CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005600200001-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
20
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 14, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 23, 1961
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005600200001-7.pdf1.02 MB
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Approved For P4easJ 3/1.'EC TT00975 p05600200001-7 25X1 23 March 1961 25X1 I opY o. TELLIGE,.- CE DIA and DOS review(s) completed. DIA and DOS have no objection to declassification and release 25X1 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 25X1 j A d F l 2003/03/10 CIA RDP79T0 975= 05600200001 7 / pprove or ease : - X - j 23 March 1961 25X1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 2. Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow scheduled for 28 March, day after SEATO Council of Ministers meeting opens in Bangkok. (Page i) 5. Communist China: Foreign Minister Chen Yi says Peiping will not enter UN until US ends "occupation" of Taiwan. (page tit) 7. Ethiopia: Troops in Addis Ababa protest against low pay; Emperor promises investigation to rectify inequities. (Page ftv) 8. Morocco: King Hassan II exploiting recent capture and release of foreign oil technicians to further his claims to Spanish Sahara. (Page tv) 9. Watch Committee conclusions. (page v) 25X1 25X1 No Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600200001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 j Appr?o~11 Fo 0975p5600200001-7 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 23 March 1961 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 25X1 Moscow probably feels that the Laotian situation is moving into a new and decisive phase which may require high-level coordination of future bloc steps and which in any event makes desirable a new demonstration of bloc solidarity. Yester- day's TASS announcement refers, as did the announcement prior to a similar session last year, to a meeting at the "top level. " This suggests that Eastern European party leaders and premiers may again attend along with the foreign and defense ministers, who are specifically mentioned in the *Warsaw Pact: The chief purpose of the Warsaw Pact meeting announced for 28 March in Moscow is to create a forum from which to respond to Western moves on the Lao- tian situation. This meeting of the Pact's Political Consult- ative Committee is timed to follow the current meeting in Bangkok of SEATO military advisers and the opening on 27 March of the meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers. 25X1 r>,, Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600200001-7 >>5~X~11 Approved For e 2003/03/10: CIA-RDP79TOO97 i~5600200001-7 ANO announcement. Such a meeting could provide an occasion for Khrushchev to break his long public silence on foreign affairs. It is probable that next week's session will cover the Berlin question, at least on a pro forma basis, and possibly in a more threatening context. (Backup, Page 2) MM" 25X1 25X1 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 EV/ 23 Mar 61 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 j j j 200001-7 Approved For U6a AAT/~A /f j j j 25X1 Communist China: Foreign Minister Chen Yi, in an inter- view published in Hungary's party newspaper, has said that it will not be possible for Peiping to enter the UN until the US end its "occupation" of Taiwan and withdraws its armed forces front the area. Heretofore, Peiping's public statements on UN repre sentation have not gone beyond insistence on the ouster from the UN of the Chinese Nationalists. While Peiping has not issued an official policy statement along these lines, the Chinese Communists may believe that international pressures for their participation in the UN have reached a point that encourages them to press their demands for a US withdrawal from Taiwan with new vigor. (Backup, Page 4) 23 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF 25X1iii Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 25X1 FIN Ethiopia: The Emperor on 21 March 'Met a deputation of 500 unarmed enlisted men representing all army units in the Addis Ababa area, following peaceful demonstrations by these troops who were protesting against low pay scales. The troops dispersed peacefully after the Emperor promised to institute a full probe to rectify inequities in army pay scales. They re- portedly remained dissatisfied, however, and reconvened into smaller groups to discuss further moves. The Emperor ap- pears reluctant to yield to the soldiers' demands despite warn- ings from senior army leaders that they will be unable to control. the troops unless concessions are forthcoming. The populace in the canital is an-oarent1v becominLr more svmDathetic to demands tor rexorm. / A A ish Sahara: King Hassan 11 is exp Morocco-~Pan loiting I - 11 foreign oil technicians--in the capture and release of Che eluding three Americans--to further Morocco's claims to Spanish Sahara, in the opinion of the American charge d1af air. an invading Moroccan group and are attacking it from land and Morocco's claim to the Sahara with Spain and France. The Spanish command in the Canary islands claims that Spanish forces in northeastern Spanish Sahara have surround spective embassies, contains a clear threat that other oil pro pectors in northern Spanish Sahara will get similar treatment At the same time, Hassan indicated he was willing to negotiat faires and the British ambassador in Rabat. These official believe that the King's communiqud, issuedsimultaneously with his theatrical release of the captured men to their re- 25X1 23 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF I A/b/ 11 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO05600200001-7 Approved For Ias 2003/03/10: CIA-RDP79T00975 3b0200001-7 j rmp~ 25X1 On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS A. No change from last week. B. No change from last week. \23 Mar 61 DAILY BRIEF Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600200001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 Approved For fas 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A 600200001-7 25X1 Warsaw Pact Mpetin On antra-bloc m.atterp, the Soviet leaders could use next week's meeting ris an opportunity to apply new pressures de signed to bring Albania baok-xrito line with the' USSR. In the military field,' discussion 6f.--.a- possible reduction-in Soviet forces in Hungary might be on the agenda, as might also plans for Warsaw pact combined-training excercises later this year.- Meetings of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Com- mittee have been used since the Pact's formation in 1955 as a forum for discussion of a wide range of pressing political matters by Soviet bloc leaders. These meetings have been attendedy observers from Communist China; last year's session was at- tended also by observers from North Vietnam and North Korey.. The final communiques of these various meetings have annoue`d a unified bloc position on the questions at issue. Thus the meeting in February 1960, although marred sharp Sino-Soviet differences, issued a statement which ibrde- fully. restated the Soviet position on -the Berlin and German issues and outlined those topics the USSR intended to discuss at the then-forthcoming Big Four "summit" meeting. 'The com- muniqu? following the April 1959 meeting was directed toward the issues to be considered at the Big Four foreign ministers' conference that spring. The May 1958 meeting was used to attack the theses issued a month earlier by a. congress of the Yugoslav patty and to widen the break in party relations between the bloc and Belgrade. The meetings in 1958 and 1960, though not the one in 1959, were attended by Soviet bloc party leaders and chiefs of state, in addition to the foreign and defense min- isters. 25X1 23 Mar 61 .CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 Approved For R se 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975 600200001-7 25X1 Peiping Expands Conditions for UN Seat [eiping's reported new demand is a logical expansion of its thesis that "imperialism --especially US imperialism--'"'is. the greatest danger in the world and that the Communist bloc's efforts must be devoted to a no-holds-barred struggle against it. This attitude is reflected in Peiping's current in- sistence on the withdrawal of US forces and the recognition of its claim to Taiwan as a necessary preliminary to the set- tlement of all Sino US ,p.robbem_] [Following the 103rd Sino-US ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw on 7 March, Peiping said it would be difficult to reach agreement with the US on any matter until the US ends its "occupation" of Taiwan. Peiping now may be seeking to take the issue outside the field of bilateral Sino-US relations and force its consideration in the UN. The Chinese Commu- nists may also intend through this maneuver to make it more difficult for any consideration in the UNof a "two Chinas" solution Ehe new condition may not reflect a firm policy position. Peiping may be employing the familiar tactic of setting a high price in preparation for bargaining later. Chou En-lai may have been hinting at the nature of a compromise accept- able to Peiping when he told Edgar Snow last November that the US must agree to withdraw its forces but added that as to the specific steps on when and how to withdraw, "they are matters for subsequent discussion." CAUny UN members which now support Peiping's entry into the UN would Probably be unwilling to attempt to accom- modate the Chinese Communists beyond voting to seat Pei- ping's representative. These members believe that UN mem- bership is a privilege as well as a right and therefore would consider Peiping's demands demeaning to the organization. Britain's recent announcement that Communist China should be seated in the United Nations has subsequently been am- plified by a Foreign Office private view that no condition 23 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600200001-7 Approved For FWe fould be attached by Taipei's supporters to the seating of Peiping. On the other hand, the Foreign Office would oppose the Chinese Communists if Peiping advanced such conditions as UN recognition that Taiwan belonged to China or that charges of aggression against Communist China be expunged from UN records. 25X1 25X1 23 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600200001-7 25X1 Approved For lease 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975 5600200001-7 Army Dissidence Threatens Ethiopia Ambassador Richards indicated on 22 March that while an uneasy calm has returned to Addis Ababa, trouble could break out again unless the Emperor acts quickly to accom- modate the army dissidents' demands. The Emperor's attempts to date to reduce the growing criticism of his regime appear to have failed. He sought to alleviate army, discontent on 14 March by announcing a mod- est increase in its pay scales and to quell. dissension among junior and middle-level officers the next day by promoting 73 army officers. The pay increase, however, which is to come from the present army budget, falls considerably short of that promised by the rebel leadership last December. Moreover, air force, police, and navy personnel will be aroused over be- ing denied a pay raise equal to that given the army, while army officers are likely to. regard their promotions simply as a counterbalance to those given air force officers last month. Po- lice officials are also displeased because the Emperor recently appointed an army officer instead of a career police official as commissioner of police. 25X1 Handbills, which may have originated in the Ministry of Defense, were circulated in the capital on 20 March setting forth the demands of the dissidents. These included--in addi- tion to the pay raise--the dismissal of Chief of Staff Kebede and other, high government officials, threatening direct action if. they are not complied with. The American army attache notes that the dissidents ap- parently have succeeded in establishing organizational ties through several if not all local army units. A leader capable of directing action against the regime is not yet known to have emerged, however. Although. army officers reportedly have 25X1 23 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 Approved For Wea4 00200001-7 25X1 secured all arms in unit armories, the troops could recover these weapons through muss action if the situation were to get out of hand, 25X1 25X1 23 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 25X1 25X1 Approved F Moroccan Claims to Saharan Territories 5A5600200001-7 Soon after Spain published regulations on 15 June 1959 for the exploitation of petroleum resources in the Spanish Sahara, the Moroccan Embassy in Madrid made known Mo- rocco's claims of sovereignty over the region, The Moroccan economic counselor in Madrid indicated at that time that he thought American oil companies should be advised this was a contested area and that they might subsequently have to rene- gotiate their status with another government. The following year, nine American firms obtained concessions from the Spanish Government, and by January 1961,38 American teams were engaged in exploratory work. Emphasis was placed on the northwestern part of the Spanish Sahara because of the availability of supply lines and water. Thee .United Oil Company, whose 11 employees were captured--apparently by Moroccan irregulars at the direction of the Moroccan Army--on 11 March, had recently ceased operations in Latin America to.concentrate on exploratory work in Spanish Sahara and Australia. The Moroccan press, meanwhile, continues to play up charges of Spain's aggressive intentions, reporting on 21 March the arrival of Spanish reinforcements not only in Spanish Sahara but also in the Spanish-held presidios of Ceuta and Melilla on Morocco's Mediterranean coast. It also claims that Spanish mil- itary aircraft created havoc among the population by flying low over the southern Moroccan town of Tarfaya on 20 March, and 25X1 23 Mar 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 Approved For lease 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975 5600200001-7 continues to charge Spanish authorities with kidnaping a team of four Italian oil prospectors operating in the Tarfaya area. 23 Mar. 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05600200001-7 Approved Formal ase 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00 705600200001-7 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President -Executive Offices of the White House The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Derr:irtment of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005600200001-7 Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-