CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005500140001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 17, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
17 January 1961
DAILY BRIEF
THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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Communist China e Pakistan: At Peiping's request,
talks on a pre iminary boundary agreement between Com-
munist China and Pakistan are now under way, according
to Pakistan's foreign minister. The Chinese probably hop
to use such an agreement, following the pattern of recent
border accords with Burma and Nepal, to put additional
pressure on New Delhi to accept a compromise solution in
the Sino-Indian. border dispute. Indian claims in the Ladakh
area might well be prejudiced by a bilateral Sino-Pakistani
boundary settlement, and the dispute between India and Pak-
istan over Kashmir would also be further. complicated. A
preliminary agreement between Peiping and Pakistan would
probably call for the establishment of a joint committee to
undertake formal demarcation of the border.
ASIA-AFRICA
Iraq: !Anti-Communist elements in Mosul, in northern
Iraq, began a general strike on 13 January to protest actions
by the Qasim regime favoring pro-Communist elements. Stu-
dents in Mosul have been on strike since 1 January. following
,the arrest of several anti-Communist teachers. During the
past several months anti-Communists in Mosul have almost
daily been. carrying out revenge killings of Communists who
helped suppress the March 1959 rebellion. The governor and
the commandant of police have tacitly condoned these assassi-
nations. The general strike is an indication.that Iraqi anti-
Communist elements are becoming bolder in their protests.
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Sy ?ia$ordaiia Both Syria and Jordan have within the
past few days asked for additional emergency shipments of
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wheat from the United States. Food shortages which have
resulted from three successive years of drought are particu-
larly serious in the Bedouin tribal areas; some 760,000 peo-
ple in Syria and about 100,000 in Jordan are reported,to be
in extreme need. Prospects for the 1961 harvest are good;
thus the critical immediate requirement, is for supplies to tide
these people over until Auguste The Bedouin populations will
also need longer-term aid to build up their herds, which have
been depleted to about 25 percent of the pre-drouaht size.
*Cnnj7n4The initiative in eastern CnnL?n remains with the
Lumumbist forces and their tribal li 25X1
e in the area 25X1
does not plan to take strong action against the dissidents unless i
ordered to do so by headquarters in Leopoldville.
believes that the Baluba forces will succeed in setting up another
"independent" state in northern Katangao Hammarskjold has
reiterated his confidence in Rajeshwar Dayal, his representative
in Leopoldville who is widely believed to be favoring Lumumba,
and has rejected K savubu9s formal demand of 14 January that 25X1
Dayal be recalled 25X1
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17 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF
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El Salvador: The armed forces in El Salvador are report-
17 El Salvador: The armed forces in El Salvador are report-
ed united
ed behind Defense Minister in a plan to over-
-
throw Defense Minister Castillo Castillo in a plan to over-
throw the civil-military junta before it permits a Communist
throw the civil-military junta before it permits a Communist
m~
takeover. The attempt reportedly will be made soon. The
takeover. The attempt reportedly will be made soon. The
armed forces plan to enforce strong initially through a
armed forces plan. to enforce strong rule rule initially through.
military directorate in order to bring the Communist threat
military directorate in order to bring the Communist threat
under control. Non-Communist political parties, however, are
under control. Non-Communist political parties, however, are
to be permitted to continue political activity in preparation for
to, be permitted to continue political activity in preparation for
congressional elections which may be called in May.
congressional elections which may be called in May.
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7 Jan an 61 DAILY
DAILY BRIEF iii
BRIEF
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL.
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Sino-Pakistani Boundary Talks,
Communist China and Pakistan are discussing a prelim-
inary boundary agreement, according to the Pakistani. foreign
minister. EThe talks apparently follow a recent suggestion by
the Chinese Communist ambassador to Pakistan that negotia=
tions be started over .the. Hunza area and such other regions
along the border as Pakistan might wish to discuss. Prior to
that time Peiping had not shown any interest in such talks
Peiping has apparently concluded that its failure to gain
any concessions from. India after the talks, between Chou and
Nehru in March 1960 and several months of low-level discus-
sion by Foreign Ministry experts necessitated a. change in tac-
tics. The Chinese may hope that evena. preliminary border
agreement with Pakistan, following boundary accords with Bur-
ma and Nepal, will put addition pressure on New Delhi to accept
a compromise solution for the Sino=Indian border along lines
drawn up by Peiping.
The Chinese probably also feel that a bilateral boundary
settlement with Pakistan would prejudice Indian claims in the
Ladakh area. The Karakoram mountain range, which might
provide the basis for demarcating portions of the Sino-Pak-
istani border, roughly divides the Indian- and Chinese-occur
pied parts of Ladakh.
. Pakistan has been especially concerned about China's
claims to the Pakistani border state of Hunza and apparently
hopes to forestall any serious incidents while gaining Peiping's
recognition of the "traditional" border. In addition, the Pak-
istanis probably calculate that China's interest in making a show
of progress at this time gives them a transitory bargaining ad-
vantage.
A preliminary boundary agreement would likely follow the
pattern of preliminary Chinese border accords with Nepal and
Burma. In each case a joint committee was established to nego-
tiate.the formal demarcation, and round rules were set u to
overn the committee's action.
17 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
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Anti-Qasim General Strike in Mosul
Fearing that Prime Minister Qasim is about to favor
Mosul's pro-Communist elements, anti-Communists there
began a general strike on 13 January. This action follows a
student strike begun in Mosul schools on 1 January after the.
arrest of several anti-Communist teachers. Rumors have
spread in Mosul that Qasim intends to replace two strongly
anti-Communist officials--the governor and the police chief
--who have tacitly condoned revenge killings of Communists
during the past several months. These assassinations, which
have averaged six or seven a week since early last fall, have
been in retaliation for massacres by Communist elements
in the aftermath of the Marche 1959 Mosul revolt. Although
Iraqi military courts have been carrying out repressive meas-
ures against Iraqi Communists, Qasim has repeatedly
vitiated the courts' work by releasing imprisoned Communists)
LOn 28 December the Baghdad military. court handed down
death sentences to seven Communists and gave 22 other Com-
munists and pro-Communists prison sentences for their part
in the Mosul massacres; 55 others were sentenced the day
before. Meanwhile, the editor of the country's largest Com-
munist paper failed to appear in court on 27 December to face
charges of violating censorship regulations; he is believed to
have gone und.ergroundjj
[While apparently trying to mollify local Communists,
Qasim appears to appreciate the strength of Iraqi "nationalist"
sentiment in favor of Arab solidarity. Emphasis on Arabism
has become an increasingly dominant theme in his recent
speeches- he has frequently referred to the "Arab nation,"
talked of greater economic and political cooperation, and dis-
played a less hostile attitude toward the UAR. However, none
of these gestures is likely to placate Iraqi anti-Communist
and. pan-Arab elements. Some plotting against Qasim appears
although rivalries between factions have
to be continuing
,
militated so far against efforts to overthrow. him.
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The Situation in the Congo
(The initiative in the eastern Congo remains with the
Lumumbist forces and their tribal allies, who reportedly
are becoming more aggressive as a result of 'recent suc-
cesses, Baluba tribesmen have cut the rail link between
Elisabethville and Kamina air base and, together with troops
from Kivu Province, continue to oppose reinforcement of the
UN garrison at Manonoo 25X1
the in the area does not
pan
to take strong action against the dissidents unless ordered to
do so by headquarters in Leopoldvilleo 25X1
=the Baluba forces will succeed in setting up an in e-
pendent" state in northern Katanga-.3
[Tshomb$'s government in Elisabethville reportedly now
has imported more than 100 Belgian paracommandos. Although
Tshombe apparently distrusts his native troops, Belgian off i-
cers with the Katanga forces discount the possibility of dissen-
sion among Africans in the armed forces. The native civilians
in many of the province's important mining cities reportedly
present a threat to order; they apparently have some weapons
at their disposal
FUN Secretary General Hammarskjold has Oreit- 25X1
erated his confidence in Rajeshwar Dayal, his representative
in Leopoldville, and has rejected Kasavubu's formal demand of
14 January that Dayal be recalled. Hammarskjold took issue
with charges made against Dayal by Kasavubu, but said he would
refer the matter to the Security Council for final action
Day as been withholding information and slanting reports
in such a way as to favor Lumumba supporters. However,
Hammarskjold angrily told American officials on 14 January
that he was "very determined" to keep Dayal in the Congo,
despite a campaign of "Russian-type" innuendo which he implied
was coming from Western sources. Nevertheless Hammarskjold
may yet have to appoint anew representative if the UN follows
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(the precedent of acceding to such requests from recognized chiefs
of state in the country where UN troops are serving: 25X1
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Salvadoran Armed Forces Reportedly Planning Coup
The armed forces of El Salvador, under the leadership of
the minister of defense, Colonel Castillo Navarette, plan to
overthrow the ruling civilian-military junta soon in an attempt
to head off. a Communist takeover, 25X1
The arme o ,
which.had been virtually paralyzed by disunity, appear to have
been spurred to cooperation by increasingly bold Communist ac-
tivity in recent weeks. Unrestricted Communist organizational
activity among. the Salvadoran peasants and 25X6
the visit to Cuba ear , er.. is month. ' o a group of Salvadoran ex-
tremists have particularly heightened the concern of the military.
the army is well or-
ganize or the coup, which has the support of "practically all"
important military leaders. A newly, formed political party plans
public demonstrations in. the capital during the next day or. so to
givethe army a. show of popular support for its action,
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The army plan reportedly calls for strong rule initially
through a three-man military junta composed of the defense min-
ister, army chief of staff Colonel Portillo, and Colonel Yanez,
one of the three military members on the present six-man junta.
The new government would permit continued activity by all non-
Communist political parties in preparation for. congressional
elections which may be called next May. The Communist-front
April and May Revolutionary party would be outlawed.
The coup planners are said to recognize the possibility of
some. bloodshed after they initiate action, and .the Communist-
influenced student and labor groups in the capital would probably
attempt counteraction. As long as the army remains united.
however,. it could probably control any disorders.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Detense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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