CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005200450001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 22, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

~:~Vzzzd
Approved For ReJse 20X01p: ET975A0Q;2004 0001-4
22 August 1960
Copy No. C 70
PF CUMENT N. Y
ANGE IN CLASS,
UECLASSRrOr,D
MASS. CHAM n TIN. TS~rfS
NEXT HEMW PATE:
AUTIh HR E6 ?
DATE? JUN 198Q REVIEWER:
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Release 20 TO": 1ECR]Ef75A005200450001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200450001-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200450001-4
 Approved For Faso
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
22 August 1960
DAILY BRIEF
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Mali Federation: Senegalese authorities appear to be exer-
cising complete control in Dakar, following their proclamation
of secession from the Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan on
20 August. L Frouble may break out, however, in rural areas of
Senegal where there are Soudanese residents. The attitude in the
Soudanese capital of Bamako is. reported bitter, and a strong
5200450001-4 25X1
Approved For Releas
25X1
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200450001-4
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200450001-4
 Approved For FW ase 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00500450001-4 25
reaction may be forthcoming from the repatriation of Soudanese
officials of the Mali Government--including Modibo Keita, the
president of the Mali Council of Ministers and Soudanese premier.
rent officials are striving to maintain a public
position o neu rality in this issue concerning a French Community
republic. De Gaulle has proposed talks in Paris, and the
Senegalese Premier has announced hi acceptance.
I
*Laos: _Souvanna Phouma apparently is moving to meet at
least some of General Phoumi's preconditions for negotiations.
He has reinstituted General Ouane as armed forces commander
and has placed him in charge of security in Vientiane, with
Captain Kong Le serving as Ouane's "temporary deputy." Ouane's
freedom of action under such an arrangement is questionable.
Kong Le's paratroopers are with-
raw ng rom e city and are being replaced by civil and military
police and possibly regular army elements as well. Souvanna
claims that either he or Ouane will meet Phoumi in Savannakhet
as soon as the "arrangements" now in process in Vientiane are
completed. Meanwhile, Phoumi continues to apply pressure on
the Vientiane regime by moving up his troops, although the lo-
cation of his units is the subject of conflicting reports. He. may
interpret Souvanna's conciliatory gestures as a sign of weakness
and hence raise his price for. a settlement.
25
Li
22 Aug 60 DAILY BRIEF ii
Approved For Release 002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 5200450001-4 25
MNS
nomommil
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200450001-4
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200450001-4
 Approved For
elease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 0 200450001-4
Mali Situation
Senegalese authorities appear to be in complete control of
Mali's capital city of Dakar--which is also Senegal's capital
following the announcement on 20 August that Senegal had seceded
from the Mali Federation. They have had the Soudanese officials
of the Mali Government- -including Modibo Keita, who is presi-
dent of the Mali Council of Ministers and Soudanese premier--
under house arrest but have now expatriated them by train to the
Soudanese capital of Bamako. Soudanese officials are bitter
about Senegal's actions, but any countermeasures will probably
be delayed until after Soudan's leaders arrive in Bamako late
today.
25X1
:,Trouble may break out in some rural areas of Senegal where
there are Soudanese residents, but in view of the reported unity
among top Senegalese leaders, local authorities should be able to
contain any disturbances. The Soudanese leaders, realizing that
Senegal might secede, reportedly alerted Soudanese residents out-
side Dakar and contacted opponents of Senegal's leadership for pos-
sible political action in Ste Louis, Thies, and Diourbelo Appar-
ently the. Soudanese had expected to use Mali troops and security
forces to prevent secession,1. but 600 of Mali's best troops are in
the Congo with the UN force, and the French command of the 7, 000
Community troops in the Dakar area would hesitate to intervene in
an internal Mali problem.
for Mali President on 27 August-]
25X1
25X1
on a promise to support Senegalese leader Leopold Sen hor. in? hia. bid
(Although a crisis has been developing between Senegal and Sou-
dan over allocation of top administrative posts--Soudan has gone back
i a s declaration on 19 August of a state of emergency and his
25X1
Approved For Releasd 2002110 91 ? CI -RDP79T00975 005200450001-4
22 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
 Approved For ReIq a 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0Q 00450001-4
PORTUG
Conakry
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005200450001-4
 25X1
Approved For R- ase 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO -200450001-4
.Lorder to the Mali chief of staff to alert his troops convinced
Senegal's leaders that Keita was planning a coup.
French officials are striving to maintain a public position
of neutrality. In response to appeals by both Senegalese and
Soudanese leaders, De Gaulle, as president of the French Com-
munity, stated that France would not take sides, since the crisis
was an internal Mali affair. He suggested that the leaders should
come to Paris to discuss with him a rapprochement between the
two states or their intended relations with France and the Commu-
nity. There are extensive agreements between France and Mali
covering cooperation in defense, finance, and foreign affairs.
Senegalese Premier Mamadou Dia has indicated his desire to at-
tend; Soudanese officials have not been in a position to reply.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200450001-4
22 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
 25X1
Situation in Laos
"From their respective headquarters at Vientiane and
Savannakhet, Souvanna Phouma- and General Phoumi continue
to seek a basis for negotiations. After. rejecting Souvanna's
first delegation on 19 August as not having proper authority',
Phoumi sent a message insisting that Souvanna dispatch a
competent emissary to Savannakhet, that Captain Kong Le
return to his pre-coup duties, that the second parachute
-battalion withdraw to its base about ten miles from Vientiane,
and that General Ouane ensure the security. of the capital.
__~ouvanna is meeting
at least part of oum s demands. General Ouane has been
reinstituted as armed forces commander and is now ostensibly
in charge of the security of Vientiane, with Kong Le serving
as "temporary deputy"--an arrangement which casts doubt
on Ouane's freedom of action. Kong Le's paratroopers, who
had been maintaining security in Vientiane, now appear to be
withdrawing-although it is not clear to where--and are being
replaced by civil and military police and possibly also by
regular army. troops.
Souvanna informed Ambassador Brown on 21. August that
the situation. was in the hands of the military and that the
"issues were being resolved. He added that either he or Ouane
will meet Phoumi in Savannakhet after the arrangements in
process- -presumably the transfer of control of Vientiane from
the paratroopers to other elements--are completed. Souvanna
said he believed these arrangements would soon be complete.
Souvanna, who has tended to be overly optimistic in the past,
may well be so in this case also, particularly in his apparent
confidence that Kong Le will quietly.take a back seat to Ouane.
25X1
Approved For Re - 0450001-4
22 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
25X1
 Approved For R I ase 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 00450001-4
25X1
25X1
f-P. houmi, meanwhile, continues to maintain pressure on his
opponents in Vientiane through psychological warfare methods
and by moving his troops toward Vientiane. The exact location
of the units involved is the subject of contradictory reports;
there are indications that certain units have not advanced as
far as previously reported. In any event, it will be at least
several days before the bulk of Phoumi's forces could be in
position around the capital. While he would probably prefer
a bloodless solution to the crisis, Phoumi may interpret
Souvanna's conciliatory gestures as a sign of weakness and thus
be emboldened to raise his price for a settlement- -possibly
even asking for a return to the status quo ante the Kong Le
coup. Any such demand would probably end all prospects for
a negotiated settlement.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Rele
22 Aug 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200450001-4
Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05200450001-4
 Approved For Rele se 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO 5200450001-4
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor.
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval. Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
Approved For Rellease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00P200450001-4 25X1
 Approved For Release 20~~1~ : ~~Q~75A005?00450001-4
Approved For Release 20Vlp: C#Alff rII-NT75A005200450001-4