CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005300220001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 26, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

~/// Approved For"'~lease pb/O5E(REi7TTOO97 ,PO53OO22OOO1-8
'25X1'
26 September 1960
2
Copy No. Cj~- !
r
. . r
r,/O
r
r
r r
r
r
r
r
... _..__ r
ri c I?J r. ASS,
2
State Dept. review completed
Approved For ReleaseTOFV045IEIrOO975AO05300220001_8
~~rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr/l.~
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300220001-8
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300220001-8
 . 25X1 Approved For lease 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00 7'50005300220001-8
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
26 September 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
25X1
25X1
caused by his proposal to revamp the UN machinery from
overshadowing his heavy emphasis on anticolonialism, which
Congo crisis, Khrushchev now is trying to prevent the uproar
of his proposal. Having ailed to win significant Asian-Africa
support for Soviet attacks on Hammarskjold's handling of the
a three-man "collective executive body," Khrushchev now is
linking a solution of the disarmament question to the adoptio
USSR-UN: In an effort to offset the adverse reaction to
his proposal to replace the UN secretary general's office wit
he hopes will gain Asian-African support for Soviet positions
on other issues.
USSR: Radio Moscow has announced plans to mark 27
September as "A. Day in the World" in commemoration of a
similar effort sparked 25 years ago by Maxim Gorky. All(.,
listeners over the world have been invited to submit accounts
of their activities on that day. These will be incorporated in a
special 24-hour broadcast designed to "create jointly a truth-
ful picture of one day, X27 September," and the results will
later be published in a book. This appears to be little more
than a propaganda splurge. However, with Khrushchev at the
UN and the Sibir range-instrumentation vessels still in the
Pacific, it could provide the occasion for some startling o-
litical initiative or for a new spectacular space. effort. 25X1
25X1 Approved For Re ease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T009 5A005300220001-8
I
jj
WEEMS
 25XI
I I. ASIA-AFRICA
1~~Mnxsi,
M Er
0
Afghanistan- Pakistan 6. Border tension is growing as Afghar
Army reinforcements move. closer to the scene of recent Push-
toon, tribal fighting along the northern sector of the frontier.
Premier Daud, in informing Ambassador Byroade on 24 Sep-
tember of the "serious situatioxVI stated that Afghan Army unit
being moved up to the border have already been involved in
"skirmishes" with Pakistani I 'sympathizers I I --presumably
tribal elements inside Afghanistan who oppose the entry of gov-
ernment troops into their territory. The danger of clashes
26, Sept 60
25X1
DAILY BRIEF
25-Xl
5AO05300220001-8
MPPI VV%~U FVI F-,,TMCA~%~ 4VV41VV1V-* . %~IM-FXLJrl V I V~~
 J~~~~j/jjjjjjj///j/jjj~~~jj/jjjjjjjjjj~~j/~~~~~/jjjj/jjj~~jjjjjjj/jjjjjjjjjjjjjjj~~jjjjjjjjjj/j/~j~j~~jjj~j~jj
Approved Fo lease 2002/0/04 . CIA-RD~7~T00~ 005300220001-a /~{
25X1
between regular army forces on either side will increase as
both Kabul and Rawalpindi take measures to support their
tribal partisans, although efforts Probably will be made to
keen the disturbances localized.
25X1
25X1
*Turkey: I~The "withdrawal" of Colonel Alparslan Turkes
from his position of under secretary to the prime minister on
22 September probably reflects a growing cleavage within the
ruling Committee of National Union (CNU) between a group
of ambitious nationalistic young officers and a larger conserva-
tive element. As close adviser to General Gursel, chairman
of the CNU and interim chief of state, Turkes has attracted
26. Sept 60
DAILY BRIEF iii
01
 -----
25X1
11
IS//X1
r
0
rowing resentment within the committee. Lt. Gen. Madanoglu,,
another strong figure in the CNU, appears to be Turkes' leading
antagonist
25X1
III. THE WEST
Iceland-UK: ,The announcement by the Icelandic Foreign
Ministry that it will begin talks with Britain on the fisheries
dispute on 1 October has triggered a call by Icelandic Communists
and other extremists for demonstrations against any compromise
on Iceland's 12-mile fishing limit. These groups hope to main-
tain this irritant in Iceland's relations with Britain and NATO by
preventing a settlement; they also hope to discredit the govern-
ment by portraying its willingness to negotiate as being a sell-
out of Iceland's interests. The central issue in the negotiations
probably will' be the period of time in which British and other 25X1
fishing interests will be ermitted to phase out their operations
inside the 12-mile ?
26 Sept 60
DAILY BRIEF iv
25X1 Approved For Re ease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T009 5A005300220001-8
IMM
 Approved Fo
Khrushchev Links Plan for Revamping UN Machinery
To Disarmament
Khrushchev's press conference remarks on 24 September
reflect his concern that the widespread adverse reaction to
his proposal to replace the UN secretary general's office with
a three-man "collective executive body" threatens to overshad-
ow and jeopardize the USSR's bid. to gain the support and sym-
pathy of the Asian-African nations by exploiting the Congo is-
sue and anticolonialism in general. Having failed to win sig-
nificant Asian-African support for his attacks on Hammarskjold's
handling of the Congo situation, Khrushchev shifted to the dis-
armament problem to justify his proposal to revamp the UN
machinery. He told his press conference that unless his pro-
posal is adopted, "we will be unable to solve the disarmament
question" because it would be impossible to have an interna-
tional armed force, established in accordance with a disarma-
ment treaty, under the command of Hammarskjold.
Khrushchev insisted that he was not attacking the secretary
general personally and. that the USSR was seeking only "better
organizational forms" to assure "true peaceful coexistence"
and impartiality that would protect the interests of all nations.
Soviet concern over the uproar that greeted Khrushchev's pro-
posal was also evident in press reports that Soviet diplomats
at the UN are stressing that Khrushchev had made "no formal
proposals" and that his plan to replace the secretary general
by an executive committee was merely a "suggestion."
The concept of a three-man executive body composed of
representatives of the West, the Communist bloc, and the
neutralist nations probably was intended to serve the double
purpose of winning favor with the uncommitted states and
indicating the USSR's extreme displeasure with Hammarskjold's
actions in the Congo crisis. It is unlikely that the Soviet lead-
ers had any. serious expectation of gaining acceptance of this
plan or that they intend to press their proposal to a vote in the
General Assembly.
K,hrushchev's heavy emphasis on the "final elimination of
colonialism" in his speech to the General Assembly on 23 Sep-
tember was designed not only to win Asian-African support and
25X1
Approved Fo
26 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A0p5300220001-8
mobilize the uncommitted nations on behalf of Soviet positions
on other issues, but also to strengthen the USSR's hand, in deal-
ing with the Sino-Soviet dispute. Peiping has given the speech
terse, factual treatment in broadcasts beamed abroad but has almost
entirely ignored it in broadcasts to the domestic audience.
President Nkrumah's address, in contrast, was accorded ex-
tensive coverage o
Khrushchev's speech did not contain any major changes in
Soviet positions on outstanding East-West issues. After making
the expected indictment of United States policy, he restated the
Soviet proposals of 2 June on general and complete disarmament,
moving a reduction of conventional forces from the second to the
first stage in order to "take into account the wishes of some West-
ern powers." He also proposed that an. undefined number of neu-
tral nations should participate in the next round of disarmament
negotiations.
On the questions of Germany and Berlin,' Khrushchev re-
affirmed his post-summit position that the USSR will "wait awhile
with the solution of the question of a German peace. treaty" and
seek agreement with the West at another summit conference "in
a few months' time
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300220001-8
26 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
 Approved Fo
P5300220001-8
Soviet Radio to Observe "A Day in the World"
Radio Moscow has announced plans to observe 27 Septem-
ber as "A Day in the World." Letters have been sent to cer-
tain prominent individuals, and a general invitation has been
issued to all listeners throughout the world to submit accounts
of their activities on that day. The results will be broadcast
in a 24-hour special program and will appear later in book
form.
This effort, undertaken jointly by the all-Union radio and
the official government organ Izvestia, will commemorate a
similar program which was broadcast on 27 September 1935 and
published several months later as Maxim Gorky's book A Day
in the World. Gorky's work covered the events of 27 September
1935 on a country-by-country basis; the United States was fea-
tured as a "land of contrasts" between monopoly capital and
the working class and between liberal and extreme conservative
political positions. Much attention was given to the work of the
American Communist party and other left-wing political and
social groups.
Radio Moscow's focus on the "events and problems which
are stirring mankind" and its appeal to listeners for aid in cre-
ating a "truthful picture" of 27 September suggest that the
current effort will result in a stock propaganda barrage on the
growing strength of the "socialist camp and the working-class
movement."
It is possible, however, that Khrushchev will take advan-
tage of the planned events by presenting some dramatic new
diplomatic initiative at the United Nations. Another possibility
is a space effort; the Sibir range-instrumentation ships are
still in the Pacific where they could support an earth satellite
or space venture. When talking to newsmen yesterday, Khrushchev
said that the USSR has not yet attempted to launch a man into space,
but "we have both the rockets and the space ship in which a man can
be sent aloft,"
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A005300220001-8
26 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300220001-8
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300220001-8
 Diss~Bt'f(e e 2fWRJg11J;WMtJfF -
The resignation of Col. Alparslan Turkes on 23 September
from his prominent position as under secretary to Prime Min-
ister Gursel appears to reflect a growing cleavage within the
Committee of National Union, (CNU). Turkes, who has attracted
the ambitious nationalistic young members of the CNU, has been
outspoken against the Republican Peoples party (RPP) of Ismet
Inonu and is reported to have political ambitions of his own. The
Turkes faction, probably no more than one fourth of the commit-
tee's membership, has irritated the majority, which favors
early restoration of normal...- civil government.
Turkes' major antagonist within the committee is Lt. Gen.
Cemal Madanoglu, an influential member of the CNU who ap-
pears to favor the RPP. There have been suggestions that if
a struggle for power within the government should develop it
would be between Turkes and Ma.danoglu.
Turkes submitted his resignation while most of the members
of the CNU were touring the provinces explaining the background
of the revolution, and surveying popular reactions. He may have
been making a bid for the support of those members who remained
in Ankara. Those who met to discuss the resignation are reported
to have suggested that Turkes become prime minister, with Gursel
remaining as head of state. The Turkish home service announce-
ment of the resignation explained that it had been necessary be-
cause of Turkes' increasing duties within the committee.
The military regime is entering a critical period during which
the former leaders of government will beltried., a new constitu-
tion and electoral law must be presented to the people, elections
are to be held, and a new constituent assembly chosen.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approvea or a ease
26 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
 Approved F?r Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A005300220001-8
Iceland and Britain to en Talks on Fisheries Dispute
The Icelandic Foreign Ministry announcement on 21 Septem-
ber that talks with Britain on the fishing limits dispute will
open on 1 October in Reykjavik has triggered a call by Icelandic
Communists and other extremists for popular demonstrations
against any compromise on the 12-mile fishing limits. Last
August Prime Minister Thors? Conservative-Social Democratic
government agreed to undertake negotiations on this contro-
versial issue, which has threatened, several times to disrupt
relations between the two countries. As a conciliatory gesture,
British fishing interests at that time agreed to extend. to 13
October their temporary compliance with the 12-mile limit in
order that the talks might be held in a calm atmosphere.
This issue overshadows all others on the Icelandic political
scene, and the Thors government has little room for maneuver
because it maintains that the 12-mile-fishing-limit principle is
not a subject for negotiation. The British have indicated their
willingness to respect Iceland's unilaterally extended fishing
limits provided they are able to phase out their operations
within the disputed waters over a period of years. A central
issue in the talks is likely to be the period of time during
which British and other fishing interests claiming. "historic
rights" will be permitted to continue to fish within the new
boundaries.
The Thors government's caution on this issue is dictated
by the intense activity of the Communists and other extremist
groups which have.pictured the government's willingness to ne-
gotiate as a sell-out of Iceland's interests, They want to main-
tain tensions in Iceland's relations with Britain and NATO and
to discredit the Conservatives and Social Democrats for their
role in favoring talks with Britain. As the date for opening the
talks approaches, the Communists probably will organize mass
demonstrations in an effort to mobilize opinion against any
compromise settlement and to force the government to retreat
on this issue.
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A005300220001-8
26 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300220001-8
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300220001-8
 Approved Fo lease 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A0053 0220001-8 25X1
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
Approved For Rlelease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A005P00220001-8
25X1
 ~ ;000,
Approved For ReleastbWO EIepEj700975AO05300220001-8