CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005300420001-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 10, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 19, 1960
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005300420001-6.pdf637.65 KB
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Approved ForrReleaseTQP/25E IETT00975A005300420001-6 25X1 19 October 1960 Copy No. C j DIA and DOS review(s) completed. sec:':,., u,~.,?;r ay 0 25X1 25X1 / / / ii Approved For Release /27 liMTOO975AO05300420001-6 0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300420001-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300420001-6 r///%///%on//% j j AKWJved Fo lease 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T 097 05300420001-6 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 19 October 1960 DAILY BRIEF 1. THE C: UMM U NIS'1' 13 LUU II. ASIA=AFRICA 25X1 25X1 25X1 South Vietnam: The cabinet reshuffle announced yester- day apparently represents a gesture by President Diem toward meeting some of the criticism from within and without govern- ment circles over his authoritarian leadership, It is also pos- sible, however, that Diem may take this opportunity to remove officials critical of him, In any event, the changes announced, which affect four ministries, do not suggest any intention by Diem to relax his personal control over certain key ministries or any significant weakening of the influence of his chief political ad- viser, his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. Unless Diem is prepared to follow up with more sweeping measures to win public support, the political opposition to his regime will probably continue to grow. F77 I p " Ira : Anti-Communist civilian and army elements in Iraq, believing Prime Minister Qasim has shifted to the left in recent weeks, are reported to be planning action against him in the near j Approved For Rele se 2003/02/27: CIA-RD P79T009 5AO05300420001-6 25X1 j' VEX 25X1 Approved Fo - elease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T 9 57005300420001-6 j j I 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 edly are planning a coup. Qasim has weathered several future. Cone civilian Arab nationalist group is said 't6.-`;be plotting to kill him by destroying his car with bazooka fire,7 at the same time, some disgruntled army officers allegc coup attempts and one assassination effort. 25X1 UAR-Jordan: During his current visit to Syria, UAR President Nasir is using sharp personal attacks on Jordan's King Husayn in an effort to bolster the flagging enthusiasm in Syria for the Egyptian-Syrian union. Nasir's demagogic tactics and repeated pleasafor "unity" suggest he is genu- inely concerned over the growing separatist feeling in the UAR's Northern Region. an Jordan, Nasir's attacks on Husayn have aroused a popular pro-Nasir reaction among Arabs of Palestinian West Jordan. Amman is reported uneasy, with expectations of further serious Jordan-UAR trouble. Husayn, meanwhile, has sought increased British assistance to stave off an im- pending financial crisis in the Jordanian Army 25X1 in Brazzaville reports, lead to a "complete breakdown of au! thority." Although information from this country is sparse, the position of conservative, pro-French President Leon M'Ba reportedly is being strongly challenged by influential elements within his regime headed by National Assembly President Gondjout and Foreign Minister Gustave Anguile. ternal struggle for power which could, the American charge which became independent in August, is in the throes of an in Gabon: Gabon, one of the eight French Community states (Map) 25X1 25X1 A A F oil- 2003/02/27 ? CIA RDP79T009 A005300420001 6 pprove or a se 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300420001-6 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300420001-6 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved Fql Cabinet Reshuffle in South Vietnam The cabinet reshuffle announced in Saigon on 18 October appears to be a gesture by President Diem to deal with dis- satisfaction in and out of government circles over the worsen- ing security situation and over his own authoritarian rule. New appointments to the defense and interior ministries, coupled with plans to reinforce military intelligence and command func- tions, are probably meant to strengthen the campaign against the Communist guerrillas; changes in the information and jus- tice ministries are probably aimed more broadly at political discontent. The changes, however, do not suggest any intention by Diem to relax his tight control or to weaken the role of his brother and chief political adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, a primary target of crit- icism. Diem's retention of the defense post for himself and his tendency to control provincial appointments through instructions to the Ministry of Interior may deny effective authority to the new appointee's.. Also;,'the information ministry is to be replaced by a directorate-general, presumably to function under the pres- idential. secretary, raising doubt that the replacement of the responsible minister will. result in the reforms of censorship and control demanded by Diem's critics. The ministerial chang- es are among several long sought by Ngo Dinh Nhu, who had been under sharp criticism from the previous incumbents. As such, they may be the prelude to further moves by Nhu. to remove his opponents .in the government. Unless Diem is prepared to follow up the reshuffle with broaaer measures to combat rural discontent and to open up channels for responsible criticism, political opposition will probably continue to grow. I sweeping changes in Diem's military as we as civilian entourage were needed to prevent the collapse of the government. Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300420001-6 19 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300420001-6 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300420001-6 Approved Fort Renewed Anti-Qasim Plotting in Iraq 25X1 Growing discontent over Qasim's policies and his appar- ent favoring of the Communists in recent weeks.. has revived plotting by civilian and. army elements against him (One anti- Communist civilian group allegedly is planning to assassinate Qasim with bazooka fire while he is riding in his carTT Other reports state that anti- Communist army and air force offi- cers have decided to attempt a coup in the immediate future. This military group had been previously reported formulat- ing plans for a coup, but had delayed in carrying it out in the hope that Qasim would stop depending on the Communists. Qasim's recent crackdown on several anti-Communist newspapers and his patronage of the congress of the Commu- nist-dominated International Union of Students now being held in Baghdad have alarmed all anti-Communist elements. Iraq now is polarized into a well-organized and highly vocal Communist minority and a strongly anti-Communist but faction-ridden majority. There is official and public dis- enchantment with the Soviet bloc economic assistance to which Qasim has committed the country, and Qasim' has lost a great deal of respect and popular support. The absence of real progress in the country's economic development since the revolution.has, resulted in further discontent. Reported dissatisfaction in army circles with Soviet mil- itary equipment is an added factor for attempting to loosen Iraq's ties with the Soviet bloc. A committee which has been meeting for the past three weeks discussing Soviet military aid is said to be "convinced that Iraq has been sold much equipment either obsolete or unsuitable for the army's needs." 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300420001-6 19 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved For elease 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A 05300420001-6 Nasir Carries Anti-Husayn Campaign to Syria 25X1 Since arriving in Latakia on a surprise visit beginning 14 October, Nasir has used King Husayn as a whipping boy in an obvious effort to distract Syrians from their difficulties with his own regime. In speeches in Latakia, Aleppo, Hama, and Damascus, Nasir attacked the Jordanian King, who re- cently made anti-UAR comments at the United Nations. Hu- sayn's airing of an Arab dispute in the international assem- bly and the alleged murder of a Syrian pilot who crash-landed in Jordan provided Nasir with points of departure for his at- tack. His popular reception has been enthusiastic, but his repeated emphasis on the solidity of Egyptian-Syrian unity re- flects his concern over conditions in Syria. L Dissension within the Syrian cabinet appears to be a major oncern and, was the eason for Nasir's visit. Cabinet chairman Abd al-Hamid Sar- aj, whose heavy-handed tactics may be the cause of the dif- iculties, has been conspicuous in Nasir's touring group. A altering economy, plotting against the Cairo regime by Syri- dissidents, and possible Jordanian-Iraqi moves in support f such elements are other important problems Nasir must onsider. 25X1 25X1 25X6 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300420001-6 19 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 25X6 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300420001-6 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05300420001-6 Approved For F e base 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975M05300420001-6 cu ia9j.~/ Taounde (SP ) J U I