CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005200420001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 18, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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18 August 1960
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copy NO. U 71
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JUN 19
DATE: REVIEWERi
State Dept. review completed
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j
F,
ME
II. ASIA-AFRICA
India=Pakistan: Conclusion of the long-delayed treaty
dividing the waters of the Indus River basin now is probable
as a result of agreement on the most important disputed
points. Although negotiation of remaining details could cause
further delays, Nehru is scheduled to go to Pakistan to sign
the treaty about 20 September. While reiterating his willing-
ness to discuss other matters with Ayub, Nehru recently indi-
cated he is still not ready to take up the Kashmir dispute and
is not interested in joint defense proposals. The Nehru-Ayub
meeting could, however, lead to general exploratory talks at
a lower level to continue the improvement in relations desired
by both leaders.
Japan: Prime Minister Ikeda has announced that the Diet
is likely to be dissolved in November and elections held shortly
thereafter. In addition to his desire to satisfy the general feel-
ing that he should seek an early public mandate, Ikeda probably
is encouraged by impressive conservative victories in three suc-
cessive gubernatorial elections and by failure of the Socialist
parties to develop a popular issue for exploitation. Public opin-
le-
F
j
ion polls also reveal unusually strong support for the new govern-
ment.
Portuguese Africa: Plans for strong reinforcement of Por-
tuguese security forces in Mozambique and Angola have been
reported to the US consul general in Lourenco Marques by a re. & k
liable source. A civil defense organization has been established
in Mozambique, and armed troops and police are much in evi-
dence. These measures reflect increasing Portuguese distrust
of the native population and. a growing fear of subversion. from
neighboring territories 25
*Congo: As Secretary General Hammarskjold prepares for I<
the- emergency session of the Security Council, he is seeking sup=
port for his interpretation of the UN's role in Congo, a position
already attacrect by the Soviet Union. According to press reports
18 Aug 60
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Cuba:
III. THE WEST
25X1 % he Castro
,,,,regime is sending large amounts of money to various other Latin y
from the UN, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov has j
strongly objected to the secretary general's stand that the
9 August resolution bars UN intervention in internal Congolese
disputes.
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Lumumba, in Leopoldville, continues to take repressive
measures against both UN personnel and Belgian interests. On 25
17 August he threatened to confiscate all Belgian assets in the
ited in Belgium several months ago.
Congo if Brussels did not quickly return Congolese funds depos-
American countries to carry on Cuba's campaign against the OAS
and perhaps to bribe delegates to the OAS foreign ministers' meet-
ing now under way in Costa Rica. This money may. be part of the p
$8,000,000 in 100- and 50-dollar bills which Cuba is known to have
j 18 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF iii
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imported from the US since Way. Cyeanwhile~ the Cuban delega-
tion has threatened to withdraw from the OAS conference in pro-
test of its treatment by Costa Rican security forces. Cuba might
then demand that the UN Security ouncil resume consideration
of the Cuban complaint apainst the US which the council referred
to the OAS in mi -Julf. t I
IV. WINIA.;n %.;V1VUYjI-JL--j-ZZ L;V1NUJ.JUb1UWb
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the United States or its possessions in the immedi-
ate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate
direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies,
or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.
C. The following developments are susceptible of direct ex-
ploitation by Soviet/Communist hostile action which could
jeopardize the US in, the immediate future:
LLVIW~Ly ULM W415 L11C 11AAALW;L;_Y U41AW ILLY VL AUKULUK %;V11AJJAL%;4LAA1r'
the situation. There is still no evidence of any Chinese Com-
munist or North Vietnamese. intentions overtly to intervene.
x x oit t
Nevertheless the situation remains favorable to Communist
oit Lon,
Although the Kong Le. revolutionary faction has succeeded
In. setting up a new government with approval by the National
Assembly (but not yet by the King), the situation in Laos re-
mains confused. General Phoumi.intends to defy.the new
government. He apparently controls enough troops to retake
Vientiane, provided he. can obtain sufficient money, supplies,
and transport. The Pathet Lao has not yet intervened effec-
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ug
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 Approved Ford
India and Pakistan Near. Final Agreement on Indus
Waters Treaty
The way now seems clear for conclusion of the much-de-
layed treaty between India and Pakistan on the division of waters
in the Indus River basin. While quibbling over remaining de-
tails could cause further delays, International Bank Vice Presi-
dent Iliff informed Ambassador Rountree on 15 August that dur-
ing his recent talks in New Delhi and Rawalpindi, both govern-
mentshadagreedto a compromise of the most important points
still in dispute.
President Ayub confirmed publicly on 17 August that Nehru
will visit Pakistan on 19 to 20 September to sign the treaty.
Ayub reiterated that he hoped to discuss "all questions" of
mutual interest with Nehru, including the dominant Kashmir
dispute. The Pakistani President recalled in a broadcast on
13 August that he had made every conceivable effort to solve
Indo-Pakistani problems even though the response from In-
dian leaders had been. "very tardy indeed." He apparently
feels the next move.is up to Nehru. Ayub, concerned over
growing domestic criticism, probably will exploit Nehru's
visit as a foreign policy success. He .is unlikely at this time,
however, to risk further adverse reaction at home by mak-
ing any substantial concessions.
On several occasions recently Nehru expressed his will-
ingness to go to Pakistan, probably realizing that some re-
ciprocal gesture. on his part is necessary now if the improve-
ment in relations is to continue. He denied in Parliament on
1 August that he had refused to talk with the Pakistanis, and
said he would take the opportunity of a visit to discuss "what-
ever matters" are raised. Nehru made it clear that he was
not interested in Ayub's joint defense proposals, and his later
comments on Kashmir suggest he still is not prepared to ne-
gotiate a settlement of this 13-year-old dispute. The Nehru-
Ayub meeting may nevertheless lead to exploratory talks on
these and other questions at a lower lever in order to further
the rapprochement both leaders desire.
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 Prime Minister Ikeda announced on 15 August that the
lower house of the Diet would probably be dissolved in early
November and that general elections would be held soon there-
after. An official spokesman in the prime minister's office
indicated later that dissolution and elections might be held
even earlier.
Ikeda is anxious to satisfy public expectations that he
will seek. an early popular mandate in order to dissociate his
administration completely from the Kishi government. In ad-
dition, he has been encouraged by decisive conservative vic-
tories in gubernatorial contests in Aomori, Saitama, and. Gum-
ma prefectures. In these elections, the Socialist party failed
to arouse public opinion against the US-Japanese security treaty,
and apparently suffered because of its strong-arm tactics in. the
Diet. and encouragement of mob action outside. Like the Social-
ists, the more moderate Democratic Socialist party is short of
funds and lacks an exploitable issue.
Ikeda has promoted popular support by announcing his in-
tention. to reduce some taxes and expand social welfare serv-
ices, including financial assistance for retraining and relocat-
ing unemployed workers. Ikeda may also be consolidating his
control of the conservatives, a cardinal element in his efforts
to achieve political stability in Japan. He has an able, if not
well .known, cabinet supported by most LDP factions. A threat
by Ichiro Kono, a bitter intraparty rival, to form a new con-
servative party in order to preclude "despotic rule" by Ikeda
thus far has not been supported by other LDP factions and may
actually be an acknowledgment of Ikeda's strength.
Nationwide polls conducted in August by the large Asahi
and Ma.inichi newspapers indicate that the LDP has regained
the public support it lost during the May-June political crisis
and that both Socialist parties have less support. Results of
the Asahi poll indicate that the Ikeda cabinet now has public
support second only to that accorded the Yoshida cabinet which
was in office at the time the peace treaty was signed in 1951.
In both polls, almost two out of every three persons who re-
sponded indicated a preference for the LDP. They also reveal
that all but a small, active minority of the Japanese populace.
continues to be politically apathetic toward the security alli-
ance with the United States.
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Portugal Increases Security Precautions in African Territories
Portugal apparently is making strenuous efforts to in-
crease its defense capability in its overseas provinces of
Mozambique and Angola. Plans for large-scale reinforce-
ment of the security forces--which might ultimately add 40, -
000 men--mainly Portuguese--to the 5,000 Portuguese and
15,000 native troops now in the two territories--have been re-
ported to the American consul general in Lourenco Marques.
Several small contingents of Portuguese soldiers have recent-
ly arrived in both territories, armed troops and police are
much in evidence, and an ambitious civil defense program
emphasizing the protection of isolated settlers has been set
up in Mozambique.
The increased vigilance comes after numerous indications
that African nationalists in adjoining territories have begun to
direct their attention toward the Portuguese possessions. An-
golan exiles in Leopoldville have recently become more active,
and there have been reports of nationalist attempts to enter
Angola from the. Congo. Agitators apparently have infiltrated
northern Mozambique from Tanganyika and reportedly have had
some success in fomenting anti-Portuguese demonstrations.
Portuguese officials have repeatedly stated that Portugal
has no intention of yielding to African nationalism, and the se-
curity forces have kept native movements dispersed and im-
potent. At the same time, doubts over the reliability of the
native population are apparently growing in Lisbon. The strin-
gency of the security controls in Portuguese Africa can be ex-
pected to increase as nationalist influences from neighboring
territories become more effective.
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The Congo Situation
Secretary General Hammarskjold, under severe attack
from both Congo Premier Lumumba and the USSR, is taking
the chaotic Congo situation back to the Security Council in or-
der to obtain council support for his position. He maintains
that the UN forces are not authorized to intervene in internal
Congolese disputes despite the demands of Lumumba that the
UN crush the rebellious. Katanga government.
The session may be of crucial importance because Lu-
mumba, backed by the Soviet Union, is increasingly critical
of Hammarskjold and. has threatened to demand the withdrawal
of all European elements of the UN force--an action which Ham-
marskj old has said he would reject in favor of urging the with-
drawal of the entire emergency force.. Either course would
remove present restraints from Lumumba and provide a wide
opportunity for exploitation by opportunistic African govern-
ments as well. as Communist bloc countries.
In Leopoldville, Lumumba continues to take repressive meas-
ures against. Belgians and to harass UN personnel. Subsequent to
the widespread police checks of personal documentation on 16 Au-
gust in Leopoldville, Congolese troops on 17 August set up ma-
chine guns at the airport and. interfered with plane landings. The
premier threatened to seize all. Belgian assets in the Congo if
within. two weeks Brussels has not returned Congolese funds, in-
cluding gold, which were sent to Belgium several months ago.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
.The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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