CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005500160001-3
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RIPPUB
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T
Document Page Count: 
17
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 21, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
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Publication Date: 
January 19, 1961
Content Type: 
REPORT
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TOPS T Approved For RelAwit 200 C75AOOW01600- 19 January 1961 . Copy No. C 77 TELLIGE.." CE 25X1 i State Dept. review completed TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500160001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500160001-3 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500160001-3 "IF 25X1 Approved For 4eaae 2003/04/17 - 5A`S/6500160001-3 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 19 January 1961 DAILY BRIEF THE COMMUNIST BLOC 25X1 25X1 LI USSR: The addition of two new candidate members to the p -arty presidium on 18 January lays the groundwork for further shake-ups in that ruling party body, possibly at the 22nd party congress scheduled for October 1961. The new candidates, 50-year-old Gennady Voronov, party.chief in Orenburg Oblast--a major grain producing area-and 46- year-old Viktor Grishin, Soviet trade union head, are per- haps being groomed as replacements for full members whose tenures may now be insecure. Nikolay Podgorny, presidium member and Ukrainian party chief, was sharply criticized by Khrushchev at the plenum for weak leadership of agriculture and may be on probation. for the coming year. The plenum-- one of the longest in recent years--ended with a report on the November Moscow conference of Communist parties by Mikhail 25X1 Suslov, who along with Khrushchev and Kozlov Wed - inant role in the conference. Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500160001-3 ~~~~~~~~~\~~~ Approved For Rel a 2003/04/17 .CIA-RDP79T0097 A0 016@MU 25X1 N Poland-Cuba: The Polish regime has been reluctant to 25.X1 become involved in bloc aid to Cuba beyond the minimum re- quired to conform with. Soviet policies, mainly because it hopes to negotiate large amounts of American long-term eco- nomic aid. Polish handling of other aspects of relations with Cuba also has differed markedly from the treatment accorded Havana by the rest of the bloc. Warsaw made a point of not inviting Castro's chief Communist adviser, Che Guevara, for a state visit during his recent tour of Eastern Europe. High- level Polish officials repeatedly have implied in conversations 25X1 with American officials that.their interests in Cuba are min- imal, and they have emphasized itary goods to Hav na F- 19 Jan 61 ASIA-AFRICA DAILY BRIEF 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500160001-3 MUMMEMEMEMEME\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\O\\\\ ~~oooooo~oo~~~~~oo~o~oooo~~~o~o~~~~~ooo~ooooo~o~o Approved For R se 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T009 5AbWt001600013"X 25X1 I plinippines: i ipp n - m presse his concern to an American Embassy official over what 25X1 he termed the weakening of the SEATO alliance by the attitude of the British and French, particularly toward the Laotian crisis. M He said that one reason for calling a conference of foreign min- isters of South Vietnam, Nationalist China, South Korea, and the DAILY BRIEF iii 19 Jan 61 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500160001-3 Approved For R se - 5A( 00160001-3 25X1 by insisting that Morocco accept Soviet pilots and technicians on a long-term basis. Moscow may, however, urge the Moroc- 25X1 assemble aad test the aircraft. E M0 El Salvador. The Salvadoran armed forces evidently pre- sented the provisional government with an ultimatum on 16 Jan- uary demanding the immediate curtailment of Communist and pro-Castro activity in El Salvador. The government has appar- ently, at least for the moment, succumbed to the military pres- sure. Defense Minister Castillo Navarrete, who was reported earlier in the week to have army backing for a coup p if necessary to quell the Communists, told American Embassy officers on 17 January that he and a number of other officers had spent most of the previous day talking with the ruling junta on measures for con- trolling the Communists. On 17 January, the junta issued a strong public warning that it is prepared to counter Communist activity. It also announced the recall of the Salvadoran ambas- 25X1 sador in Havana. Chile =USSR: The conservative Alessandri government is reported about ready to approve the sale to the Soviet Union of 60,000 tons of semifinished copper products annually over the next five years. This is about 10 percent of Chile's total produc- tion. Copper is usually in short supply within the bloc, and Chile has not ade any direct copper sale to the Soviet Union in recent 25X1 years. WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS 25X1 'ema" DAILY BRIEF 19 Jan 61 25X1 v No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions yin. the imme- diate future B. /o Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500160001-3 25X 1 Ar.r.rnvnr! Cnr Dnln n 9nnglnn/17 rIA_DfD7QTAA? Anncsurnhannn1_z IMN r areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate futur C. Lhe Sino-Soviet bloc support for the Communist forces in Laos continues unabated and there are indications that it will increase. 'Continuing Communist attacks from the Xieng Khouang area threaten to divide and weaken the Royal Laotian Army forces. With its mil- itary position deteriorating, the Boun Oum - Phoumi government is increasingly likely to seek outside mil- itary assistance D. 1ther developments affording increased opportunities for exploitation by the Communist bloc: The pro-Lu- mumba regime in Stanleyville is apparently meeting with success both in its political and military activity in the Congo and is pushing ahead with arrangements for ma- terial aid and increased diplomatic support from the radical nationalist African states and the bloc. Despite .evidence of attempts by anti- Lumumba leaders to sub- merge their own differences, the political situation of the " Leopoldville group is still deteriorating.) 19 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF vi Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500160001-3 Approved For Re ase 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T009 5A000160001-3 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Philippines, which opened in Manila on 18 January, was the apparent inability of SEATO to act in the Laotian crisis. Stressing his belief that any indication that the US was waver- ing in its. firm positions would have. wide repercussions in the area, Serrano asserted that there is considerable Asian disappointment with SEATO and that continuation of the pres- ent trend might force the Philippines to reappraise its SEATO policies. *Franc e-A1 eria: De Gaulle and rebel premier Ferhat Abbas have agreed in principle to meet, and that negotiations are now under way to determine when and where--perhaps in the first week of March in a French city other than Paris. De Gaulle would consider his demand that various Algerian ten- dencies be represented would be met by the inclusion of the chief of a rival nationalist group in preliminary negotiations only. In Tunis, a member.. of the rebel. government assert- ed the rebels have no desire to allow formalities to stand in the way of opening negotiations and are considering measures to reassure French settlers that their interests would be respect- ed in an Algerian republic. Premier ere may break with a au a over the decision to enter into full negotiations. Morocco-USSR: Corocco and the Soviet Union are report- ed in disagreement as to the terms for delivery of the 14 jet aircraft which, according to a 15 N v ember Moroccan c u- nique, are a gift of the USSR. King Mohame as reuse to accept the Soviet technicians which Moscow insists shall accompany these planes. Both the King and the crown prince have told the Amer- ican ambassador that Soviet military pilots and technicians would not be accepted in Morocco. The USSR probably would not risk jeopardizing the political benefits of the gift of these aircraft 19 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF iv 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500160001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500160001-3 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500160001-3 25X1 ApF irpt i- eeha wi12?d3O# k7 Ia4MapS,Z! f 69WWp` 0160001-3 Philippine Foreign i er Serrano a expresse eep 25X1 concern to an American Embassy officer over the weakening of the SEATO alliance, 25X6 particularly with regard to the Laotian'CrigiS. According to Serrano, his principal reasons for calling the con- ference of foreign ministers from South Korea, South Vietnam, and Nationalist China, which opened in Manila on 18 January, were SEATO's apparent inability to act in the Laotian situation and the need to exchange views with non-Communist neighbors and to indicate support for the American positio Reiterating firm Philippine support for the role now played by tiie United States in the Far East, Serrano emphasized his fear that any indications of wavering would have wide repercus- sions. 25X6 He also voiced ear that Pakistan might be waver- ing in its attitude toward SEATO. Serrano asserted that a continuation of the present trend in the organization might force the Philippines to reappraise its policy toward SEATO Serrano has indicated a long-standing desire to forge closer ties with non-Communist Asian neighbors within the framework of firm American defense commitments in the area. Although Serrano may be partly motivated by his desire to gain personal political credit for Philippine initiatives, there have been sev- eral previous efforts to organize top-level consultations, sparked partly by the desire of South Korea and Nationalist China for greater regional anti-Communist unity. Neither Thailand, which shares current Philippine disillusionment with SEATO, nor Pak- istan accepted invitations to the Manila meeting, but Serrano ap- parently envisages subsequent bilateral talks with those govern- ments and with Malayan [American. ambassador Johnson in Bangkok reports SEATO morale to be "at low ebb," and fears that the organization may be "fatally discredited" unless it can soon persuade its Asian mem- bers that it is able to take some meaningful action with regard to the Laotian crisis 19 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500160001-3 Approved For R~ Negotiations for Meeting of De Gaulle With Ferhat Abbas Reported Under Way F 'immediately after the 6- January referendum vote on his Algerian policy, De Gaulle issued instructions that steps be taken immediately--through well-established links between the French Government and the Provisional Algerian Government (PAG)--to pave the way for direct nego= tiations between himself and rebel representatives. De Gaulle's willingness in principle to meet PAG premier Ferhat Abbas was conveyed to the rebels, and Abbas agreed. Negotiations are now under way to determine the time and place. De Gaulle, who waived his preference for Paris, offered to meet Abbas "anywhere in French territory" but balked at Abbas' insistence on Geneva. Within the French President's official staff it is es- timated that meetings would begin during the first week of March. Consideration is also being given to inviting to the proposed meeting Mohammed Ben Bella--the rebel deputy premier whom the French captured and imprisoned five years ago--and Messali Hadj, leader of the moderate and rival Algerian Nationalist Move- ment, who resides in France under police protection. oresee difficulty, however, in inducing the PAG to accept Messalio The French do not intend that Ben Bella and Messali should be present at more than the preliminary and final sessions Rebel Minister of Information Yazid told the US Embassy in Tunis on 17 January that the PAG is willing to meet French rep- resentatives without any preconditions or agenda. Yazid asserted that the PAG had no desire to let formalities stand in the way of opening negotiations, and was considering means of reassuring French residents in Algeria that their in- terests would be respected in an Algerian republic. The pro- visional government probably feels that its position has been strengthened by the willingness of Algerian Moslems to accord it open support and by the massive abstention by urban Moslems in the recent referendum. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 19 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500160001-3 have reservations as to his approach. Their apprehensions are shared by leaders of the recently outlawed rightist Front for French Al- geria, by certain senior army elements, and by some members of the Delegation General in Algiers. These groups fear that the PAG, feeling that Paris will try to present a negotiated set- tlement as a rebel capitulation, will take countermeasures to convert it into a rebel. victory. They argue that this could be done by resumption of intensive terrorism and by a rebel offen- sive from non-Algerian bases once De Gaulle gets too involved in negotiations to withdraw. it is con- sidered probable that Premier ere may o sect so vigorously to full negotiations with the rebels that he will resign or be re- moved from office. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 19 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500160001-3 Approved For Salvadoran Junta Under Military Pressure Announces Anti-Communist Measures The Salvadoran armed forces evidently presented the pro- visional six-man civil-military junta with an ultimatum on 16 January demanding the immediate curtailment of Communist and pro-Castro activity in El Salvador. The junta apparently has yielded, at least for the moment, to the military pressure. Col. Castillo Navarrete, the minister of defense, who was re= ported earlier this week to have army backing for a coup if necessary to quell the Communists, told US Embassy officers on 17 January that he and a number of other officers had spent 16 hours with the junta the previous day discussing measures for controlling the Communists. On 17 January, the junta issued a strong public warning that it is prepared to counter Communist activity. Col. Cas- tillo Navarrete told the US officials that a series of decrees will be issued soon providing legal basis for taking action- -including jail sentences--against extremist and subversive activity. The junta already has announced the recall of its ambassador in Havana. No decision to sever relations completely at this time was made, according to Col. Castillo Navarrete, since that ac- tion could best be realized through joint action within the Organ- ization of American States. Although. Castillo Navarrete expressed criticism last month of US assistance programs in Latin America and told a group of American officials that his government intended to replace US advisers to the National Police Force with Chileans or Italians or both, he stated on the 17th that he. had decided after reconsid- eration that US experts were needed and that his government would soon request US assistance for the security forces. The junta will probably encounter difficulties, however, in carrying out its anti-Communist measures. The pro-Communist and Castro sympathizers who have already deeply infiltrated the 25X1 25X1 19 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500160001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05510 0160001-3 provisional government at all levels have demonstrated adept- ness in legal maneuvering to achieve their ends; they are also likely to' organize student protest demonstrations. If the junta is unable to control the extremists, the armed forces may oust the junta and set up a totally military regime to rule until elec- tions can be held. 19 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500160001-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975AO05 Chile May Approve Sale of Copper to USSR The conservative Chilean government headed by President Jorge Alessandri appears ready to approve a five-year con- tract for annual sales to the USSR of 60,000 tons of semifin- .ished copper products--about 10 percent of Chile's total pro- duction. The price is to be no lower than the London Metals Exchange monthly settlement figure for the month in which shipment .is made. Payments are to be made in US dollars or convertible sterling. The contract will be subject to yearly renewal by the Chilean Government. Chile has not accepted past Soviet or Chinese Communist . offers to take copper, partly at least because past offers in- volved barter arrangements. In. addition, about 90 percent of its copper comes from US-owned mining companies. This offer, however, seems more likely to be accepted for several reasons. World copper prices have declined steadily since last October, and Chile badly needs to increase its supply of dollars and foreign exchange. A sale.of 60,000 tons is worth about $35 million at present London Metals Exchange prices --a sum almost equal to Chile's $40 million balance-of-pay- ments deficit in 1960. With congressional elections only six weeks away, leftist political leaders would exploit a refusal to sell copper, which accounts for about 60 percent of Chile's foreign exchange and over 50 percent of its tax revenue. Furthermore, the USSR has recently increased its efforts to formalize commercial relations with Chile, in order to obtain an additional source of copper, which usually is in short supply in the bloc. However, Chile has not heretofore made any direct sale of copper to the .USSR.. Bloc countries have bought some Chilean copper through West Germany. In recent years trade with the USSR has accounted for less than one percent of Chile's total trade. Chile has no diplomatic relations with the. bloc, but Czech and Hungarian. trade mis- sions are in Santiago. 25X1 19 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500160001-3 Approved For ReI}ase 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05501160001-3 THE `PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United-States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Department of Commerce The Secretary of Commerce Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National, Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500160001-3 Approved For ReiJ' P3/5 RETP79Tb0975AO05500160001-3 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500160001-3