CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005500240001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 30, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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30 January 1961
State Dept. review completed
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.30 January'1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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3. Poland interprets November Communist manifesto
as endorsement of its right to determine internal
policies. (Page it)
4. Italy: Threat to Fanfani government increased~by
alliance of Christian Democrats and Socialists in
Milan. (Page tit)
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Poland. Party First Secretary Gomulka, in his speech
t
t
o
he central committeel 2021r
penum on. Januay, inter-
preted the manifesto of the November 1960 conference of
Communist parties in Moscow as an. endorsement of the
Polish party's right to determine its own internal policies.
At the same time, Gomulka was careful to stress his su
port for Soviet foreign policy, indicating, that he did not feel
this would preclude good relations with the West. 25X1
6 V,
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3.0 Jan 61
DAILY BRIEF
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Italy The threat to Premier Fanfani's Christian
Democratic government has been sharply increased by
the alliance formed by the Christian Democrats and the
Socialists to administer the city of Milan. The right-
wing Liberal party has reacted strongly and may with-
draw support: from Fanfani if this alliance extends to
the provincial government. The Liberals- fear that the
Milan alliance opens the way to a national. government
relying on Socialist support, which they may.feel they
can block. if they force early national elections by over-
throwing Fanf ani
30 Jan 61
DAILY BRIEF
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Poland
Gomulka used the 20-21 January.central committee
plenum of the Polish Communist party to reassure the
people that he interpreted the manifesto of the November
1960 conference of Communist parties in Moscow as an
endorsement of the Polish party's right to determine its
own internal policies, including the relative freedom for
individuals which has characterized the Gomulka period
in Poland. - Gomulka, who has relied on Khrushchev for
support since 1958, was careful to stress his support of
the Soviet foreign policy line, indicating his belief that
this would not standin.the way of good relations with the
West.
The Polish leader is hampered by the .fact that. his par-
ty has little popular support and that many of its members
are opportunists rather than dedicated Communists. He. has
felt it necessary to rely on party militants who, while ef-
fective as administrators, are opposed to his liberal inter-
nal policies. The regime's avoidance of terror as an instru-
ment of policy has permitted leading intellectuals and tech-
nologists to. be safely aloof from politics, and the masses to
remain openly apathetic or opposed to Communism, although
all concerned apparently believe that there is no feasible al-
ternative to Gomulka.
The regime's gradual encroachments on Roman Catholic
influence are most recently illustrated by educational meas-
ures substituting the study of Communist ideology for. the
study of religion and the humanities. This violation of. a 1957
modus vivendi between church and state is bound to increase
tensions and will add to the uneasiness already caused.by the
conflict over questions of birth control and. confiscatory taxes
on. church property.
In the economic field, individual. farmers, who constitute
over 52 percent of the population, fear that force will eventu-
ally be used to collectivize agriculture, but they continue to
resist "voluntary" membership. in the regime's farm coopera-
tives. The urban standard of living--particularly regarding
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housing and food--has not met the expectations raised
.by the Polish Communists, and the prospect is for con-
tinued austerity, at least until 1964 to help a for
rapid expansion of heavy industry. 25X1
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? Italian Government's Tenure Increasingly Threatened
The local elections in Italy. last November failed to
give the four party coalition supporting Premier Fan
fani's all - Christian Democratic government a majority.
in such key -cities as Milan, Genoa, Florence, Venice,
and Rome. The Christian Democrats are.hampered in
seeking allies outside the national. coalition to form city
administrations because their Social Democratic and
Republican partners object to alliances with the Mon-
archists on the right, while their Liberal allies oppose
ties to the Nenni Socialists on.the left.
A minority city government's greatest weakness is
the necessity to muster an absolute. majority on. the mu-
nicipal budget. The only alternative, a Rome-appointed
commissioner to take ? the place of mayor and governing
board, is. a highly unpopular solution which was tried in
Venice, Genoa, and Florence before the last elections,
and apparently lost the Christian Democrats some votes.
Socialist leader Nenni had originally indicated.that
he would participate in the Milan city administration only
if the Socialists were also accepted in the government of
Milan Province. The national coalition parties have suf-
ficient seats to form the provincial administration,cand
Christian Democratic party Secretary. Aldo Moro report-
edly would rather have a commissioner appointed for
Milan Province than risk a coalition including the Social-
ists because he is convinced that Liberal party leader
Giovanni Malagodi would then. bring Fanfani down. While
the Christian Democratic leaders in -the province are sym-
pathetic to the Socialists, they may not press the. issue be-
cause Socialist leader Nenni does not want a crisis now.
The Liberals threaten to repeat the policy they fol
lowed in January 1960, when they caused a lengthy cabinet
crisis by withdrawing support from the government because
they feared Socialist backing was in prospect. The current
coalition resulted after Communist-led riots brought about
the downfall. of an interim cabinet dependent on nee-Fascist
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support. When Fanfani was invested, the Socialists
abstained instead of following their usual practice of
joining the Communists in opposition during a vote of
confidence.
The Liberals expect that, when the Socialist party
congress is held from 16 to 19 March, Nenni will have
to have some quid pro quo to justify to his party's left
wing his move away from the Communists. The Lib-
erals may decide to dump Fanfani before March in or-
der to discredit Nenni by blocking local alliances between
Socialists and Christian Democrats. A repetition of the
protracted cabinet crisis of 1960 would jeopardize the
Italian parliamentary system, and if early elections re-
sulted the Christian Democrats would probably suffer
and the Communists gain.
30 Jan 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of. State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman,: The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Maxine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
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