CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A005400530001-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
20
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 11, 2002
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 31, 1960
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A005400530001-3.pdf | 1.06 MB |
Body:
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31 December 1960
Copy No. -C
I...N.-TELL16ENCE
DOCUMENT No. 5
NO MANGE IN CLASS. ~{
[] CE.CLASSIB:IED
CLASS. GHxNGcD 70. TS S C
NLXT R.:VkW DATi tQ Q a
State Dept. review completed
AUTHs Nil 70-2
10 JUN 1980
DATES _____ REVIEWERi
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LATE ITEM
* Laos: The rapidity of the advance of anti-government
forces in the Plain des Jarres area northwest of Xieng Khouang
town now makes it probable that there is a "sizeable aggression"
from North Vietnam, according to a joint message from US
missions in Laos. On the basis of fragmentary information,
the message reports that the area is expected to fall no later
than l January.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
31 December 1960
DAILY BRIEF
25
schedule and dates have not been fixed, Khrushchev has ac-
cepted invitations to the UAR, Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, and
.Ethiopia. The Soviet charge in Lome recently discussed
with Prime Minister Olympio a visit by the Soviet premier
to Togo in January as part of a West African tour. Khru?
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Africa: -Soviet Premier Khrushchev will visit
Africa in late January and early February, according to
the Indian ambassador in Moscow. Although the specific
shchev also appears to be angling for bids from Libya and
Sudan, and may hope to include Morocco and Mali-which
on his African itinerary.
have recently expanded their ties with. the Communist bloc--
ommunis ina: communist China's first announce-
year and probable underfulfillment of the plan in industry.
Natural calamities are cited as affecting the entire economy.
People's Daily reports that of the 150,000,000 acres affected
by the "severest natural calamities in 100 years," more than
one third sustained serious losses, with no harvest at all in
some places. Light industry, which depends on agriculture
for raw materials, will not reach planned goals this year.
Peiping claims, however, that 1960 targets for steel, iron,
coal, electric power, petroleum, machine tools, and trac-
tors will be reached in spite of production and transport in-
terruptions. There is considerable evidence that 1960 has
been a poor agricultural year, but probably no worse than
ments of 960 economic achievements indicate a poor harvest
1959, also a year of bad weather and disappointing yields. By
overstressing the severity of natural calamities, the regime
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may be attempting to exonerate its policies from blame for
the serious food shortages and also preparing the ground for
a return to announcing realistic statistics--a practice aban- 11111
11 1 aim-
--played by the Communist representatives which led to the
conclusion of the negotiations on renewing Soviet and East
German trade agreements with Bonn. reflect Khrushchev's de-
sire to avoid precipitating a crisis at this time which might
jeopardize his efforts to establish a conciliatory atmosphere
on. the key issue of Berlin. before making a formal demarche
for a. new summit meeting. A further important factor was the
desire to ensure continued delivery to East Germany of much-
needed industrial goods from. West Germany. The bloc nego-
tiators offered compromise formulas which permit both sides
to save face but do not prejudice the fundamental.Communist
claim that East Berlin is controlled by the East Germans and
that Bonn has no authority to negotiate for West Berlin, I
I I. ASIA-AFRICA
Cambodia - Communist Bloc. Prince Sihanouk strength-
ened Cambodia's commitment to some Sino-Soviet foreign pol-
icy objectives and obtained extensive. economic aid during his
recent tour of Communist countries. Peiping has agreed to supply new grants and technical assistance totaling nearly
$40,000,000. The Soviet Union. is giving Cambodia a.techno-
logical institute. In addition, the USSR and Czechoslovakia
are extending credits for industrial development, hydroelec-
tric dams, and geological surveys. In return, Sihanouk reit-
erated Cambodian support. for Chinese Communist and Mon-
golian admission to the UN and negotiated a treaty of friend-
ship and nonaggression with Communist China,
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go's Stanleyville "government," or his representative in Cairo
may also attend. King Mohamed V, who personally called the
be an active participant. Antoine Gizenga, leader of the Con-
the Congo, may. take on a strong anti=French. complexion in
view of African anger over the recent French atomic tests
and a report that Algerian rebel premier Ferhat Abbas will
Africa- The African "summit" conference in Casablanca
from 3 t57 January, originally planned to deal primarily with
conference and accordingly postponed his scheduled Asian trip,
is reportedly chagrined because only Nasir, Nkrumah, Toure,
and Keita of the some 14 Afro-Asian chiefs of state invited. have
accepted. Because of the lack of preparation for the conference 25
and the divergent views of the participants, it will be difficult
for them to agree on any significant practical action.
Uganda: Violent outbreaks may occur. within the next few
days in Britain's Uganda protectorate as a result of the impasse
nounce'the province's agreements with Britain and attempt to
between the British Government and the tribal rulers of Buganda
Province.: Most Buganda officials, concerned that the prov-
ince's special privileges will be lost as Uganda moves toward
independence as a.unit, appears adamant in their intention to de-
31 Dec. 60 DAILY BRIEF
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KEI UBLIL UP I rit LyNVv
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Congo Lake Albere
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31 DECEMBER 1960
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FEDERATION OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND /
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Bukavu
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secede from the protectorate shortly.
The secession at-
tempt has little chance of succeeding, and the Buganda King 25X1
and his lieutenants have urged their followers to avoid vio- 25
lence. Jowever, extremist-led demonstrations are a strong
Possibility
I
Brussels. An attempt to move 2100 Congo Army paratroops from
Luluabourg to Bukavu--now controlled by Gizenga sympathizers--
appears imminent; four DC-4 aircraft commandeered by Colonel
Mobutu from the Congo's civil airline reportedly are to airlift
the force to Usumbura. Ruanda-Urundi_ about 7n miles
Congo: Belgian Government officials have indicated that
they will approve a request by President Kasavubu for permis-
sion to land troops in Ruanda-Urundi for operations against dis-
sidents in Kivu Province, according to the American Embassy in `P
31 Dec 60 DAILY BRIEF
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resident Kasavubu reportedly has agreed to meet with the
in Leopoldville on 3 January. Most of the Congo's political leaders
will probably not be in Leopoldville at this time, making it un-
likely that the meeting will contribute significantly to apolitical
UN Conciliation Commission- -probably including Hammarskjold--
solution in o:
France-Algeria: France has notified NATO that it is
temporarily withdrawing two infantry battalions, number-
ing about 1, 600 men, from its contingents in Germany in order
to bolster security forces in Algeria during the 6-8 January
referendum period. According to the official note announcing the
withdrawal, the troops will be away from their regular stations
from 31 December to about 15-20 January. Reports of riots
planned by both Moslem and rightist groups in the first half of
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January have probably led Paris to adopt this means of strengthening
security forces in the major cities of Algeria, thus avoiding further
depletion of metropolitan police ranks or recall of additional army
eru- u ae LPeru has severed diplomatic relations with
Cuba, it was announced in Lima yesterday. Peruvian President
Prado on 28 December had, authorized such a move within three
days, provided some other Latin American government would
take similar action shortly. The Peruvians have been urging the
Colombian and Argentine governments to take the same step.
Argentina and Cuba maintain regular diplomatic relations; Colombia
and Cuba do not now exchange ambassadors but there has been
no formal break in relationsa
.31 Dec 60
DAILY BRIEF
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Cambodia Accepts Extensive Bloc Aid
Prince Sihanouk, who returned on 26 December from a
tour of Communist countries, has strengthened Cambodia's
commitments. to some Sino-Soviet foreign policy. objectives
in return for extensive bloc economic aid. He. reiterated
Cambodia's support. for Peiping's claims to UN. membership
and control. over Taiwan and for Mongolia's admission to the
United Nations; he concurred on major Soviet goals relating
to disarmament, a summit conference at the United Nations,
and even UN reorganization.. He also signed a treaty of friend-
ship and nonaggression with Communist China and joined Pei-
ping in condemning the "acts of certain. countries" designed to
create tensions in Southeast Asia.
In return for these probloc statements, Sihanouk, brought
home extensive economic commitments. Peiping, whose eco-
nomic aid to Cambodia had totaled $28,000,000, pledged new
grants for nearly $40,000,000 to expand and complete Chinese
aid projects now under way, to build a steel mill and machine
plant, and to assist the reorganization of Cambodia's producer
cooperatives. Also included in Peiping's aid was technical as-
sistance for the Phnom Penh - Sihanoukville railway project.
From the Soviet Union, Sihanouk obtained the pledge of a 12-
passenger helicopter and a technological institute.
For the first time, Cambodia has accepted bloc credits
repayable in Cambodian produce. The Soviet Union agreed to
carry out a ? "deep geological survey"--presumably for oil--and
studies and eventual, construction of hydroelectric dams on the
Kamchay and Mekong rivers. Czechoslovakia, on a similar
basis, agreed to build an 18,000-ton sugar refinery, a tire fac-
tory, and a tractor assembly plant. Cambodia plans to launch
joint shipping companies with both Communist China and Czech-
oslovakia.
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31..Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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African Leaders' Conference at Casablanca
The African "summit" conference in Casablanca from
3 to 7 January may take on a strong anti-French complexion,
in view of African anger over the recent French atomic tests
and -the report that Algerian rebel premier Ferhat Abbas will
be an active participant,. instead of merely an observer. None
of the pro-French African states will be represented. The
conference was originally planned to deal primarily with the
problem of UN involvement in. the Congo, and India, Ceylon,
and Indonesia were accordingly invited. The American Em-
bassy in Rabat says that either Antoine Gizenga, leader of the
.Congo's Stanleyville "government," or his representative in
.Cairo is expected to attend.
King Mohamed V called the conference on. his personal
initiative, and accordingly postponed his Asian trip until 10
January, apparently to the considerable annoyance of the gov-
ernment concerned. The King is reportedly much chagrined
because--of some 14 Afro-Asian heads of state invited--only
Nasir of the UAR, Nkrumah of Ghana, Toure of Guinea, and
Ke.ita of Mali have accepted. Toure will presumably remain for
only two days, as he is scheduled to begin an. official visit to
Belgrade on 5 January. Libya, after considerable hesitation,
is sending its foreign minister, and the Ceylonese ambassador
in Cairo will attend. President Bourguiba of Tunisia probably
avoided attending because of the strained relations between
Morocco and Tunisia over the Mauritania issue. Premier
Olympio of Togo is said to have declined because he feels that
African states should support the UN in the Congo. Refusals
from India and Nigeria have been particularly embarrassing.
The American Embassy in Rabat feels that these developments
have widened the rift between the King and.the crown prince,
who took over the actual arranging of the meeting.
A Moroccan officialhas said that the conference must end
with "practical decisions for the future of the African. continent;"
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Because of the lack of preparation--the first invitations were
apparently not issued until after mid-December--and the
divergent interests of the participants, it will be difficult
for them to. agree on any significant action, although Nkru-
mah reportedly will propose the establishment of a joint
African high. commando However, a strong condemnation
of France or an attack on. the U'N position in the Congo would
beexploited b the Communist bloc.
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Tension is g in ugaffiffa-
[Violent outbreaks may occur in the next few days in
Britain's Uganda Protectorate. as a. result of the continuing
impasse between the British Government and the tribal
rulers of Buganda Province. Most Buganda officials,.
concerned that the province's special privileges will be
lost under current British plans to move Uganda toward
independence as a unit, appear determined to denounce
its agreements with Britain and attempt to secede from the
protectorate.
CRelations between Buganda and Britain have been. tense
since last September, when negotiations between British of-
ficials and a delegation headed by the Buganda King broke
down. Colonial Secretary Macleod, who maintains that the
province's status cannot be changed unilaterally, has urged
the Buganda officials to take part in the consultative process
which is to culminate in the writing of a new Uganda constitu-
tion next summer. The King and his advisers, however, have
refused to participate without a guarantee that the constitution
will establish a federal structure. Buganda is boycotting the
Uganda Legislative Council, and attempts to register the
province's inhabitants for the elections early next year have
been almost completely unsuccessful, 3
cn the face of the British refusal to negotiate the seces-
sion question, the Buganda efforts to set up a separate state
have little chance of success. The King and some of his ad-
visers, apparently realizing the weakness of their position,
have urged their followers to avoid violence. However, the
idea. of secession has taken. hold of the popular imagination
and is being exploited by Buganda extremists. Pro-independ-
ence sentiment thus is likely to run high, and extremist-led
demonstrations are a strong ossibilit
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Peru Breaks- Diplomatic Relations With Cuba
[Peru has broken diplomatic relations with Cuba, it was
announced in Lima yesterday. Peruvian President Prado on
28 December had authorized Prime Minister Beltran to proceed
with such a move within three days, provided that some other
Latin American government would soon take similar action. Bel-
tran felt that an editorial campaign in Lima newspapers and publi-
cation of correspondence recently seized in a raid on the Cuban
Embassy in Lima would be sufficient to win strong popular back-
ing in Peru for such a move. One letter from the Havana Foreign
Ministry to the Cuban Ambassador in Lima reveals that Cuba has
been siding with Ecuador in the recent flare-up of the highly emo-
tional dispute over the Peruvian-Ecuadorean boundary. According
to the letter, the Cuban Government also supports abrogation of
other territorial settlements in the western hemisphere, going
back as far as Mexico's cession of territory to the United States
The Peruvian Government has been seeking Argentine and
Colombian agreement to break relations with Cuba at this time.
The Argentine Government may not want to lose its listening post
in Havana, however--particularly since Argentine Ambassador
Amoedo, a long-standing friend of Fidel Castro although strongly
pro-US, has been particularly active there. Moreover, an
Argentine spokesman recently stated that the embassy in Havana
was important as a refuge for anti-Castro Cubans-.-j
[Colombia and Cuba do not now exchange ambassadors, but
there has been no formal break in relations. Earlier this month
Honduran Foreign Minister Alvarado Puerto proposed to the
Colombian and Venezuelan Governments that the three jointly
sever diplomatic relations with the Castro regime. On 28 De-
cember--possibly prior to the Peruvian demarche for a Colombian
break with Cuba--the Colombian Foreign Ministry announced that
its former ambassador to Havana would not return to Cuba but that
a lower-ranking Foreign Ministry official was to be sent there]
(The Honduran President, concerned over a strong pro-
Castro faction within his own Liberal party, would be reluctant to3
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break with Cuba unless in so doing he associated himself
with other democratic Latin American governments with
high prestige in Honduras, such as Venezuela and Colombia.,
The Peruvian Government is generally regarded as more
conservative than those of Venezuela, Colombia, or Honduras]
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31 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the. Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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