CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005500180001-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 19, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 23, 1961
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005500180001-1.pdf798.21 KB
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0.- * Approved For Rise 20014". cSMRE 75AQQf500180001-1 000r/ 25X1 23 January 1961 Copy No. TELLIGE.N.CE vim TOP SECRET State Dept. reirftWff@th tt@jIease 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500180001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500180001-1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500180001-1 ~ ~ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\\ \\ \\\\ \ \\\ ---1-1------- . . . . .\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\. . . . -\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\O \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Approved For R s 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975 500180001-1 25X1 23 January 1961 CONTENTS THE COMMUNIST BLOC 25X1 I 2. Chinese Communists map steps to combat eco- nomic difficulties. (Backup, Page 2) ASIA-AFRICA - ASIA-AFRICA 25X1 Belgian defense officials apparently aiding Tshomb496 government. (No Backup) 5, Situation in South Vietnam, (No Backup) (Map) THE WEST 6. Brazilian ambassador in Mexico expresses misgiv- I ings over attitude of new Brazilian Government to. ward Castro regime, (No Backup) I 25X MEN ROM Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500180001-1 25X1 ? Approved Forlea r.IA-RnP 05500180001-1 mEmsoll IMM, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN MOMEN 25X1 THE COMMUNIST BLOC Communist China: Following the Chinese Communist central committee plenum held from 14 to 18 January, Pei- ping announced a series of moves designed to overcome the present economic difficulties, bolster popular morale, and silence critics within the country who are blaming the regime for China's current difficulties. According to the communique issued at the end of the plenum, agricultural production will receive primary stress in 1961, capital construction will be cut back, and quality will be emphasized in industrial pro- duction. In addition, free markets are to be encouraged at the village level. Politically, Peiping has inaugurated a mass campaign against both "bad elements" who oppose and are sabotaging. the regime's policies and "well-intentioned" cadres which. have "misunderstood" those policies. The cam- paign--to be carried out with great publicity--will provide the regime with scapegoats for its own mismanagement as well as discourage further criticism from the population. 1101 1001 1001 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500180001-1 \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ ------------ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ O \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ ........ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ O \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \\ \ \ \ \\ \ \\ \ \ \ \\ \ \ \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\ Approved For Rse 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975 W500180001-1 25X1 \ 5X1 ASIA-AFRICA , 0\1 11m 110 Congo-Belgium: COfficials of the Belgian Defense Minis- try appear to be aiding Tshombe's Katanga government without the knowledge of the Belgian Foreign Ministry. A Foreign Min- istry official told the American ambassador on 19 January that his office had just learned that Defense Ministry personnel had h 25X1 ." ""d "'""'6 e0a "bit' Wi VV LL bls a 61.6 161ba WlaV 1lQ lA I \ left Brussels that Jay for service with Tshombd's forces. I 25X1 25X1 a senior Belgian 25X1 mintary pincer naa statea a e glum was willing to sell the equip- ment then at Kamina base to Tshombd for a token payment; in addition, the officer reportedly had recommended that equip- ment and training fora aracommando battalion be provided by 25X1 Belgium. indicated that more than 200 "deserters" m from Belgian units in Ruanda-Urundi are now serving with the Katangan forces, The military activities apparently conflict] 23 Jan 61 DAILY BRIEF ii MEN Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500180001-1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00180001-1 with policies develop ; We heads of other ministries, whose representatives have told American officials that although Bel- glu wi !i d to send aid, It would defer to its major NATO al- -Iles. ' auth Vic tv m: The survival of the Diem government In thVietinam Vietnam tinues to be threatened by the operations of =.. e g ated. 7,000 Co moist guerrillas directed by North r ~m ar x the rserally deteriorating situation. In the n ;, : era vhcy are concentrated, the ULqiq now e- erc se control in many rural areas despite ! d sec 'tty s rs C,- b by units of Diem's 150,000-man ar- ? .t< g l ar7 fr ? - o. T Cc awunt to have also shown zre in force in the northern plateau region and r c i - ,~z oxtG! e Laigon. In addition to the guerrilla 7or4L Viet mere rre conducting a major prop- ca-4r,~`;n designed to promote a united front'that would the ~4 _ eral dis :ctisfaction with the Diem regime's so- d p L'tical control-a. -e increased Cow-: list threat has reinforced Diem's cu cation with security men. ores at the expense of eco- $Ic_ development pr qr ^_ ss. His failure to counter Com- ni&'t influences by rel'or; of his rigid and highly centralized er ent is encouraging further plotting by frustrated pol- Iticiams and restiveness tit'n the military.. Diem survived attexnl,cd coup by paratroop elements in November 1980 became the rest of the army remained loyal to him. 25X1 AIE WEST ril-Cuba: The Brazilian ambassador in Mexico has -7;^ caiicern,to the US bansy -ver the probable at--' r of the new Brat an Government toward the Castro re- e In Cuba. Be said that President-elect Janio.Quadros, who be Ina rated on 31 January,, has a number of pro-Cuban scrs. Quadros visited Castro last March in an effort to re- fu=te Communist charges that he. Is a "Wall Street lackey" and . DAILY BRIEF Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500180001-1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005180001-1 subsequently made a number of statements favorable to Cas- tro. In his only postelection press conference last October, Quadros refused to comment on the Cuban situation and has not issued any policy statements on any subject since. Quadros has been holding himself virtually inaccessible in Europe for the past three months and upon his return to Brazil on 20 Jan- uary brushed aside queries as to his cabinet choices. It seems unlikely that he will take any precipitate action either for or against Castro and he may make an effort to mediate between Cuba and the anti-Castro governments In the hemisphere. Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500180001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500180001-1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500180001-1 25X1 Approved For ase 2003/04/17 :CIA-RDP79T00975A00550 Chinese Communist Central Committee Announces Retrenchment The first plenary session of the Chinese Communist party central committee to be held in 17 months, meeting in Peiping from 14 to 18 January, decided on a series of moves designed to bolster the Chinese economy and silence domestic critics who are blaming the regime for the current difficulties. The communique issued by the plenum acknowledges a sec- ond year of bad harvests in China and makes an appeal for every effort to bring in a better harvest in 1961. to comprehend the. difference between socialism and Communism and not giving enough stress to. the workers' need for material incentives, Peiping is thus blaming these cadres for implement- ing policies advocated by the leadership itself just a short time ago. food" and "down with Communism" have been reported in Dairen, Hainan Island, and Peiping The central committee communique takes cognizance of this opposition, while claiming that over 90 percent of the population wholeheartedly stands behind the regime. It admits that a ? "small minority of unreformed landlord and bourgeois elements" have taken advantage of the present prob- lems to.carry out sabotage, and in. some cases have infiltrated party ranks and economic organizations on. the lower level. The communique also asserts that a few "well-intentioned" cadres have misunderstood the party's fundamental policies and therefore have erred in their work. These cadres are accused of failing Lpposition. to the regime's. economic policies is known to ave flared into the open recently, and posters reading "more To silence the opposition and provide scapegoats for its own mismanagement, the central committee has announced amass cam- paign .to be carried out with maximum publicity against the "bad elements" and to raise the ideological level of those "well-inten- tioned" cadres which erred. This rectification campaign will 25X1 25X1 .23 Jan.61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500180001-1 Approved For R~ probably, last for several months and result in some widely publicized purges at the' provincial or lower levels. The references to opposition of only a "few elements". in, the par- ty and government, however, suggest that any purge will affect only a small minority of the cadres; there is no indi- cation .that it will reach into the top leadership. In citing overfulfillment in advance of production goals originally scheduled for 1.962, the communique puts the. best face possible on industrial performance. in 1960, but failure .to meet 1960's "leap forward" goals is apparent. The com- munique suggests that the value of industrial output increased by only. 14 percent in 1960, less than half the 29 percent sched- uled. The. guidelines for 1961, as spelled out in .the communi- que, comprise mainly a .further.-effort. to boost agricultural production, . stopgap measures to tide.light industry over con- tinued shortages of raw materials, and a reduction in the rate of growth in. heavy industry. Investment in capital construc- tion is to be. reduced, and. the emphasis in industry is to be on "consolidating, filling out, and raising of standards;' No pro- duction .goals are announced for 1961,. but the tone of the com- munique is a, clear admission that Peiping's "great leap forward" has spent its. force. The communique. also announces that the central committee plans to establish six regional bureaus to strengthen leadership over the municipal, and provincial party committees. The six regional committees are identical with the form of party organ- izations in. force .before June 1954. They were dissolved at that time in the aftermath of the purge of two regional. leaders who were charged with., attempting' to set up, "independent kingdoms:' The: current reorganization points up the lack. of qualified :lead- ership at the intermediary level, which. apparently is severe enough to force.-Peiping to run the danger of allowing regional- ism to develop once again. The plenum also passed a resolution on. the Moscow meet- ing of Communist parties held in November 1960, affirming 25X1 25X1 23 Jan.. 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN .. Page 3 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500180001-1 Approved For (ease 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO0550 180001-1 25X1 Peiping's satisfaction with the results of the conference and its intention. to adhere to the. declaration produced by the conference. The resolution is similar to the Soviet party central. committee's resolution of 18 January.. The language of the Chinese resolution at several points implies that the Chinese party will continue to advocate a more militant strategy than Moscow currently favors, but the emphasis on the importance of Sino=Soviet "unity"= -dem Glared to be in the "fundamental interests" of the two countries- suggests that Peiping will refrain, for. a time at least, from polemics. with Moscow. 23 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500180001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500180001-1 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500180001-1 Approved For fttse 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500 80001-1 25X1 ? THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive. Offices of the White House Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Scientific Adviser to the President Director of the Budget Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities Executive Secretary, National Security Council The Department of State. The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor Director, International Cooperation Administration The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Commandant, United States Marine Corps Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director National Security Agency The Director National Indications Center The Director 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500180001-1 onroved For e D13Q 79T00 0055001 9T009 00550018000180001-1 Approved For R~/- -1 Y Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500180001-1