CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005200200001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 23, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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23 July 1960
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
.23 July 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Iran: In a 19 July note apparently more friendly than
threw en ng, rushchev reiterated to the Shah the. Soviet posi-
tion that Iran must agree to ban all. foreign bases and troops be-
fore relations can be improved; in addition he offered economic
aid. The Shah is considering giving formal assurances to the So-
viet. Union that..;iran ?will.not be used as a base for reconnaissance
flights over the Soviet Union and that he will not allow foreign
missile bases in the country. The Shah is under heavy pressure
from neutralist-minded Iranian politicians as well as constant
Soviet propaganda and may feel he must make some gesture to
ease his position.
(Page 1)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
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a marauding Force Publique band numbering 250.
in forcing a total evacuation. Continued tension in the Congo in-
terior, where Ethiopian units of the UN force have failed to pro-
tect Belgian nationals, suggests that the Belgians will move slowly
in yielding their security functions. In Katanga, Belgian aircraft
have attacked--presumably with the knowledge of Premier Tshombe--
Republic of the Congo:. Premier Lumumba's apparent satis-
faction with the resolution calling for the "speedy" withdrawal
of Belgian troops in the Congo appears based on an assumption
that the UN will also force Belgium to evacuate its bases In the
Congo, including those in Katanga. Should Belgian forces carry
out their stated intention of withdrawing only to their bases, the
volatile Lumumba will probably request UN and possibly Soviet aid
(Page. 2)
 Hpproveu ro iea9e LUULI'iuici : L.uw-r(Ur( i )U ( UUOLUULUUUU'i -i
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. As a result of un-
rest in the Congo, the government of the white-dominated Fed-
eration of Rhodesia and Nyasaland .is increasingly concerned
over the possible intensification of African nationalism within
the Federation. A number of African nationalists have been ar-
rested by Southern Rhodesian authorities, processions in Sal-
isbury have been banned for three months, and federal, army
and police reserves have been. called up. African strikes and
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ing brought under control, may lead the Southern Rhodesian
and federal governments to clamp down even further. Activi-
ties of hitherto moderate African leaders reflect disillusionment
with the multiracial approach and may lead them to shift to a
more radical approach along racial lines.
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`\ Morocco-France: The Moroccan Government has categor-
ically rejected Frances offer to evacuate French bases in Morocco
INS
by the end of 1964 and insists on the end of 1962 as the terminal
date, according to :French Ambassador Parodi in Rabat. Prodded
by increasingly sharp criticism of foreign bases by both the right-
ist and leftist press, the King and crown prince are likely to inten--
sift' efforts to bolster the prestige of their government by obtain-
ing commitments from both France and the United States to -
draw forces b the end of 19
25
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23July60
DAILY BRIEF
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III. THE WEST
Britain-Iceland: Britain is making a new attempt to get Ice-
land to enter negotiations on the dispute over Iceland's 12-mile
fishing limit. Feeling in Iceland has been aggravated by several
violations in late June and early July of the British Trawlers'
Federation three-month.ban on. fishing inside this limit. A mem-
ber of the Icelandic cabinet earlier privately stated that Iceland
would leave NATO if British naval vessels return to the disputed
waters after the truce expires on 13 August. London is skeptical
how long British trawler skippers can be restrained from enter-
ing disputed waters without some progress toward negotiation.
23 July 60 DAILY BRIEF iii.
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IMMEM,
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 Approved Fo
Soviet Note to Iran
Khrushchev . has taken.. a new tack to resolve the impasse
in Soviet-Iranian relations over Tehran's defense arrangements
with the United States. On 19 July he sent a note--which was
apparently "more friendly than threatening"- -to the Shah reiterat-
ing Moscow's position that Iran must agree to ban all foreign bases
and troops before "normal" relations between the two countries
can be restored.
Khrushchev suggested that this could be achieved by an ex-
change of assurances between. Iran and, the USSR that no third
country would be allowed to use, construct, or maintain mili-
tary bases or to station armed forces on the territory of either
party. Such an agreement, he said,would result in Soviet assist-
ance, including joint: economic projects, and probably increased
aid from the United States as well. He has previously indicated
that the USSR has no objection if Iran--like Afghanistan--takes
aid from both sides. e
'The Shah is considering giving formal guarantees to the
Soviet Union that Iran will not be used as a base for reconnais-
sance flights over the Soviet Union and that he will not allow
foreign missile bases in the country, according to Foreign Min-
ister Abbas Aram. The Shah has already made both of these
pledges publicly at various times. If the Shah's reply is as
limited as indicated by Aram, it will probably be unacceptable
to the USSR.
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:'.Despite heavy pressure from neutralist-minded Iranian
politicians .and constant Soviet propaganda and attempts to in-
fluence opposition leaders, it seems unlikely that the Shah will
take any steps which would seriously jeopardize his standing
with the West, but he may feel he must make some gesture
to ease his position.
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.Lumumba Seeking Complete Belgian Withdrawal From Congo
Premier Lumumba's apparent satisfaction with the UN reso-
lution calling for the "speedy" withdrawal of Belgiantroops in
the Congo appears based on an assumption, that the UN will also
force Belgium to evacuate its Congo bases and withdraw from
the "independent" province of Katanga. Brussels, however, con-
tinues to oppose ?sending any UN troops to Katanga, where Bel= gian forces are stationed with the approval of Premier Tshombe.
In addition, Belgian Premier Eyskens reiterated on. 22 July that
Belgium's occupation of its Congo bases "is guaranteed and . author-
ized by treaty:' The treaty in question, although initialed on 29
June, has not been ratified by either. country.
Should Belgian forces carry out their stated intention of with-
drawing only to their bases, the mercurial Lumumba will prob-
ably request UN and possibly Soviet aid in forcing a total evacu-
ation. Lumumba's departure. for New York on 22 July to address
the UN was reportedly prompted by his desire to spell out his
charges of Belgian aggression in the Congo in a world forum.
Tension continues high in the Congo interior. At Stanleyville,
Ethiopian units of the UN force have refused to protect Belgian na-
tionals and re
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ave joined in s ddtia
omeepreaons. In K-
tanga, Belgian aircraft and troops have attacked-presumably with
the knowledge of Premier Tshombe--a marauding Force Publique
band numbering about 250. In view of the continuing clashes,
Brussels can be expected to move slowly in yielding responsibil-
ity for internal security. Belgian Foreign Minister. Wigny stated
on 21 July--prior to the UN resolution--that Brussel
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sider order reestablished only after disorders had ceased and
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j Rhodesian Government Fears Spread of Congo Unrest `
(As a result of unrest in the Congo, the government of the white-
dominated Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is increasingly
concerned over the possible intensification of African nationalism
in the Federation. In an apparent effort to head off increased na-
tionalist activity, authorities in Southern Rhodesia arrested three
leaders of the principal African political party in Salisbury on 19
July. When Africans organized protest demonstrations on 20 July-
including a general strike which was 70 percent effective and an at-
tempt by more than 2,000 Africans to march to the center of town--
the Southern Rhodesian Government arrested several other leading
Africans and banned all processions in the area for three months.
Despite the mobilization of army and police reserves, the unrest
continued through 2]L July. On 22 July Prime Minister Whitehead
stated that 181 Africans had been arrested.
'-Whites in the Federation have watched the African take-over
of the Congo with growing apprehension. The obvious sympathy of
most African nationalists with the Lumumba government, coupled
with the fear that Africans in the Federation may draw moral and
material support from Congolese sources, may lead the Europeans
to increase the stringency of the controls over African political ac-
tivities. Southern Rhodesia, where 220,000 of the 300,000 whites
are concentrated, is likely to take the lead in the clamp-down, which
may be further intensified as a result demonstrations
in Salisbury.
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Moroccan- French Negotiations Stalled on Evacuation Issue I?
The negotiation of outstanding Moroccan- French problems,
which was resumed in June after the installation of the King's
government, is again stalled on the issue of the evacuation of
French forces. The Moroccan Government, according to French
Ambassador Parodi in Rabat, has categorically rejected France's
offer to evacuate all French bases in Morocco by the end of
1964. Rabat insists that the end of 1962 be the terminal date
for French withdrawal. France has about 20,000 army,
navy, and air force personnel in Morocco. During informal ap-
proaches to the United States regarding the possibility of
advancing the, date agreed on for the evacuation of American
forces from Morocco, the end of 1963, both Foreign Minister
M'Hammedi and Crown Prince Moulay Hassan have suggested
that American forces be pulled out before December 1962.
2 Within the past two months both the rightist and the leftist
press in Morocco has become increasingly more unfriendly
toward the United States--as well as toward France--on the
air-base .issue. In an editorial published on 19 July entitled
"After U-2, RB-47 Affair," the rightist French-language week-
ly Al-Istiglal notes that countries allowing American bases
might well get the impression of taking enormous risks for
nothing. "When it comes down to it, " Al-Istiglal added, "Ameri-
cans might well see in the near future serious disintegration
in their system of external defenses, and we cannot forget we
shelter American U-2 and RB-47 bases in Morocco."
,In the face of such prodding, the King's government--al-
ready dedicated to the early evacuation of all foreign troops- -
is likely to intensify efforts to bolster its prestige by obtaining
commitments from both France and the United States to with-
draw their forces by the end of 1962. Since early June, most
Spanish forces a parently have been withdrawn.
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British-Ic n c Fishing Dispute
_Britain is making a new attempt to get Iceland to enter nego-
tiations on the dispute over Iceland's 12-mile fishing limits. Lon-
don denies Reykjavik's right to establish such limits unilaterally,
and feels obliged to provide naval protection to its trawlers operat-
ing on "the high seas:' Nevertheless, the Macmillan government
finds the issues annoying rather than critical, recognizes the in-
herent threat to Iceland's cooperation with NATO, and hopes to
end the dispute short of complete capitulation.
Britain now has indicated its willingness to negotiate on the
basis of Iceland's 19;58 proposal for a 12=mile fisheries limit, with
a period of three years for phasing out historic rights and revising
certain. base lines. Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd has sent a per-
sonal letter to Prime Minister Thors to press this proposal.
L_While there is some opinion within Iceland's Conservative -
Social Democratic government in favor of opening negotiations
with Britain, the majority probably holds that such a move would
not be accepted by the public at this time in view of the continued
agitation by Communists and other extremists. The strategy of
these groups apparently is to embarrass the government and dis-
credit Iceland's membership in NATO by insisting that the US de-
fense force intervene and protect Iceland from "aggression:'
In May, Iceland's justice minister told a member of the US
Embassy that Iceland would withdraw from NATO if British naval
vessels again entered the 12-mile zone. Feelings in Iceland have
been aggravated by several violations in late June and early July of
a British Trawlers' Federation three-month ban on fishing inside
the 12-mile limit, instituted to provide a quiet period for negotia-
tions to start. In one case an Icelandic vessel fired live shells
through a British trawler's funnel. I
Although no incidents have occurred since 15 July when the
trawler owners accepted government advice to forcefully renew
their instructions not to enter the disputed waters, the. truce ex-
pires on 13 August. The Macmillan government may be expected
to encourage an extension, but the Foreign Office is skeptical how
long the current lull can. last without some progress toward nego-
tiation.
23 July 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval. Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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