CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005700100001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 6, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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6 May 1961 /
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Copy No. C
C
TELLI EA- E
a go
Dept.
review completed
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6. Libya: Cabinet reorganized. (rage ' t t t)
7. Iran: Appointment of new prime minister intended
to end demonstrations in Tehran. (rage tit)
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
2. Congo: Leopoldville may reconvene parliament.
(rage tt)
3. Communist China: Chou En-lai rejects offer of
American wheat from Burmese prime minister.
(rage ti)
4. Pyongyang invites South Koreans to visit North
Korea. .(kage it)
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Congo: C-Leopoldville's Foreign Minister Bomboko- -the
dominant figure at the Coquilhatville political conference--ap-
parently hopes to enlist UN support to disarm Tshombd?s
troops, and subsequently himself move against Gizenga, ac-
cording to the American Embassy in Leopoldville. There are
indications that the Leopoldville group may reconvene parlia-
ment--a move long sought by Gizenga--as a means of secur-
ing Gizenga's attendance at the current talks. Leopoldville
government leaders, who are still keeping Tshombd under de-
tention, apparently regard the present conference at Coquilhat-
ville as crucial to the Congo's future and have no plans to defer
outstanding issues to a subsequent meeting.
Belgian. Foreign Minister Spaak, who is also minister of
African affairs in the new cabinet, will seek to build. up the
Leopoldville government at Tshombd's expense and to weed
out some of. the more blatant Belgian. supporters of Tshombd
in Katanga. Because of strong right-wing sentiment in Bel-
gium, however, he would be reluctant to see a general exodus
of Belgian settlers from Katanga at the UN's insistence. 25X1
nist current
Communist China? Demonstrating an extreme sensitivity
to any suggestion that Communist China needs American help
in its present difficulties, Premier Chou En-lai rejected an
offer, extended by Burmese Premier U Nu in April, of some
300,000 tons of wheat from private American sources on favor-
able terms. Chou admitted that the purchase of Canadian and
Australian grain for hard currency was placing a heavy strain
on China, but declined to consider a proposal that would have
permitted payment for the American wheat in. Chinese Commu- 25X1
North - South Korea: North Korea has offered to throw
open its borders and pay the bills for a wide variety of visitors
from South Korea, On 4 May Pyongyang issued.a statement en-
dorsing a proposal for North-South contacts it said had been
6 May 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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made the same day by a group of South Korean students.
Pyongyang invited the students to come North and offered to
provide "freedom of travel" and living facilities. Virtually
every segment of the South Korean population was promised
similar treatment in this offer, which Pyongyang undoubtedly
expects Seoul to denounce. Although the bulk of South Korean
political and student leaders probably will reject Pyongyang's
offer, public interest in reunification has been growing since 25X1
April of last year. Page 5)
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Libya: [The reorganization of Prime Minister Uthman's
cabinet on 4 May appears aimed at heading off a new govern-
mental crisis over graft and corruption among top officials.
Members of the Uthman government have in their six months
of power managed to find "legal" as well as sub rosa means
for extracting large sums from several Western-owned oil
companies. Although the pro-Western minister of foreign
affairs has been replaced by an experienced diplomat who has
also been favorably disposed toward the West, the composi-
tion of the revised cabinet as a whole suggests a continuation
of the gradual trend in Libya toward nationalist and neutralist
policies Page 7)
6 May 61
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DAILY BRIEF iii
O k
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Iran: -C-onfirmatiOn by the Shah of reports that Ali Amini
has ge-en appointed prime minister to replace Sharif-Emami,
who resigned on 4 May, would indicate an intent to appease
elements which have called for reform and an attempt to
quiet demonstrations which have been going on in Tehran
since 2 May. r
is reported to be reluctant to accept the ost.
_P ~~~ I
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44-
5 Mav and is a vossible choice for prime minister,"", e -
Amin! would, probably attempt a moderate re-
formist program, but his success would depend on the extent
to which the Shah is willing to support him against the ultra-
conservatives, who would oppose any reforms threatening
their interests. General Bakhtiar also talked to the Shah on
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6 May 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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The Situation in the Congo
According to press reports, Tshombe has been advised
that he will not be released until he has guaranteed the par-
ticipation of Katanga deputies in parliament. In April, ele-
ments of the Congo Army nominally loyal to Gizenga report-
edly agreed to recognize General Mobutu's authority in return
for a reconvening of parliament as desired by Gizenga.
Bomboko may regard a reconvening of parliament as the
price which Leopoldville must pay to secure Gizenga's r-
ticipation in negotiations aimed at reuniting the Congo. jThe
American Embassy in Leopoldville reports that Gizenga has
"made long strides" in the past three weeks to increase his
parliamentary support. Gizenga appears assured of the sup-
port of over 40 deputies of the 136-man lower chamber--a
bloc comparable to that controlled by Lumumba during his
period as premier.
Spaak has to contend with powerful rightist elements in
the cabinet which are hostile to any course which might ap-
pear to be sacrificing Belgian interests. An aggressive sup-
porter of a vigorous pro-Katanga policy, former Defense
Minister Gilson has been retained in the cabinet as minister
of interior as a concession to the rightist elements among
the Social Christians. Another "flight" of Belgians from the
Congo would have grave repercussions on public opinion and
seriously weaken Spaak's position as foreign minister. I
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North Korea Seeks Contacts With the South
The Seoul University league for national unification which
Pyongyang states proposed North -South student talks, claims
to have affiliated organizations on a number of South Korean
campuses but probably speaks for only a small minority of
leftist-inclined students. However, the failure of the "April
revolution" of 1960 to provide anticipated economic improve-
ments has increased public interest in reunification as a solu-
tion for the country's ills:
Aware of this interest, North Korea is conducting an in-
tensive propaganda campaign around the reunification theme.
Boasting of its economic progress in the past few years,
Pyongyang bombards the South with offers of economic assist-
ance and calls for a wide range of contacts as preliminary
steps toward reunification. Pyongyang has sought to make
Seoul responsible, in the eyes of the Southern population, for
thwarting these overtures.
Responsible South Korean government and opposition
leaders have been strongly opposed to any form of exchange
with the Communists and probably prefer to avoid any ini-
tiative on reunification. Last November, however, the Chang
Myon government showed some willingness to take a more
flexible position toward North-South contacts in order to con-
vince the public it was moving in a reasonable manner to satisfy
desires for reunification.
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- p
Libyan Cabinet Shake
[Three of the six new cabinet appointees were drawn from
the House of Deputies' Committee on Finance and Economy, the
body which would have been most likely to attack the executive
branch effectively on the corruption issue. These appointments
are presumably a continuation of Uthman's maneuvers to frag-
ment the opposition in the House of Deputies which.brought about the
fall of the Kubar government last October. The charges then
centered on bribes and other irregularities in the government's
handling of the costly Fezzan road project. In spite of the past
scandal, both he and King Idris are insistent that construction.
of the Fezzan road be continued by the same Libyan firm and
on much. the same basis as originally planned
he government is also extremely vulnerable because of
the crudity of the favors, granted by top officials in response
to bribes from a few of the many Western-owned oil companies
operating in Libya. In March, for example, the government
unexpectedly opened several concession areas, accepted the
applications of two companies which had paved the way with
appropriate largesse, and immediately closed the bidding.
In a more open and "legal" fashion, federal officials have
worked with. Libyan provincial governments to obtain large spe-
cial payments from companies in connection with pipeline
rights-of-way. Public resentment has rapidly increased and
tends to be directed against the Western oil industry as well
as against venal Libyan officials
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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