CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005400510001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 29, 1960
• Content Type: REPORT

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29 December 1960
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CENTRAL IN I ELLIGt:Nk t BULLETIN
I
29 December 1960
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR: At least nine members of the Soviet party
presi ium have been. dispatched to key provincial. centers
within the USSR during the last week to explain the out-
come of the November conference of world Communist
leaders to local party officials? The relatively rare prac-
tice of providing. authoritative expositions of party policy
.by top members of the hierarchy has been connected in.
the past with complicated or controversial issues, such
as the Zhukov ouster and this year's troop=reduction. an-
nouncement. In. the present instance, the intention prob-
ably is to givesecond-echelon officials a clearer picture
of the Soviet leadership's view of the USSR's relationship
with China than emerged in the ambiguous conf n do u-
ments.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
I
Congo: Gizenga's move into Kivu Province on 25-27
Decem e--accomplished with only a few hundred troops--
may have given him control over much of the province. Al-
though some troops in Kivu. remain loyal to Mobutu, the
dissidents may have broken Mobutu's "economic blockade"
of Orientale Province in large measure by gaining control of
a major food-producing area. If the dissidents are success-
ful. in extending their influence to the Congo interior, this
success is likely to impress the independent African states,
most of which-are sympathetic toward the Gizenga regime
while doubtful concerning its long-term prospects. Some
African states, which are scheduled to meet in Casablanca
in early January, may offer the dissidents material aid or
even grant formal diplomatic recognition. Gizenga's move
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will increase pressure on Mobutu to undertake military op-
erations against the dissidents, notwithstanding Hammar-
skjold's threat to withdraw UN troops in such. an event. In
Leopoldville, President Kasavubu has told the Liberian am-
bassador that he is ready to receive the UN Conciliation
.Commission and suggested it begin meetings by 3 January.
Yemen-UK: Imam Ahmad has declared the British
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residing in Aden and the Aden Protectorate and believed by
the Imam to be responsible for recent bombings in Sana and
other towns in Yemen. The Imam probably does not intend a
charge in Taiz persona non grata and is recalling the Yem-
eni charge from London. The Imam's action is in retalia-
tion for alleged British support of anti-monarchical Yemenis
complete break in relation
to increase Mali's susceptibility to the blandishments of the
may be reflected in cabinet changes expected shortly"] is likely
during which Mali's adherence to the Ghana-Guinea "union"
was announced, Keita indicated in private that Mali consid-
ered it had more in common with Guinea than with the other
French-speaking African states. This leftward trend,which
Mali: President Modibo Keita, who has been under
strong pressure from militant left-wing elements within his
regime, is aligning Mali more closely with its radical neigh-
bor, Guinea, where the Sino..Soviet bloc has established a
firm foothold. Prior to his recent meeting in Conakry with
Guinean President Tours and Ghanaian President Nkrumah
elements,
Sino=Soviet blocs
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III. THE WEST
EN
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the regime has information that
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El Salvador: Fourteen leaders of the Communist-front CV /L
April and May Revolutionary party (PRAM) reportedly have
either left or are about to leave for Cuba. The US Embassy
at San Salvador comments that the size and composition of the
group indicate that El Salvador is about to receive a "mas-
sive injection" of Castro-Communist doctrine, guidance, and
support. Meanwhile peasant groups reportedly being organized
by PRAM and the Communist-dominated labor federation are
taking on the character of a "popular militia" and. already may
control certain strategic points in the country. 25X1
*Paraguay: The Paraguayan government has taken extensive
security precautions in anticipation of a new attempt, possibly
starting today, to overthrow President Stroessner. 1 :1
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opposition forces plan an uprising in. Asuncion- -reportedly
scheduled for 29 December--timed to coincide with an in-
vasion of Paraguay at several points by exile groups now
based in Argentina. Between December 1959 and this past
August there were anumber of small-scale invasions of
the country by exile forces, but these did not draw major
support within the country. Although Stroessner reportedly
retains the loyalty of ;most of the armed forces, a number of
factors, including depressed economic conditions, have in-
creased popular discontent in the country, and have heightened 25X1
the possibility of more widespread support at,
tempt against the government.
ON.. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the United States or its possessions in the imme-
diate future.
B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate
direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies,
or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate future.
C. The Communist bloc airlift operations associated with
the Laotian situation continue and remain consistent with
what we believe to be a decision to provide sufficient
support to the Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces to prevent es-
tablishment of effective control over the country by an
anti-Communist Lao government. It still appears unlikely
that the Communist bloc has decided to intervene openly
with its own identifiable military forces at this time.
29 Dec 60
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Mali Moving Toward Closer Alignment With Guinea
President Modibo Keita, who has been under strong
pressure from extremist elements within Mali's single-
party authoritarian regime, is aligning his country more
closely with its radical neighbor, Guinea, where the Sino-
Soviet bloc has established a firm foothold. Earlier a dis-
tinct coolness had developed in:. the Mali- Guinea relationship,
largely because of indications that Guinean President Tourd
expected to play a dominant role in a close partnership be-
tween the two French states following the disruption in Au-
gust of the former federation between Mali and Senegal. In
October, Mali asked Tourd to postpone his proposed state
visit to Bamako until January, then pointedly agreed to a
similar visit by Ghana's Nkrumah last month.
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Since early December, however, when Keita and Toure
held a hastily arranged rendezvous at the Guinea-Mali
frontier, a rapprochement has been developing. [Keita af -
forded further evidence of this when he indicated to visit-
ing American dignitaries on 16 December that Mali con-
sidered it had more in common with Guinea than. with the
other French-speaking African states. At the same time,
he made it clear that Mali did not look to the pro-Western
Ivory Coast for inspiration and political cooperation, de.-
spite his own former close ties with .Ivory Coast leader
Houphouet-Boigny:j A week later the Mali President went
to Conakry to affirm Mali's adherence to the Ghana-Guinea
"union."
The American Embassy in Bamako believes that while
the Congo and Algerian situations have contributed to this
rapprochement, Mali's leaders are primarily attracted to
Guinea's Marxist-influenced approach to basic political and
economic problems.
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This leftward trend, (which reportedly will be reflected
in cabinet changes to be announced shortly;:) seems likely to
increase Mali's susceptibility to blandishments from the Sino-
Soviet bloc. At present Mali is in the process of establishing
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diplomatic relations with at least four bloc countries--in-
cluding Communist China and North Vietnam--and has
signed preliminary trade and: technical assistance agree-
ments with Czechoslovakia. In addition, a Soviet economic
mission has been in Mali for some time, studying possible
aid projects.
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Fourteen leaders of the Salvadoran Communist-front April
and May Revolutionary party (PRAM) are reported to have left or
to be about to leave for Cuba. The US Embassy at San Salvador
commented that the size and. composition of the group indicate
that El Salvador is about to receive a "massive injection" of
Castro-Communist doctrine, guidance, and support. The group
may hope that it can obscure the real purpose of its trip by tim-
ing the visit to coincide with, celebrations in Cuba on 1 and 2 Jan-
uary--to be attended by delegations from various Latin American
countries--in commemoration of the second anniversary of Fidel
Castro's revolutionary victory.
Peasant groups being organized by PRAM .and the Commu-
nist-dominated labor federation reportedly are taking on. the
character of a "popular militia" and already may control. cer-
tain strategic points in the country. The three civilians on the
governing six=man junta. and several cabinet members suspect-
ed of being Communist sympathizers have continued to fill gov-
ernment posts at. all levels, particularly in the ministries of
labor and justice, with suspected Communists.
A concerted drive led by Mario Castrillo Zeledon, a sus-
pected Communist who is attorney general, to gain control over
the internal security functions of the government has resulted in
a.growing awareness of the Communist threat by some military
members of the regime. The military is split by dissension,
however, and has given no recent indication that it is about to
unite, to stem the Communist bid for power.
The junta. reportedly has decided to hold congressional elec-
tions next May, to be followed by the election in the new Congress
of a provisional president to serve until a duly elected president
takes office in September 1962. This move may be intended to
mollify the military and quiet the fears of the urban citizenry,
which along with other segments of the population is becoming
increasingly worried over gains being made by Communist and
Castro. sympathizers. The Communists have already made con-
siderable progress in gaining control over the nation's electoral
machinery, however, and PRAM will probably soon be inscribed
as a political party and thus be able to compete in the May elec-
tions.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federai Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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