CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005500160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 19, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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19 January 1961
. Copy No. C 77
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State Dept. review completed
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
19 January 1961
DAILY BRIEF
THE COMMUNIST BLOC
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USSR: The addition of two new candidate members
to the p -arty presidium on 18 January lays the groundwork
for further shake-ups in that ruling party body, possibly
at the 22nd party congress scheduled for October 1961. The
new candidates, 50-year-old Gennady Voronov, party.chief
in Orenburg Oblast--a major grain producing area-and 46-
year-old Viktor Grishin, Soviet trade union head, are per-
haps being groomed as replacements for full members whose
tenures may now be insecure. Nikolay Podgorny, presidium
member and Ukrainian party chief, was sharply criticized by
Khrushchev at the plenum for weak leadership of agriculture
and may be on probation. for the coming year. The plenum--
one of the longest in recent years--ended with a report on the
November Moscow conference of Communist parties by Mikhail 25X1
Suslov, who along with Khrushchev and Kozlov Wed -
inant role in the conference.
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Poland-Cuba: The Polish regime has been reluctant to 25.X1
become involved in bloc aid to Cuba beyond the minimum re-
quired to conform with. Soviet policies, mainly because it
hopes to negotiate large amounts of American long-term eco-
nomic aid. Polish handling of other aspects of relations with
Cuba also has differed markedly from the treatment accorded
Havana by the rest of the bloc. Warsaw made a point of not
inviting Castro's chief Communist adviser, Che Guevara, for a
state visit during his recent tour of Eastern Europe. High-
level Polish officials repeatedly have implied in conversations 25X1
with American officials that.their interests in Cuba are min-
imal, and they have emphasized
itary goods to Hav na
F-
19 Jan 61
ASIA-AFRICA
DAILY BRIEF
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plinippines: i ipp n - m
presse his concern to an American Embassy official over what
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the British and French, particularly toward the Laotian crisis.
M
He said that one reason for calling a conference of foreign min-
isters of South Vietnam, Nationalist China, South Korea, and the
DAILY BRIEF iii
19 Jan 61
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by insisting that Morocco accept Soviet pilots and technicians
on a long-term basis. Moscow may, however, urge the Moroc-
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El Salvador. The Salvadoran armed forces evidently pre-
sented the provisional government with an ultimatum on 16 Jan-
uary demanding the immediate curtailment of Communist and
pro-Castro activity in El Salvador. The government has appar-
ently, at least for the moment, succumbed to the military pres-
sure. Defense Minister Castillo Navarrete, who was reported
earlier in the week to have army backing for a coup p if necessary
to quell the Communists, told American Embassy officers on 17
January that he and a number of other officers had spent most of
the previous day talking with the ruling junta on measures for con-
trolling the Communists. On 17 January, the junta issued a
strong public warning that it is prepared to counter Communist
activity. It also announced the recall of the Salvadoran ambas-
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Chile =USSR: The conservative Alessandri government is
reported about ready to approve the sale to the Soviet Union of
60,000 tons of semifinished copper products annually over the
next five years. This is about 10 percent of Chile's total produc-
tion. Copper is usually in short supply within the bloc, and Chile
has not ade any direct copper sale to the Soviet Union in recent
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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
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'ema"
DAILY BRIEF
19 Jan 61
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No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the United States or its possessions yin. the imme-
diate future
B. /o Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate
direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies,
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Ar.r.rnvnr! Cnr Dnln n 9nnglnn/17 rIA_DfD7QTAA? Anncsurnhannn1_z
IMN
r areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate
futur
C. Lhe Sino-Soviet bloc support for the Communist forces
in Laos continues unabated and there are indications
that it will increase. 'Continuing Communist attacks
from the Xieng Khouang area threaten to divide and
weaken the Royal Laotian Army forces. With its mil-
itary position deteriorating, the Boun Oum - Phoumi
government is increasingly likely to seek outside mil-
itary assistance
D. 1ther developments affording increased opportunities
for exploitation by the Communist bloc: The pro-Lu-
mumba regime in Stanleyville is apparently meeting with
success both in its political and military activity in the
Congo and is pushing ahead with arrangements for ma-
terial aid and increased diplomatic support from the
radical nationalist African states and the bloc. Despite
.evidence of attempts by anti- Lumumba leaders to sub-
merge their own differences, the political situation of
the " Leopoldville group is still deteriorating.)
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Philippines, which opened in Manila on 18 January, was the
apparent inability of SEATO to act in the Laotian crisis.
Stressing his belief that any indication that the US was waver-
ing in its. firm positions would have. wide repercussions in
the area, Serrano asserted that there is considerable Asian
disappointment with SEATO and that continuation of the pres-
ent trend might force the Philippines to reappraise its SEATO
policies.
*Franc e-A1 eria:
De Gaulle and rebel premier Ferhat
Abbas have agreed in principle to meet, and that negotiations
are now under way to determine when and where--perhaps in
the first week of March in a French city other than Paris. De
Gaulle would consider his demand that various Algerian ten-
dencies be represented would be met by the inclusion of the
chief of a rival nationalist group in preliminary negotiations
only. In Tunis, a member.. of the rebel. government assert-
ed the rebels have no desire to allow formalities to stand in the
way of opening negotiations and are considering measures to
reassure French settlers that their interests would be respect-
ed in an Algerian republic.
Premier ere may break with a au a over
the decision to enter into full negotiations.
Morocco-USSR: Corocco and the Soviet Union are report-
ed in disagreement as to the terms for delivery of the 14 jet
aircraft which, according to a 15 N v ember Moroccan c u-
nique, are a gift of the USSR.
King Mohame as reuse to accept the
Soviet technicians which Moscow insists shall accompany these
planes. Both the King and the crown prince have told the Amer-
ican ambassador that Soviet military pilots and technicians would
not be accepted in Morocco. The USSR probably would not risk
jeopardizing the political benefits of the gift of these aircraft
19 Jan 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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ApF irpt i- eeha wi12?d3O# k7 Ia4MapS,Z! f 69WWp` 0160001-3
Philippine Foreign i er Serrano a expresse eep
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concern to an American Embassy officer over the weakening
of the SEATO alliance, 25X6
particularly with regard to the Laotian'CrigiS.
According to Serrano, his principal reasons for calling the con-
ference of foreign ministers from South Korea, South Vietnam,
and Nationalist China, which opened in Manila on 18 January,
were SEATO's apparent inability to act in the Laotian situation
and the need to exchange views with non-Communist neighbors
and to indicate support for the American positio
Reiterating firm Philippine support for the role now played
by tiie United States in the Far East, Serrano emphasized his
fear that any indications of wavering would have wide repercus-
sions. 25X6
He also voiced ear that Pakistan might be waver-
ing in its attitude toward SEATO. Serrano asserted that a
continuation of the present trend in the organization might force
the Philippines to reappraise its policy toward SEATO
Serrano has indicated a long-standing desire to forge closer
ties with non-Communist Asian neighbors within the framework
of firm American defense commitments in the area. Although
Serrano may be partly motivated by his desire to gain personal
political credit for Philippine initiatives, there have been sev-
eral previous efforts to organize top-level consultations, sparked
partly by the desire of South Korea and Nationalist China for
greater regional anti-Communist unity. Neither Thailand, which
shares current Philippine disillusionment with SEATO, nor Pak-
istan accepted invitations to the Manila meeting, but Serrano ap-
parently envisages subsequent bilateral talks with those govern-
ments and with Malayan
[American. ambassador Johnson in Bangkok reports SEATO
morale to be "at low ebb," and fears that the organization may
be "fatally discredited" unless it can soon persuade its Asian mem-
bers that it is able to take some meaningful action with regard to
the Laotian crisis
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Negotiations for Meeting of De Gaulle With Ferhat Abbas
Reported Under Way
F
'immediately after the 6- January referendum
vote on his Algerian policy, De Gaulle issued instructions
that steps be taken immediately--through well-established
links between the French Government and the Provisional
Algerian Government (PAG)--to pave the way for direct nego=
tiations between himself and rebel representatives. De Gaulle's
willingness in principle to meet PAG premier Ferhat Abbas
was conveyed to the rebels, and Abbas agreed. Negotiations
are now under way to determine the time and place. De Gaulle,
who waived his preference for Paris, offered to meet Abbas
"anywhere in French territory" but balked at Abbas' insistence
on Geneva. Within the French President's official staff it is es-
timated that meetings would begin during the first week of March.
Consideration is also being given to inviting to the proposed
meeting Mohammed Ben Bella--the rebel deputy premier whom
the French captured and imprisoned five years ago--and Messali
Hadj, leader of the moderate and rival Algerian Nationalist Move-
ment, who resides in France under police protection.
oresee difficulty, however, in inducing the
PAG to accept Messalio The French do not intend that Ben Bella
and Messali should be present at more than the preliminary and
final sessions
Rebel Minister of Information Yazid told the US Embassy in
Tunis on 17 January that the PAG is willing to meet French rep-
resentatives without any preconditions or agenda.
Yazid asserted that the PAG had no desire to let formalities
stand in the way of opening negotiations, and was considering
means of reassuring French residents in Algeria that their in-
terests would be respected in an Algerian republic. The pro-
visional government probably feels that its position has been
strengthened by the willingness of Algerian Moslems to accord
it open support and by the massive abstention by urban Moslems
in the recent referendum.
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 have
reservations as to his approach. Their apprehensions are shared
by leaders of the recently outlawed rightist Front for French Al-
geria, by certain senior army elements, and by some members
of the Delegation General in Algiers. These groups fear that
the PAG, feeling that Paris will try to present a negotiated set-
tlement as a rebel capitulation, will take countermeasures to
convert it into a rebel. victory. They argue that this could be
done by resumption of intensive terrorism and by a rebel offen-
sive from non-Algerian bases once De Gaulle gets too involved
in negotiations to withdraw. it is con-
sidered probable that Premier ere may o sect so vigorously
to full negotiations with the rebels that he will resign or be re-
moved from office.
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Salvadoran Junta Under Military Pressure Announces
Anti-Communist Measures
The Salvadoran armed forces evidently presented the pro-
visional six-man civil-military junta with an ultimatum on 16
January demanding the immediate curtailment of Communist
and pro-Castro activity in El Salvador. The junta apparently
has yielded, at least for the moment, to the military pressure.
Col. Castillo Navarrete, the minister of defense, who was re=
ported earlier this week to have army backing for a coup if
necessary to quell the Communists, told US Embassy officers
on 17 January that he and a number of other officers had spent
16 hours with the junta the previous day discussing measures
for controlling the Communists.
On 17 January, the junta issued a strong public warning
that it is prepared to counter Communist activity. Col. Cas-
tillo Navarrete told the US officials that a series of decrees will
be issued soon providing legal basis for taking action- -including
jail sentences--against extremist and subversive activity. The
junta already has announced the recall of its ambassador in
Havana. No decision to sever relations completely at this time
was made, according to Col. Castillo Navarrete, since that ac-
tion could best be realized through joint action within the Organ-
ization of American States.
Although. Castillo Navarrete expressed criticism last month
of US assistance programs in Latin America and told a group of
American officials that his government intended to replace US
advisers to the National Police Force with Chileans or Italians
or both, he stated on the 17th that he. had decided after reconsid-
eration that US experts were needed and that his government
would soon request US assistance for the security forces.
The junta will probably encounter difficulties, however, in
carrying out its anti-Communist measures. The pro-Communist
and Castro sympathizers who have already deeply infiltrated the
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provisional government at all levels have demonstrated adept-
ness in legal maneuvering to achieve their ends; they are also
likely to' organize student protest demonstrations. If the junta
is unable to control the extremists, the armed forces may oust
the junta and set up a totally military regime to rule until elec-
tions can be held.
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Chile May Approve Sale of Copper to USSR
The conservative Chilean government headed by President
Jorge Alessandri appears ready to approve a five-year con-
tract for annual sales to the USSR of 60,000 tons of semifin-
.ished copper products--about 10 percent of Chile's total pro-
duction. The price is to be no lower than the London Metals
Exchange monthly settlement figure for the month in which
shipment .is made. Payments are to be made in US dollars
or convertible sterling. The contract will be subject to
yearly renewal by the Chilean Government.
Chile has not accepted past Soviet or Chinese Communist .
offers to take copper, partly at least because past offers in-
volved barter arrangements. In. addition, about 90 percent of
its copper comes from US-owned mining companies. This
offer, however, seems more likely to be accepted for several
reasons. World copper prices have declined steadily since
last October, and Chile badly needs to increase its supply of
dollars and foreign exchange. A sale.of 60,000 tons is worth
about $35 million at present London Metals Exchange prices
--a sum almost equal to Chile's $40 million balance-of-pay-
ments deficit in 1960. With congressional elections only six
weeks away, leftist political leaders would exploit a refusal
to sell copper, which accounts for about 60 percent of Chile's
foreign exchange and over 50 percent of its tax revenue.
Furthermore, the USSR has recently increased its efforts
to formalize commercial relations with Chile, in order to
obtain an additional source of copper, which usually is in
short supply in the bloc. However, Chile has not heretofore
made any direct sale of copper to the .USSR.. Bloc countries
have bought some Chilean copper through West Germany. In
recent years trade with the USSR has accounted for less than
one percent of Chile's total trade. Chile has no diplomatic
relations with the. bloc, but Czech and Hungarian. trade mis-
sions are in Santiago.
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THE `PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United-States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of Commerce
The Secretary of Commerce
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National, Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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