CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005200170001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 20, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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20 July 1960
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AUTIh HR 16.2
9 JUN 1980
State Dept. review completed
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Republic of the Congo. Premier Lumumba continues to
stim ate anti-Be gia sentiment, apparently in order to bol-
ster his position. While the situation in Leopoldville Province
appears to be easing, rising unemployment -now totaling
75,000---poses the threat of riots. Moroccan UN troops have
taken over the port of Matadi, and Belgium has agreed to pull
its troops out of the Leopoldville area. and return them to the
two Belgian bases in the Congo between. 20 and 23 July. At the
same time, in the northeastern Congo the situation continues
tense. jThere are likely to be serious international repercus-
sions if Brussels carries out its apparent intention to recognize
Katanga's secession.. Belgium has previously declared its oppo-
sition to formal recognition, but industrial groups and right-wing
ministers reportedly have ~bt?.eu ht increasin ressure on the
government.
Iraq: Exports of Iraqi oil.through the Persian Gulf may be
virtually halted on 213 July unless Prime Minister Qasim revokes
a Council of Ministers' decree drastically raising oil loading
charges beginning that day. The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC)
considers these charges illegal, and most companies within the
IPC group will refuse to pay. The company, anticipating a shut-
down, already has reduced production in Iraq's southern fields by
.40 percent. These fields account for more than 30 percent of the
country's total oil exports. Last year the southern fields produced
about $:70 million in revenues for Iraq.
III. THE WEST
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Cuba: Fidel Castro's 18 July speech lashing out against "coun-
errevo utionary activities" by "Falangist" priests indicates the
e rime's concern over growing church opposition to Cuba's increas-,
g Communist ties, The church hierarchy has thus far. vacillated
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in its public attitude toward the Castro government, but its
stand will probably be hardened by the spontaneous anti-
.Communist, demonstrations of churchgoers on 17 and 18 July.
LUS Ambassador Bonsai. feels that Soviet Premier Khru-
shchev's 9 July statement of support for Cuba has been a
serious blow to the Castro regime in that, by clarifying any
doubt regarding the Communist orientation of the government,
It has put Castro on the defensive.
(Page 4) 1 . ::1
West Germany:: Defense Minister Strauss has indicated
to th-eXm-erican Embassy in Bonn that he is '.'dubious" regard-
ing the- wisdom of ChancellorAdenauer's position that the fed-
eral government must avoid taking any action in Berlin "which
would create difficulties for our allies:' Strauss feels that if
.the Bundestag session is not held in Berlin this fall, it probably
would not ever. be held there again. Another party official ex-
plained Adenauer's position on the ground that any action, whether
It had precedent or was something new, which would serve as a
pretext for a separate treaty between the USSR and East Germany
must be avoided. He said it was assumed that the US would not
wish to be put in the kind of difficult situation which would result
from a separate treaty touched off by holding a Bundestag meet-
Ing In Berlin.
20 July 60
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The Situation in the Congo.
The situation in Leopoldville Province has eased for the
moment as UN. troops have taken over responsibility fore local
security from Belgian forces. The presence of around 75,000
unemployed in the area constitutes an element of instability,
however, particularly in the event of a serious food shortage.
Since many Belgians have left the area, for good, prospects for
the near future appear to include a 'major economic dislocation.
In the interior, major disorders continue. The American
,Consulate in Uganda has characterized. the situation in the
Congo's Kivu Province as tense, and that in Orientale Prov-
ince as having "deteriorated seriously." Force Publique units
in Orientale Province are said to be no longer responsive even
to their. chosen African "officers."
Premier Lumumba. continues to associate himself with the
anti-Belgian and.antiwhite sentiment fostered by the Force Pub-
.lique rebellion, but he appears unable to direct or control it.
Although Lumumba has been balked by the Congo Senate in his
threat to request Soviet intervention, Brussels' agreement to
withdraw Belgian troops to their Congo bases by 23 July may
bolster his prestige internally. It appears likely that Lumumba
expects the UN occupation to provide him with a period in which
to consolidate his tenuous hold. on. the Congo's governmental
machinery. He may view Soviet technical assistance as an
eventual substitute for Belgian technical and financial support.
here are indications that Brussels may shortly recognize
the independence of Katanga, which has declared itself independ-
ent of the Congo. Such a move would be condemned by the Com-
munist bloc and by most of the independent Asian and African
states as a move to establish a Belgian puppet state; it might,
however, lead to similar recognition by Portugal and France:`i
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Partial Shutdown of Iraq's Oil Production Impending
Exports of Iraqi oil through the Persian Gulf may be vir-
tually halted on 23 July when the Basra Port Administration
attempts to collect port dues 13 times the previous rate. Iraqi
officials have been ordered to forbid tankers to depart unless
the increased dues are paid.
.Although Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) officials are at-
tempting to see Prime Minister. Qasim in an effort to persuade
him to revoke the Council of Ministers' decree, they believe there
is almost no chance of a settlement before the 23 July deadline.]
Since 1951, IPC has been paying port dues equivalent to 6.5
cents per ton of petroleum exported. from Iraq's southern oil
fields. In December 1959, however, the Basra Port Adminis-
tration,. an autonomous body with authority to set its own charges,
increased cargo dues to about 78 cents per ton. The port ad-
ministration's actions were subsequently approved by the Coun-
cil of Ministers. IPC has' refused to pay, pointing out that the
increase violated existing agreements. Implementation was post-
poned until 23 July, but the charges are retroactive to last Sep-
tember. At the normal rate of production, these port charges
would add more than $9,000,000 annually to the cost of IPC crude
exported from the Persian Gulf,
The company, anticipating a shutdown, already has reduced
production in Iraq's southern fields by 40 percent. These fields
account for more than 30 percent of the country's total oil exports.
Last year the southern fields produced about $70,000.000
revenues for Iraq.
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Friction Between Church and Castro Regime Increasing
In his television speech of 18 July, Premier Fidel Castro
denounced the "counterrevolutionary activities" of "Falangist"
priests whom he accused of being responsible for the, spon-
taneous anti-Communist demonstrations by Havana churchgo-
ers on 17 and 18 July. Castro said that "the. reactionary clergy
has not been, bothered" by his regime and declared that "the
people must not permit themselves to be dragged into the game"
by counterrevolutionary demonstrators. The charges of the
Cuban leader, who interrupted his convalescence to deliver the
blast, indicate the regime's concern with increasing evidences
of church opposition to the government's growing economic and
political ties with the Communist world. (`US Ambassador Bonsai
feels that Soviet Premier Khrushchev's 9 July statement of sup-
port for Cuba has been a serious blow to the Castro regime in
that, by clarifying any doubt regarding the Communist orienta-
tion of the government, it has put Castro on the defensive`s
Despite the publication last May of a strongly anti-Commu-
nist pastoral letter by the archbishop of Santiago de Cuba, most
church authorities have hesitated to take a firm public stand
against Castro or his policies. Church officials.previously have
admitted that.they have only limited influence with the Cuban peo-
ple and that, unless careful preparations were made, most Cubans
would support Castro in the event of a showdown between him and
the church. Divergent attitudes toward Castro by the large number
of Spanish-born. priests in Cuba and the native Cuban clergy may
also hinder church unity on the .question.
The Catholic hierarchy's determination to oppose the Castro
regime openly may be hardened. by the government's use of force
in suppressing the. anti- Communist demonstrations on 1.7 and 18
July. According to Ambassador Bonsai, the incidents have cre-
ated a tenser atmosphere within influential Catholic lay circles,
and serious repercussions MY develop. F_ I 25X1
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Adenauer Opposes Berlin Bundestag Session
West German ;Defense Minister Strauss has indicated to
American officials in Bonn that he is "dubious" regarding the
wisdom of Chancellor Adenauer's position. that the federal gov-
ernment must avoid taking. any action in Berlin "which would
create difficulties for our allies." Strauss feels that. if the
Bundestag session is not held in Berlin this fall, it probably
will never be held there again. He added that this would con-
cede Khrushchev a considerable victory by allowing him to dic-
tate what the West should permit to occur in West Berlin.
The press officer of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
Bundestag faction explained Adenauer's position on the ground
that any action-whether it had precedent or was something new--
which would serve as a pretext for a separate treaty between the
USSR and East Germany must be avoided. . The CDU spokesman
said it was assumed that the United States would not wish to be
put in the kind of difficult situation which would result from a sep-
arate treaty touched off by holding a Bundestag meeting in Berlin.
The position of the Bonn government was indicated in an article
in the 15 July issue of an unofficial CDU publication written by All-
German Affairs Minister Ernst Lemmer. Lemmer, the only West
Berliner in the Bonn cabinet, maintained that despite the clear
right.of the Bundestag:to meet in Berlin, the government "should
avoid placing the powers guaranteeing Berlin's security in a po-
sition-which public opinion in those countries might not support to
the last consequences!'
Bonn's position is certain to aggravate the political controversy
between the chancellor and West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt, who
is the chancellor candidate of the opposition Social Democratic
party. Brandt sent a letter to Adenauer on 13 July maintaining
that Allied and Federal Republic rights in Berlin should not be aban-
doned or limited in the face of intensified Soviet threats. He as-
serted that cancellation of the Bundestag session would seriously
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research.
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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