CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005700100001-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
January 31, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 6, 1961
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005700100001-7.pdf752.99 KB
Body: 
Approved Foceeleas1' 4/1S:E 7TT00975,p005700100001-7 5X1 / 6 May 1961 / 25X1 / Copy No. C C TELLI EA- E a go Dept. review completed Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700100001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700100001-7 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700100001-7 j Approved Foelease 2003/04/131&EgP79T0097b005700100001-7 6. Libya: Cabinet reorganized. (rage ' t t t) 7. Iran: Appointment of new prime minister intended to end demonstrations in Tehran. (rage tit) 25X1 25X1 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 2. Congo: Leopoldville may reconvene parliament. (rage tt) 3. Communist China: Chou En-lai rejects offer of American wheat from Burmese prime minister. (rage ti) 4. Pyongyang invites South Koreans to visit North Korea. .(kage it) Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700100001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700100001-7 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700100001-7 - ApprovRGglea a 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79 00905700100001-7 I 25X1 25X1 Congo: C-Leopoldville's Foreign Minister Bomboko- -the dominant figure at the Coquilhatville political conference--ap- parently hopes to enlist UN support to disarm Tshombd?s troops, and subsequently himself move against Gizenga, ac- cording to the American Embassy in Leopoldville. There are indications that the Leopoldville group may reconvene parlia- ment--a move long sought by Gizenga--as a means of secur- ing Gizenga's attendance at the current talks. Leopoldville government leaders, who are still keeping Tshombd under de- tention, apparently regard the present conference at Coquilhat- ville as crucial to the Congo's future and have no plans to defer outstanding issues to a subsequent meeting. Belgian. Foreign Minister Spaak, who is also minister of African affairs in the new cabinet, will seek to build. up the Leopoldville government at Tshombd's expense and to weed out some of. the more blatant Belgian. supporters of Tshombd in Katanga. Because of strong right-wing sentiment in Bel- gium, however, he would be reluctant to see a general exodus of Belgian settlers from Katanga at the UN's insistence. 25X1 nist current Communist China? Demonstrating an extreme sensitivity to any suggestion that Communist China needs American help in its present difficulties, Premier Chou En-lai rejected an offer, extended by Burmese Premier U Nu in April, of some 300,000 tons of wheat from private American sources on favor- able terms. Chou admitted that the purchase of Canadian and Australian grain for hard currency was placing a heavy strain on China, but declined to consider a proposal that would have permitted payment for the American wheat in. Chinese Commu- 25X1 North - South Korea: North Korea has offered to throw open its borders and pay the bills for a wide variety of visitors from South Korea, On 4 May Pyongyang issued.a statement en- dorsing a proposal for North-South contacts it said had been 6 May 61 DAILY BRIEF ii Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700100001-7 Approvv8XQ leas 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79 0097 05700100001-7 25X1 made the same day by a group of South Korean students. Pyongyang invited the students to come North and offered to provide "freedom of travel" and living facilities. Virtually every segment of the South Korean population was promised similar treatment in this offer, which Pyongyang undoubtedly expects Seoul to denounce. Although the bulk of South Korean political and student leaders probably will reject Pyongyang's offer, public interest in reunification has been growing since 25X1 April of last year. Page 5) 25X1 Libya: [The reorganization of Prime Minister Uthman's cabinet on 4 May appears aimed at heading off a new govern- mental crisis over graft and corruption among top officials. Members of the Uthman government have in their six months of power managed to find "legal" as well as sub rosa means for extracting large sums from several Western-owned oil companies. Although the pro-Western minister of foreign affairs has been replaced by an experienced diplomat who has also been favorably disposed toward the West, the composi- tion of the revised cabinet as a whole suggests a continuation of the gradual trend in Libya toward nationalist and neutralist policies Page 7) 6 May 61 25X1 DAILY BRIEF iii O k Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700100001-7 qffi 00914AO5700100001-7 25X1 Iran: -C-onfirmatiOn by the Shah of reports that Ali Amini has ge-en appointed prime minister to replace Sharif-Emami, who resigned on 4 May, would indicate an intent to appease elements which have called for reform and an attempt to quiet demonstrations which have been going on in Tehran since 2 May. r is reported to be reluctant to accept the ost. _P ~~~ I 25X1 44- 5 Mav and is a vossible choice for prime minister,"", e - Amin! would, probably attempt a moderate re- formist program, but his success would depend on the extent to which the Shah is willing to support him against the ultra- conservatives, who would oppose any reforms threatening their interests. General Bakhtiar also talked to the Shah on 25X1 6 May 61 DAILY BRIEF iv 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO05700100001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700100001-7 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700100001-7 Approved ForWF The Situation in the Congo According to press reports, Tshombe has been advised that he will not be released until he has guaranteed the par- ticipation of Katanga deputies in parliament. In April, ele- ments of the Congo Army nominally loyal to Gizenga report- edly agreed to recognize General Mobutu's authority in return for a reconvening of parliament as desired by Gizenga. Bomboko may regard a reconvening of parliament as the price which Leopoldville must pay to secure Gizenga's r- ticipation in negotiations aimed at reuniting the Congo. jThe American Embassy in Leopoldville reports that Gizenga has "made long strides" in the past three weeks to increase his parliamentary support. Gizenga appears assured of the sup- port of over 40 deputies of the 136-man lower chamber--a bloc comparable to that controlled by Lumumba during his period as premier. Spaak has to contend with powerful rightist elements in the cabinet which are hostile to any course which might ap- pear to be sacrificing Belgian interests. An aggressive sup- porter of a vigorous pro-Katanga policy, former Defense Minister Gilson has been retained in the cabinet as minister of interior as a concession to the rightist elements among the Social Christians. Another "flight" of Belgians from the Congo would have grave repercussions on public opinion and seriously weaken Spaak's position as foreign minister. I 25X1 25X1 25X1 6 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700100001-7 Approved For'Jelease 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00I5700100001-7 25X1 North Korea Seeks Contacts With the South The Seoul University league for national unification which Pyongyang states proposed North -South student talks, claims to have affiliated organizations on a number of South Korean campuses but probably speaks for only a small minority of leftist-inclined students. However, the failure of the "April revolution" of 1960 to provide anticipated economic improve- ments has increased public interest in reunification as a solu- tion for the country's ills: Aware of this interest, North Korea is conducting an in- tensive propaganda campaign around the reunification theme. Boasting of its economic progress in the past few years, Pyongyang bombards the South with offers of economic assist- ance and calls for a wide range of contacts as preliminary steps toward reunification. Pyongyang has sought to make Seoul responsible, in the eyes of the Southern population, for thwarting these overtures. Responsible South Korean government and opposition leaders have been strongly opposed to any form of exchange with the Communists and probably prefer to avoid any ini- tiative on reunification. Last November, however, the Chang Myon government showed some willingness to take a more flexible position toward North-South contacts in order to con- vince the public it was moving in a reasonable manner to satisfy desires for reunification. 6 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700100001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700100001-7 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700100001-7 Approved Fo Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005 00100001-7 25X1 - p Libyan Cabinet Shake [Three of the six new cabinet appointees were drawn from the House of Deputies' Committee on Finance and Economy, the body which would have been most likely to attack the executive branch effectively on the corruption issue. These appointments are presumably a continuation of Uthman's maneuvers to frag- ment the opposition in the House of Deputies which.brought about the fall of the Kubar government last October. The charges then centered on bribes and other irregularities in the government's handling of the costly Fezzan road project. In spite of the past scandal, both he and King Idris are insistent that construction. of the Fezzan road be continued by the same Libyan firm and on much. the same basis as originally planned he government is also extremely vulnerable because of the crudity of the favors, granted by top officials in response to bribes from a few of the many Western-owned oil companies operating in Libya. In March, for example, the government unexpectedly opened several concession areas, accepted the applications of two companies which had paved the way with appropriate largesse, and immediately closed the bidding. In a more open and "legal" fashion, federal officials have worked with. Libyan provincial governments to obtain large spe- cial payments from companies in connection with pipeline rights-of-way. Public resentment has rapidly increased and tends to be directed against the Western oil industry as well as against venal Libyan officials 25X1 6 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700100001-7 Approved Fo- Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 700100001-7 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700100001-7 ~ii~i. Approved Fo eleas/1Sr -00975A005700100001-7 - / TOP SECRET , pprove or a ease -