CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005400510001-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
12
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 27, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 29, 1960
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005400510001-5.pdf783.94 KB
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Approved For leasetOJP2/2SE J00975,CD05400510001-5 29 December 1960 25X1 Copy No. C DOCUMENT NO. S NC DM'$NGE IN CLASS, ^ DECL, wICMi I CLASS. C s:.N LLD TO, TS S C ILXT RL'VJ, Vv G.JL. '20/0 RUTH: I4 70.2 DATEio JUN 198ONEVIEWERI 0 25X 25X1 ["LIN-999MIlLNI State Department review completed Approved For Release /2 ~4M1ET00975AO05400510001-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400510001-5 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400510001-5 j A A F x'05400510001 5 pprove or CENTRAL IN I ELLIGt:Nk t BULLETIN I 29 December 1960 DAILY BRIEF I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR: At least nine members of the Soviet party presi ium have been. dispatched to key provincial. centers within the USSR during the last week to explain the out- come of the November conference of world Communist leaders to local party officials? The relatively rare prac- tice of providing. authoritative expositions of party policy .by top members of the hierarchy has been connected in. the past with complicated or controversial issues, such as the Zhukov ouster and this year's troop=reduction. an- nouncement. In. the present instance, the intention prob- ably is to givesecond-echelon officials a clearer picture of the Soviet leadership's view of the USSR's relationship with China than emerged in the ambiguous conf n do u- ments. II. ASIA-AFRICA I Congo: Gizenga's move into Kivu Province on 25-27 Decem e--accomplished with only a few hundred troops-- may have given him control over much of the province. Al- though some troops in Kivu. remain loyal to Mobutu, the dissidents may have broken Mobutu's "economic blockade" of Orientale Province in large measure by gaining control of a major food-producing area. If the dissidents are success- ful. in extending their influence to the Congo interior, this success is likely to impress the independent African states, most of which-are sympathetic toward the Gizenga regime while doubtful concerning its long-term prospects. Some African states, which are scheduled to meet in Casablanca in early January, may offer the dissidents material aid or even grant formal diplomatic recognition. Gizenga's move 25X1 Approved For F elease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975405400510001-5 25X1 j Approved For elease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975 5400510001-5 j /1011/11 will increase pressure on Mobutu to undertake military op- erations against the dissidents, notwithstanding Hammar- skjold's threat to withdraw UN troops in such. an event. In Leopoldville, President Kasavubu has told the Liberian am- bassador that he is ready to receive the UN Conciliation .Commission and suggested it begin meetings by 3 January. Yemen-UK: Imam Ahmad has declared the British 25X1 25V1 residing in Aden and the Aden Protectorate and believed by the Imam to be responsible for recent bombings in Sana and other towns in Yemen. The Imam probably does not intend a charge in Taiz persona non grata and is recalling the Yem- eni charge from London. The Imam's action is in retalia- tion for alleged British support of anti-monarchical Yemenis complete break in relation to increase Mali's susceptibility to the blandishments of the may be reflected in cabinet changes expected shortly"] is likely during which Mali's adherence to the Ghana-Guinea "union" was announced, Keita indicated in private that Mali consid- ered it had more in common with Guinea than with the other French-speaking African states. This leftward trend,which Mali: President Modibo Keita, who has been under strong pressure from militant left-wing elements within his regime, is aligning Mali more closely with its radical neigh- bor, Guinea, where the Sino..Soviet bloc has established a firm foothold. Prior to his recent meeting in Conakry with Guinean President Tours and Ghanaian President Nkrumah elements, Sino=Soviet blocs (Page 1) 29 Dec 60 25X1 25X1 &K Approved For Rel~ase 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005l00510001-5 25X1 25X1 Approved For ease 2003/02/27 :CIA-RDP79T00975A 5400510001-5 5X1 III. THE WEST EN 25X1 25X1 29 Dec 60 the regime has information that 0 le-, 25X1 Approved For Relea 900310919Z - - 400510001-5 25X1 ME El Salvador: Fourteen leaders of the Communist-front CV /L April and May Revolutionary party (PRAM) reportedly have either left or are about to leave for Cuba. The US Embassy at San Salvador comments that the size and composition of the group indicate that El Salvador is about to receive a "mas- sive injection" of Castro-Communist doctrine, guidance, and support. Meanwhile peasant groups reportedly being organized by PRAM and the Communist-dominated labor federation are taking on the character of a "popular militia" and. already may control certain strategic points in the country. 25X1 *Paraguay: The Paraguayan government has taken extensive security precautions in anticipation of a new attempt, possibly starting today, to overthrow President Stroessner. 1 :1 j Aooroved For lease 2003/02/27: CIA-RDP79T00975 5400510001-5 25X1 0 25X1 opposition forces plan an uprising in. Asuncion- -reportedly scheduled for 29 December--timed to coincide with an in- vasion of Paraguay at several points by exile groups now based in Argentina. Between December 1959 and this past August there were anumber of small-scale invasions of the country by exile forces, but these did not draw major support within the country. Although Stroessner reportedly retains the loyalty of ;most of the armed forces, a number of factors, including depressed economic conditions, have in- creased popular discontent in the country, and have heightened 25X1 the possibility of more widespread support at, tempt against the government. ON.. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the imme- diate future. B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate future. C. The Communist bloc airlift operations associated with the Laotian situation continue and remain consistent with what we believe to be a decision to provide sufficient support to the Kong Le/Pathet Lao forces to prevent es- tablishment of effective control over the country by an anti-Communist Lao government. It still appears unlikely that the Communist bloc has decided to intervene openly with its own identifiable military forces at this time. 29 Dec 60 iv I Approved For Releasre 2nnsin2i27 ? 1 -Pnp79Tnna75nnn54OO 10001-5 25X1 j 25X1 Approved For 1W6220 1003101117 - Q 5400510001-5 Mali Moving Toward Closer Alignment With Guinea President Modibo Keita, who has been under strong pressure from extremist elements within Mali's single- party authoritarian regime, is aligning his country more closely with its radical neighbor, Guinea, where the Sino- Soviet bloc has established a firm foothold. Earlier a dis- tinct coolness had developed in:. the Mali- Guinea relationship, largely because of indications that Guinean President Tourd expected to play a dominant role in a close partnership be- tween the two French states following the disruption in Au- gust of the former federation between Mali and Senegal. In October, Mali asked Tourd to postpone his proposed state visit to Bamako until January, then pointedly agreed to a similar visit by Ghana's Nkrumah last month. 25X1 Since early December, however, when Keita and Toure held a hastily arranged rendezvous at the Guinea-Mali frontier, a rapprochement has been developing. [Keita af - forded further evidence of this when he indicated to visit- ing American dignitaries on 16 December that Mali con- sidered it had more in common with Guinea than. with the other French-speaking African states. At the same time, he made it clear that Mali did not look to the pro-Western Ivory Coast for inspiration and political cooperation, de.- spite his own former close ties with .Ivory Coast leader Houphouet-Boigny:j A week later the Mali President went to Conakry to affirm Mali's adherence to the Ghana-Guinea "union." The American Embassy in Bamako believes that while the Congo and Algerian situations have contributed to this rapprochement, Mali's leaders are primarily attracted to Guinea's Marxist-influenced approach to basic political and economic problems. 25X1 This leftward trend, (which reportedly will be reflected in cabinet changes to be announced shortly;:) seems likely to increase Mali's susceptibility to blandishments from the Sino- Soviet bloc. At present Mali is in the process of establishing 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400510001-5 29 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved For Rol se 200WO247 . GIA RE)P:79T-009:76 J90 diplomatic relations with at least four bloc countries--in- cluding Communist China and North Vietnam--and has signed preliminary trade and: technical assistance agree- ments with Czechoslovakia. In addition, a Soviet economic mission has been in Mali for some time, studying possible aid projects. 25X1 Approved For Release 2A^ C,I RDP70Tnnn~~A005400510001-5 29 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400510001-5 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400510001-5 5 ,~5pth F6~$~h 't @~~D~ti @ 01-5 Fourteen leaders of the Salvadoran Communist-front April and May Revolutionary party (PRAM) are reported to have left or to be about to leave for Cuba. The US Embassy at San Salvador commented that the size and. composition of the group indicate that El Salvador is about to receive a "massive injection" of Castro-Communist doctrine, guidance, and support. The group may hope that it can obscure the real purpose of its trip by tim- ing the visit to coincide with, celebrations in Cuba on 1 and 2 Jan- uary--to be attended by delegations from various Latin American countries--in commemoration of the second anniversary of Fidel Castro's revolutionary victory. Peasant groups being organized by PRAM .and the Commu- nist-dominated labor federation reportedly are taking on. the character of a "popular militia" and already may control. cer- tain strategic points in the country. The three civilians on the governing six=man junta. and several cabinet members suspect- ed of being Communist sympathizers have continued to fill gov- ernment posts at. all levels, particularly in the ministries of labor and justice, with suspected Communists. A concerted drive led by Mario Castrillo Zeledon, a sus- pected Communist who is attorney general, to gain control over the internal security functions of the government has resulted in a.growing awareness of the Communist threat by some military members of the regime. The military is split by dissension, however, and has given no recent indication that it is about to unite, to stem the Communist bid for power. The junta. reportedly has decided to hold congressional elec- tions next May, to be followed by the election in the new Congress of a provisional president to serve until a duly elected president takes office in September 1962. This move may be intended to mollify the military and quiet the fears of the urban citizenry, which along with other segments of the population is becoming increasingly worried over gains being made by Communist and Castro. sympathizers. The Communists have already made con- siderable progress in gaining control over the nation's electoral machinery, however, and PRAM will probably soon be inscribed as a political party and thus be able to compete in the May elec- tions. 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400510001-5 29 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved For ease 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 5400510001-5 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federai Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved For Release 2003/02/27 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400510001-5 25X1 25X1 TOP SECRET s _ i i Approved For Relea~AQ2/~T00975A005400510001-5