CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005300500001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE; BULLETIN
28 October 1960
DAILY BRIEF
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j 25X1 Io TIDE COMMUNIST BLOC
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USSR-TurY~ey
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the USSR is ready to extend
j arge-scale economic ai o "any type" and "without any
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are in line with a number of pre- 25X1
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Moscow is ready to eaten cre its of u to 500 000 000.
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Khrushchev suggested
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at their countries esta ish a emi itarize zone 25X1
a ong a order and urged that the USSR and Turkey agree to
turn. the Black Sea into a "sea of peaces' The Gursel regime'
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~as thus far displayed reluctance to undertake any new
financial obligations or to become involved in an xe~~ 25X1
strictive militar arran ements with the USSRa
creased economic aid (Page 3)
East ermany? The East German Government, evi-
dently seriously concerned over the potential effects of
Bonn's abrogation of the interzonal trade agreement for
1961, has sent a special delegation to Moscow led by the
head of the-State Planning Commission, reportedly to dis-
cuss this matter Many of the items normally imported ~'
from West Germany are essential to key East German in-
dustries and at the same time in short supply in the bloco
While East German leaders doubtless are aware of the re-
luctance among the NATO countries to support an embargo
on trade with East Germany, the vulnerability of their
economy. apparently has stimulated genuine concern over
this embargo possibilityo The delegation sent to Moscow
likely will try to engage the USSR in contingency planning
which would involve Soviet acceptance in principle of in-
IIm ASIA?AFRICA
28 Oct 60
Ap@~~~d For Rel
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Thailand: Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman has
warned~t at~current Laotian developments may force a
reappraisal of Thai foreign policy. Although no early
changes in Bangkok's commitments appear to be contem~
plated, the Thai Government recently has become dubious
of SEATO's value as a defensive alliance, and has charged
that the uncommitted nations in Asia are..rQ.ceivin~ pxefer-
ence from the I.TS in econorr~ic and ~~ilitary aid over coun-
tries aligned with the West ~ (Page 6)
III THE WEST
Venezuelan- The leftist Democratic Republican Union--
formed aclose alliance with the Communist party and another
Marxist group for- the purpose of forcing a sharp reorientation
of I3etancourt's moderately leftist policies, or of ousting him.
These three pro-Castro factions have been behind the continue
ing antigovernment disturbances in Caracas and other cities.
Betancourt is taking extensive security precautions, and is
believed to have the backing of most c>f the armed forces, which
are on full alert status to support the police and national guard
28 Oct 60 DAILY BRIEF
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Eas erman Economic De egation in Moscow
~.A delegation of East German State Planning Commission
officials, headed by their chief, Bruno Leuschner, arrived in
Mascow on 24 October, reportedly to discuss with Soviet of-
ficials the probable economic effects of Bonn's notice of termi~
nation of the interzonal trade agreement with East Germany
and of a possible embargo by NATO gauntries in support of
Bonn. High-East German officials are particularly concerned
about the effects on the engineering and chemical industries if
commodities--primarily steel products and certain types of
machinery--currently supplied by West Germany are not ob~
tamed elsewhere. These leaders may hope to turn the threat
of embargo to their advantage by getting the USSR to review its
reparted refusal to grant an earlier request for a loan of
$375,000,000 to cover the imports desired for continuation
in 1961 of East Germany's' ambitious Seven-Year Plan. The
refusal has already forced the regime to cut back its 1961. in~
vestment program.,
(East Germany reportedly had expected that three. fourths
of its 1961 foreign trade deficit would be in trade with. the Westo
This. would mean that a disruption of interzonal trade would
seriously damage the East German. economy should the USSR
continue to withhold aid. Although .businessmen in other freeG
world countries might be willing to fill the gap left by a cessa-
tion of West German exports, East Germany by itself would ap-
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parently encounter great difficult in as in
for increased im-
ports from these sources`
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Foreign Minister Thanat Khc~man's suggestion that Thai?
land may conduct a reappraisal of its cold war position re~
Elects the Thai Government's dissatisfaction with Western
handling of the Laotian crisis and with what it terms a more
generous Western aid program for uxicommitted Asian na~
tions than for outright anti~~Communist governmentse
Prime Minister Sarit, deeply committed bath personally
and ideologically to his anti~Communist relative, Laotian
General Phoumi, professes disappointment by the lack of
SEATO intervention in Laoso He has asserted that a neutral
Laos under the Souvanna Phouma government would ensure
Communist domination there and bring the Communist threat
directly to the Thai bordero He also insisted that the failure
of the Laotian Government to punish Captain Kong Le for his
Vientiane coup threatens the stability of all other Southeast
Asian _governmentse ~
(The Thai Government views the situation in Laos as only
the latest in a series of developments which make it less neces~
sary for Thailand to maintain its anti-Communist postures Like
Pakistan and the Philippines, the two other Asian members of
SEATO, the Thais have been critical of aid programs extended
to neutralist co~ntrieso It sees the ability of the uncommitted na-
tions to appeal to both camps for assistance as giving them a
special advantages - ~
~_In addition to these concerns, the Thais have been. troubled
by the United States' sales of surplus grain in Asiao The govern
ment has charged that these sales have seriously interfered with
Thailand's trade and threaten its foreign exchange situations ;
Despite Thanat's statement that no early changes in Thai-
1and's foreign commitments are contemplated, a continuation of
this restive .trend could ultimatel lead the Thais to a more neum
tral international positiono ,
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pro-Castro groups have cooperated closely in recent weeks and
have been behind the antigovernment disturbances which:have
continued in Venezuela since 19 Clctober:~
orientation of his more moderate leftist policies. These three
ousting Betancourt or forcing him to include all of them in a
new government, and thus presumably effecting a radical re-
an Communist party (PCV) and. the Marxist Leftist Revolution-
ry Movement (MIR). This would. have the purpose of either
coalition--has reportedly formed an alliance with. the Venezue-
~~FZrER~J>~~~~~O~I~uQ1~E~RD~~Ob6 ~ 83UD500001-7
Alliance Against B na cot urt
The leftist Democratic Republican Union (URD)--long a
dissatisfied component of President Betancourt's three-party
The URD, whose two remaining representatives in the cabi-
net yresented their resignation an 23 Actober
may be considering a formal withdrawn rom a ca-
n ition at all levels and. an overt alignment with the leftist-Com-
munist opposition. The party's propaganda line generally .
parallels that of the PCV and NIIR--the latter a group of defec-
tors from Betancourt's own Democratic Action party. The earli-
er resignation of the URD foreign minister in September over
policy toward the Castro regime foreshadowed the crisis which
the coalition now faces:
The campaign of violence, which has received favorable
treatment by the official Cuban press agency, has resulted in a
number of deaths and injuries. Betancourt has accused the agi-
tators, who are inciting student demonstrations, of attempting
to impose "Cuban methods" in Venezuela. He had. earlier indi-
rectly warned the PCV and MIR to cease their subversive activ-
ities, and he is unlikely to accede to pressures for inclusion of
these factions in a new government. Such a move would probably
.alienate his own party, the military, and other moderate groups ~
C,Betancourt is believed to have the backing of most of the
armed forces, now on full alert status to support the police and
national guard: in quelling the violence, and he is taking extensive
security precautions, including the shutdown of all schools ex-
cept the autonomous national universities. Both the military and
moderate groups apparentl favor strop measures to prevent
further demonstrations
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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