CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005600300001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 4, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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4 April 1961
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4 April 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Situation in Laos. (Page t)
2. Congo: Tshombe's position in Manono apparently
not yet secure.(Page it)
Cuban issue.
3. France-Portugal: Maneuvering against US on UN
MEN
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Phong Saly -"
PHONG SALY1
9
NAMITHA
Muong Sai
LUANG, PRA
Luang Prabang
SAYABOURY
P ou Khouur 7 `
Muonq KasW~,y-~~,
Nang Vyng~-./
VIENTIANE ~Borlkhane\,
Pak Sane J 1
t\ K.m Keut
~~Dien Bien Phu
-,
am Bac
~4.
XIENG KHQUANG
Muonp Soui ,,, an Ban
l(
'-t
'
'4Xieng Khouang ',
Ban To Viangl,
NORTHERN LAOS
4x- GOVERNMENT Forces in
4W KONG LE - PATHET LAO ~ Contact
KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS
610404
0
50
STATUTE MILES
4 Apr 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page
Savannakhet
- 1 1 1 b
KHAMMCUANEa
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EVEN
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 April 1961
DAILY BRIEF
Laos. Vientiane has adopted an official position of "no
comment" pending study of the Soviet reply to the British
proposal; privately, however, General Phoumi and Premie
Boun Oum are taking a gloomy line over prospects, stress-
ing the weak military situation. A country team appraisal
of the military situation in Laos underscores the defensive
psychology of the Laotian Army which is enabling the aggre
sive enemy forces to fight at a tempo of their own choosing,
and to build up strength for attack on any point. According
to this appraisal, General Phoumi appears increasingly to
feel that the Laotian Army alone will be unable to control
the military situation and is increasingly anxious for outside
help.
Major elements of the government force which withdrew
from Tha Thom have reached Borikhane, and some control
over them has been established. Other government units in the
area have been orderedfarther north to make contact with the enemy
in an effort to stabilize the situation.
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MOBUTU
3,400
MOBUTU
800
NIGERIA I ?f
400 %-?~
3
Scattered Forces
L OP DVILLE --1'' Francqui \
INDIA
800
Approximate area nominally controlled by:
Luanda Q Kasavubu-Mobutu
Gizenga
Kalonji
United Nations Forces
Selected road
Selected railroad
Selected airfield
IRELAND
655
MALAYA
750
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ETHIOPIA
1,500
GIZENGA
7,000
NIGERIA
500
L NIGERIA
.900
SWEDEN
650
TSHOMBE
7,000
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D I f' d; P
r
ec asst ie in a - anze opy pprove or e ease - - j
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C Thbd'iti i Mtl it 25X1
ongo:soms posonnanono apparenys no
t
dl
f
l
repor
e
a in
y [L1trating the 1]Ll1Q11r
i
,a ML-111Y 11110 and are
inflicting casualties on Tshombe's white mercenaries. The
mercenaries, who seem to be the only reliable and aggres-
sive elements of Tshombd's forces, apparently are becom-
ing increasingly nervous. Further operations by Tshombd
1
l
h
b
d b
I
d
th
Will a
so
ampere
, 1 VV-mall
n
e
ia ulY co114111 ent,
y
e
which is being flown to nearby Kamina
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DAILY BRIEF
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Laos
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The apparently growing number of North Vietnamese in-
volved on the enemy side.is particularly,discourag.ing.to General
Phoumi, according to American officials in Vientiane.'mer -
ican military personnel formerly stationed at Tha Thom de-
scribe the actions taken by the enemy forces during the six
weeks preceding the town's capture on. 31 March as "profes-
sional" and not of a type that could be executed by the average
Pathet Lao. Three. Soviet IL-14s on apparent air-drop mis-
sions in the Tha Thom area were. seen by reliable observers.
on 31 March, and additional drops in the same general vicinity
reportedly occurred on 30 March. So sudden and furious was
the enemy action at Tha Thom that it appears that all the gov-
ernment's crew-served weapons, including two 105-mm. how-
itzers, were captured intact
Senior American officials in Vientiane believe that the
leadership of both the Laotian Army and government is "ter-
ribly uncertain" and vulnerable to factors and forces over
which the leaders feel they have little control. One. such fac-
tor is the enemy's military potential, which General Phoumi
feels is greater than. his own at this time. A second crucial
factor.is US political, economic, and military support; if this
appears to weaken or waver, a further loss of confidence can
be expected, and with rapidity j
In his recent discussions with Admiral Felt, Phoumi re-
vealed that he has a standing agreement with South Vietnam
for a Vietnamese division. to enter southern Laos as an inter-
vention force in case he asks for assistance. He stated that
he has not yet called for entry of this division since the situa-
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Soviet propaganda has underscored Moscow's contention
that the way is now open for a peaceful solution in Laos. Presi-
dent Kennedy's remarks on the 1 April Soviet reply to the Brit-
ish proposals on Laos have been widely circulated. Moscow
radio carried the text of the President's statement and reported
that it is carried in full in the 3 April issue of Pravda. Soviet
broadcasts have also reported. an article in the Peiping People's
Daily of 1 April which called for an enlarged Geneva conference
as the "only way" to solve the Laotian problem. Moscow, in
broadcasting the remarks made by Chen Yi in Djakarta, omitted
any reference to his threat to send Chinese troops to Laos, The
Soviet broadcast quoted Chen Yi as saying that Peiping "will not
remain indifferent in the event SEATO launches direct military
intervention in Laos."
Terming the Soviet reply to the British note "practical and
correct," Hanoi's official newspaper Nhan Dan on 3 April called
for prompt convocation of an international conference, The
conference also was endorsed by Pathet Lao leader Prince Sou-
phannouvong and by the Xieng Khouang "government:' Souphannou-
vong, in a 1 April statement, and Souvanna Phouma's Xieng
Khouang "representative" Quinim Pholsena, in a statement of 2
April, both demanded withdrawal of "US, Thai, South Vietnamese,
and Kuomintang military personnel." The emphasis on this with-
drawal suggests it is a point which may be used to prolong any
cease-fire negotiations such as the USSR said should be hp-ld tween the "interested parties of Laos." -
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Situation in the Congo
Lshombe's white mercenaries from South Africa reported-
ly are annoyed by the Belgians in command of the African units
at Manonoo The Belgian officers apparently are taking credit
for the capture of the town, although their African troops re-
portedly refused to fight and the brunt of the fiLrhtine was ne
by the white legionnaires
LIn Belgium, Paul-Henri Spaak, who apparently expects to
be named the next foreign mini-ster as a result of the 26 March
elections, reportedly believes that Brussels has been helping
Katanga too extensively and that more effort should be expended
in support of the Leopoldville regime. The Belgian caretaker
government reportedly agreed on 24 March to make available
to Leopoldville $4,000,000, but the actual turnover of the funds
is likely to be delayed-
In New Delhi yesterday, Nehru took note of the "campaign
against Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal" and made public his opposition
to the replacement of Dayal now "or in the near future." He
said removal of Dayal "would also have some effect on the main-
taining of our forces" in the Congo. Dayal, the Indian diplomat
who has served as Hammarskjold's personal representative in --I
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(she Congo, is now in New York for consultations and is not ex-
pected to return to the Congo for several weeks. Dayal alienated
many Congolese officials, and there has been apprehension in Leo-
poldville that his return may generate new tensions and unssibly
touch off new anti-UN disorders.
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France May Use Cuban Issue in UN to Press US
France has continually opposed what it considers the
United States' indiscriminate efforts to win the political sup-
port of the Afro-Asian states in the UN. Paris is motivated
partly by fear of establishing precedents which will pave the
way for increased UN activity in Africa to the detriment of
French interests, particularly in Algeria. Principally, how-
ever, De Gaulle views the UN as a heterogeneous mixture
numerically dominated by new states, fundamentally incapa-
ble of action but increasingly tending to assume the respon-
sibility of the large powers for the maintenance of peace.
The US vote in the Security Council on 15 March in favor
of the Liberian resolution calling for UN consideration of the
Angolan question probably was the immediate occasion for
the French suggestion to the Portuguese. Various French
political commentators have recently berated the US for
failure to "stand with its allies," The influential and usually
pro-American Raymond Aron said in an article on 22 March
in Le Figaro that the US "double standard" will backfire when
"the Marxists train their guns on US 'imperialism' in Latin
America." Paris can be expected to continue to urge the other
colonial powers to utilize the Cuban resolution or any similar
resolutions, particularly those critical of US policy in Latin
America, as an opportunity to make this point forcefully.
Lisbon's sharply hostile reaction to the recent US vote
suggests that it will give serious consideration to the French.
tactic, Portuguese officials believe the US position has en-
couraged Afro-Asian attacks on the colonial powers, and Lis-
bon has been seeking ways to induce the US to change its Af-
rican policies. The vitriolic anti-American press campaign
and demonstrations in Portugal have linked the US stand with
that of the Soviet Union. and have singled out Ambassador
Stevenson as the chief villain. A leading editorial on 29 March
in the government-controlled newspaper Diario de Noticias
stressed that the US bases in the Azores had been granted with
the understanding that Portuguese sovereignty would be re-
spected in all of the Portuguese colonies, that Portugal had
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only joined the UN on the insistence of the US and. Britain, and
that the loyalty and solidarity Lisbon had given the NATO al-
liance had been forgotten.
The Cuban request for UN General Assembly considera-
tion of "the clear threat to international peace and security"
posed by "the various plans of aggression and acts of interven-
tion" of the United States against the Cuban Government was
originally submitted last October. Cuba has subsequently
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further detailed its charges again9t tht, ITS in several formal
r. mnlaints circulated in the LTN.
For some weeks, Cuba's public position has been that it
is willing and anxious to engage in bilateral discussions with
the US, provided such discussions are on a "basis of equality
and with. an open agenda," but that the present US attitude
upnfig siwh discussions.
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Owe
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (international Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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TOP SECRETS
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TOP SECRET
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