CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005600050001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

SEC. T
Approved For FceasT 3/1
T 00975AX5600050001-4
25X1
6 March 1961
Copy No.
reliff9grelgOLN-1
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
DIA and DOS have no objection to declassification and release
Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600050001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600050001-4
Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600050001-4
 j A roved For ase 2003/03/10 CIA-RDP79T0097 5600050001-4 25X1
pp
j ?
6 March 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
25X1
3. Pakistan and USSR sign agreement on oil exploration.
(Page n )
4. West Germany revalues the mark. (Page it)
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600050001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600050001-4
Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600050001-4
 istan, hope that the Soviets will succeed where Western oil com-
panies have failed. Leaders of the military government probably
are also motivated by political considerations. While maintaining
Pakistan's commitment to its Western alliances and continuing to
rely strongly on US aid, President Ayub and his associates have
sought in recent months to demonstrate a greater "independence"
Pakistan The agreement on of exploration signea in
Karachi on 4 March after several months of bargaining is the firsi
major Soviet aid program accepted by the Pakistani Government.
The agreement provides for a credit of $30,000,000 to finance a
five-year program of technical assistance in oil prospecting and
surveying. The credit carries the usual favorable terms--repay-
ment over 12 years at 245-percent interest. Pakistani officials,
impressed by the discoveries of Soviet teams in India and Afghan-
in. foreign policy as a. rem' r th t Pakistan's cooperation should
not be taken for granted.
West Germany:Cln. a sudden move, Bonn has raised the ex-
change value of the West German mark 5 percent in an effort to
halt the steady influx of foreign exchange- -chiefly dollars--which
has contributed to US balance=of-payments difficulties. The,Netherlands
has announced that the guilder is being similarly revalued. Although]
6 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF
25X1
25X1 Approved Fora Release 2003/03/10: CIA-RDP79T0097105600050001-4
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600050001-4
 ---------------- 1\N0\\\EN\\N\\\\7%x
i\ Approved For R` lease 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 600050001-4 2 `
an
CQerman government and banking officials-- u;nd r: strong pres-
sures from industrial and .commercial interests-'--had re
peatedly rejected revaluation, the failure of Bonn's recent
easing in its tight monetary policy to correct West Germany's
chronic billion-dollar payments surplus and the threat of
25X1
another wave of speculation apparently convinced Bonn offi-
cials that a more realistic pegging of the mark was unavoid-
able} This action--which applies a brakes on inflation but
25X6
also makes German exports more ex ensive may
e
25X6 intended to demonstrate Chancellor Adenauer's willingness to
take additional steps to ease pressure on the dollar}
25X1 25Xt
25X1
6 Mar 61
DAILY. BRIEF
iii
SX,
AMIN
Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600050001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600050001-4
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600050001-4
 Approved ForiRelease 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T009715AQ05600050001-4
Pakistan and USSR Sign Agreement on Soviet Aid in Oil Ex-
".l oration
Agreement in principle on the Soviet credit was reached
in Moscow in December during the visit of the Pakistani min-
ister of fuel, power, and natural resources, but consumma-
tion of the. deal was delayed pending further negotiations in
Karachi. Pakistani officials had originally hoped that Moscow
would agree to share the expense. of exploration if oil is not
found--Pakistan paid only 25 percent of the cost of explora-
tion undertaken by Western oil companies--but this idea was
promptly dismissed by Soviet negotiators. Pakistani officials
also pressed for even more favorable credit terms than they
received, including repayment in nonconvertible rupees. In
the end Pakistan apparently conceded its main points, al-
though the Soviets, in agreeing to rupee repayment, probably
assured Pakistani officials that Moscow would not demand
conversion to hard currency unless acceptable exports were
not available.
. The Soviet ambassador recently discussed publicly the
possibility of additional assistance in such areas as atomic-
energy development for peaceful purposes, medical training,
and agrarian problems. He also expressed hope that a cul-
tural agreement would be signed. Pakistani officials have
shown some reluctance with regard to further aid programs,
but conclusion of the oil deal may make it difficult for them
to turn down publicized offers in the social welfare field,
because these are keyed to popular demands and have stirred
considerable public interest.
Despite President Ayub's repeated reaffirmation of
Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policy and commitment to
the CENTO and SEATO alliances, neutralist tendencies have
been increasingly evident in government circles since mid-
1960. A number of top officials, sharing the view held by
many intellectuals and large sections of the public, question
the value of a rigid commitment to the West, noting that
6 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600050001-4
 Approved For R ase 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO 00050001-4
neutralist countries often gain more by exploiting the competing
interests of both major power blocs. The military government
since early this year has permitted much of the press to carry
on a sustained editorial campaign calling for "gradual disen-
gagement from the role of a committed nation" and for improved
relations with the bloc. The line taken by the press presum-
ably has reinforced the latent neutralist sentiment of the bulk
25X1
of the population, especially in East Pakistan.
[In his latest conversation with Ambassador Rountree, Ayub
explained that in. view of Pakistan's "extremely difficult stra-
tegic position"- -with enemies or potential enemies on all sides,,
excepting Iran- -it was essential to avoid trouble with Commu-
nist China. Ayub felt he could. not secure a border settlement
from Peiping--which would ease the threat to Pakistan's se-
curity from that direction- -without modifying his government's
position on Chinese representation in the UN and specialized
agencies. Ayub indicated that Pakistani delegations would
abstain on procedural questions involving the seating of Chinese
Communist representatives, and would have to vote for ac-
ceptance should a substantive resolution come to a vote
(Ayub and his associates also calculate that an accommoda-
tion with Peiping will increase pressure on India in connection
with the Kashmir dispute, and that better relations with Moscow
will put Afghanistan at a disadvanta a in its dispute with ak-
o over the Pushtoonstan issue)
25X1
6 Max 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600050001-4
 Approved For ase 2003/03/10: CIA-RDP79T00975A 600050001-4
Bonn Raises Value o west erman Mark
[Foreign exchange trading in West Germany was briefly
interrupted on 4 March and then resumed at a new rate of four
German marks to the dollar, compared with the old rate of
4.23. Later, Economics Minister Erhard confirmed that Bonn
has revalued the mark and described himself as the "initiator
and driving force behind the action:' He explained the move as
a necessary step to maintain the stability of the German cur-
rency and price levels in West Germany, as well as to stem the specu-
lative influx of dollars into the country. International financial
circles have long been concerned over Bonn's chronic balance-of-
payments surplus, which increased another $2 billion in 1960 for
a total. gold and foreign exchange reserve of more than $7.5 bil-
lion. Revaluation is intended to help correct this imbalance.
Although the move.benefits German consumers through lower
or stable prices, German businessmen. and labor leaders are
critical because of the resultant reduction of Bonn's competitive
price edge in world markets, which they fear may put a damper
on Bonn's continuing boom
[While praising the move, some Western officials have ques-
tioned whether a 5..percent revaluation is sufficient to reverse the
imbalance. These officials suggest that instead of an immediate
flow of dollars back to the United States, speculators might stand
pat in anticipation of, further changes not only in the mark but in
other. currencies as well
En a press interview on 5 March, Erhard gave assurances that
in addition to revaluing the mark, Bonn intends to go ahead with
plans for a billion dollar aid program for underdeveloped coun-
tries as a further means of easing the US financial. burden
6 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600050001-4
 25X1
Approved For R se 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 -600050001-4
Hostility to Trujillo Intensifying
Arrests. and tortures have increased markedly in recent
weeks, particularly in traditionally anti-Trujillo cities in the
interior, according to information reaching the American Con-
sulate from a number of independent sources. Although oppo-
sition to Trujillo extends to all social and economic levels ex-
cept the generally politically inert peasantry, it has long been
led by middle class and professional elements who are moderate
and friendly to the United States. It is these groups that have
been most. gravely weakened by the government's repression and
.by the economic difficulties of the past two years. Dissident
leaders fear that unless Trujillo is soon ousted, there will. be
little hope of a moderate successor.
The military and police organizations, which remain the
key to Trujillo's survival, show no sign of disaffection. How-
ever, relatives of certain key officers have been victims of
Trujillo in the past year, and these and other officers may well
desert him if they become convinced that his end is near.
The American Consulate noted on.3 March that Trujillo,
who is probably aware of the gravity of the current political and
economic situations, may be planning a simulated coup. Under
such a plan, the government would be turned over to a military
junta composed of officers ostensibly opposed to Trujillo but
actually controlled by him a After OAS sanctions against the
Dominican Republic had. been lifted and the government assured
of a market for Dominican . sugar in the US, Trujillo would be
recalled. Such a strategy is consistent with Trujillo's mentality
and with tactics he has used in the past.
6 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600050001-4
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600050001-4
Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600050001-4
 r
2003/03 10 : CIA RDP70T0007c n 00050001-4
Approved For Rei s
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600050001-4
 i i
Approved ReleasTOP3/1S.ECRETTQ09~5A005600050001-4
TOP SECRET