CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005200330001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 8, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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8 August 1960 25X/
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Indonesia-Netherlands. The recent arrival of Dutch naval
units, inc u ing the aircraft carrier Karel Doorman, in West
New Guinea-an area claimed by Indonesia-poses the possibil-
ity of an armed clash between Indonesian and Dutch forces, In-
deliberate provocation by either side, but from chance encoun ers
between Indonesian air patrols and
lead to an unpremeditated inc' t
further increase tension. The most critical period will be from
24 to 26 August when the Dutch ships are scheduled .to be exercis-
ing north of New Guinea. Danger would appear to stem, not from
t
donesian public concern over the Dutch naval movements has
been deliberately revived by the Djakarta government, and the
likelihood of a highly emotional speech on the subject by Pres=
ident Sukarno on 17 August, Indonesian independence day, will
THE WEST
Cuba: Fidel and Raul Castro's week-end harangues expressed
confidence and determination that neither the US, which Fidel IMMOM
.called "militarily second best," nor the "lackey foreign ministers
of the OAS," can stop the Cuban revolution and Latin America's
"liberation from the Yankee colonial yoke:' The Castros' uncom-
prom ising vehemence and the decree in effect ordering confisca-
I1
suggest that the Cuban leaders are convinced that US military interW
vention in Cuba, which they might even be. trying to provoke, would
before the opening of the OAS foreign ministers' meetings. T hey
enhance the Prospects for Latin America's "revolution of libera-
tion !'
8 Aug 60
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LATE ITEM
*Republic of the Con oa President Kasavubu's Abako party,
which is strong in the lower Congo region, has revived its pre-
independence demands for "independence" within a loose con-
federation. This may be followed by similar declarations by
other opponents of Congolese Premier Lumumba's concept of a
highly centralized state, Encouraged by the success of Katanga
Province's Premier Tshombd in inducing the UN to hold up its
scheduled move of troops into Katanga, the anti-Lumumba ele-
ments appear to be attempting to join forces in an effort to unde
mine and possibly oust Lumumba. Tshombe's regime, mean-
while, is pushing the buildup of its new security force and still
appears determined to resist any external force attempting to
move into the province.
The UN Security Council session on the Congo crisis, which
was scheduled for 7 August, was postponed until 8 August.
Tunisia, Ceylon, Argentina, and Ecuador are reportedly work-
ing on a resolution designed both to meet Hammarskjold's re-
quest for new assurances to Tshomb6 of the UN's neutrality in
the Congo's constitutional controversy and to gain the acceptance
of African countries backing Lumumba. Ghana and Guinea have
already offered military assistance to Lumumba independent of
the UN effort.
s
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The Situation in the Congo
As the UN Security Council prepares to consider the Congo
crisis again on 8 August, tension has once more risen sharply
in the Congo amidst signs pointing toward an early showdown
between Premier Lumumba--who is due back in Leopoldville
on 8 August--and Congolese political elements opposed to him
and his concept of a highly centralized Congo state. President
Kasavubu's Abako party, which is dominant in the lower Congo
region, revived publicly on 7 August its earlier demands for
"independence" within a loosely-joined Congo confederation
and adopted a formal expression of no confidence in Lumumba.
Kasavubu's failure to dissociate himself from his party's
action suggests he may be behind it and perhaps also working
with leaders of other parties to undermine and possibly oust
Lumumba. Earlier Kasavubu and Lumumba were bitter rivals
for the premiership of the first Congolese government. Premier
Tshombd of separatist Katanga Province indicated on 7 August
that he was engaged in "negotiations" with other confederation-
minded Congolese leaders, including "some" from the lower Congo
and also Equator Province.
Time appears to be working against Lumumba's opponents.
There is increasing evidence that Lumumba is proceeding rapid-
ly to reorganize the disintegrated Force Publique as part of his
personal political organization. This presumably accounts in
part for the lack of interest and. evasiveness of Lumumba-
appointed Congolese officers toward UN suggestions for the
organization of a national army.
In Katanga, Tshombe is endeavoring to strengthen his bargain-
ing position in any future negotiations with the central government
and to counteract charges that he is merely a Belgian puppet.
Tshombe declared on 6 August that his government did not intend
to preserve an exclusive role for Belgians in the exploitation of
Katanga's great mineral wealth and that Belgian troops would leave
the province as soon a the new Katanga forces are strong enough
to maintain security., elgium, apparently encouraged by indications
that wide Katangan `s port for Tshomb6 is facilita.'.ing a rapid build-
up of the new force toward a 3, 000- man goals offered to make
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an early announcement of its intention to withdraw Belgian troops
?om Katanga within a few weeks, according to a Belgian official
in Elisabethville
Tshombe's regime still appears determined to resist with
all its resources any external force, whether or not under UN
auspices, which might attempt to move into Katanga Province.
Plans for resistance apparently include the harassment of
"invaders" by tribesmen employing guerrilla tactics. A Belgian
official who visited the province last week returned to Leopoldville
with reports that tribes loyal to Tshombd were "preparing for
war. " Such reports are contributing to the great concern being
displayed among the approximately 15, 000 Belgian civilians re-
maining in the Katanga.
Moscow, which. has become increasingly critical of the UN
intervention, has denounced Hammarskjold for "capitulation to
the colonialists, " Izvestia on 6 August said the Security Council
must call for an immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from
Katanga and an end to "attempts to tear this province from the
Congo Republic. "
In a statement of 5 August terming the Congo situation as
"absolutely intole ra'ble," the Soviet Government charged
Belgium, supported by its NATO allies, with defying the United
Nations. While the statement carefully avoided commiting the
USSR to any unilateral action, it attempted to sustain the im-
pression that Communist bloc countries stand ready to send
forces if the present UN contingents are unable to enforce the
Security Council's resolutions. Soviet leaders apparently hope
that their implied threats of unilateral action will increase
pressure for an early withdrawal of Belgian forces, thus en-
abling the USSR subsequently to claim credit for having protected
Congolese independence and unity.
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'THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security. Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration.
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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