CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A005700090001-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
17
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 30, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 5, 1961
Content Type:
REPORT
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Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A005700090001-9.pdf | 1020.42 KB |
Body:
iiiiiiiiiii~i
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5 May 1961
M-IL LINO
State Dept. review
completed
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5 May 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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France: Paris to maintain stand on independent nu-
clear force at 8-10 May NATO conference in Oslo.
(rage i
5. France-Algeria: De Gaulle believes complete army
reorganization needed; plans no cabinet changes at
this time. (Page i)
7. India: Food-grain production reaches new high in
1960-1961. (rage t v)
8. Iran: Teachers' strike developing into popular dem-
onstrations against regime. (Page Lv)
9. Ghana: Nkrumah extends direct personal control in
recent cabinet and party changes; strengthens more
radical elements. (rage v)
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ON
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NATQ: apparently i n s Press sTrongiy
ran - Pa
its argument for an in ependent French nuclear striking force
at the 8-10 May Oslo conference of NATO foreign ministers
and will certainly do so during President Kennedy's visit to
France 31 May - 2 June. The French deputy permanent repre-
sentative to the NAC advised his Foreign Ministry in a 12
April memorandum that French participation with the US and
UK in strategic nuclear planning for the alliance is the only
guarantee that Europe will not be "sacrificed" in a nuclear war,
and that such participation is unlikely unless France acquires
its own striking force. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville,
purportedly reflecting De Gaulle's personal views, told Ambas-
sador Gavin on 19 April that France considered it "unrealistic"
to assume that the US would initiate the use of strategic nu-
clear weapons "merely because Germany or France were be-
ing overrun," and that therefore France could not surrender
its responsibility for national defense "to NATO or anyone
else." (Backup,
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France-Algeria: De Gaulle
Ihad been surprise
an bitterly deceived" by the recent coup attempt in Algeria.
De Gaulle believes a complete reorganization of the French
Army and administrative security services is needed,. and
said he is less upset by those who actively opposed him than
by "fence-sitting" officials who waited to see which. side would
win out in the crisis. Contrary to numerous press stories,
De Gaulle does not anticipate
making changes in his cabinet at this time.
e Gaulle anticipates that negotiations with the Algerian
rebels will begin about 11 or 12 May, but professes pessimism
about the prospects of these negotiations because of divisions
within the rebel leadership. Describing tension. among thj
5 May 61
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ropean settlers in Algeria as greater will remain calm,
M
h
e
De Gaulle questioned now long t
f terrorism in both Al-
and indicated he feels new outbreaks o
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geria and France ale probable
i e harvest combined with an increase
c
India: A bumper r
in other food-grain crops, has resulted in a new high in In-
dian food-grain production during 1960-61. While these re-
sults reflect in part New Delhi's strenuous efforts to expand
acreage and yields, the key factor appears to have been gen-
erally favorable weather. The average food-grain production /G
over the past three years nonetheless represents a gain of
about 42 percent over production a decade ago, thus more than
during the
keeping pace with India's 22 percent population ge 5)
same period.
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Iran: The strike of government-employed teachers de-
manding higher pay which started in Tehran on 2 May is snow-
balling into larger popular demonstrations against the regime.
Large crowds were reported on 4 May to be demanding the e
resignation of Prime Minister Sharif-Emami, and the army
has been called in to help maintain order. Employees of other
5 May 61
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government ministries are considering joining the demon-
strations. Communist sympathizers, who are strong in the
Ministry of Education, will welcome the occasion to harass
the government, although they did not instigate the strike.
*Army and police.units are reported very much in evidence.
j These forces have the capability of maintaining order, but the
degree of their loyalty to the government is uncertain. A
repetition of the violence which has already caused the deaths
of two teachers would further alienate the already considerable
bod of moderate opinion, which is turning against the Shah.
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Page 6)
Ghana: Changes in government and party positions an-
nounced in Accra on 1 and 2 May represent the latest in a
series of moves by Nkrumah aimed. at extending his direct
personal control over virtually all key governmental func-
tions and over the apparatus of the ruling Convention Peo-
ple's party. The changes apparently are motivated largely
by domestic considerations--especially Nkrumah's dissatis-
faction over the pace at which Ghana's development programs
are being implemented- -but also reflect frustrations he has
encountered in his pan-African policies. The cabinet re-
shuffle has weakened the regime's "old guard," and appears
to have strengthened younger and more radical elements,
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experiences of Communist countries.
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France Renewing Argu ? "ents for Independent Nuclear Force
lhere were indications last year that De Gaulle intended
to "wait for a new US administration" before renewing his de-
mands for US nuclear assistance and tripartite strategy and
policy coordination. He reopened one of these subjects in his
11 April press conference when, after reiterating his familiar
argument against integration of French forces in NATO, he
sharpened his long-standing demand for tripartite Western
policy and strategy coordination in terms of the "necessity to
thoroughly clarify the question of the use of nuclear armaments
of both Western powers who possess them. "
De Gaulle's views were elaborated on 19 April by Couve
de Murville, who told Gavin that he thinks "NATO"--and im-
plicitly a variety of related problems--will be the first item
of interest in the forthcoming talks between the French and
US presidents. According to Couve, NATO is unrealistic as
now conceived, particularly as regards the strategy of US
nuclear retaliation to save Europe from being overrun by the
Soviets. He said De Gaulle believes that in any major Soviet
attack Germany would be overrun and the "battle of Europe"
decided in France. Couve stated that the West would neces-
sarily use tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet forces but
would not use strategic weapons against the USSR unless the
latter first used them against the US. Therefore France has
concluded that "warfare under NATO auspices" would result
in the total destruction of western Europe. With this pros-
pect, Couve said any nation is "extremely reluctant" to give
responsibility for its own defense to anyone else, such as
SACEUR)
/mbassador Finletter reported on 3 May that he had been
shown copies of French deputy permanent representative
Jurgensen's memorandum in connection with the latter's sum-
mary of what he expects to be the French position on military
matters at the Oslo conference. The memorandum's discus-
sion of the need for and ways of maintaining strategic nuclear
weapons in Europe described the idea of a multilateral NATO
deterrent as "not necessary," asserted that purely maritime
deployment of missiles is unsatisfactory, and argued that
therefore "possession by France on its territory of its own)
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(nuclear strike force is in the interest of all western Europe."
The memorandum concluded that France must either "go it
alone" to acquire its own strike force, or must receive from
the US technical cooperation, both nuclear and missile, sim-
ilar to that given the UK. The memorandum hinted that if
this were provided, France's position in NATO would be more
cooperative.
Ln view of past French performance at North Atlantic
Pact sessions during periods of De Gaulle's efforts to assert
France's claims to a special position with the US and UK in
NATO, the French may criticize and stall in Oslo conference
discussions--primarily with the idea of laying the group rk
for De Gaulle's talks with President Kennedy in Paris
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Indian Food-Grain Production at New Highs for 1960-61
As a result, government food-grain stockpiles now amount
to nearly 3,000,000 long tons, the highest level since independ-
ence was attained in 1947. The program to build up these
stockpiles as a buffer against adverse weather in future years
is being aided substantially by New Delhi's purchases of Amer-
ican surplus agricultural commodities under the PL-480 pro-
gram.
The improved food supply situation will help the ruling
Congress party, facing elections in Orissa State next month
and nationally early in 1962. In addition, it will help the ca-
reer of Food and Agriculture Minister S. K. Patil, an ener-
getic Bombay politician who originally shied away from the job
because of the possible hazards to his ambitions. While he
now is in. a position to capitalize on agriculture's successes
and has strengthened his party position. by assuming several
key responsibilities for the 1962 elections, he must accelerate
the pace of food-grain production during the next five years.
The Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66) calls for an addi-
tional increase in food-grain production- -by more than 31 per-
cent over this year's 76,000,000 long tons--largely through im-
provement of techniques and extensive production and use of
chemical fertilizers. This food program is at the heart of the
Third Plan, and the importance of achieving its goals is em-
phasized by the fact that India's population--now about 438,000,-
000- -has already exceeded the level expected for 1966 made
by Indian planners during preparation of the Second Five-Year
Plan in 1955.
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Demont`ations in-Iranrlncrease in tntenstt;
he present demonstrations are more serious than those
following the rigged parliamentary elections earlier in the
year- -demonstrations which had been confined almost en-
tirely to university students and attracted little public sup-
port. The strike has been planned for some time and cli-
maxes a period of increasing teacher activity which has in-
cluded peaceful one-day strikes in Tehran and the provinces.
Prime mover in the teachers' activities has been Mohammad
Derakhshesh, chairman of the "Licentiates Society," who was
arrested on 1 May in an attempt to head off the strike. He
has since been released. The standard teacher's salary is
about $40 per month, little better than that of many common
laborers. The government budget for this year provides for
an additional $4,400,000 to raise salaries by 10 to 15 percent,
but the demonstrators now are demanding an even greater in-
crease. A probable further complication is Derakhshesh's
desire to demonstrate his influence with the teachers. His
rival for leadership of the teachers, who was government-
sponsored, was elected to parliamer
The schools and the bazaar are closed and there are
rumors that employees of the Ministry of Justice and the
Ministry of Health, as well as bus and taxi drivers, may join
the strike. The antigovernment National Front is reported to
be debating whether or not to throw its support to the strikers.
The National Front will have an opportunity to turn out in force
on 5 May to attend the commemoration services being held on
the 40th day after the death of former Prime Minister Mos-
sadeq's finance minister
he army, unlike the police, is not trained in riot con-
trol, and. further large demonstrations could lead to more
bloodshed. However, the willingness of the army to fire on
the demonstrators has not been tested; if it refuses, this would
probably mark the beginning of a precipitous decline in the
prestige and influence of the Shah.
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Nkrumah Widens Personal Role in Ghana
President Nkrumah, who was endowed with far-reaching
executive authority under the republican constitution Ghana
adopted last July, announced in mid.-February that he planned
to take over the secretary generalship of the Convention Peo-
ple's party (CPP) as of 1 May. L the same speech he ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the "ideological deficiencies" of
many of his supporters and promised to strengthen the mech-
anism of the CPP
Nkrumah's wider purpose and his dissatisfaction with in-
creasing intra-party bickering were brought into clearer focus
early last month in a major policy address calling for tighter
party discipline and the complete subordination under the CPP
of Ghana's labor, farmers, cooperative and women's organiza-
tion. At the same time, he demanded that members of parlia-
ment must either liquidate their private investments or resign,
and pledged, in unprecedentedly forceful fashion, to root out
the traditional evil of official corruption. In subsequent pub-
lic statements on 18 April and 1 May, Nkrumah announced
modifications in the government's structure and innovations
in the party apparatus--such as directing regional administra-
tive officers to act also as regional party secretaries- -increas-
ing his own direct influence over the regime. He described his
campaign as a move to "put our house in order" in anticipation
of new phases of the pan-African movement abroad and the
"industrial and technical revolution" at home.
The American Embassy in Accra reports that these initi-
atives by Nkrumah have sharply accentuated differences in out-
look among ministers, and other party and government lead-
ers. This was particularly apparent during the week preceding
the announcement of the new government when a group com-
posed primarily of early Nkrumah supporters, many of whom,
such as Finance Minister Gbedemah and Agriculture Minister
Botsio, have acquired substantial personal holdings, waged a
better struggle against the radicals. The absence of any
dramatic personnel changes in the new cabinet indicates that
the older leaders apparently succeeded in forcing Nkrumah to
forego, at least temporarily, the sweeping changes which seemed
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to have been in the offing. Nevertheless, both Gbedemah and
Botsio have had their powers curtailed while.former Minister
of Social Welfare Quaidoo, who attacked the party and indirect-
ly Nkrumah in parliament on 25 April, has been dropped from
the cabinet entirely. The left wing's representation, mean-
while, has been strengthened by the inclusion of former CPP
secretary general Adamafio as minister of state for presidential
affairs.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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