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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005400410001-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
15
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 26, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 17, 1960
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005400410001-6.pdf808.38 KB
Body: 
0/' Approved Fo1f'eleaseWKMPS*0097"005400410001-6 25X1 State Department review completed 17 December Copy No. C DOCUMENT No, _ -s No f ..:,'GE IN CLASS. y~( G'I'i:', As:trnz.u /r C9t15a1 E`9,:de;cti T 0: T5 $ 0 ki t , M. ni2 t J'. DA 9 JUN 1980 REVIEWER; Approved For ReleasETOp/25' EcRIE00975A005400410001-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400410001-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400410001-6 ? Approved Fo elease 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T0 97'05400410001-6 j CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 17 December 1960 DAILY BRIEF I.. THE COMMUNIST BLOC j E U 25 " Approved Fo Release 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP7 00975A005400410001-6 0 0 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400410001-6 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400410001-6 25X1 Approved Fo elease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T0 97IW05400410001-6 25X1 j I I. ASIA.AFRICA 0 25X1 is to visit Mom-radiscio in. the near future`? I conversation between Abdirascid and the Chinese Communist ambassador in Cairo. An official Chinese delegation reported Somali Republic Communist China. Prime Minister Abdirasc d announced in the Soma i par iament on 14 Decem- ber that. his government had decided to recognize Communist China and exchange diplomatic representatives. The decision, the result of an assiduous campaign by Peiping in competition with Nationalist ChinaC.reportedly was made following a.recent 25X1 Iran: The Shah of Iran open to 25X1 25X1 begin parliamentary elections within the next ten. days. He plans to allow voters a choice between at least two contenders for each seat and he will personally select the candidates. The.Shah in- behalf of their favorites. It is unlikely that such an order would be followed. Public knowledge of the wholesale rigging of last August's elections forced the Shah to suspend them. A new elec- tends to order local authorities not to manipulate the voting on tonal fiasco could cause public disturbances I ,17 Dec 60 25X1 Approved Fo - 975AO05400410001-6 25X1 0 k" 25X1 25X1 I 25X1 Approved Fo elease 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T 097 005400410001-6 j S 25X1 M 25X1 *Ethhiopia: Troops loyal to the Emperor have regained al- most complete : control of Addis Ababa, and the coup attempt apparently has collapsed. Loyalists have freed the crown prince and other officials who were being held in the palace. Most of the dissidents are at large in the Addis Ababa area. EThe army reportedly has issued orders for the.arrest of the 25X1 25X1 ringleaders, including Bodyguard commander General Menghis- / 1 0-- tou, Director of Security Workeneh, and Germami Neway, Men- ghistou's brother,who reportedly was the behind-the-scenes leader of the dissidentThe Emperor, who landed in Asmara 25X1 on the afternoon of 16 December, can be expected to im ose severe punishment on all those involved in the cou 0 E Italy: Political tensions are rising as the Christian Dem- ocrats are negotiating for allies outside the four parties sup- porting the government; only with such alliances will they be able to govern key cities where the four parties do not have a majority following the local. elections on. 6 and 7 November. The Christian Democrats are playing down the national polit- ical significance of the local collaboration with the Nenni So- cialists which is urged by the government's moderate left sup- porters. Opposition by right-wing Christian Democrats and 17 Dec 60 iii 25X1 Approved F - 0975A005400410001-6 c Approved Fo elease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T U,IWUU5400410001-O j 1 25X1 Liberals to such collaboration could build up pressures leading to the fall of Fanfani's government. Ecuador: Ecuador's pro-Castro anti-US minister of government--the principal exponent of pro-bloc policies within the. government in- formed Ecuadorean Communist leaders on 13 December that the cabinet had secretly decided to establish relations with the USSR. Three days earlier Foreign Minister Chiri- boga.had announced that Ecuador and Czechoslovakia ould soon exchange diplomatic missions of legation rank. Pres- ident Velasco told Ambassador Bernbaum on 14 December that while Ecuador is willing to establish relations with the USSR, he will neither take the initiative nor yield to domes- tic pressures for close ties with the bloc or withdrawal from the Organization of American States.. (OAS).)i IV. SPECIAL WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS [On the basis of findings of Special Watch Committee Meeting on 16 December 1960 concerning developments re- latigg to Laos, the United States Intelligence Board concludes that-j IThe recent developments in Laos have undoubtedly forced the Communists to review their tactics and immediate objec- tive. (Such evidence as we have to date regarding Communist in- tentions is susceptible of two interpretations: Ca. A decision to rely on the Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces with such increased assistance as is required in materiel ancdj 17 Dec 60 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP79100975AO05400410001-6 WE- V 4 25X1 . ---~--~-- ~- ----- -----?----~----- IMM Approved Fo elease 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79 0091*0005400410001-6 j ..selected personnel, to prevent the Phoumi - Boun Oum forces from establishing effective control of Laos;, lb. A decision to intervene openly with Democratic Republic of Vietnam or Chinese Communist forces: CTbe course of action "a" would not only advance Communist interests in Laos but would also allow full opportunity for attempting to isolate and discredit the US. Although the evidence better supports the adoption of course "a," open intervention under course "b" is not precluded even though such course might involve sub- stantial risks to the bloc. F 25X1 LATE ITEM 17 Dec 60 Approved or Release 2003/02/27. CIA-RDP79T 0975A005400410001-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400410001-6 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400410001-6 Approved Fo teleO Iranian Elections Scheduled to Begin Next Week i_.1. hopes to begin parliamentary elections-,.,Nithin the next ten days. He plans to allow voters a choice between at least two contenders for each. seat, but will personally select the candidates, thus ensuring a parliament respon- sive to his demands. The Shah claims he will not attempt to assure the victory of any particular individual or party, and he intends to order local authorities..:not,to:influence voting on behalf of their favorites. It seems unlikely that many local officials will refrain from manipulating the voting, but the Shah may hope to avoid the obvious involve- ment of central government officials',' remier Sharif -Emami and Interior Minister Alavi- Moqadam are urging the Shah to,-.,allow an unrestricted number of independents to stand for election. They be- lieve that if no party wins a clear majority, their chances of retaining officb will be increased. Allahyer Saleh, a prominent independent who is distrusted by the Shah for his popularity and past association with former Premier Mossadeq, apparently will be permitted to run. Former Premier Eqbal, who was forced to resign last August over election scandals, is actively leading the Melliyun party in the hope of again becoming premier. Approved For Release 2003/02/27 CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400410001-6 17 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page. 2 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400410001-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400410001-6 The Christian emocra s are now negotiating for new local allies because the 6-7 November.local elections in many cities, including Rome, Milan, Genoa, Turin, Venice, and. Florence, failed to give a majority to either the coalition supporting the national government- -Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, Republicans, and Liberals--or to the Nenni Socialists and Communists. The Christian Democratic party is pledged not to form municipal governments with the Commu- nists or.neo-Fascists, and one or the other of its various fac- tions opposes any nationwide collaboration.with.the Nenni So- cialists or with the Monarchists;, who have too few city coun- cil seats to offer important municipal solutions on a large scale. 25X1 25X1 Christian. Democratic party leaders are anxious to play down the significance of local commitments to the Nenni So- cialists because of the implications such commitments would have for the national government. Apprehension on. the part of the Liberal party lest the. national government rely on Nenni Socialist parliamentary support led to the collapse of the Segni government in February 196Q. The extent of Christian Demo- cratic. collaboration with the Socialists in municipal councils may therefore determine the life of the Fanfani coalition. Nenni is stressing the significance of local agreements, however, in order to convince his own party's left wing that his policy of independence of the Communists is paying off. Nenni and his supporters fear that failure to achieve alliances with the Christian Democrats in important cities would hurt him vis- a-vis the Socialist left wing at the March party congress. He has been pressing for collaboration in the Sicilian regional gov- ernment with the Christian Democrats, who now participate with the neo-Fascists and Monarchists. Meanwhile the Communists are attempting to. draw the So- cialists back into united action by exploiting a series of strikes in. the railway and industrial sectors. Additional strikes are threatened by teachers, newsmen, and shopkeepers. The strikes are based on.economic issues, and not only the Communist- dominated CGIL but the largely Christian Democratic and Social Democratic unions have participated in most of them. Approved orRelease 2003/0 /27 : GIA ^ornT^^^ 5AO05400410001-6 17 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400410001-6 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400410001-6 Approved Foe ease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975 005400410001-6 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive' Offices of the White :House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved Fo 5400410001-6 25X1 25X1 Approved For Releas o /2 . t T00975AO05400410001-6