CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005400220001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 25, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGEINCE BULLETIN
25 November 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC ,,,,,,,,,.
USSR-China: In apparent reply to the 2 X November
j Pea le's Daily editorial which presented the- familiar
p
Chinese arguments in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Pravda
j on 23 November also editorialized on the declaration
wk~ich followed the meeting of bloc leaders in 1957. It
j selected for emphasis, however, those aspects of the
j declaration4pfor example, on peaceful coexistence ~,nd
j the preventability of war~~whieh correspond to present
j .Soviet positions. This continuation of open discussion
j .between: the Soviet and Chinese parties while interna~
j tional Communist-leaders are still meeting in Moscow
j indicates-that .they have been unable to resolve their dfs~
agreements and suggests that they- have found it difficult
to formulate a communique which will satisfy both parties.
TY~e moderate tone of the Pr,_, avda editorial, howeverv
would appear to presage-the probable nature of any eom-
munique w
sis on the
Chinese, c~
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'the incidents represent a premediated effort by Peiping to
precipitate new clashes with the Indiansa Chinese troops
are in the area, however, probably attempting to check. the
re-entry of Tibetan- rebels gath4~red in Sikkim. New Delhi,
apprehensive .about its defense position in Sikkim, has re~
centl .augmented and alerted Indian troops in the area.
substantive: border negotiations, and it seems un~i4~ely that
~d on the Tibet-Sikkim border,. allegedly by Chinese Com-
unist snipers. Peiping has been pressing New Delhi for ~'~
cent incidents in which Indian soldiers were killed or wound
~~ommunist China -India: :Relations between Peiping
a,n New Delhi will be further exacerbated by several re-
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hailand: 11~any coup .rumors, of varying plausibility, are
again. circulating in Bangkok. The possible participants in such
a move and their motivations are by no means clear.
yrian o icia s are isp a mg an attitude of friend
ly cooperation toward Americans unprecedented in recent, years.
The Syrians appear to be taking 'their lead from Syrian Execu-
tive Council. President Sarraj, whose -recent show of warmth. i
2 5 Nov 60
UATLY BRIEF
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responsibility forrevving Syria's sagging econorn and ma be
counting heavily on American assistance:
(Page 5)
in marked contrast to his previously hostile, anti-US behavior.
i arraj, now apparently undisputed boss of Syria, has assumed
III. THE WEST
France-A1~er~iae .Rightist opposition to De Gaulle's Al-
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pparently picked for his effectiveness in handlin the rin-
elegate general in Algeria. Morin is a tough administrator
f Algerian affairs, and the selection of Jean Morin as new
ointment of the relatively liberal Louis Joxe as minister
i al area of ri htist concentraition in France,
Bolivia : President Paz has told US Ambassador Strom on
22 ve~mber he may hand. over the presidency "this week" to
Vice President Juan Lechin--Bolivia's leftist labor- leader who
has .often displayed an anti-US .attitude--if US aid to meet press-
ing economic problems is not g~.^anted. Paz' difficulties are in-
tensified by a pronounced pro-Communist, leftist drift in recent
months, widespread labor and peasant unrest, serious vio-
lence in the Department of Coch~.bamba this month, and in-
creasing pressure on the bankrupt government to accept bloc
offers of aid. Strom believes that Paz' position is gravely
thrPa.tPnc?~l_ `I
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ai o e regime +~es not appear immediately threatened ~ ~~
by the student strike that led it to impose martial law through-
out Haiti on 22 November. However, drastic police action
25 Nov 60
DAIL :Y BRIE F
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 against. the students, likely should there be public demonstra-
tions, could- cause a sudden swelling of antigovernment feeh
ing and. even widespread rioting threatening the government.
President Duvalier's opponents are diverse and poorly organ
ized, but the President is unpopular, ,particularly in the
capital. The primary rnotivatio:n for the strike is probably
resentment over the President's refusal to free a student lead
er jailed without charges for some weeks.
(Page 8)
IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Prospects for the Republic of Korea Over the Next Few
j Years:. Likely Future of Chang Government and Leftward L
j Trends, Economic .Stability, .and Fore~.gn Policy, Especially
Toward the US and Japan Present and Future Status of Armed
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Forces. TIE 42.1~2~60. 22 November .1960.
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Moscow and Peiping 13,eopen Pubtic Dispute
In apparent reply to the 21 November People's Dail
editorial. which presented the familiar Chinese arguments
in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Pravda on 23 November also
editorlialized on the declaration-which followed the meet-
ing of bloc leaders in 1957. That declaration was issued
on 22 November, and the use both Peiping and Moscow are
making of the third anniversary of its appearance suggests
that .their current discussions, like the talks in Bucharest
in June 1960, have taken them back to the .1957 manifesto
as the only possible basis for a new pronouncement which,
while making another ritualistic assertion of bloc- unity,
will in fact register. failure to make any progress toward
resolving the basic issues in dispute.
The 1957 manifesto was itself a compromise document,
carefully formulated to reflect differing views on the pol-
icies to be pursued by international Communism. The doc-
ument- emphasized Soviet views, but it included Chinese ad-
ditions which made it possible for each party to claim that
the declaration upheld its own views.
Throughout the course of the controversy, the Chinese
have heavily stressed only those. elements which corre-
spond to their positions, and the burden. of the argument
presented in the most recent People's Dail editorial seems
to be that the declaration remains valid and that they are
faithful to it. In a separate comment on the declaration,
the Albanian regime's. major passer has added its. voice in
support of the Chinese positions. '
-The Pravda editorial, in contrast, has selected for
emphasis those aspects of the declaration which elaborate
the Soviet positions, while acknowledging, in brief, some of
the views stressed by the Chinese. While maintaining -that
the Soviet party regards the "Leninist principle of peaceful
coexistence'.' as the Correct line for Communist foreign
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policy, it adds that this does "not deny the struggle of
.classes; does not mean the conciliation of socialism and
capitalism:'
,Emphasizing. that war. can rxow be prevented by the
strength of the "socialist" forces, the editorial notes that
"as long as imperialism exists., ..there will exist threats
to the. cause of peace:' Reiterating the conclusion of the
1957 declaration that the main. danger to Communism is
"revisionism," the editorial nevertheless pointedly observes
that "dogmatism and sectarianism" could also represent a
"basic danger at individual. stages of development of one
party or another:'
1Vloscow's reply to the Chini~se, then,. while remaining
fixm on the basic issues, treats the doctrinal. difficulties
much as the 195.7. declaration did. The continuation of
open discussion between the Soviet and Chinese parties
.whale the meetings in Moscow axe still in progress indi-
cates that they have been unablE~ to resolve their disagree-
ments and suggests that they have found it difficult to for-
mulate a. communique which will satisfy both partieso The
moderate. tone of the Pravda ediitorial, however, would- ap-
pear to presage-.the probable nature of any communique
which may result-one placing. the heaviest emphasis on
the majority Soviet. view but so worded that the Chinese-can
sign it and continue to claim that their views are valid
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Indian Troops Fired On in Tibet-Sikkim Border Area
At least f v n i ier ~ ave een wounded and sev-
er possibly killed in the border state of Sikkim during the
past two weeks by rifle. fire which allegedly came from Chi
nese snipers in Tibet. The firing may actually have come
from-armed TikSetan rebels who were forced out of their coun~
try following t~fe .rebellion. in 19~i8 and are now attempting to
reenter it b~way of Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nepal.
~If Chinese troops were, in fact, involved, they probably
were not acting on specific orders from. Peiping to provoke
clashes with the Indians. The Chhinese have lately gone to great
lengths in promoting their "peacefulness" to repair the damage
done to their Asian reputation by the Sino-Indian border clashes
of 1959. Chinese. forces now on the Sikkim border are probably
interested primarily in preventing the reentry of rebels into
Tibet,
t is unlikely that. the activities of the Chinese and Indian
teams, -now in Rangoon drafting a final report to pinpoint the
border claims of both sides, wild be affected by the new inci~
dents~~
~~Rumors of .increased activity opposite.Sikkim and continu-
ing reports of sniping activity along the Sikkim-Tibet frontier
have caused India to augment its forces in the Sikkim-Darjeel-
ing area to more than three brigades and to order an alert
among all Indian. forces in the vicinity:
India's quick reaction to the events in Sikkim, which will
almost certainly further strain Sino-Indian relations, under-
scores New Delhi's concern oveY?-the defense of this strategic
border area.. Should the reports of sniping activity continue, it
is likely that New Delhi will lift, its current restriction on Indian
counterfire.~
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rians A ear to Be Seekin Im roved Relations With US
e merican consu -genera in Damascus has noted a
series of recent incidents indicating an official Syrian of -
fort to improve the heretofore cool relations with the United
States. The effort has been rr.;ost noticeable in Syrian deal-
ings with both private and official Americans on economic,
technical, and. cultural matters. The. Syrian director of
technical assistance9 for example, recently stated that "the
opportunity far expanding American. cooperation was un-
pr.ecedented," and, representatives of American business
firms and other American visitors have- remarked on the
favorable reception they have received.
Syrian Executive. Council President Abd al-Hamid. Sar-
raj~'startled American officials recently by his friendly at-
titude- during the farewell- call of the- former American con-
sulo Sarraj had. been considered perhaps the most ardentl
anti-American member of the Nasir regime.
since achieving -what appears o e near
s e u on y in Syria, following Nasir's cabinet re-
shuffle in September, ~a.rraj Yeas put on a new face and. is
generally accepted by Syrian c-fficials as the one who can
cut red tape and. bring administrative order and. effectiveness
Sarraj's future may be tied to the Nasir regime's devel-
op nt program in Syria, far which foreign aid is indispen-
sable. Soviet bloc economic aid. to the UAR has so far been
channeled to :Egypt for the most part. Western and especial-
ly American assistance, long favored by lesser Syrian offi-
cials, now may be sought on a considerably .lamer scale:
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De Gaulle Appointments May Add to Rightist .Discontent
The appointment of Louis Joxe as minister of Algerian
affairs and Jean Morin as delegate general in .Algeria will
probably further consolidate rightist opposition to De Gaulle's
Algerian policy. Joxe is a career civil servant with liberal
views-who has been ambassador to both Bonn and Moscow
and, until his new appointment, was minister of education.
Considered completely loyal to De Gaulle, he will probably
have strong support from French political elements which
favor a liberal solution.
To replace the previous delegate general, Paul Delouvrier,
who was selected primarily for his ability as an economist and
manager, De Gaulle hats sent to :~lgeria one of;the ranking civil
and police administrators in France. As superprefect of the
Toulouse region since mid-195, Morin is experienced in deal-
ing with the heavy concentratian of rightist elements in south-
west France--including the paratroop training camp at Pau.
Administratively, the personnel changes will strengthen
De Gaulle's hand, prior to hrs visit to Algeria early next month
and to the national referendum an Algerian policy--now set
for the first two weeks of January. However, the changes
will also emphasize the gulf between De Gaulle and the right-
ists, will probably encourage them to close ranks, and may
occasion. further rightist demonstrations.
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Bolivian Preside t Threatens ito Ste. Down
o a.vlan rest en az o. m assador Strom on 22
November. that he may hand over his office "this week" to
Vice President Juan Lechin--the leftist labor leader who
has often displayed anti-US attitudes--if US aid is not
granted to meet his pressing economic problems. Paz as-
serted. that he himself opposed aid from the Communist
bloc, which was readily available, but that Lechin would,
not hesitate to go "to the other side." Strom believes that
Paz' position is gravely threatened, especially by current
overdue government obligations, and that a credit of about
$5,000,000 would be required t.o support him through an
interim period.
Paz' difficulties are complicated by a pronounced pro-
communist, .leftist trend in recent months--particularly
within the ruling Nationalist Revolutionary Movement party
--widespread labor and peasant unrest, and. violence this
month i,n the Department of Cochabamba, leading to the
promulgation of a state of siege there on 19 November. Dem-
onstrations were. conducted against Strom during his visit
to the city of Cochabamba on 14 November, and further anti-
US outbreaks axe possible.
Pressures are also mounting on the bankrupt adminis-
trat on to accept bloc offers of aid., especially a Soviet offer
to build. a tin smelter in Bolivia. The government announced
recently that a commercial mission would leave shortly far
Western .Europe, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR to seek
credits for Comibol, the national mining corporation, and
Paz has indicated that it will also investigate a rumored
Soviet credit offer of $60,000,CI00 to Bolivia!s national petro-
leum agency. Czechoslovakia, the only bloc country with
which Bolivia exchanges diplomatic missions, has also been
discussing arrangements with Bolivia for su 1 in a ui -
ment and supplies to Comibol. a
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Student Strike Prompts Martial Law in Haiti
The Duvalier government on 22 November imposed martial
law throughout Haiti as a reaction to the calling of a long-
threatened student strike which the government described as
politically motivated and Cornm,unist-controlled. The strike
is believed to have been touched off chiefly by resentment over
President Duvalier's refusal to free a student' leader who has
been in jail without charges .since 1 September. Leaders of
the principal student organization, which encompasses uni-
versity and high school student>, are apparently sympathetic
to the Castro regime in nearby Gaba, and the possibility of
Cuban influence in the strike cannot be eliminated. Yesterday,
as the strike continued, the government ordered all schools
in the country closed until after Christmas and summarily
expelled from .Haiti French-born Archbishop Foirier--who
was threatened with arrest last yeax .when he critized the
regime--accusing him of giving $7,000 to aid the students.
There apparently is no immediate threat to the regime,
as -the opposition is poorly organized and made up of diverse
elements. Businessmen. and government employees yesterday
staged a demonstration in Port au Prince in support of Duvalier.
The President is :generally unpopular, however, particularly
in the capital, and any drastic police action to break up student
demonstrations might ],ead to wiidespread xioting that could bring
the government down.
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vember that the government wa:~ exhibiting an attitude of con-
fidence, also reported local speculation that the regime had
US officials in Port au Prince, who commented on 23 No-
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deliberately encouraged the strike to provide pretext for ar-
resting political opponents and t;o try to convince the United
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States that Haiti has a lame Communist problem and will
require massive aid.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for. National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the Presitdent
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Departrrient of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Arrny
Chief of Naval OheraL-ians, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defer.~se for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
.Assistant C~.ief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Sulrreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
-The Ghairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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 i i i i i i /y ~~~/Jl>~ 1l ~~lifi~~ i~ l r~ ~l ~~~l~~i i i i i i i i i i i i,