CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005400530001-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
20
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 11, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 31, 1960
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005400530001-3.pdf1.06 MB
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Approved ForWAe1easeTcO/R/21S5 90097$ 05400530001-3 6/ 25X1 31 December 1960 Copy No. -C I...N.-TELL16ENCE DOCUMENT No. 5 NO MANGE IN CLASS. ~{ [] CE.CLASSIB:IED CLASS. GHxNGcD 70. TS S C NLXT R.:VkW DATi tQ Q a State Dept. review completed AUTHs Nil 70-2 10 JUN 1980 DATES _____ REVIEWERi NNIVvcaa I V1 u%=1GQJG jrVjW/L~C~t~1Cj1VVJ/J/1VVJYVVJJVVV1-J "00 00 ;50040r~ 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400530001-3 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400530001-3 25X1 Approved Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 LATE ITEM * Laos: The rapidity of the advance of anti-government forces in the Plain des Jarres area northwest of Xieng Khouang town now makes it probable that there is a "sizeable aggression" from North Vietnam, according to a joint message from US missions in Laos. On the basis of fragmentary information, the message reports that the area is expected to fall no later than l January. Approved For Release 2002/10/21 m - 400530001-3 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400530001-3 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400530001-3 'EM: _00" Approved Fo - 05400530001-3 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 31 December 1960 DAILY BRIEF 25 schedule and dates have not been fixed, Khrushchev has ac- cepted invitations to the UAR, Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, and .Ethiopia. The Soviet charge in Lome recently discussed with Prime Minister Olympio a visit by the Soviet premier to Togo in January as part of a West African tour. Khru? I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC USSR-Africa: -Soviet Premier Khrushchev will visit Africa in late January and early February, according to the Indian ambassador in Moscow. Although the specific shchev also appears to be angling for bids from Libya and Sudan, and may hope to include Morocco and Mali-which on his African itinerary. have recently expanded their ties with. the Communist bloc-- ommunis ina: communist China's first announce- year and probable underfulfillment of the plan in industry. Natural calamities are cited as affecting the entire economy. People's Daily reports that of the 150,000,000 acres affected by the "severest natural calamities in 100 years," more than one third sustained serious losses, with no harvest at all in some places. Light industry, which depends on agriculture for raw materials, will not reach planned goals this year. Peiping claims, however, that 1960 targets for steel, iron, coal, electric power, petroleum, machine tools, and trac- tors will be reached in spite of production and transport in- terruptions. There is considerable evidence that 1960 has been a poor agricultural year, but probably no worse than ments of 960 economic achievements indicate a poor harvest 1959, also a year of bad weather and disappointing yields. By overstressing the severity of natural calamities, the regime Approved For ~elease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO01400530001-3 2 Approved Ford may be attempting to exonerate its policies from blame for the serious food shortages and also preparing the ground for a return to announcing realistic statistics--a practice aban- 11111 11 1 aim- --played by the Communist representatives which led to the conclusion of the negotiations on renewing Soviet and East German trade agreements with Bonn. reflect Khrushchev's de- sire to avoid precipitating a crisis at this time which might jeopardize his efforts to establish a conciliatory atmosphere on. the key issue of Berlin. before making a formal demarche for a. new summit meeting. A further important factor was the desire to ensure continued delivery to East Germany of much- needed industrial goods from. West Germany. The bloc nego- tiators offered compromise formulas which permit both sides to save face but do not prejudice the fundamental.Communist claim that East Berlin is controlled by the East Germans and that Bonn has no authority to negotiate for West Berlin, I I I. ASIA-AFRICA Cambodia - Communist Bloc. Prince Sihanouk strength- ened Cambodia's commitment to some Sino-Soviet foreign pol- icy objectives and obtained extensive. economic aid during his recent tour of Communist countries. Peiping has agreed to supply new grants and technical assistance totaling nearly $40,000,000. The Soviet Union. is giving Cambodia a.techno- logical institute. In addition, the USSR and Czechoslovakia are extending credits for industrial development, hydroelec- tric dams, and geological surveys. In return, Sihanouk reit- erated Cambodian support. for Chinese Communist and Mon- golian admission to the UN and negotiated a treaty of friend- ship and nonaggression with Communist China, 25X1 31 Dec 60 DAILY BRIEF ii Approved For Re No j O y 05400530001-3 Approved Fo ease 9009110191 - - 05400530001-3 % A go's Stanleyville "government," or his representative in Cairo may also attend. King Mohamed V, who personally called the be an active participant. Antoine Gizenga, leader of the Con- the Congo, may. take on a strong anti=French. complexion in view of African anger over the recent French atomic tests and a report that Algerian rebel premier Ferhat Abbas will Africa- The African "summit" conference in Casablanca from 3 t57 January, originally planned to deal primarily with conference and accordingly postponed his scheduled Asian trip, is reportedly chagrined because only Nasir, Nkrumah, Toure, and Keita of the some 14 Afro-Asian chiefs of state invited. have accepted. Because of the lack of preparation for the conference 25 and the divergent views of the participants, it will be difficult for them to agree on any significant practical action. Uganda: Violent outbreaks may occur. within the next few days in Britain's Uganda protectorate as a result of the impasse nounce'the province's agreements with Britain and attempt to between the British Government and the tribal rulers of Buganda Province.: Most Buganda officials, concerned that the prov- ince's special privileges will be lost as Uganda moves toward independence as a.unit, appears adamant in their intention to de- 31 Dec. 60 DAILY BRIEF Approved For Re ease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 400530001-3 ~~/O Approved Foi eIease 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T0097 005400530001-3 KEI UBLIL UP I rit LyNVv SUDAN buns! t., C)RIENIALE Congo Lake Albere E Q U A T E U R ,Stanleyvill . ,. UGA l L ,,old 11 Atlantic Ocean 31 DECEMBER 1960 D MIlE9 2DD rIS J K A S- abourg .' ~.1 Luputa' K nina? ' D K A T N G A isab :h ille FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND / K I V U Bukavu Kindd.u -' akwan ,4 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400530001-3 Approved For - 9799 5400530001-3 secede from the protectorate shortly. The secession at- tempt has little chance of succeeding, and the Buganda King 25X1 and his lieutenants have urged their followers to avoid vio- 25 lence. Jowever, extremist-led demonstrations are a strong Possibility I Brussels. An attempt to move 2100 Congo Army paratroops from Luluabourg to Bukavu--now controlled by Gizenga sympathizers-- appears imminent; four DC-4 aircraft commandeered by Colonel Mobutu from the Congo's civil airline reportedly are to airlift the force to Usumbura. Ruanda-Urundi_ about 7n miles Congo: Belgian Government officials have indicated that they will approve a request by President Kasavubu for permis- sion to land troops in Ruanda-Urundi for operations against dis- sidents in Kivu Province, according to the American Embassy in `P 31 Dec 60 DAILY BRIEF iv Approved or Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T0097 A005400530001-3 j j j j j j j 25 5' Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005400530001-3 resident Kasavubu reportedly has agreed to meet with the in Leopoldville on 3 January. Most of the Congo's political leaders will probably not be in Leopoldville at this time, making it un- likely that the meeting will contribute significantly to apolitical UN Conciliation Commission- -probably including Hammarskjold-- solution in o: France-Algeria: France has notified NATO that it is temporarily withdrawing two infantry battalions, number- ing about 1, 600 men, from its contingents in Germany in order to bolster security forces in Algeria during the 6-8 January referendum period. According to the official note announcing the withdrawal, the troops will be away from their regular stations from 31 December to about 15-20 January. Reports of riots planned by both Moslem and rightist groups in the first half of 25X1 January have probably led Paris to adopt this means of strengthening security forces in the major cities of Algeria, thus avoiding further depletion of metropolitan police ranks or recall of additional army eru- u ae LPeru has severed diplomatic relations with Cuba, it was announced in Lima yesterday. Peruvian President Prado on 28 December had, authorized such a move within three days, provided some other Latin American government would take similar action shortly. The Peruvians have been urging the Colombian and Argentine governments to take the same step. Argentina and Cuba maintain regular diplomatic relations; Colombia and Cuba do not now exchange ambassadors but there has been no formal break in relationsa .31 Dec 60 DAILY BRIEF 5 Approved or Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 5400530001-3 j Approved For - 05400530001-3 25X1 Cambodia Accepts Extensive Bloc Aid Prince Sihanouk, who returned on 26 December from a tour of Communist countries, has strengthened Cambodia's commitments. to some Sino-Soviet foreign policy. objectives in return for extensive bloc economic aid. He. reiterated Cambodia's support. for Peiping's claims to UN. membership and control. over Taiwan and for Mongolia's admission to the United Nations; he concurred on major Soviet goals relating to disarmament, a summit conference at the United Nations, and even UN reorganization.. He also signed a treaty of friend- ship and nonaggression with Communist China and joined Pei- ping in condemning the "acts of certain. countries" designed to create tensions in Southeast Asia. In return for these probloc statements, Sihanouk, brought home extensive economic commitments. Peiping, whose eco- nomic aid to Cambodia had totaled $28,000,000, pledged new grants for nearly $40,000,000 to expand and complete Chinese aid projects now under way, to build a steel mill and machine plant, and to assist the reorganization of Cambodia's producer cooperatives. Also included in Peiping's aid was technical as- sistance for the Phnom Penh - Sihanoukville railway project. From the Soviet Union, Sihanouk obtained the pledge of a 12- passenger helicopter and a technological institute. For the first time, Cambodia has accepted bloc credits repayable in Cambodian produce. The Soviet Union agreed to carry out a ? "deep geological survey"--presumably for oil--and studies and eventual, construction of hydroelectric dams on the Kamchay and Mekong rivers. Czechoslovakia, on a similar basis, agreed to build an 18,000-ton sugar refinery, a tire fac- tory, and a tractor assembly plant. Cambodia plans to launch joint shipping companies with both Communist China and Czech- oslovakia. 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400530001-3 31..Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 25X1 African Leaders' Conference at Casablanca The African "summit" conference in Casablanca from 3 to 7 January may take on a strong anti-French complexion, in view of African anger over the recent French atomic tests and -the report that Algerian rebel premier Ferhat Abbas will be an active participant,. instead of merely an observer. None of the pro-French African states will be represented. The conference was originally planned to deal primarily with the problem of UN involvement in. the Congo, and India, Ceylon, and Indonesia were accordingly invited. The American Em- bassy in Rabat says that either Antoine Gizenga, leader of the .Congo's Stanleyville "government," or his representative in .Cairo is expected to attend. King Mohamed V called the conference on. his personal initiative, and accordingly postponed his Asian trip until 10 January, apparently to the considerable annoyance of the gov- ernment concerned. The King is reportedly much chagrined because--of some 14 Afro-Asian heads of state invited--only Nasir of the UAR, Nkrumah of Ghana, Toure of Guinea, and Ke.ita of Mali have accepted. Toure will presumably remain for only two days, as he is scheduled to begin an. official visit to Belgrade on 5 January. Libya, after considerable hesitation, is sending its foreign minister, and the Ceylonese ambassador in Cairo will attend. President Bourguiba of Tunisia probably avoided attending because of the strained relations between Morocco and Tunisia over the Mauritania issue. Premier Olympio of Togo is said to have declined because he feels that African states should support the UN in the Congo. Refusals from India and Nigeria have been particularly embarrassing. The American Embassy in Rabat feels that these developments have widened the rift between the King and.the crown prince, who took over the actual arranging of the meeting. A Moroccan officialhas said that the conference must end with "practical decisions for the future of the African. continent;" 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400530001-3 31 Dee 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved For Release 9009110191 - - 05400530001-3 Because of the lack of preparation--the first invitations were apparently not issued until after mid-December--and the divergent interests of the participants, it will be difficult for them to. agree on any significant action, although Nkru- mah reportedly will propose the establishment of a joint African high. commando However, a strong condemnation of France or an attack on. the U'N position in the Congo would beexploited b the Communist bloc. Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400530001-3 31 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 25X6 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400530001-3 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400530001-3 Oproved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975Aa Tension is g in ugaffiffa- [Violent outbreaks may occur in the next few days in Britain's Uganda Protectorate. as a. result of the continuing impasse between the British Government and the tribal rulers of Buganda Province. Most Buganda officials,. concerned that the province's special privileges will be lost under current British plans to move Uganda toward independence as a unit, appear determined to denounce its agreements with Britain and attempt to secede from the protectorate. CRelations between Buganda and Britain have been. tense since last September, when negotiations between British of- ficials and a delegation headed by the Buganda King broke down. Colonial Secretary Macleod, who maintains that the province's status cannot be changed unilaterally, has urged the Buganda officials to take part in the consultative process which is to culminate in the writing of a new Uganda constitu- tion next summer. The King and his advisers, however, have refused to participate without a guarantee that the constitution will establish a federal structure. Buganda is boycotting the Uganda Legislative Council, and attempts to register the province's inhabitants for the elections early next year have been almost completely unsuccessful, 3 cn the face of the British refusal to negotiate the seces- sion question, the Buganda efforts to set up a separate state have little chance of success. The King and some of his ad- visers, apparently realizing the weakness of their position, have urged their followers to avoid violence. However, the idea. of secession has taken. hold of the popular imagination and is being exploited by Buganda extremists. Pro-independ- ence sentiment thus is likely to run high, and extremist-led demonstrations are a strong ossibilit 25X6 31 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400530001-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400530001-3 25X1 Approved Foil Peru Breaks- Diplomatic Relations With Cuba [Peru has broken diplomatic relations with Cuba, it was announced in Lima yesterday. Peruvian President Prado on 28 December had authorized Prime Minister Beltran to proceed with such a move within three days, provided that some other Latin American government would soon take similar action. Bel- tran felt that an editorial campaign in Lima newspapers and publi- cation of correspondence recently seized in a raid on the Cuban Embassy in Lima would be sufficient to win strong popular back- ing in Peru for such a move. One letter from the Havana Foreign Ministry to the Cuban Ambassador in Lima reveals that Cuba has been siding with Ecuador in the recent flare-up of the highly emo- tional dispute over the Peruvian-Ecuadorean boundary. According to the letter, the Cuban Government also supports abrogation of other territorial settlements in the western hemisphere, going back as far as Mexico's cession of territory to the United States The Peruvian Government has been seeking Argentine and Colombian agreement to break relations with Cuba at this time. The Argentine Government may not want to lose its listening post in Havana, however--particularly since Argentine Ambassador Amoedo, a long-standing friend of Fidel Castro although strongly pro-US, has been particularly active there. Moreover, an Argentine spokesman recently stated that the embassy in Havana was important as a refuge for anti-Castro Cubans-.-j [Colombia and Cuba do not now exchange ambassadors, but there has been no formal break in relations. Earlier this month Honduran Foreign Minister Alvarado Puerto proposed to the Colombian and Venezuelan Governments that the three jointly sever diplomatic relations with the Castro regime. On 28 De- cember--possibly prior to the Peruvian demarche for a Colombian break with Cuba--the Colombian Foreign Ministry announced that its former ambassador to Havana would not return to Cuba but that a lower-ranking Foreign Ministry official was to be sent there] (The Honduran President, concerned over a strong pro- Castro faction within his own Liberal party, would be reluctant to3 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400530001-3 31 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 25X1 . Approved For D05400530001-3 break with Cuba unless in so doing he associated himself with other democratic Latin American governments with high prestige in Honduras, such as Venezuela and Colombia., The Peruvian Government is generally regarded as more conservative than those of Venezuela, Colombia, or Honduras] 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05400530001-3 31 Dec 60 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 25X1 Approved For lrivfe se 2002/10/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 5400530001-3 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the. Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director Approved For 25X1 Approved For wIeaseT~P/21~ R~8'0097&905400530001-3 ' s -