CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005300100001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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12 September 1960
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
12 September 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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Albania: The first suggestion that the Tirana regime may
becim-17-n-ginto line with Moscow in. the Sino-~'Soviet dispute is
the ouster of Liri Belishova from her positions as party polit-
buro member and party secretary. According to a 9 September
communique, the Albanian party central committee acted after
hearing a report by politburo member Rita Marko, who recently
returned from extensive training in the USSR. Belishova, an
ideologist, is probably being used by the regime as a scapegoat
for its past espousal of certain of the Chinese Communist view-
wints th figure in the current Sino-Soviet dispute.
I
USSR-Monaolia: Khrushchev and Mongolian Premier Tse-
denl5ai -signed an agieement in Moscow on 9 September under.which 16
the USSR will provide Mongolia a $150,000,000 development loan on
"easy terms:' This large technical and economic aid to Mongolia's
third Five-Year Plan suggests an effort to reinforce the USSR's
long-tim6 dominance in an area where the Chinese Communists-
who loaned M ji $50,000,000 in May--have become increas-
ingly active.
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I I. ASIA-AFRICA
strength. I
South Korea: The'ruling South Korean Democratic party, which
has 6v-er two ds of the seats in the National Assembly but has
been split about evenly into factions supporting and opposing Prime
Minister Chang Myon, apparently is nearing agreement on a new
compromise cabinet,..al6o to be headed by Chang. As a price for
cooperation, however, the party faction opposed to Chang is de-
manding that he recognize it as an independent negotiating group
in the assembly. Such an arrangement would allow the faction to
retain its position as a potential opposition bloc in future tests of
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Coffin o: The UN command in the Congo appears to be involved
in an all-out effort to establish the authority of Congolese Pres-
ident Kasavubu and-set the stage for an early attempt to remove
Lumumba from power. Working through Col. Mobutu, the chief
of staff and most important figure in the Congolese Army, the UN
apparently arranged the surrender of arms on 10 September by
the bulk of the 3,000 Congolese troops stationed in the Leopold-
ville area. In addition, the'UN provided the troops with their first
pay in two months and announced an order--attributed to the Con-
golese Army--calling for a general cease-fire throughout the
Congo. Plans were revealed for the dispatch of a special UN
team to supervise along the borders of separatist Katanga Prov-
ince the truce which the UN command clearly hopes will result
from the. cease-fire order. The cease-fire order has been cau-
tiously welcomed by Katanga President Tshombe and his allies in
Kasai Province, but has in effect been denounced by Lumumba who
stated on 10 September that Congo Army operations would continue
in Katanga and Kasai.
j
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e
Meanwhile, Kasavubu has transmitted to Hammarskjold an
initial list of a new cabinet, headed by moderate leader Joseph
Ileo, to replace Lumumba's cabinet, which Kasavubu.insists was
legally dismissed last week. Efforts apparently are being made
by Kasavubu supporters to line up support for the new group, pre-
sumably with a view to reversing at a new parliamentary session
the endorsement won last week by Lumumba in both houses. Di-
rect action looking to the arrest of Lumumba is also apparently
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At the UN, the Security Council is scheduled to resume meet-
III. THE WEST
V
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Dominican Republic: Reacting to the recent OAS decision
to impose sanctions on the Dominican Republic, the Trujillo
government has called a huge Castro-type rally for 24 Septem-
ber to demonstrate its popular support. The government-con-
trolled radio has also begun warning US businessmen to defend
Trujillo from US attacks if they wish to ca tinue doing business
in his country. American officials in Ciudad Trujillo see the fu-
ture of US interests there as "increasingly bleak" as long as
Trujillo retains control, Dominican Foreign Minister Herrera
Baez is visiting Western Europe in an attempt to counter antici-
pated trade and shipping boycotts by Western Hemisphere coun-
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El Salvador: The stability of President Lemus' middle-of-
the-road regime is under serious strain, although developments
of the past few days have lowered tensions somewhat. While the
state of siege declared on 5 September continues, Lemus' con-
ciliatory moves have apparently succeeded in reducing the strong
public resentment caused by the government'skindiscriminate use
of force against the Communist-encouraged student demonstra-
tion on 2 September. Communist and pro-Castro elements will
probably be quick to encourage new demonstrations as opportunity
offers, but student leaders seem for the present to be takin a
conciliatory line,
12 Sept 60
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DAILY BRIEF iii
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Albanian Political Changes
The 9 September announcement that Albanian politburo
member and party secretary Liri Belishova had been relieved
of her party functions for committing "grave errors in the par-
ty line" is the-first indication that the regime may finally be re-
acting to Soviet insistence that Tirana desist from support of
certain Chinese Communist positions. The fact that politburo
member Marko, who had recently returned from extended train-
ing in the USSR, delivered the report to the central committee
suggests that a shift in Albanian propaganda toward a more So-
viet orientation is forthcoming.
The Albanian regime, whose propaganda has long differed
from Moscow's in the treatment of Yugoslav revisionism, found
itself out of step with the Soviet position on key issues affecting
bloc unity at the conference of Communist party leaders at
Bucharest in June. Since that time, the Albanian leadership
has equivocated on giving Soviet policies full support. Albanian
party boss Enver Hoxha is the only East European party leader
who does not now plan to lead his country's delegation to the UN
General Assembly session opening on. 20 'September. Similarly
he was the only East European party leader absent from the
Rumanian party congress in June.
Under increasing pressure to conform, the Alganian regime
has apparently chosen Belishova as a logical scapegoat for its
left-wing deviationism. Belishova is a leading party ideologist,
and was one of the three important regime officials who visited
China this summer. While she has made statements favorable
to the Chinese, so have all Albanian leaders at one time or
another. The ouster should set the stage for Tirana to endorse
Khrushchev and his policies.
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Soviet Loan to Mongolia
Before he departed for the United Nations meeting, Khru-
shchev signed an agreement providing Mongolia with over
$150,000,000 in. a long-term loan which the Mongolians may
repay on "easy terms." Signed on 9 September in Moscow, where
Mongolia's Premier Tsedenbal has been "vacationing" for over
.a month, the agreement also provides for deferring payment on
earlier loans and for sending Soviet technicians and workers to
help Mongolia implement its Third Five-Year Plan beginning in
1961.
About 10,000 Chinese workers already are in Mongolia, fur-
thering Peiping's effort to expand its influence by aiding Mongolia's
nascent industrial and agricultural development. In May, Chou
En-lai visited Ulan Bator and loaned the Mongolians $50,000,000--
bringing to $115,000,000 the total of Chinese Communist grant and
credit assistance since 1956 when Peiping first gave economic as-
sistance to Mongolia. The latest Soviet-Mongolian agreement will
bring Soviet aid in the same period of time to well over $275,000,-
000.
Mongolia is the oldest Soviet satellite and traditionally one of
the most obedient. In the past, however, there have been' indica-
tions that some Mongolian leaders would prefer greater independ-
ence and viewed economic ties with Peiping as a hedge against
total Soviet domination. Even the Moscow-oriented Tsedenbal
showed some reluctance to choose sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute
until his visit to the Soviet Union. Then, in mid-August, the offi-
cial Ulan Bator newspaper published an article endorsing the Soviet
position and implicitly criticizing the Chinese. Now, with the large
development loan, Moscow seems determined to reinforce its dom-
inance in Mongolia's economy as well as in its political affairs.
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South Korean Premier May Form New Cabinet in. Quest
Of Stability
The South Korean Democratic party,, which has over two
thirds of the seats in the National Assembly but has been split
because of personal rivalries into two approximately equal
factions supporting and opposing Prime Minister Chang Myon,
apparently is nearing agreement on a new compromise cabinet,
also to be headed. by Chang. Chang's government, inaugurated
on 23 August, has controlled through its faction only about 90
seats in the 233-seat Assembly while the faction headed by Kim
To-yun has 86.
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Four of Changes 14 ministers submitted their resignations
on 7 September to pave the way forbringing representatives of
the opposing faction into the cabinet. Further changes may be
made to allot five posts to the opposition faction and several to
independents. Nominees and assignments have not been decided.
Leaders of the opposition faction, who had refused to participate
in Chang's government when it was first formed, have changed
their position at least tentatively to avoid discontent among their
followers as well, as in response to public pressures.
A coalition would strengthen Chang's position for the time
being and, by drawing the opposing faction into sharing respon-
sibility for government policy, would lessen the threat of a no-
confidence move in the Assembly. At the same time, however,
as a price for cooperation, the opposition faction is demanding
that Chang recognize it as an independent negotiating group within
the assembly. Such an arrangement would make it easy for the
faction .to function as a de facto opposition bloc in future tests
of strength.
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The Congo Situation
The UN command in the Congo appears to have embarked
on an all-out effort to establish the authority of Congolese Pres-
ident Kasavubu and set the stage for an early attempt by Premier
Lumumba's Congolese opponents to remove him from power. defin-
itively. This effort apparently has the support of Col. Mobutu, the
chief of staff and most important figure in the Congolese Army--
control of which will probably prove decisive in determining the
outcome of the Kasavubu-Lumumba power struggle. Mobutu, who
recently claimed that three quarters of the army was loyal to him,
reportedly arranged the surrender of arms by the bulk of the 3,000
Congolese troops stationed in the Leopoldville area, This action
took place at a UN-controlled army camp on 10 September. In ad-
dition to its virtually certain inspiration of this development, which
would seem seriously to undermine Lumumba's position, the UN has
provided the troops with the first pay many of them have received in
two months.
These moves by the UN command coincided with its announce-
ment of an order- -attributed to the Congolese Army--calling for a
general cease-fire throughout the Congo and of plans to supervise the
execution of the order along the borders of separatist Katanga Prov-
ince. The cease-fire order has been welcomed "in principle" by
Katanga President Tshombe, whose regime Lumumba has vowed to
crush, and by Tshombe's ally, Albert Kalonji, the leader of the
hard-pressed anti-Lumumba movement in neighboring Kasai Prov-
ince. Lumumba, on the other. hand, denied the validity of the cease-
fire order and announced that his troops were continuing to operate
"with great success" in Katanga and Kasai. Press reports from
Elisabethville, however, indicate that last week's incursions into
Katanga from Kivu Province by Congolese Army elements have not
yet been followed by any invasion in force.
Meanwhile, Kasavubu and his supporters have pushed ahead
with the formation of a new cabinet composed of moderate, fed-
eralist-minded elements to replace Lumumba's leftist regime, de-
spite the latter's continued claims to be the only legal government
of the Congo. . Headed by Senate President Ileo, the cabinet list trans-
mitted by Kasavubu to Secretary General Hammarskjold over the
week end names Kalonji as interior minister and Justin Bomboko as
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foreign minister--the post Bomboko held. until recently in the
Lumumba government. There is evidence that Lumumba's op-
ponents are making strenuous efforts to develop wider support,
apparently with a view to reversing at an early date the votes of
confidence won last week by Lumumba, after demagogic appeals,
in. both houses of the Congolese parliament. Kasavubu's group
may also attempt to arrest Lumumba in the near future, espe-
cially if it becomes convinced it can rely on substantial support
from Congolese troops as well as the neutrality of UN forces in
the Leopoldville area. The group probably drew encouragement
from the firm stand taken on ii September by Ghanaian,troops in
the face of an attempt by Lumumba to regain by force control
over the UN-guarded Leopoldville radio station.
semblyo
smaller countries, to command large-scale support from the as-
Bomboko departed for New York on 11 September to speak
at the UN in behalf of the proposed Ileo government, and it is pos-
sible that representatives of Lumumba's regime may also arrive in
time for the Security Council's next meeting on the Congo crisis,
now scheduled for the afternoon of 12 September,
Moscow's immediate negative reaction to IIammarskjold's
blunt speech of 9 September suggests that the USSR may veto any
resolution . aimed at strengthening the secretary general's hand in
the Congo. Some UN members reportedly are considering the ad-
visability of calling an emergency session of the General Assembly--
possible on. 24-hour notice- in order to keep the UN in the Congo.
Hammarskjold's prestige is still sufficient, particularly among the
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Dominican Reactions to OAS Sanctions
The Trujillo dictatorship has responded to the OAS diplo-
matic and economic 'sanctions in a variety of ways- -the most
dramatic being the announcement of a mass meeting for 24 Sep-
tember to demonstrate its popular support. Trujillo has often
used this device in the past, and his well organized political
machine now is reported to be intent on surpassing all previous
turn-outs.
The government- controlled Radio Caribe has warned US
business men to begin defending Trujillo against US attacks if
they wish to continue doing business in his country. Trujillo
reportedly said on 29 August that if sanctions are applied against
his regime he will seize three large US-owned firms as a first
step toward taking over all private US investment in the Dominican
Republic- -estimated at $200,000,000. American officials in Ciudad
Trujillo see the future of US.interests there as "increasingly bleak"
as long as Trujillo retains control.
Paraguay is the only OAS member that has still not announced.
reduction of its embassy to consular level or withdrawn diplomatic
representation from the Dominican Republic entirely. Trujillo is
also having difficulty in obtaining oil and shipping services. A for-
mer high-ranking member of his regime said on 1 September that
Trujillo will make arrangements to buy oil. from Canada and Near
Eastern countries and is already trying.to charter the necessary
tankers. Foreign Minister Herrera Baez now is. visiting Western
European countries in an effort to strengthen trade ties and ensure
the continuance of European shipping services.
The USSR's demand in the UN Security Council on 6 Septem-
ber that the council endorse the OAS sanctions has resulted in a
marked cutback in Radio Caribe's propaganda favorable to Castro
and to the Soviet bloc, although its attacks on "US imperialism"
continue. A Trujillo opponent has told a US official that the USSR's
UN move has, however, strengthened the hand of the pro-Castro
faction among the dissidents. Most of the dissidents are pro-US
moderates and professional men.
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The Situation in El Salvador
Since early August the four-year-old, mildly reformist re-
gime of Salvadoran President Lemus has been under persistent
attack by leftist student and labor elements, many of them pro-
Communist and pro-Castro. After a student and labor demon-
stration on 2 September in which one youth was killed and many
people were seriously injured as a result of police action, Lemus
on 5 September. decreed a 30-day state of siege--El Salvador's
first since 1952. The President, himself a military man, took
this action. under pressure from the officers of the armed forces,
who were reportedly considering a coup if he refused.
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The state of siege, although removing the immediate threat
to the administration, did not halt. leftist exploitation of the situa-
tion. Despite an appeal for calm by the. Archbishop of San Salva=
dor, there was much public indignation over the security police's
indiscriminate use of force in the 2 September disorders. A new
anti-government demonstration was called for 9 September and
there were widespread rumors that a protest general strike was
being planned for 15 September--El. Salvador's Independence Day.
On 8 September, however, a group of business and civic lead-
ers including the Archbishop met with the President and later, with
student leaders, and the next day the government made a statement
promising. an investigation of the responsibility for the violence on
2 September and the release of some of the arrested students. The
9 September mass meeting went off peacefully and with no interfer-
ence from the police, and student leaders are reported in the press
as favorably impressed by the government's "changed attitude."
The US Embassy sees the imminent threat of Lemus' overthrow as
removed.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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 TOP blECRIET