CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005400120001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 14, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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14 November 1960
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CEN AL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
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14 November 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
South Vietnam- Suppression of the attempted coup
against President Diem appeared virtttially complete by
the afternoon of 12 November with the surrender of near-
ly all rebel paratroopers to loyal forces which had en-
tered Saigon in response to Diem's earlier radio appeals.
Efforts are being made to stabilize the military situation
as rapidly as possible in order to prevent Communist
guerrillas from profiting by the diversion of field units
to Saigon. Some increase in Communist activity has been
reported ."in Tay Ninh Province west of Saigon.
Effective government control is now in the hands of
Diem and loyal military officers on whom he may be in-
creasingly dependent. to maintain his authority. He has
promised repressive action against the rebel military
leaders and reportedly has arrested some civilian oppo-
nents not known to have been actively involved in the plot.
Unless he is prepared to carry out his earlier promises to
the rebels to effect sweeping reforms and government re-
organization, he may face early. difficulties from civilian
mobs who evidenced considerable support for the coup at-
tempt when it seemed to be succeeding and who may have
received some arms from the paratroops. 25X1
(Page 1)
L Laos- In Luang Prabang, the group of officers under
Major Bountheng, having apparently sustained its 10 No-
vember coup in the. royal capital, is moving to establi$h.`
closer ties with General Phaumi's Savannakhet Revolution-
ary Committee. Premier Souvanna Phouma meanwhile
seems determined to hang on despite the narrowing of his
area of maneuver, caused by what now appears to be the
loss of northern Laos to his Savannakhet o ponents.
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ur eYY The remova of members of e om-
mittee of National Unity (CNU) on 13 November by chief
of state General Gursel appears to have eliminated--for
the present--the "extremist" wing of the ruling military
junta. Most of the remaining 23 members of the CNU are
regarded as firmly pro-Western and as more likely to
work for an early return of the government to civilian
control. While Gursel's move probably represents the
will of the stronger faction within the original CNU, the
influence within the armed forces of the "extremists"--
particularly that of their leader, Colonel Alpaslan Turkes--
is believed to be strong and is a potential danger to the
resent ruling, group,
III. THE WEST
West Germanys Ambassador Dowling believes that
Adenauer s reported initiatives to improve relations with
the USSR stem primarily from his desire to exploit Khru-
shchev's recent display of a less hostile attitude toward him
Adenauer has long been disturbed by the intensity and dura-
tion of Soviet propaganda against the Federal Republic,. in-
cluding charges of "war-mongering" which he feels have
gained some credence in the West.. The chancellor also has
doubts and misgivings regarding the support of his allies,
but Ambassador Dowling believes a German-Soviet "deal_
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s precluded by Adenauer's conviction that West Ger-
any's survival de ends upon its close association
ith the West.-'
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Venezuela: President Betancourt advised US 25X1
harge Stewart on 9 November that he would soon re-
rganize his cabinet--whose incumbent members re-
signed en masse on 11 November--and exclude repre -
entatives of the pro-Castro Democratic Republican
Union, long a dissatisfied and obstructionist component
of the ruling three-party coalition.. Some elements of
his party reportedly were involved with Communists
nd pro-Castro leftists in the serious antigovernment
demonstrations of 19-28 October, and these groups now-
may. form an open alliance in a continuing effort to un-
dermine the government, particularly by exploiting the
sharp deterioration of Cuban- Venezuelan relations and
Venezuela's economic difficulties. The cabinet reorgan-
zation is nevertheless likely to strengthen Betancourt
in the long run by consolidating his support from mod-
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Nicaragua: Rebel groups attempting to seize key spots
in southern Nicaragua were dispersed in separate actions
on 11. and 12 November by Costa Rican and Nicaraguan de-
fense groups. They apparently represent a variety of Nic-
araguan opposition groups, from . conservatives to a leftist
pro-Castro faction. Members of the latter. group were cul-
tivated by the Cuban ambassador prior to the Nicaraguan
diplomatic break with Cuba last June and may subsequently
have received. Cuban aid. There is no confirmation, how-
ever, of Nicaraguan Government claims that the rebel move
was directed or closely supported by the Castro regime. The
Nicaraguan Government, which has declared martial. law,
expects another attack by rebels known to be near the bor- 25X1
der with Honduras to the north, but is believed capable of
sunnre sincr anv nF+ r^ bel rai s from this quarter
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posed of a rightist faction and a Communist front po]
party which has ties with the Castro regime in Cuba.
(Page 8)
he insurgents are led by a coalition of expediency com-
siege throughout the country.
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*Guatemala: President Ydiigoras remains in control in the
capital following coordinated insurgent attacks on military in-
stallations in Guatemala City and two key provincial capitals
on 13 November. The attackers, however, apparently withdrew
from.their Guatemala City objective with a quantity of military
equipment and were joined by an unknown number of defecting
soldiers. Ydigoras, faced with the most serious threat of his
nearly three years in office, immediately decreed a state of
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DAILY BRIEF iv
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Attempted Coup D'Etat Fails in South Vietnam
Suppression of the attempted coup d'etat against
South Vietnamese President Diem was virtually com-
pleted by the afternoon of 12 November with the sur-
render of nearly all rebel paratroops to loyal infantry
forces which entered Saigon in response to Diem's
radio appeals. Control of the government appears to
be in the hands of President Diem and a committee
including loyal military generals, with former field
commander Brig. Gen. Nguyen Khanh actually direct-
ing operations in Saigon. Efforts are being made to
stabilize the situation as rapidly as possible so that
army units diverted from areas of Communist guer=
rilla activity can be withdrawn from Saigon. No ab-
normal Communist attacks have been reported except
in Tay Ninh Province near the Cambodian border.
Diem's position is likely to remain shaky and in-
creasingly dependent on the military. There is no cer-
tainty that he will carry out the concessions made in
negotiations with the coup leaders on 11 November in
an apparent effort to gain time for his rescue. Should
he postpone or fail to carry out his promises of sweep-
ing reforms to alleviate economic corruption. and polit-
ical repressions, or revert to reliance on the political
advice of his unpopular -brother Nhu, he will continue to
face apathy among the rural population and growing hos-
tility in Saigon itself.
Although the paratroop ranks have reportedly been
granted amnesty, Diem has threatened severe punish-
ment for their leaders. Reports are conflicting concern-
ing the whereaboutsiof -revolt' leaders Lt. Col. Nguyen
Chanh Thi and Lt. Col. Vuong Van Dong. There are also
reports that the Diem government has arrested several
civilian opponents of the regime who are not known to
have been actively involved in. the plot.. Such moves could
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lead to unrest among mobs in Saigon who evidenced
considerable enthusiasm for the coup attempt when it
seemed to be succeeding and who may have received
arms from surrendering paratroopers. There is some
danger that Communist agents may attempt to stir up
mob actions which could lead to further army firing on
civilians,
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The. Situation in Laos
I Major Bountheng, leader of the group of officers
which seized control of the royal capital of Luang Pra-
bang on 10 November, has asked General Phoumi in
Savannakhet to send a delegation at once to concert plans
for action against the Souvanna Phouma government in
Vientiane. Phoumi plans to send.military and civil.liaison
officers shortly but will not go himself. No overt opposi-
tion to Bountheng's take-over has been reported in the
First Military Region, which embraces northern Laos and
has its headquarters in Luang Prabang
1 Although former Premier. Phoui Sananikone was appar-
ently in Luang Prabang at the time of the Bountheng coup,
there is little evidence that he stimulated the action. How-
ever, he will undoubtedly exert a strong influence on the
Bountheng group while holding himself in readiness for a
possible bid to head any new government formed in the
event Premier Souvanna Phouma resigns or is ousted by
the National Assembly.
Souvanna meanwhile seems determined to hang on even
though his freedom of maneuver has been seriously reduced
by what now appears to be the loss of northern Laos to his
Savannakhet opponents. He asked Ambassador Brown in
Vientiane on 12 November to hold up further military aid
shipments to Luang Prabang. He also stated that he will
refuse to recognize the validity of any action taken by the
King because he considered the monarch to be in effect a
prisoner of Phoum.i. Souvanna talked vaguely about retak-
ing Luang Prabang by force, but such a move is unlikely,
inasmuch as he lacks the military resources to accomplish
this while at the same time holding Vientiane against either
the Pathet Lao or Phoumi forces to the south.
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Adenauer Seeks to Reduce Tension With U88H
Ambassador Dowling in Bonn believes that Chan-
cellor Adenauer's reported initiatives to improve rela-
tions with the USSR stem from a desire to exploit Khru-
shchev's recent change of attitude toward him. Adenauer
has publicly welcomed Khrushchev's "friendly attitude,"
evidenced by overtures to the West German ambassador
in Moscow and the avoidance recently of strong personal
attacks on Adenauer. The chancellor has been disturbed
by the intensity and duration of Soviet propaganda against
the Federal Republic, including charges of "war-monger-
ing" which he feels have gained some credence in the
West,
L The chancellor in turn has had doubts and misgivings
regarding the support of his allies, but Ambassador Dow-
ling believes a German-Soviet "deal" is precluded by
Adenauer's conviction that West Germany's survival de-
pends upon close association with the West. Adenauer's
public hint on 11 November that Khrushchev may be in-
vited to Bonn may be an attempt to pressure Bonn's allies
to remain firm on Berlin. In view of Khrushchev's demands
for an April summit, Adenauer may also feel that proposing
a meeting with Khrushchev after that date will delay new ne-
gotiations on Berlin.)
," Although Adenauer's call on 10 November for a meeting
between President-elect Kennedy and Khrushchev to discuss
disarmament is a switch from his usual suspicion of bi-
lateral talks, he continues to oppose discussion of the Berlin
and Germany problems until there has been a significant re-
duction of international tension through an agreement on dis-
armament. Khrushchev's letter of 12 November to an East
Berlin student rally, while couched in moderate terms, indi-
cates that there has been no change in Soviet policy on Berlin.
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P?'o-Castro rty-to u
Venezuelan Coalition
e rom.?
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Venezuelan President Betancourt advised US C a ge
Stewart on 9 November that he would soon reorganize his
cabinet--whose incumbent members resigned on 11 No-
vember-and exclude representatives of the pro-Castro
leftist Democratic Republican Union (URD), long a dissatis-
fied and obstructionist component of the three-party coali-
tion. The new government will be composed of the mod-
erate Christian democratic COPEI and independents as well
as Betancourt's own Democratic Action party (AD), a reor-
ganization which will probably strengthen Betancourt in the
long run by consolidating his support among moderates and
especially in the armed forces. Betancourt, with the coop-
eration of COPEI, will also retain control of the Congress
and be released from the pressures by the ultranationalist
URD on his moderate leftist policies.-6
L,The breakup of the present coalition was foreshadowed
by the URD's criticism of the regime and demands for its
leftist reorientation following the antigovernment violence
of 19-28 October--the major test of Betancourt's stability
since he took office in early 1.959. Some elements of the
URD, whose top leaders seemed to condone the unrest, were
apparently involved with Communists and a pro-Castro Marx-
ist faction in fomenting its
These groups, already joined in a struggle with the. AD for
conTrol of organized labor, may now ally openly in a continu-
ing effort to undermine the government. They have maintained
close liaison with the Cuban regime, which still has consider-
able appeal to radical elements in Venezuela, and are likely to
exploit the recent sharp deterioration in Cuban-Venezuelan
relations. The opposition will probably also attempt to cap-
italize on Betancourt's serious economic difficulties, includ-
ing depressed business conditions, high unemployment, and a
critical decline of foreign exchange reserves which led to the
imposition of exchange controls on 8 November. E
LA massive progovernment rally in Caracas on 1 Novem-
ber, at which the crowd jeered the Cuban Government and its
leaders and called for the "firing squad" for Castro, will pos-
sibly have a sobering effect on pro-Castro elements who may
be planning additional disturbances. d
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The Situation in Guatemala
(Based on information available as of 0400 hours EST, 14 No-
vember)
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President Ydigoras remains in control in the capital following
coordinated insurgent attacks on military installations in Guatemala
City and in two key provincial cities on 13 November. Attempts
to seize the two major army garrisons in Guatemala City--which
would have meant the immediate fall of the government--failed,
but the insurgents were able to enter a lesser military installa-
tion in the capital and to withdraw with a quantity of military
equipment and with a number of defecting soldiers. At about the
same time, the army garrison in the Caribbean city of Puerto
Barrios revolted and the garrison in Zacapa, key city controlling
the rail line from the capital to the sea, also apparently came
under insurgent controls Ydigoras, facing the most serious
threat of his nearly three years in office, immediately decreed
a state of siege throughout the country.
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The extent of army defection is still unclear, but key of-
ficers including Defense Minister Gonzalez Sigui and the capital's
two regimental commanders apparently have thus far remained
1?byalo The air force, potentially a decisive element in quelling
the revolt, has already gone into action against insurgent-con-
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art o
the airforce is committed to neutrality in passive support of the
revolts
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While there is no evidence at this time that the 11 November
rebel attacks in Nicaragua and the current revolt in Guatemala
are coordinated moves directed from Cuba, the Castro regime
is known to be- deeply involved in Central American revolutionary
plotting.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National. Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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