CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005300250001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 29, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
29 September 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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North Vietnam - USSR - Communist China- LHo Chi Minh
intends to keen North Vietnam out of the Sino- Soviet dispute,
Ho de-
movement outside the bloc. He said that after the Bucharest
conference he had tried to get Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung
to "sit together and resolve their differences" but both had re-
fused., Although Ho indicated personal preference for certain
Chinese views, his noncommittal policy is borne out by recent
North Vietnamese speeches`1
plored the effect the dispute was having on the ommunist
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drop for use in the event it is decided to send regular army
along the frontier continues and Afghan forces become more
deeply involved. The Pakistani Air Force is organizing an air,
ghan and Pakistani regular forces is mounting as tribal fightin
Afghanistan-Pakistan: The danger of clashes between Al-
troops into the area, Meanwhile, there are reports of disturb=
ances:"in sor e..Afghan cities, possibly a result of opposition to
the call-up of reserves.
29 Sept 60
can i nppruveu r
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*Laos: The capture on 28 September of Sam Neua town,
with its k y airfield, will give the Communist Pathet Lao im-
portant bargaining leverage in any peace talks with the royal
Laotian government. The status of the Sam Neua garrison is
not clear, but it had earlier been reported planning to establish
new defense positions at Muong Peun, about 20 miles southwest
of Sam Neua town. Support of this position would be extremely
difficult because of its relative inaccessibility by surface means
and because its small airstrip is only marginally serviceable.
Vientiane radio claims, meanwhile, that there has been a re-
volt in the Second Military Region command structure and that
the region, which has jurisdiction over Sam Neua and Xieng
Khouang Provinces, has now swung its support to the Souvanna
Phouma government. If this is true, Lao army forces in Sam
Neua may negotiate a truce with the Pathet Lao rather than make
a stand at Muong Peuno
29 Sept 60
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Military commanders representing the Souvanna regime
and General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee
agreed in Luang Prabang on 28 September to a cease-fire be-
tween, their respective forces pending the outcome of negotiations
on substantive points at issue between the two groups. These 25X1
talks are slated to begin within five days.
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DAILY BRIEF v
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North Vietnam Hopes to Stay Out of Sino-Soviet Feud
LHo Chi Minh intends to keep North Vietnam out of the
Sino-Soviet dispute,I
1116 expresse
deep concern about the feud, deploring its effect on Commu-
nist movements outside the.bloc.5
The North Vietnamese leader, who made an unannounced
trip to Moscow in mid-August and has consistently stressed
the need for "socialist unity" in recent speeches, admitted
his own efforts at mediation had failed. He said that after
the Bucharest conference in June, he had tried to get Khru-
shchev and Mao Tse-tung to "sit together and resolve their
differences" but each, convinced that his position alone was
the correct one, had refused. Ho complained "neither Khru-
shchev nor Mao seemed to realize" the damage their dispute
was doing.)
IAn old-line revolutionary determined to overthrow. the
present government of South Vietnam, Ho expressed some
personal views which would be more acceptable in Peiping
than in Moscow. In Ho's opinion, the "bourgeois" elements
who brought Afro-Asian nations from colonial status to in-
dependence had served their ur ose and should now be dis-
osed of by "class struggle."
Whatever his private sentiments, Ho's noncommittal
policy was borne out by his speeches at the North Vietnamese
congress. North Vietnamese writers and spokesmen have
continued since then to avoid those aspects of the ideological
debate which could be construed as criticism of either Khru-
shchev or Mao Tse-tunaj E:
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Danger of Afghan-Pakistani. Strife Increasing
The danger of clashes between Afghan and Pakistani army
units is mounting as tribal fighting along the frontier continues,
with heavy casualties, and Afghan forces become more deeply
involved.
Pakistani Foreign Minister Qadir announced on 28 Septem-
ber that "the government of Pakistan is holding itself in readi-
ness for all eventualities and is capable of dealing effectively
with all attempts at violating Pakistan's frontiers:' He empha-
sizedAfghanistan's "hostile concentrations" along the border, and
stated that the Afghans reportedly are claiming that they have
the support of a "certain big power:' tAs an indication of the ex-
tent of its concern, the foreign secretary on. 28 September called
in the-Soviet and American ambassadors to present his govern-
ment's views on the situation. In commenting on rumors of So-
viet promises of military support to Afghanistan, he told the So-
viet ambassador, "We expect and hope the USSR will not get in-
volved.
The Pakistani Air Force is organizing an air drop in the
event it is decided to send regular army troops into the moun-
tains where the fighting is taking place. The Pakistanis appar-
ently hope, however, that tribes friendly to Pakistan will gain
control, expel the Afghan irregulars who have crossed the bor-
der, and restore order.
The Afghans have shown considerable ncern about Paki-
stan's reaction to the border provocations. Kabul has appar-
ently placed its Soviet-supplied NHG-17 let fighters on the
alert Afghanistan's continued efforts to strengthen its mili-
Mary position along the border are probably directed at pre-
venting Pakistan from stirring up trouble among Afghanistan's
tribes as well as at encouraging tribal opposition to Pakistani
authority across the border.
Meanwhile, there are reports of disturbances in some
Afghan cities, possibly a result of opposition to the call-up
of reserves. Many reservists are reportedly already de-
serting.
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The Situation in Laos
Sam Neua town, with its key airfield, has apparently fallen
to the Pathet Lao forces which have been gradually advancing on
it since about 1 September. The fate of the Sam Neua garrison
is not clear, but it had been earlier reported planning to establish
new defense positions at Muong Peun, about 25 miles southwest of
Sam Neua town. While Muong Peun is described as a good defensive
position, support of troops there would probably present serious
problems. It would be difficult to supply and reenforce the garrison
by surface means, and Muong Peun?s small airstrip is only margin-
ally serviceable. Control of Sam Neua town, the military and
administrative center of Sam Neua Province, will give the Pathet
Lao important bargaining leverage in any peace talks with the royal
government. f
Vientiane radio has broadcast a statement by Lt. Colo Kham
Hou, military commander in Xieng Khouang Province, claiming
that he had assumed command of the Second Military Region and
pledging his loyalty to the Souvanna Phourna government. The re-
gion, which embraces Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang Provinces, has
been loyal to General Phoumi's Savannakhet Revolutionary Com-
mittee. It is as yet unclear whether Kham Hou. can legitimately speak
for the whole region, but if the region has in fact, swung to Souvanna,
it constitutes a serious blow to Phoumi s .fortunes. Any such switch
might also lead the Lao army forces in Sam Neua to negotiate a
truce rather than offer further resistance to the Pathet Lao.
'ilitary commanders representing the Souvanna regime and
the Savannakhet Revolutionary Committee, led by Generals Ouane
and Phoumi respectively, held a short meeting in Luang Prabang
on 28 September which resulted in a cease-fire agreement between
their forces. This meeting is to be followed within five days by a
full dress conference of military and political leaders from both
sides who will seek to resolve the substantive points at issue. A
mutually face-saving compromise will be difficult to achieve
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juvanna Phouma, in confirming to Ambassador Brown that
his government had approached the Soviet ambassador in Phnom
Penh with the suggestion that diplomatic relations with non-resi-
dent envoys be established, pleaded the pressure of "public
opinion" as the reason for his move. He added that relations would
not actually be establi-shed for at least a month., Should a new govern-
ment emerge from the impending political conference, it is possible that
the effort to establish relations with the USSR will be quietly dropped
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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