CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005500280001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 3, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

iiii
r~s ee~se~
Approved For ReleaW2003 / : aNINWINMA975A005W0280001-0
3 February 1961
Copy No.
PON -21MI
State Dept. review completed
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500280001-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
 \ Approved For Rele 2003/04/17. CIA-RDP79T00975 0050280001-0
3 February 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
I
25X11
000
.3e Chinese UN Representation: Peiping's supporters
may attempt to reopen the moratorium issue at UN
General Assembly reconvening in March. (Page tt)
6. Arab League: Tunisia, Iraq, and Jordan are at-
tempting in current league meeting to curtail
Nasir's influence. (Page M)
7. Ethiopia: Haile Selassie delays naming new gov-
ernment; appears more concerned with pressing
charges against the rebels. (Page fv)
8e Bolivia: President Paz Estenssoro believes ac-
ceptance of bloc aid will not endanger further aid
from US, (age tv)
I
I
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500280001-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
 40 25X1
Approveu ror r1ralltse 22003,04, 1 1 %AA-rxur vu I UVJ UM vve_ovvv I _V
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Chinese UN Representation: (Nationalist China's po-
siti4;n in-the United Nations is becoming increasingly
precariou , s. Taipei suffered some of its worst setbacks
during the first half of the 15th, UN General Assembly.
Although the assembly in October decided to shelve the
question of Chinese UN representation for the duration
of the session, it did so by the slimmest margin Taipei
h as received since 1951. In addition, for the first time
Nationalist China will almost certainly lose its seat on
the UN Economic and Social Council, although the five
permanent members of the Security Council have tradi-
tionally been re-elected when their three-year terms ex-
pire. Nationalist China may also lose its right to vote un-
less it makes a payment of more than $1, 000, 000 toward
its overdue assessments before the assembly resumes.
Although it is difficult to overrule a previous decision
of the assembly, all these factors may encourage
some of Peiping's supporters to reopen the issue of
Chinese UN representation at the General Assembly
,S-Usion scheduled to resume on 7 Marchl. F I
3 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF
ME
ME
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO05500280001-0
 Approved For RelehaS 2003/04/17. CIA-RDP79T00975 000280001-0
25X1
110,
nESIMMEN,
Arab League: The Arab League foreign ministers be-
gan meeting in Baghdad on 30 January with the represent-
atives of all ten league members present for the first time
3 Feb 61 DAILY BRIEF
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
 25X1
25X1
Approved
For Rel se 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T0097 A0 00280001-0 25X1
in nearly three years. Tunisian participation in the meet-
ings, ending the boycott imposed by Bourguiba in 1958, ap-
pears to be part of an effort by Tunisia, Iraq, and Jordan
to .make the league more effective and less of an exclusive
instrument of UAR President Nasir's policies. Nasir, how-
ever, holds important advantages in any contest for influ-
ence in the. league. His more strident anti-Western prop-
aganda has greater popular appeal in the other Arab states,
while the league's secretariat is located in Cairo, subject
to all the direct and indirect influences the UAR leader can
bring to bear. Most other Arab leaders will almost certain-
ly feel compelled to echo Nasir's strong propaganda attacks
on Western policies, especially concerning Algeria, Congo,
r
and Israel, regardless of their differenc , with Na
their real attitudes on these questions.
Ethiopia: The political situation in Ethiopia appears to
be deteriorating further as Emperor Haile Selassie continues
to delay naming a new government. The Emperor, preoccu-
pied with security matters in the seven weeks following the
abortive coup, has concerned himself more with pressing
charges against those who participated in or sympathized
with the revolt than in reconstructing the government or in
attempting to alleviate the conditions which caused the up-
rising. The American ambassador believes new disorders
could break out in Addis Ababa if the military tribunal,
which is reported ready to begin proceedings against the
popular rebel leader Menghistu Neway, imposes the death
sentence.
Bolivia: resident Paz Estenssoro believes that accept-
ance of Soviet bloc economic aid will not endanger the US
grant-aid program which makes up a substantial part of Bo-
livia's domestic budget, according to American Ambassador
Strom. Strom states that although Paz is aware the blot
3 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500280001-0
25X1 1
 qgg'-I
75AO%9500280001 -0 25X1 INE
1001
25X1
[may score politically in Latin America through contributing
"show" projects for Bolivia, Paz feels no obligation to im-
pede such a development. A Bolivian economic mission will
probably leave for the Soviet bloc on I March to explore a
Soviet offer c, i .150 000 000 cri: lit.IF
SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS
AND ESTIMATES
(Available During the Preceding Week)
Ethiopian Prospects After the Abortive Coup of Decem-
r-
ber 1960. SNIE 76.1-61. 24 January 1961.
Supplements NIE 76-60.
3 Feb 61
DAILY BRIEF
25X1
25X1
25X1
'Q0,11"
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO05500280001-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
 Approved For Rele*
Chinese UN Representation: Taipei's UN
Position Precarious
jhile a majority of UN members have supported
the moratorium on Chinese UN representation since 1951,
it has been evident since 1955 that Taipei would not be able
to muster the necessary two-thirds majority vote to sus-
tain its position if its right to the China seat were formally
questioned on a substantive vote. The 15th UN General As-
sembly on 8 October "decided not to consider" the question,
but only 42 members supported the resolution, while 34 op-
posed it and 22 members--mostly African--abstained. Fol-
lowing the balloting, various African delegates made state-
ments indicating that the abstentions were grudgingly given
and would not be repeated in the future. Many supporters of
the moratorium agreed that it could not be upheld at any fu-
ture session. One of these, the government of Pakistan, has
recently asked the US Embassy in Karachi whether the United
States would be prepared in the future to have its allies "fol-
low their own conscience" on the question or whether it con-
siders support of the moratorium a test of friendship with
the United State?
Nationalist China, considerably in arrears in paying its
assessed dues, would find it difficult to get the assembly to
grant an exception which would enable it to retain its vote at
the resumed 15th session. The UN Charter does provide that
the General Assembly may permit a defaulting member to vote
if failure to pay is due to "conditions beyond the control of the
member:
Nationalist China faces another critical vote when the
World Health Organization convenes in New Delhi on 7 Feb-
ruary. If Peiping's supporters--encouraged by Taipei's pre-
carious UN position- -succeed in unseating Taipei, this will
be the first time Communist China has been formally admitted
to an international organization affiliated with.the United Na-
tion~i f I
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
3 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
 Approved For Relea
280001-0
.The Arab League
The Arab League was founded in 1945 to promote
unity among its member states, but it has made little
progress toward achieving.this goal. Its founders--fore-
most of whom was the late Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri
Said--professed a desire to work toward the sacrifice of
sovereignty and special interest in order to attain such
unity. The original members were Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and Yemen, along with Egypt and Syria,
which in 1958.formedthe United Arab Republic. Entry into
the league by Libya (1953), the Sudan (1956), and Tunisia
and Morocco (1958) brought the total membership to its
present ten.. Algeria, whose rebel government has a rep-
resentative attending the current meeting, is not a mem-
ber. In the 16 years of the league's existence, relatively
minor advances in cultural and economic cooperation have
been made, but political differences remain as pronounced
as ever.
The league attempts to set forth a coordinated Arab
viewpoint on various issues and maintains information of-
fices outside the Arab world for this purpose. This kind.of
display of unity is negated, however,?by the almost constant
propaganda contest among Arab leaders for position as the
leading champion of Arab causes, At various times, for ex-
ample, Cairo, Amman, and Baghdad have accused each
other of promoting a policy of softness toward Israel or of
lukewarmness toward the Algerian rebels.
In recent years, Nasir's strong advocacy of his type of
Arab nationalism and neutralism, which offends pro-Western
Aral? governments and many ambitious Arab leaders, has been
.the most constant irritant in inter-Arab relations. Jordan's
King Husayn and Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim--well aware of
Nasir's past sponsorship of attempts to overthrow their re-
spective regimes--oppose Nasir's continued dominance of the
League, but neither commands great trust or respect from
other members. In such an atmosphere, the league is unlike-
ly to increase its meager contributions to Arab unity, and ef-
forts to form a bloc to undermine Nasir's influence in the or-
ganization will probably grow only gradually.
25X1
25X1
25X1
3 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
 Approved For Relea?1 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO055002P0001-0
Situation in Ethiopia Deteriorating
Haile Selassie's legal adviser had urged that trials
of those suspected of disloyalty be conducted "in an open
and dignified manner" This the Emperor has refused.
I secret
trials of civilians ians accused of criticizing the regime or of
expressing sympathy for the aims of the rebels have been
under way for over a week, with sentences of up to eight
years pronounced.
The Emperor has failed to reassert his strong personal
leadership and the American ambassador has characterized
the political situation in Ethiopia as a "state of aimless drift:'
Dissident elements are .circulating antiregime rumors and
distributing leaflets in the capital asking for support of the
rebel cause. This activity, together with the widespread con-
cern over the fate of General Menghistu, the former Imperial
Body Guard commandant, has increased public support for
the objectives espoused by leaders of the abortive coup.
Western officials in Addis Ababa, aware that a continu-
ation of the present trend could lead to further . disorders, have
apparently been unable to persuade the Emperor that prompt
political and economic reforms are necessary to quell the dis-
content.
3 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
 Approved For Relea a 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO0550 280001-0
Bolivian President Plans to Accept Both US and Soviet
Bloc Aid
resident Paz has indicated to American Ambassador
Strom that he is making plans to utilize both US and Soviet
bloc aid. The United States has contributed grant aid in re-
cent years to enable the Bolivian Government to balance its
domestic budget. In a conversation with Ambassador Strom
on 30 January, Paz conveyed the impression that he consid-
ers American grant aid, contributed in recent years to bal-
ance Bolivia's domestic budget, a part of ordinary revenues
on which his administration can count'
he USSR,which has offered a credit of $150,000,000,
wants its :aid to go to projects entirely separate from
those where US aid is involved, according to an earlier
statement by Paz. Paz has also said that he was consid-
ering "reserving" for the USSR the opportunity to provide
equipment for hydroelectric generating plants for the nation-
alized Bolivian Mining Corporation because he assumed that
such plants would not be included in aid to the mines from
the United States, Germany, and the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank. If this assumption was incorrect, Paz said,
Soviet aid could be reserved exclusively for the national pe-
troleum company
he Bolivian Government signed a cultural agreement
with Czechoslovakia on 23 January providing for relations
between scientific institutions, universities, and cultural and
sports organizations. The signing took place during the six-
day visit of Deputy Foreign Minister Hajek, who had been in-
vited by President Paz. Ambassador Strom notes that the pact
is Bolivia's first cultural agreement with the bloc and that it
provides opportunity-for political penetrationD
3 Feb 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0
 Approved For Release 200si04i17 - CIA-RnP79TOO975A00550080001-0
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005500280001-0
 00
,00
A._._._____J 1"f~ ~f/~I II~~~1f1T Af1~1r AI 1 rrI I /10I 1 I .1 A
i
TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05500280001-0