a focus by drought and the worsening economic situation and blamed on Egyptian domination of the country. antagonism toward Cairo s control among all classes downerst peasants, army officers, and commercial circles-- has reached a point where general anti-Egyptian demonstrations could break out,J There is no sign yet, however, of any orzanized effort to split the UAR. 28 June 60 DAILY BRIEF 5A005100500001-9 2 1111ORMOMMON 005 0050000 9 Approved F ZMEMS Q4 CIt. THE WEST shchev's 30 June - 8 July visit. P; . . . 25X6 Austria; The government has indicated to the American Em- bassy that it is considering the purchase of MIG-l7 aircraft from Poland. The foreign minister implied his approval of the move, saying he wanted to improve trade and general relations with Po- land. Defense Minister Graf has said he will defer action until next fall in an attempt to avoid any apparent connection 'with Khru- 25X1 28 June 60 DAILY BRIEF iii Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975 005100500001-9 2 M ME Approved F Moscow Breaks Off Disarmament Negotiations The main factor in Moscow's decision to break off the dis- armament talks in Geneva before the West could present its revised proposals may have been the calculation that the West- ern move would entail prolonged negotiations which would un- dercut the Soviet effort to portray the West as opposed to any program \fcr total-disaarrhament3 Soviet tactics since the publication of the 2 June revisions of Khrushchev's plan have been aimed at establishing a record of Western opposition. in anticipation of a disarmament debate when the UN reconvenes this, fall. In the covering letter transmitting the proposal to the West, Khrushchev established this theme by asserting that the West was not prepared to implement the plan. In his closing remarks at Geneva, Soviet delegate Z orin declared that the Western powers had refused to work. out a disarmament program and had reduced the negotiations to an "arid discussion of controls' While Soviet statements and actions had clearly foreshadowed an eventual breakoff in the negotiations, the timing of the move also reflects increased Soviet readiness to adopt a more negative attitude on specific issues following the collapse of the summit and to accept probable adverse free-world reactions. In a conversation with the chief American delegate to the nuclear test talks, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin expressed "ex- treme skepticism" as to US intentions to conclude a test ban agree- ment. He is apparently under instructions to table proposals on each outstanding issue, probably as a prelude to insisting that the West commit itself on the duration of the moratorium on small underground tests or agree to a long recess. Tsarapkin created the impression that the Soviet Government has strong doubts that anything will be accomplished until a new administration takes office in Washington--"and possibly not even then" 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100500001-9 .28 June 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975 005100500001-9 rj Leftist Agitation in Zanzibar A leftist trend among Arab and African nationalists in the British protectorate of Zanzibar may lead to demonstra- tions against US space-tracking installations under construc- tion there. British officials report that leftist sentiment has been fanned by bloc propaganda since the U-2 incident, and that a major demonstration against the US installations is planned for 10 July. The Zanzibar Nationalist party (ZNP)-- the leading party among Zanzibar's population of. 300, 000-- held public meetings in mid-June to protest the agreement which permitted the construction of tracking stations there.-I The anti -US manifestations coincided with evidence of increased Chinese Communist activity in the protectorate. The American. Consulate in Tanganyika observed on 17 June that Peiping was sending "considerable" propaganda material to Zanzibar, and that its broadcasts emphasized the "military dangers" to Africa of "bases" such as the US tracking stations. Peiping has also sponsored trips to China for at least 15 Zanzibar Arabs. .Although the ZNP leadership is Communist inclined, its campaign against the,bases reflects in part the stresses of the. local political scene. AUK commission has responded to recent nationalist agitation with a series of proposals de- signed to make Zanzibar, like Singapore, internally self-gov- erning. The current agitation appears directed in part by a desire to manufacture issues for elections expected to be held in the fall. Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100500001-9 28 June 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved Four F[elease 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79T00975Ap05100500001-9 Syrian Resentment of '[JAR Near Danger Point A :riot in Damascus on 21 June protesting the lack of cheap 'bread is the first overt; reflection of widespread discontent among the Syrian lower classes which has been brought to a focus by drought and the worsening economic situation and blamed on Egyp- tian domination. One person was killed when troops were called in, and suppression of any mention of the incident in the press has resulted in exaggerated rumors which are spreading rapidly. There were open complaints (luring the incident concerning the money be- ing spent on Nasir's political organization, the National Union, at a time when Syria is suffering from a serious wheat shortage. I antagonism toward Cairo's con- trol exists among all classes of the Syrian populace--landowners, peasants, the army, commercial and white-collar classes, Com- munists, and anti-Communists--and that it has reached the point where anti= Egyptian rioting could easily break out. While there is considerable resentment over Egyptian domination in the adminis- tration and army as such, much of the present unrest stems from the poor economic conditions that followed the Syrian-Egyptian un- ion to form the UAR in 1958. Crop failures, import restrictions, the threat of nationalization, and the lack of foreign exchange have all contributed to the alienation of every major section of Syrian society. Suppression of anti=Egyptian, demonstrations by Cairo-controlled security forces could lead to a general strike throughout Syria--sev- eral of which in the past have paralyzed nearly all. activity--and per- haps the assassination of a prominent UAR or pro-UAR figure such as Vice President Marshal Amir or the much=hated Minister of Interior Sarraj. It is doubtful that there is any group or party in Syria with the strength and organization to overthrow the Nasir re- gime there. However, although the Egyptians control the. armed forces, it is questionable whether Syrian troops would obey the orders of Egyptian or ippro.-Egyptian officers to fire on Syrian crowds, 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100500001-9 28 June 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100500001-9 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100500001-9 Approved F elease 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP79T00975 005100500001-9 25X1 Austria Considers Purchase of MIG-17 Aircraft From Poland Defense Minister Graf has indicated to the US Embassy in Vienna that he is considering the purchase of MIG-17 air- craft from Poland. Foreign Minister Kreisky and Trade Min- ister flock are reported as supporting this project out of . a - desire to improve trade and general relations with Poland. Graf, however, has said he will make no move until fall in an attempt to avoid giving the appearance of a connection be- tween the purchase and 1 rushchev?s visit, 30 June - 8 July. Austria, which likes to make occasional gestures in sup- port of its professed neutrality under the 1955 state treaty, has in the past obtained some military equipment from the bloc - -notably tanks from the USSR and light training aircraft from Czechoslovakia. The Austrian Air Force, with 80 air- craft, has practically no combat capability. Poland has sold MIG-17s .to Indonesia, Iraq, and the UAR. There is -a widespread belief within the Austrian business community and in highest government circles that bloc trade could be increased to 20-25 percent of total trade without sub- jecting Austria to serious blocpressure or endangering its independence. In 1959 bloc trade constituted about 11.5 per- cent of total Austrian imports and 14.8 percent of total ex- ports, and Austrians hope to increase this substantially in Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05100500001-9 28 June 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 25X1 y h ? Approved F r - 05100500001-9 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive. Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United .States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved F4 25X1 T,?~~p?~~kC ~~RET ~ ~ ? ~ ~ ~ ~ ... _ _ _ _ _ .. 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