CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005300500001-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
13
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 1, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 28, 1960
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005300500001-7.pdf645.94 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release~0~/1 ~ ~1~1~~00975A~0053AO~g0~01~ 7 C _.. / L " 25X1 28 Oct~tyer X96(3 25X1 copy No 0 ~ NO C+~i.~ctE 1~ CLdS&. ~' I [] aw::r_n.~~J$i; EFL: ~~,, N~K~~ ;:.~k,,,;~ Lkr:.__~.~o ..25X1 ~ ~y ' ~~ ,~ ~ 0 JUN 198 / ~Sr4iESdF~'~6~' pAT?C .~-- _ --.~_ S Vl;:'vY1fi! / I / 1 / 1 / I / I 25X1 / ~ / ~ / ~ / ~ / ~ / ~ / i / i / i / ~ Approved For Release~~~12~~~0975A005300500001-7 / r bOCUA?EN7 N0. ~L ~ _~...~_ 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005300500001-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005300500001-7 //,,~%///%%~%~%%%%%///~%~%%%/~%%%%%///%%~%~%~%%/%%%///%/%~%%/%//%%/%%%/O/%///////%%~%%///////%///~%%%///%////O%%/%i/%%/~'/ %~~~/D//%%///%~%%//////////j :% Approved For ~ se 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T0097 Q~5300500001-7 25X1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE; BULLETIN 28 October 1960 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 j 25X1 Io TIDE COMMUNIST BLOC j USSR-TurY~ey j 25X1 25X1 the USSR is ready to extend j arge-scale economic ai o "any type" and "without any 25X1 conditions" to Turkey and is prepared to show its good will b reducin the Soviet Black S Fl t d l i ll ti t y g ea ee an nava ns ons a a in the areao //~i,; 25X1 The re~ // j ported statements are in line with a number of pre- 25X1 j vious Soviet overture ~~~ including hints that 25X1 ~~~% Moscow is ready to eaten cre its of u to 500 000 000. 25X1 %~~'%: 25 Khrushchev suggested ;,;,; 25 / %!'% at their countries esta ish a emi itarize zone 25X1 a ong a order and urged that the USSR and Turkey agree to turn. the Black Sea into a "sea of peaces' The Gursel regime' 5X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T009~T5A005300500001-7 ///O/ / % O ~ % % % ~ ~ ~O / ~ ~ % /// // ///// ~ ~ ~ ~ // / % ~ ~ ~ ~ % / / / / % ~ / / / / / / / / / / / % % % % / / / % i % / / / / / / / / / O / D / % % / . O D / % % O / ' 25~proved For:Rel. ase 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T00 ~r+ 25X1 25X1 7 A~05300500001-7 ~as thus far displayed reluctance to undertake any new financial obligations or to become involved in an xe~~ 25X1 strictive militar arran ements with the USSRa creased economic aid (Page 3) East ermany? The East German Government, evi- dently seriously concerned over the potential effects of Bonn's abrogation of the interzonal trade agreement for 1961, has sent a special delegation to Moscow led by the head of the-State Planning Commission, reportedly to dis- cuss this matter Many of the items normally imported ~' from West Germany are essential to key East German in- dustries and at the same time in short supply in the bloco While East German leaders doubtless are aware of the re- luctance among the NATO countries to support an embargo on trade with East Germany, the vulnerability of their economy. apparently has stimulated genuine concern over this embargo possibilityo The delegation sent to Moscow likely will try to engage the USSR in contingency planning which would involve Soviet acceptance in principle of in- IIm ASIA?AFRICA 28 Oct 60 Ap@~~~d For Rel DAILY BRIEF 25X1 25X1 25X 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 ease 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T0 97505300500001-7 25X1 Thailand: Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman has warned~t at~current Laotian developments may force a reappraisal of Thai foreign policy. Although no early changes in Bangkok's commitments appear to be contem~ plated, the Thai Government recently has become dubious of SEATO's value as a defensive alliance, and has charged that the uncommitted nations in Asia are..rQ.ceivin~ pxefer- ence from the I.TS in econorr~ic and ~~ilitary aid over coun- tries aligned with the West ~ (Page 6) III THE WEST Venezuelan- The leftist Democratic Republican Union-- formed aclose alliance with the Communist party and another Marxist group for- the purpose of forcing a sharp reorientation of I3etancourt's moderately leftist policies, or of ousting him. These three pro-Castro factions have been behind the continue ing antigovernment disturbances in Caracas and other cities. Betancourt is taking extensive security precautions, and is believed to have the backing of most c>f the armed forces, which are on full alert status to support the police and national guard 28 Oct 60 DAILY BRIEF 25~I~proved For Release 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79TOQ975A005300500001-7 ;~ ~ , ,. % ,_ 25X1 25X1 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005300500001-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005300500001-7 Approved For_Relea - 5405300500001-7 Eas erman Economic De egation in Moscow ~.A delegation of East German State Planning Commission officials, headed by their chief, Bruno Leuschner, arrived in Mascow on 24 October, reportedly to discuss with Soviet of- ficials the probable economic effects of Bonn's notice of termi~ nation of the interzonal trade agreement with East Germany and of a possible embargo by NATO gauntries in support of Bonn. High-East German officials are particularly concerned about the effects on the engineering and chemical industries if commodities--primarily steel products and certain types of machinery--currently supplied by West Germany are not ob~ tamed elsewhere. These leaders may hope to turn the threat of embargo to their advantage by getting the USSR to review its reparted refusal to grant an earlier request for a loan of $375,000,000 to cover the imports desired for continuation in 1961 of East Germany's' ambitious Seven-Year Plan. The refusal has already forced the regime to cut back its 1961. in~ vestment program., (East Germany reportedly had expected that three. fourths of its 1961 foreign trade deficit would be in trade with. the Westo This. would mean that a disruption of interzonal trade would seriously damage the East German. economy should the USSR continue to withhold aid. Although .businessmen in other freeG world countries might be willing to fill the gap left by a cessa- tion of West German exports, East Germany by itself would ap- 25X1 parently encounter great difficult in as in for increased im- ports from these sources` 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005300500001-7 28 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005300500001-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005300500001-7 25X1 25X1 rid I~r~1~a~~ ~~g~c g5~@~~001-7 Foreign Minister Thanat Khc~man's suggestion that Thai? land may conduct a reappraisal of its cold war position re~ Elects the Thai Government's dissatisfaction with Western handling of the Laotian crisis and with what it terms a more generous Western aid program for uxicommitted Asian na~ tions than for outright anti~~Communist governmentse Prime Minister Sarit, deeply committed bath personally and ideologically to his anti~Communist relative, Laotian General Phoumi, professes disappointment by the lack of SEATO intervention in Laoso He has asserted that a neutral Laos under the Souvanna Phouma government would ensure Communist domination there and bring the Communist threat directly to the Thai bordero He also insisted that the failure of the Laotian Government to punish Captain Kong Le for his Vientiane coup threatens the stability of all other Southeast Asian _governmentse ~ (The Thai Government views the situation in Laos as only the latest in a series of developments which make it less neces~ sary for Thailand to maintain its anti-Communist postures Like Pakistan and the Philippines, the two other Asian members of SEATO, the Thais have been critical of aid programs extended to neutralist co~ntrieso It sees the ability of the uncommitted na- tions to appeal to both camps for assistance as giving them a special advantages - ~ ~_In addition to these concerns, the Thais have been. troubled by the United States' sales of surplus grain in Asiao The govern ment has charged that these sales have seriously interfered with Thailand's trade and threaten its foreign exchange situations ; Despite Thanat's statement that no early changes in Thai- 1and's foreign commitments are contemplated, a continuation of this restive .trend could ultimatel lead the Thais to a more neum tral international positiono , 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005300500001-7 28 Oct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 25X1 gpproved For Release 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005300500001-7 Approved For Release 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005300500001-7 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 pro-Castro groups have cooperated closely in recent weeks and have been behind the antigovernment disturbances which:have continued in Venezuela since 19 Clctober:~ orientation of his more moderate leftist policies. These three ousting Betancourt or forcing him to include all of them in a new government, and thus presumably effecting a radical re- an Communist party (PCV) and. the Marxist Leftist Revolution- ry Movement (MIR). This would. have the purpose of either coalition--has reportedly formed an alliance with. the Venezue- ~~FZrER~J>~~~~~O~I~uQ1~E~RD~~Ob6 ~ 83UD500001-7 Alliance Against B na cot urt The leftist Democratic Republican Union (URD)--long a dissatisfied component of President Betancourt's three-party The URD, whose two remaining representatives in the cabi- net yresented their resignation an 23 Actober may be considering a formal withdrawn rom a ca- n ition at all levels and. an overt alignment with the leftist-Com- munist opposition. The party's propaganda line generally . parallels that of the PCV and NIIR--the latter a group of defec- tors from Betancourt's own Democratic Action party. The earli- er resignation of the URD foreign minister in September over policy toward the Castro regime foreshadowed the crisis which the coalition now faces: The campaign of violence, which has received favorable treatment by the official Cuban press agency, has resulted in a number of deaths and injuries. Betancourt has accused the agi- tators, who are inciting student demonstrations, of attempting to impose "Cuban methods" in Venezuela. He had. earlier indi- rectly warned the PCV and MIR to cease their subversive activ- ities, and he is unlikely to accede to pressures for inclusion of these factions in a new government. Such a move would probably .alienate his own party, the military, and other moderate groups ~ C,Betancourt is believed to have the backing of most of the armed forces, now on full alert status to support the police and national guard: in quelling the violence, and he is taking extensive security precautions, including the shutdown of all schools ex- cept the autonomous national universities. Both the military and moderate groups apparentl favor strop measures to prevent further demonstrations Approved For Release 2002/07/12 :CIA-RDP79T00975A005300500001-7 28 C+ct 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 25X1 25X1 Approved For-ilea 09705300500001-7 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved For Releas ~75A005300500001-7 25X1 25X1 ~ j r, i, ~ i i ~ i i i i i~ i. ~ ice. ~ i ~~ i i iii i i i ii i i i i i, ~ ~ i ~ i ~ i~~is~i~~~ Approved Forease ~~12 0975.x;05300500001-7 ~. / /, /`` / / //, A roved For Releas /1 I/~~ii 00975A005300500001-7 ~/