CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005500210001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 26, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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26 January 1961
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Soviet party's central committee meeting strength-
ens public image of Khrushchev as dominant figure
in USSR, (Page t)
2. Soviet plan fulfillment report shows 10-percent
increase in gross industrial production in 1960.
(Page t)
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4. Communist China is endeavoring to purchase large
quantities of grain from non-bloc areaso (Page ti)
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6. Leopoldville conference of Congo leaders is unlikely
to contribute significantly to a solution of the coun-
try's problems o (Page tit)
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8. Resignation of French Air Force General Challe in
protest over De Gaulle's Algerian policy will encourage
civilian and military extremism in Algeria. (Page iz )
9. Successful military coup in El Salvadoro (Page ft )
10. Watch Committee conclusionso (Page v)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
26 January 1961
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USSR: Following an eight-day meeting of the party's
centrar-committee, which further strengthened Khru-
shchev's public image as the dominant figure in Soviet af-
fairs and re-emphasized his active responsibility for the
troubled sphere of agriculture, the Soviet premier has be-
gun a tour of the USSR's critical agricultural areas. Khru-
shchev's on-the-spot survey, which began in the Ukraine on
.24 January, will also take him into the New Lands areas of
Siberia and the Kazakh Republic. This round of visits, which
Ambassador Thompson regards as a demonstration of Khru-
shchev's confidence in the effectiveness of personal interven-
tion, may be accompanied by the removal of some of the re-
gional leaders whose agricultural mismanagement was an=
grily criticized by Khrushchey at the centril committee ses-
sion.
USSR, Economic: The official report of the fulfillment
of the S-5-vi-e-1-5-60plan shows a 10-percent increase in gross
industrial production over 1959, an annual increase greater
than needed to achieve Seven-Year Plan (1959-65) goals. For
the.first two years of the plan, industrial output has increased
22.1 percent, compared with the 17 percent originally sched=
uled. Overfulfillment of some industrial goals will not be al-
lowed to continue, however, since in order to balance over-all
economic achievements some investment will be shifted from
heavy industry to the support of agriculture. This is necessi-
tated by agriculture's lack of progress toward the 70-percent
gross increase in output called for by the Seven-Year Plan.
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NEW,
. Communist ChinaUn contrast to its role as a net ex-
porter of food grains in recent years, Communist China is
making strenuous efforts to purchase large quantities of
wheat, rice, and other foodstuffs from free world.coun-
s,
tries, chiefly in order to alleviate domestic food shortage
but also to fulfill
negotiations are under way for the Chinese to boost
their wheat purchases from a reported figure of 300,000
tons for this year to about one million tons. Chinese trade
negotiations also are under way with Canada, and an agree-
ment is expected in the near future which may involve over one
million tons of wheat and barley. An agreement with Burma
signed late last year provided for. the purchase of 350,000
tons of rice by. China in 1961, and China apparently is prob-
ing for other potential food suppliers in Asia and the Middle
East. Grain imports of this size, requiring substantial for-
eign exchange expenditures, indicate the mnitude of Pei-
ping's cur
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Congo. The Leopoldville conference of Congolese lead-
ers whhi.ch convened on 25 January at Kasavubu's request has
as its announced purpose the preparation of a later confer-
ence of all Congolese leaders. It has been boycotted by
Lumumba's supporters, whose position has been strength-
ened by the recently published letter from Hammarskjold
.to Kasavubu, urging that Lumumba be tried or released
from jail. The conference, which is unlikely to contribute
significantly to a solution of. the country's political prob-
lems, may, however, produce some greater degree of co-
ordination between Congolese in Leopoldville and Tshombe's
government in Katanga. Meanwhile, anti-white activities by
Gizenga's troops are continuing in Orientale and Kivu prov-
inces, with the result that France has ordered the evacua=
tion of its nationals from that area and has urged Belgians
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to leave also. In Leopoldville, UN officials are increas-
ingly concerned over Belgian assistance to Mobutu's army;
about 100 Belgian officers reportedly arrived
Leovoldville.
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U
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rance: it orce Ueneral Maurice Challe, NATO com-
man ern chief. for Central Europe and former commander
of all French forces in Algeria, has submitted his resigna-
tion from the French armed forces in protest over De Gaulle's
Algerian Policy. De Gaulle, who is said to have tried to dis-
suade Challe, is reported very disturbed over this as a.fur-
ther indication of dissatisfaction in the French Air Force.
Challe's action could have repercussions.. particularly among
officers in Algeria, where it will encoura a civilian and mil.
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*El Salvador: Violence erupted in San Salvador following
the seizure of the government by the military early on 25
January, and more serious disturbances between the mil-
itary and Communist-led mobs are anticipated: The coup
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was led by officers gravely concerned over the deposed
junta's failure to take energetic measures against the
Communists. The American Embassy reported that by noon
the takeover was apparently complete, with all army gar-
risons supporting it. Colonel Anibal Portillo, army chief
of staff, was selected by the army officers as leader of
the new regime, along with Lt. Col. Julio Rivera, com-
mandant of the general staff school. A roundup of Com-
munist leaders was apparently under way immediately af-
ter the coup. Former President Osorio, who engineered
the coup last October, and all but one member of the de-
posed junta are believed to be under detention. The miss-
ing junta member has gone into hiding.
Within a few hours of the coup., several hundred civil- .
ians were gathered in front of the presidential palace call-
ing for a general strike to protest the army seizure of
power. This may lead to further violent demonstrations
by Communist-led groups, who have received Cuban sup-
port. There may be bloodshed, but the army is believed
capable of suppressing disorders. Military leaders of the
revolt had earlier advocated holding congressional elections
as soon as possible in which all non-Communist yartiej~
would be permitted to participate. F_ I
WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
A. Rio Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities
against the United States or its possessions in the imme-
diate futureA.
L
No Sino-Soviet, bloc country intends deliberately to ini-
tiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US
allies, or areas peripheral to the bloc in the immediate
future'1.
C. Sino-Soviet bloc support for Communist forces in Laos
continues; the bloc has increased its local airlift capability.
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C6ommunist forces, operating on relatively shorter in-
terior supply lines from the Plaine des Jarres area,
retain theinitiative and capability to extend offensive
operationq
ri
Me pro-Lumumba regime in Stanleyville is apparently
meeting with success both in its political and military
activity in the Congo and is pushing ahead with arrange-
ments for material aid and increased. diplomatic support
from the radical nationalist African states and the bloc.
Despite evidence of attempts by anti-Lumumba leaders
to submergetheir own differences, the political situa-
tion of the Leopoldville group is still deterioratinO.
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Khrushchev's Dominance Underscored
A week after conclusion of an eight-day plenary meet-
ing of the Soviet party .central committee, called to exam-
ine agricultural. problems, Khrushchev has begun a round
of personal inspection tours in key agricultural areas. His
first visit began on. 24 January in the Ukraine, where 1960
agricultural performance has been under severe criticism
Khrushchev's announced schedule calls.for subsequent visits
to such areas as the North Caucasus, Georgia, and the New
Lands regions of Siberia and Kazakhstan. The tour, viewed
by the US Embassy in Moscow. as demonstrating Khrushchev's
self-confidence.. that personal intervention can produce better
results, may also result in a juggling of regional leaders,
many of whom. were the targets of angry Khrushchev outbursts
before the central committee.
The public record of the committee's proceedings will
increase the impact of Xhrushchev's on-the-spot survey
trips--a.further indication of his active responsibility in
the agricultural sphere. Announcement at the session of
the convening of the .22nd party congress, already being her-
alded as a landmark' in party history, and the assignment of
the focal role at the congress to Khrushchev, was followed
by a lavish outpouring of personal tributes to the party, chief
and premier.
These developments appear to have reinforced the pub-
lic image of Khrushchev as the chief architect of Soviet pol-
icy--an image which probably reflects accurately his polit-
ical strength and acts to inhibit any serious challenge to his
authority.
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Soviet 1960 Plan Results
Soviet industrial production continues to increase at an
annual rate greater than needed.to achieve Seven-Year Plan
.(1959-65) goals. According. to. the official report of plan ful-
fillment in 1960 released on 25 January by the-USSR's Cen-
tral Statistical Board, gross industrial production in 1960
increased 10 percent over 1959 instead of the planned 8.1 per-
cent and, in the first two years of the Seven-Year Plan, in-
creased 22..1 percent compared with the 17 percent original-
ly scheduled.
Planned goals for steel and oil were overfulfilled; 65,-
300,000 tons of steel and 148,000,000 tons of oil. were pro-
duced. Steel output approached that originally scheduled in
the.Sixth Five-Year Plan (1955-60) which was abandoned in
1958, and oil production was almost 10 percent more than
contemplated in that plan. The. raw materials shortages which
:plagued the Sixth Five-Year Plan have apparently been eased.
Electricity production--292,000,000 kilowatt-hours--was also
above plan but not by as much as Soviet officials had recently
indicated, probably reflecting a year-end slowdown.
Overfulfiliment of industrial goals will not continue at
the present pace, however. In order to balance over-all. eco-
nomic achievements some investment will be shifted from
heavy industry to the support of agriculture, which is mak-
ing no progress toward achieving the 70-percent increase in
gross agricultural output called for. by the Seven-Year Plan.
While 1960 grain production was reported as 133, 000,000
metric tons, indications are that grain output was probably
closer to 100,000,000 metric tons--about the same as the es-
timated 1959 harvest. Meat and milk production, declined
slightly from last year's level. Khrushchev in his speech to
the recent central committee plenum on agriculture claimed
that the seven-year steel target could be surpassed .by as
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much as 10,000,000 metric tons, but that this performance
might be held back. in order to increase agriculture's con-
tribution to consumer industries.
There reportedly was an increase of 5,500,000 persons
in the state labor force (which excludes collective farms and
producers' cooperatives), in contrast with a planned increase
? of only 2,000,000. All but about 2,000,000 of this increase,
however, apparently resulted from the conversion of some
collective farms into state farms and of many producers' co-
operatives into state industrial enterprises. There are no
indications that the total .labor force grew more rapid. last
year than in recent years. F_ I
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Ranking French NATO Commander Resigns Commission
In Protest Over De Gaulle's Algerian- Policy
(Air Force General Maurice Challe, the ranking French
officer in SHAPE and former French commander in chief in
Algeria, informed SACEUR on 24 January that he has sub-
mitted his resignation from the French armed forces in pro-
test over De Gaulle's Algerian policy. Challe, who since
March 1960 had.been NATO commander in chief for Central
Europe, stressed to General Norstad that the resignation
had nothing to do with his NATO assignment, but was based
purely on "personal and national considerations" arising out
of his former responsibilities in Algeria. Challe said De
Gaulle's present policy was not compatible with the assur-
ances that he had given to his subordinates in Algeria and
that they, in turn, had passed on to Moslems loyal to the
French, F_ I
[De Gaulle, who is said to have tried to dissuade Challe,
is reportedly very disturbed by this as a further indication
of dissatisfaction in the French Air Force.. Challe, as air
deputy to Chief of National Defense General Paul Ely in 1958,
played a key role in.the military maneuvering which brought
De Gaulle to power. Considered a completely loyal officer,
he was selected by De Gaulle in late 1958 to succeed the less
reliable army general Raoul Salan as commander in Algeria.
After De Gaulle proclaimed his self-determination policy for
Algeria, and prior to the January 1960 Algiers insurrection,
Challe was reported to have alerted the government to the
deleterious effect of the policy on military morale in Algeria.
Until Challe failed to nip the insurrection in the bud, he was
considered a likely successor to Ely. The latter, who is
scheduled to retire in March, is reportedly trying to min-
imize.the effect of Challe's resignation by delaying action on
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Eit until March, when he himself and a number of other high-
ranking officers are scheduled to retire. Challe's action has
not yet been made public
(The opposition among officers, which had been reported
spreading since De Gaulle began referring last fall to a future
Algerian republic virtually independent of France, recently
seemed to be subsiding. It did not manifest itself during the
tense period of Moslem rioting accompanying his December
visit to Algeria nor during the equally tense 6 to 8 January
referendum there, and the public declarations of opposition
by numerous senior retired officers seemed to have no ef-
fect on officers on active duty
( halle's action, when it becomes known, will encourage
extremists, both civilian and military, to redouble their ef-
forts to try to sabotage any negotiations De Gaulle undertakes
with the Algerian rebels by creating incidents which could
jeopardize the ossibility of a cessation of hostilities.
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Armed Forces Seize Government in El Salvador
Violence erupted in San Salvador following the seizure
of the government by the military early on 25 January, and
more serious disturbances between the military and Com-
munist-led mobs are anticipated. The American Embassy
reports that by noon all army garrisons were believed sup-
porting the coup. Colonel Anibal Portillo, army chief of
staff, and Lt, Colo Julio Rivera, commandant of the.com-
mand and staff school, were chosen by the officers to head
the new regime. These officers have established a five-
man junta which, in addition to themselves, includes three
civilians; the most prominent of theseis Dr. Jose Antonio
Rodriguez Porth, a conservative, pro-US lawyer and former
dean of the school of law.
The issue that prompted the coup was the grave concern
among military officers over the failure of the deposed junta
to take energetic action against the Communists. The Amer-
ican Embassy reported that a roundup of Communist leaders
was under way immediately after the coup. Former Pres-
ident Oscar Osorio, who engineered the 26 October coup, and
all but one member of the deposed junta are reportedly being
detained. The remaining junta member, Dr. Fabio Castillo,
who is believed to have been sympathetic to the extreme left-
ists, is reported to have gone into hiding.
The most immediate challenge to the new authorities oc-
curred within a few hours of the coup when a mob estimated
to number 1,500 gathered in front of the presidential palace
shouting in favor of the ousted junta and against the military
and calling for a general strike to protest the coupe The Com-
munists, who have had three months of unrestricted freedom
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to buildup mass support, may succeed in instigating grave
disorders, and.further bloodshed may result. The Salva-
doran Army, however, is believed capable of dealing with
such disorders unless they are long sustained. There still
remains some danger of a split in the army, however, as
the now jailed former President Osorio retains some mil-
itary support. If the new regime should turn to the extreme
right and be impelled to resort to strong repressive meas-
ures, the Communists could eventually enhance their influ-
ence by exploiting the resulting grievances of moderates and
non-Communist leftists.
The Communists and pro-Castro elements in El Salvador
probably have received support from Cuba. Fidel Castro re-
portedly told members of a Communist delegation from El
Salvador earlier. this month that he would assist them in de-
feating the Salvadoran Army should the army attempt to
seize power. Castro is believed to have supplied them with
a large sum of money.
Immediately after the coup, the new authorities issued a
public statement claiming that the purpose of the coup is to
eradicate the Communists and to achieve "constitutionality" as
soon as possible. Before the coup, some military leaders had
advocated holding congressional elections as soon as possible
in which all non-Communist parties would be permitted to par-
ticipate. The detention of Osorio, however, raises some ques-
tion that this will now be carried out, since Osorio had been in
the process of forming a new political party which appeared to
have wide backing.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and.Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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