CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005300410001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 18, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For4pleaseTOOP/2 0097 p0530041000e
25X1
18 October 1960
Copy No. C 74
25X1
ri
DOCUMENT P~0-a*
NO Cif. Sdv_~ i HAGS,
Tt : S C
NEXT f1LVikN hill:
AUTH: NH 70.2
DA E: nEVIEWER 25X1
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
j
Approved For Release p279ERET00975A005300410001-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300410001-7
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300410001-7
 ~jj~jj~jjj~ j
RNS"ved F elease 2003/02/27 .CIA-RDP79T 09005300410001-7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25X1
18 October 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
E
j
Berlin: An article in the East Uerman party newspaper
on 15 October warned that East Germany may impose restric-
tions on West German shipments to West Berlin unless Bonn
agrees to renew the interzonal trade agreement. The inter-
zonal trade agreement was denounced by Bonn on 30 Septem-
ber, with the effective date to be 31 December. The new East
German threat appears designed to put pressure on West Ger-
many to renew the interzonal trade agreement for 1961, as
well as to test general Western reactions.
Ui
25X1
25X1
P/m/li,
2,6-oved For RoIease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T04975A0053004100d1-7
7 ///////%.. '' /
 25
>4proved For lease 2003/02/27 .CIA-RDP79T 09A005300410001-7
j
25X1
U
VA
II. ASIA-AFRICA
25X1 Burma-USSR:Burmese Premier U Nu has accepted
an invitation to visit the USSR, F_ I 25X1
25X1
and plans to go in November following a meet- ? r_
ing with Nehru in New Delhi. U Nu may hope to obtain Mos-
cow's assistance for new economic development projects. He
may also desire to balance the effect in Moscow of his recent
visit to Peiping for the signing of the Sino-Burmese border
treaty and his attendance at Communist China's National Day
25X1 celebrations.
25X1
would be successful]
Turkey: In the mass political trial of former Menderes
regime officials which began on 14 October, the prosecu-
tion has demanded death for 38 persons, including Menderes
and ex-President Bayar. The trial is currently in recess un-
til 19 October to allow the defendants more time to confer
with their attorneys. [Meanwhile, many retired military of-
ficers are reported to be congregating in Istanbul, and some
ave informed the American army attache that they will
launch a counter-revolt if former Chief of the General Staff
Erdelhun is sentenced to death. The attache believes some
bloodshed is possible, but does not believe a counter-coup
Libya: In the face of the strongest parliamentary pres-
sure on the government in Libya's nine years of independence,
King Idris on 16 October replaced Prime Minister Kubar and
revised the cabinet. The new prime minister, Muhammad
Ben Uthman, is a politician and businessman from the sparse-
ly populated Fezzan Province who has held portfolios in most
18 Oct 60
DAILY BRIEF ii
A l5 6I'ed For R lease 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79TOp975A005300410001-7
25X1
 25X1
18 Oct 60
25X1
25X1
25X1
4V le-
25X1
DAILY BRIEF
ApWDa(Jbd For Relkase 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79TO 975AO05300410001-7
25X1
Phouma regime economic aid:7
tablishment, the American army attache reports.. The new
Soviet ambassador is reported to have offered the Souvanna
cabinets since 1951. His selection appears designed to an-
swer the criticisms of corruption in government, and also
to avoid accentuating frictions between Tripolitanian and
Cyrenaican politicians. The new premier has been friendly
and cooperative with American officials.
Laos: CThe Defense ministry and army headquarters
staffs -in Vientianei,- appear. demoralized and bitter over the
confusion resulting from deepening splits in the military es-
paralysis in the central government will)xAsiex-Mahambets
separatist 'position,
I
couraging a reopening of parliament as a vehicle for the ree-
oncili-4i , iiof,, opposing Congolese factions. Tshombe' may
have encouraged Mobutu to reaffirm his intention to "neu-
tralize" all factions in Leopoldville in hopes that continuing
0
*Republic of the Congo: As a result of his talk on 16 Oc-
tober with Katanga, Presi nt Tshombe, Mobutu apparently
has reconsidered his earlier intention to reconvene the Con-
golese parliament. On 17 October he stated that the army
and the College of Commissioners will run the Congo until
the end of the year, and that there will be "no question of
parliament meetings-. The UN administration has been en.
I I I. THE WEST
Bolivia-USSR: Bolivian President Paz is under strong
domestic pressure to secure foreign aid, from the USSR if
necessary, for the construction of a tin smelter. Last week,
when the Bolivian UN delegation discussed Khrushchev's Sep-
tember''offer of a tin smelter with Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko, Gromyko apparently made the offer conditional
on Bolivia's establishing an embassy in Moscow. Paz appar-
ently is planning to establish such an but has in-
dicated to the American ambassador that the opening date
25X1 might be delayed.
25X1
 25X1
Approved Fq
Communists
With Bergin
ireaten. to Bloc West German Trade
East Germany has threatened to interfere with traffic be-
tween West Berlin and West Germany unless Bonn agrees to
renew the interzonal trade agreement for 1961. The threat
was attributed to a medium-level official of the Ministry for
Foreign and Internal German Trade in an article in the offi-
cial party newspaper, Neus Deutschland, on 15 October, al~
though the term "blockade" was not used. He asserted that
the West German abrogation of the interzonal trade agreement
affected not only the movement of goods between. the Federal
Republic and West Berlin but also agreements between the
railway systems of the two parts of Germany and for deliv-
eries of electricity, gas, and water to West Berlin.
jSome West German officials are fearful that any new trade
negotiations with the East Germans will inevitably be held on
a ministerial level and. imply recognition of the Ulbricht regime
East German officials were said to be willing to conclude agree-
ments on all matters at issue "if appropriate official offers of
negotiations are submitted to them:' The East Germans are re-
ported by a high East German . trade official. to be confident that
Bonn will seek a resumption of interzonal trade as soon as West
Berlin begins to feel the pinch caused by the loss of certain East
German exports to West Berlin, particularly coal.
The East German threat appears designed also to test West-
ern reaction. In a discussion of the Berlin problem on 5 Octo-
ber, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official asked an American Em-
bassy officer what solutions the West envisaged. Denying, that
there was no alternative to the Soviet proposal to make West
Berlin a free city, he asked for Western. reaction to including
East Berlin in a free city, to be established within the framework
of a German confederation, with each part of the city retaining a
large measure of autonomy.
The USSR has officially rejected suggestions along this line
on the grounds that East Berlin is the capital of East Germany.
Moscow, however, would probably hope to represent any such
Western offer as a retreat from the fundamental position that
Western occupation rights are based on Germany's unconditional
surrender and cannot be the subject of bargaining apart from an
agreement on German unification. 17
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved or Release
- -
18 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300410001-7
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300410001-7
 Approved Fo Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79TOO975
Burma's Prime Minister Plans to Visit Moscow
J'rime Minister Nu has accepted an invitation to visit
Moscow in November,
He intends to visit Indian Prime Minster Nehru en route.
.This trip may have fence mending as its primary pur-
pose. During the administration of former Premier Ne Win,
several incidents in Rangoon-including the defection attempt
by the Soviet military attache and Burma's cancellation of So-
viet "gift" projects-caused a marked deterioration in Soviet-
Burmese relations. Because of his commitments to sign the
Sino-Burmese border treaty and to take part in Communist
China's National Day celebrations in Peiping, U Nu was forced
reluctantly to decline Khrushchev's suggestion that he attend
the opening session of the General Assembly. For the same
reason he was unable to accompany Nehru to New York as he
had hoped.
J" An additional factor in Nu's decision to visit Moscow at
thistime may be his desire for aid to new economic develop-
ment projects. Khrushchev and Nu are reported to have held
preliminary aid discussions in Rangoon in February before Nu
resumed the premiership. To date, although Nu probably is
anxious to balance Western assistance in Burma with new bloc
aid, no new assistance has been forthcoming. Nu's government
has prepared a portfolio of development projects, including a
massive development scheme for the Chindwin, Burma's sec-
ond largest river, for which he has sought aid from both the
United States and the USSR. The United States observers have
felt the projects either too vague or too costly for Burma to con-
sider, and the Soviet Union has only offered the loan of techni-
cians, to be paid by Burma, for preliminary surveys. iI
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300410001-7
18 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
 Approved F r Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 05300410001-7
Mass Political Trial in Turkey Could Spark Unrest
In the mass trial which started on 14 October, the prose-
cution has demanded the death penalty for 38 leaders of .the
ousted Bayar-Menderes government and lesser penalties for
the remaining defendants. The trial now has been recessed
until 19 October to allow the defendants more time to confer
with their attorneys. Nearly 100 of the 500 prisoners reported-
ly have been released, but the remainder, including ex-Presi-
dent Bayar and ex-Premier Menderes, face sentences of death,
prison terms, and exile.
25X1
25X1
The long-awaited trial, which may continue for more than
two months, began on 14 October with Bayar being charged with
selling for personal profit a dog which had been a, state gift
from the government of Afghanistan. This seemingly unimpor
tantitem apparently is aimed at reducing pro-Bayar sentiment
among the peasants, who would consider the. sale of such a
gift particularly repugnant. This tactic could boomerang,
however, by convincing the peasants that the military regime
has failed to uncover conclusive evidence of serious criminal
guilt.
CAUny military officers, recently forced to retire, are
reported gathering in Istanbul. Some have informed the Ameri-
can army attache that they will launch a counter-revolt if
former Chief of General Staff Erdelhun is sentenced to death,
They believe they would have support within the First Army,
which they could use to control the Istanbul area, and state
that pro-Menderes civilians would revolt in the Izmir area.
They claimed that winter conditions in northeastern Turkey
could prevent the Third Army from moving to support the
ruling Committee of. National Union (CNU). The former com-
mander of the disbanded Turkish Korean Brigade is reported
to be one of the group threatening action against the interim
government. The attache notes that the CNU is aware of the
alleged threat and that, while bloodshed is possible, he does
not believe a move to upset the CNU would be successful.(
There is little indication. that the CNU has been able to
convince the people of Turkey that the leaders of the former
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300410001-7
18 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
25X1
 25X1 .
25X1
Approved F r Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T00975 005300410001-7
regime deserve to be executed. (?Opposition within the Repub-
lic People's party to the proposed, executions is reported to be
strong, but is not likely to have much influence on the CNU.
The regime might be encouraged to extend clemency, however,
if convinced that Turkey's international prestige would be ad-
versely affected,
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300410001-7
18 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page ~5
 Approved Fo Release 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T00975
Libyan King Replaces Prime Minister Kubar
In the face of strong parliamentary attacks on corruption
among top-level officials and with a no-confidence resolution
pending in the Libyan House of Deputies, King Idris on 16 Oc-
tober accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Kubar. He
named as new prime minister Muhammad Ben Uthman, a pol-
itician and businessman from sparsely populated Fezzan Prov-
ince.
Ben Uthman has been in most of the cabinets during Libya's
nearly nine years as an independent state; he has also long been
one of the Fezzan's five representatives to the lower house. His
selection appears designed to answer criticism of corruption in
government and, at the same time, to avoid accentuating fric-
tions between politicians of the two larger provinces, Tripoli-
tania and Cyrenaica. He is reported to be a solid backer of the
crown prince, as well as of the King, and has been friendly and
cooperative in his dealings with American officials.
On 29 September, four days before Parliament convened
in extraordinary session on the corruption scandal involving the
Fezzan road project, the King had replaced four ministers but
retained Kubar. Now he has further revised the cabinet under
Ben Uthman, and has enlarged its membership to 14 by including
additional prominent parliamentary figures as well as former
provincial officials.
Prior to the parliamentary elections in January 1960, both
the House of Deputies and the Senate had exercised little more
than a rubber- stamp .unction. Now, however, with an increas-
ingly effective opposition bloc in the House, the Parliament has
demonstrated that it is a governmental force to be reckoned with,
at least on major issues where it can obtain wide popular back-
ing.
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300410001-7
18 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6y'.
 The Situations Laos
The Defense Ministry and army headquarters staffs in
Vientiane are characterized by the American army attache
as being demoralized, confused, and in some cases quite
bitter as the result of splits in the military establishment and
the pervasive influence of Captain Kong Le and his followers.
Other factors are said to include General Ouane's failure as
armed forces commander to exercise effective command over
even the forces present in Vientiane, the defection to Phoumi's
camp of Vientiane defense commander General Amkha, and
the sudden departure of approximately ten senior officers on
new assignments abroad as service attaches. Other reports
indicate the chief criterion for their selection as attaches was
their unwillingness to cooperate with Kong Le.`
:.Many officers and noncommissioned officers in Kong Le's
2nd Paratroop Battalion reportedly play dual military and civil
roles. A close associate of Kong Le occupies the key position
of chief of cabinet in the Ministry of Defense, from which post he
has allegedly monitored all command functions and kept General
Ouane "fully neutralized" in his dual capacity as armed forces
commander and secretary of state for defense. Ouane's decision
to go to Luang Prabang on 16 October, where he intends to re-
main, undoubtedly is in part due to a sense of powerlessness in
attempting to assert his authority in Vientiane. With the depar-
ture of Ouane, General Amkha, and the attache-designates, there
are now very few senior officers in Vientiane, thus leaving the
field even more than before to the Kong Le cliquey
L_The only potential source of serious opposition to Kong Le
in the capital is about 300 infantry troops, under Captain Southep,
who came to Vientiane from Luang Prabang Province last month.
Although Southep is reputed to be strongly anti ? Kong Le and an
able commander, he is undoubtedly under close surveillance and
his ability to,take action may already have been neutralized:.
Soviet Ambassador- designate Abramov is still awaiting an
audience from the King so that he can present his credentials.
In the meantime, however, there are indications that he may have
made informal offers of assistance to Premier Souvanna Phoumao"
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release p003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300410p01-7
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300410001-7
18 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T0097 A005300410001-7
25X1
25X1
Bolivian Interest in Soviet Tin Smelter
Bolivian President Paz is under strong domestic pressure
to secure foreign aid for the. construction of a tin smelter.
Last week, when. the Bolivian UN delegation discussed Khru-
shchev's September offer of a smelter with Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko, Gromyko indicated the next step could be
taken through the "Bolivian Embassy in Moscow." Reminded
that Bolivia has no embassy there, Gromyko pointed out that
the new Bolivian President has promised to establish one. The
conversation then grew rather bitter and nothing was agreed
to, according to Bolivia's UN delegate, who concluded that the
question. was dead for the time being.
Bolivian President Paz stated in late August that Bolivian
laws provided for the establishment of such an embassy and
that his government intended "to carry out the laws." In a
conversation with American Ambassador Strom on 27 Septem-
ber, Paz mentioned plans for the embassy but said that at
that time no one was being considered for the post.
The original Soviet overture concerning a tin smelter for
Bolivia was apparently made during a visit of Bolivian sena-
tors to Moscow last July.
Virtuall all of Bolivia's tin now must be sent to a smelter
in.Britain. (A German engineering team concluded after an
eight-month survey in Bolivia about two years ago that a tin
smelter would cost about $20,000,000 and would be economical-
ly infeasible. The team could not solve the electric power
question and problems arising from the 13,000-foot altitude of
the tin mines- -an altitude which would reduce smelting efficien-
cy by 40 to 60 percent-.--"
Bolivia's interest in smelting its own tin received an addi-
tional stimulus in recent months from reports that Brazil has
a. tin. smelter of new design, using charcoal for fuel. Accord-
ing to Vice President Juan Lechin, who is also head of the
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300410001-7
18 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
 25X1
Approved F elease 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T00975A
Bolivian Miners' Federation, this type of smelter could be
copied successfully in Bolivia. CA high Brazilian Foreign
Ministry official told the American ambassador recently
that Brazilian companies connected with that smelter have
been negotiating with the Bolivian Government for construc-
tion of one. in Bolivia.
The manager of Bolivia's nationalized Mining Corporation
asked Ambassador Strom on 13 October about the US Govern-
ment attitude toward the Soviet offer. He also commented that
he was leaving for Germany on 21 October to discuss a German
proposal to improve Bolivia's tin mines, and that his negotia-
tions in Germany would be difficult. unless the government took
a. definitely negative position on the Soviet offer before he ar-
rived in Germany.
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300410001-7
18 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9
 Approved F C Release 2003/02/27 m -
'Aftov
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
Approved For
25X1
 Approved For Kee lp70975A000410001-7
F
0.0
00
Approved For Relea=QQ 2/ - T00975A005300410001-7 00
WAOO~ or