CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005300220001-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
15
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 26, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 26, 1960
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005300220001-8.pdf867.26 KB
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~/// Approved For"'~lease pb/O5E(REi7TTOO97 ,PO53OO22OOO1-8 '25X1' 26 September 1960 2 Copy No. Cj~- ! r . . r r,/O r r r r r r r r ... _..__ r ri c I?J r. ASS, 2 State Dept. review completed Approved For ReleaseTOFV045IEIrOO975AO05300220001_8 ~~rrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrrr/l.~ 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300220001-8 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300220001-8 . 25X1 Approved For lease 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00 7'50005300220001-8 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 26 September 1960 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC 25X1 25X1 caused by his proposal to revamp the UN machinery from overshadowing his heavy emphasis on anticolonialism, which Congo crisis, Khrushchev now is trying to prevent the uproar of his proposal. Having ailed to win significant Asian-Africa support for Soviet attacks on Hammarskjold's handling of the a three-man "collective executive body," Khrushchev now is linking a solution of the disarmament question to the adoptio USSR-UN: In an effort to offset the adverse reaction to his proposal to replace the UN secretary general's office wit he hopes will gain Asian-African support for Soviet positions on other issues. USSR: Radio Moscow has announced plans to mark 27 September as "A. Day in the World" in commemoration of a similar effort sparked 25 years ago by Maxim Gorky. All(., listeners over the world have been invited to submit accounts of their activities on that day. These will be incorporated in a special 24-hour broadcast designed to "create jointly a truth- ful picture of one day, X27 September," and the results will later be published in a book. This appears to be little more than a propaganda splurge. However, with Khrushchev at the UN and the Sibir range-instrumentation vessels still in the Pacific, it could provide the occasion for some startling o- litical initiative or for a new spectacular space. effort. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Re ease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T009 5A005300220001-8 I jj WEEMS 25XI I I. ASIA-AFRICA 1~~Mnxsi, M Er 0 Afghanistan- Pakistan 6. Border tension is growing as Afghar Army reinforcements move. closer to the scene of recent Push- toon, tribal fighting along the northern sector of the frontier. Premier Daud, in informing Ambassador Byroade on 24 Sep- tember of the "serious situatioxVI stated that Afghan Army unit being moved up to the border have already been involved in "skirmishes" with Pakistani I 'sympathizers I I --presumably tribal elements inside Afghanistan who oppose the entry of gov- ernment troops into their territory. The danger of clashes 26, Sept 60 25X1 DAILY BRIEF 25-Xl 5AO05300220001-8 MPPI VV%~U FVI F-,,TMCA~%~ 4VV41VV1V-* . %~IM-FXLJrl V I V~~ J~~~~j/jjjjjjj///j/jjj~~~jj/jjjjjjjjjj~~j/~~~~~/jjjj/jjj~~jjjjjjj/jjjjjjjjjjjjjjj~~jjjjjjjjjj/j/~j~j~~jjj~j~jj Approved Fo lease 2002/0/04 . CIA-RD~7~T00~ 005300220001-a /~{ 25X1 between regular army forces on either side will increase as both Kabul and Rawalpindi take measures to support their tribal partisans, although efforts Probably will be made to keen the disturbances localized. 25X1 25X1 *Turkey: I~The "withdrawal" of Colonel Alparslan Turkes from his position of under secretary to the prime minister on 22 September probably reflects a growing cleavage within the ruling Committee of National Union (CNU) between a group of ambitious nationalistic young officers and a larger conserva- tive element. As close adviser to General Gursel, chairman of the CNU and interim chief of state, Turkes has attracted 26. Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF iii 01 ----- 25X1 11 IS//X1 r 0 rowing resentment within the committee. Lt. Gen. Madanoglu,, another strong figure in the CNU, appears to be Turkes' leading antagonist 25X1 III. THE WEST Iceland-UK: ,The announcement by the Icelandic Foreign Ministry that it will begin talks with Britain on the fisheries dispute on 1 October has triggered a call by Icelandic Communists and other extremists for demonstrations against any compromise on Iceland's 12-mile fishing limit. These groups hope to main- tain this irritant in Iceland's relations with Britain and NATO by preventing a settlement; they also hope to discredit the govern- ment by portraying its willingness to negotiate as being a sell- out of Iceland's interests. The central issue in the negotiations probably will' be the period of time in which British and other 25X1 fishing interests will be ermitted to phase out their operations inside the 12-mile ? 26 Sept 60 DAILY BRIEF iv 25X1 Approved For Re ease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T009 5A005300220001-8 IMM Approved Fo Khrushchev Links Plan for Revamping UN Machinery To Disarmament Khrushchev's press conference remarks on 24 September reflect his concern that the widespread adverse reaction to his proposal to replace the UN secretary general's office with a three-man "collective executive body" threatens to overshad- ow and jeopardize the USSR's bid. to gain the support and sym- pathy of the Asian-African nations by exploiting the Congo is- sue and anticolonialism in general. Having failed to win sig- nificant Asian-African support for his attacks on Hammarskjold's handling of the Congo situation, Khrushchev shifted to the dis- armament problem to justify his proposal to revamp the UN machinery. He told his press conference that unless his pro- posal is adopted, "we will be unable to solve the disarmament question" because it would be impossible to have an interna- tional armed force, established in accordance with a disarma- ment treaty, under the command of Hammarskjold. Khrushchev insisted that he was not attacking the secretary general personally and. that the USSR was seeking only "better organizational forms" to assure "true peaceful coexistence" and impartiality that would protect the interests of all nations. Soviet concern over the uproar that greeted Khrushchev's pro- posal was also evident in press reports that Soviet diplomats at the UN are stressing that Khrushchev had made "no formal proposals" and that his plan to replace the secretary general by an executive committee was merely a "suggestion." The concept of a three-man executive body composed of representatives of the West, the Communist bloc, and the neutralist nations probably was intended to serve the double purpose of winning favor with the uncommitted states and indicating the USSR's extreme displeasure with Hammarskjold's actions in the Congo crisis. It is unlikely that the Soviet lead- ers had any. serious expectation of gaining acceptance of this plan or that they intend to press their proposal to a vote in the General Assembly. K,hrushchev's heavy emphasis on the "final elimination of colonialism" in his speech to the General Assembly on 23 Sep- tember was designed not only to win Asian-African support and 25X1 Approved Fo 26 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A0p5300220001-8 mobilize the uncommitted nations on behalf of Soviet positions on other issues, but also to strengthen the USSR's hand, in deal- ing with the Sino-Soviet dispute. Peiping has given the speech terse, factual treatment in broadcasts beamed abroad but has almost entirely ignored it in broadcasts to the domestic audience. President Nkrumah's address, in contrast, was accorded ex- tensive coverage o Khrushchev's speech did not contain any major changes in Soviet positions on outstanding East-West issues. After making the expected indictment of United States policy, he restated the Soviet proposals of 2 June on general and complete disarmament, moving a reduction of conventional forces from the second to the first stage in order to "take into account the wishes of some West- ern powers." He also proposed that an. undefined number of neu- tral nations should participate in the next round of disarmament negotiations. On the questions of Germany and Berlin,' Khrushchev re- affirmed his post-summit position that the USSR will "wait awhile with the solution of the question of a German peace. treaty" and seek agreement with the West at another summit conference "in a few months' time Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300220001-8 26 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved Fo P5300220001-8 Soviet Radio to Observe "A Day in the World" Radio Moscow has announced plans to observe 27 Septem- ber as "A Day in the World." Letters have been sent to cer- tain prominent individuals, and a general invitation has been issued to all listeners throughout the world to submit accounts of their activities on that day. The results will be broadcast in a 24-hour special program and will appear later in book form. This effort, undertaken jointly by the all-Union radio and the official government organ Izvestia, will commemorate a similar program which was broadcast on 27 September 1935 and published several months later as Maxim Gorky's book A Day in the World. Gorky's work covered the events of 27 September 1935 on a country-by-country basis; the United States was fea- tured as a "land of contrasts" between monopoly capital and the working class and between liberal and extreme conservative political positions. Much attention was given to the work of the American Communist party and other left-wing political and social groups. Radio Moscow's focus on the "events and problems which are stirring mankind" and its appeal to listeners for aid in cre- ating a "truthful picture" of 27 September suggest that the current effort will result in a stock propaganda barrage on the growing strength of the "socialist camp and the working-class movement." It is possible, however, that Khrushchev will take advan- tage of the planned events by presenting some dramatic new diplomatic initiative at the United Nations. Another possibility is a space effort; the Sibir range-instrumentation ships are still in the Pacific where they could support an earth satellite or space venture. When talking to newsmen yesterday, Khrushchev said that the USSR has not yet attempted to launch a man into space, but "we have both the rockets and the space ship in which a man can be sent aloft," 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A005300220001-8 26 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300220001-8 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300220001-8 Diss~Bt'f(e e 2fWRJg11J;WMtJfF - The resignation of Col. Alparslan Turkes on 23 September from his prominent position as under secretary to Prime Min- ister Gursel appears to reflect a growing cleavage within the Committee of National Union, (CNU). Turkes, who has attracted the ambitious nationalistic young members of the CNU, has been outspoken against the Republican Peoples party (RPP) of Ismet Inonu and is reported to have political ambitions of his own. The Turkes faction, probably no more than one fourth of the commit- tee's membership, has irritated the majority, which favors early restoration of normal...- civil government. Turkes' major antagonist within the committee is Lt. Gen. Cemal Madanoglu, an influential member of the CNU who ap- pears to favor the RPP. There have been suggestions that if a struggle for power within the government should develop it would be between Turkes and Ma.danoglu. Turkes submitted his resignation while most of the members of the CNU were touring the provinces explaining the background of the revolution, and surveying popular reactions. He may have been making a bid for the support of those members who remained in Ankara. Those who met to discuss the resignation are reported to have suggested that Turkes become prime minister, with Gursel remaining as head of state. The Turkish home service announce- ment of the resignation explained that it had been necessary be- cause of Turkes' increasing duties within the committee. The military regime is entering a critical period during which the former leaders of government will beltried., a new constitu- tion and electoral law must be presented to the people, elections are to be held, and a new constituent assembly chosen. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approvea or a ease 26 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved F?r Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A005300220001-8 Iceland and Britain to en Talks on Fisheries Dispute The Icelandic Foreign Ministry announcement on 21 Septem- ber that talks with Britain on the fishing limits dispute will open on 1 October in Reykjavik has triggered a call by Icelandic Communists and other extremists for popular demonstrations against any compromise on the 12-mile fishing limits. Last August Prime Minister Thors? Conservative-Social Democratic government agreed to undertake negotiations on this contro- versial issue, which has threatened, several times to disrupt relations between the two countries. As a conciliatory gesture, British fishing interests at that time agreed to extend. to 13 October their temporary compliance with the 12-mile limit in order that the talks might be held in a calm atmosphere. This issue overshadows all others on the Icelandic political scene, and the Thors government has little room for maneuver because it maintains that the 12-mile-fishing-limit principle is not a subject for negotiation. The British have indicated their willingness to respect Iceland's unilaterally extended fishing limits provided they are able to phase out their operations within the disputed waters over a period of years. A central issue in the talks is likely to be the period of time during which British and other fishing interests claiming. "historic rights" will be permitted to continue to fish within the new boundaries. The Thors government's caution on this issue is dictated by the intense activity of the Communists and other extremist groups which have.pictured the government's willingness to ne- gotiate as a sell-out of Iceland's interests, They want to main- tain tensions in Iceland's relations with Britain and NATO and to discredit the Conservatives and Social Democrats for their role in favoring talks with Britain. As the date for opening the talks approaches, the Communists probably will organize mass demonstrations in an effort to mobilize opinion against any compromise settlement and to force the government to retreat on this issue. 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A005300220001-8 26 Sept 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300220001-8 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300220001-8 Approved Fo lease 2002/09/04 :CIA-RDP79T00975A0053 0220001-8 25X1 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved For Rlelease 2002/09/04: CIA-RDP79T00975A005P00220001-8 25X1 ~ ;000, Approved For ReleastbWO EIepEj700975AO05300220001-8