CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005700120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 9, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

/ 17
a Approved Foss,~eleasel0f'4/1$E T00974AO05700120001-5
25X1
9 May 1961
Y 25X1
opy NO.
100
169 stli!
State Dept. review completed
/
25X1
I yr JGVRG
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700120001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700120001-5
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700120001-5
 1/o 4 Approved Faf.Pelea
2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975;009-M6120001-5
9 May 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
25X1
VON
5. Iran: New prime minister lifts press control; plans
to punish several officials for corruption. (Page t t t)
6. Morocco: Oassan 11 criticized both by supporters
and by left-wing opposition. (Page tit)
7. Jordan: Adverse domestic reaction to Husayn's en-
gagement. (tv)
8. Great Britain: Two key trade unions express sup-
port for Labor leader Gaitskell's pro-NATO policy.
(page tv)
9. Venezuela: President Betancourt calls for economic
austerity program. (Page tv)
10. De Gaulle attempts to put Algerian situation in
perspective. (page v)
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO05700120001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700120001-5
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700120001-5
 j Approved i- ele se 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975 005700120001-5
Iran; : Prime Minister Ali Amini believes his main task 25X1
in the immediate future is to produce some concrete benefits
for the public to forestall a. "red revolution." Meanwhile, he
has lifted press control, and instructed the various security
organizations to limit their activities to their proper spheres
of responsibilities. Amini hopes to prosecute and punish sev- /,
eral highly placed officials, including military, for corruption,
and the special courts being formed for this purpose will be
established in about two weeks. Radio Moscow has reported
factually on the situation but the Soviet-controlled clandestine
radio National Voice of Iran continues its attacks, insisting
that a change of cabinet is meaningless and that the Shah's re-
gime must be overthro ~`=.:.
Page 5)
25X1
Morocco: The delegation by King Hassan iI of his powers
as president of the council of ministers to the chief of his per-
sonal cabinet, Ahmed Reda Guedira, is another indication that
the King intends to continue his personal and absolute rule for
some time. Both the Istiglal party, the major political organ-
ization supporting the King, and the left-wing opposition Na-
tional Union of Popular Forces have criticized the King's action.
9 May 61
DAILY BRIEF
0 /<
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700120001-5
 0--
Fd rtele se 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79TO09 5700120001-5
Approved
j
The press is speculating that a. cabinet reshuffle may be. im-
minent, A new flare-up of violence involving the left-wing
Moroccan Labor Union and its Istiqlal-created rival, the Gen-
eral Union of Moroccan. Workers, has also contributed to the
25X1
25X1
Congress on 5 May is a comprehensive effort by President
Betancourt to restore business confidence and halt the deterio
separate trade union, votes last week a strong trend of support
ings become more. apparent to him he may possibly consider
abdication ~^
F
Rritain? IFi'ha Amarinan Fi'.mhaaav in Tnnrinn canna in two
growing. instability in Morocco.
Page. 6)
Jordan: Reaction in Jordan to King Husayn's announcement
on 1 May of his engagement to a British girl has ranged from
dismay to anger, with a number of Jordanians predicting that
this "ill-advised" step will lead to the King's "finish." Husayn's
authority is such that he probably can proceed with his marriage O k
plans in the face of a sullen. but not openly rebellious people.
The American ambassador nevertheless believes the. danger to
the King's position. is real and, that as the depth of adverse feel-
for Labor Party leader Hugh Gaitskell's pro-NATO policy, and
against the position of last year's Labor party conference call-
ing for British unilateral nuclear disarmament. The votes of
these two. unions should be more than enough to bring the an-
nual party conference this fall back into line with the party's
leadership on defense issues and should help repair the party's
popular standing. Some trade union. elements who support
Gaitskell's pro-NATO policy, however, continue to oppose US
air and naval nuclear bases in Britain
25X1 (Backup, Page 9)
Venezuela: The economic austerity program presented to
ration in Venezuela's financial situation. The government,
which has been under strong pressure from both rightist an
measures. The new program calls for a 10-percent reduction
to financial expedients instead of politically unpopular remedf
Communist-leftist elements, had thus far generally resorted
DAILY BRIEF
9 May 61
1.
bK
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700120001-5
 NONE ................................................. ....... - --
Now
Approved Fdtjkele~sse 2C 3/04/17: CIA-RDP79'TOO h0120001-5
TOO
I al
0
25X1
25X1
in salaries of public employees, increased taxes which do not
affect the key foreign-owned oil industry, and a reduction in
expenditures of the gove rnment- owned economic enterprises
now operating at a substantial loss.
25X1
*France -Algeria: De Gaulle's 8 May speech~ which was
partly an eTfort-to set the April military insurrection in per
spective and turn French public attention to the possibilities
of future progress, contained a hint of French official appre-
hension over tension among the European settlers in Algeria.
He appealed to the settlers to "renounce absurd and-agitated
dreams." To reinforce De Gaulle's appeal, units of the French
Mediterranean fleet appeared off Algiers, and the Algiers po-
lice repeatedly broadcast warnings that settlers should not
Y'Play the game of the extremists on both sides.T_ I
De Gaulle's rene7~v_ed offer to negotiate the future of Algeria
with "Algerian elements, primarily those fighting us," was
made against a background of frequent reports that the rebel
government in Tunis is ready to begin whenever the French
set a date. Presumably for tactical reasons, he coupled this
with the usual reminder that France would build a "new Algeria
without the rebels if no agreement can be negrotiate-d--F
25X1
25X1
0
9 May 61
DAILY BRIEF v
gg/,ag
r,j,
, 'I
All
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO05700120001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700120001-5
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700120001-5
 25X1
25X1
Approved F
700120001-5
Ali Amini hopes that the "drastic and spectacular" gestures
which he is planning will impress the public sufficiently to con-
vince them that he is "different" from the other prime ministers.
However, he needs the Shah's cooperation and feels he must work
carefully to prevent the return of the Shah's old suspicions of
prime ministers who try to goverf
(Amini claims he won the Shah's permission.to exercise com-
plete freedom in choosing his cabinet and. in dissolving the Ma.jlis
whenever he considers it desirable... The Shah insisted on re-
taining control of the army, however, and on retention of Gen-
eral Amir-Azizi as minister of the interior. Amini conceded
these points but insisted in turn that he must have a greater voice
in determining the effectiveness of military spending. Amini be-
lieves he has persuaded the Shah that all cabinet ministers will
report to the Shah only through the prime minister, The minis-
ters of war and. interior and the chief of the national police were
specifically singled out by Amini in this regar
Plans of New Iranian Prime Minister 1
cAmini has described the government institutions as "so
packed with incompetents and. so ineffective" that major reor-
ganization is required practically everywhere. His problem is
to assemble a capable group to put the ministries on a proper
working basis without losing the Shah's confidenc7
(Amini's assessment of his country's situation and require-
ments is similar to that of most preceding prime ministers-.
All have been undercut, however, by the intrigues of the Shah,
who attempts to keep any official from becoming too powerful
by constantly playing one against the other. Amini's success
will depend on his ability to isolate the Shah from such private
contacts and, perhaps more importantly, eliminate the cour-
tiers around the Shah who use their relationship with the court
for their own private advantage
25X1
25X1
9 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700120001-5
 Approved Fo elease 2003/04/17 :CIA-RDP79T00975A 05700120001-5
Moroccan King Delegates Certain Powers
[Even prior to the publication on 4 May of the decree dele-
gating certain of the King's powers, Guedira was reported to
be the most powerful man in Morocco after King Hassan II.
Guedira was said in effect to be running the Moroccan Govern-
ment as a result of Hassan's ineffectiveness in performing his
official duties and to be the only person from whom ministers
could obtain decisions. He is believed to have antagonized the
ministers of foreign affairs and interior by making ambassa-
dorial and internal appointments without consulting them. He
is. also widely believed to have "sold out" to the French and to
have extensive financial holdings outside Morocco
The Istiglal daily newspaper Al Alam characterized the
delegation of powers as incompatible with the popular will,
which wanted a government organized on. sounder foundations.
At Tahrir, published by the left-wing National Union of Popular
Forces (UNFP), called for a government based on popular will
and stated that Morocco lives "a year after the great experiment
began, in constitutional anarchy under the dictatorship of an ir-
responsible and corrupt administration which is submitted to
neither ministerial nor governmental control."
The Istiqlal-sponsored General Union of Moroccan Workers
(UGTM) has the avowed purpose of liquidating the left-wing
Moroccan Labor Union (UMT), which is aligned with and forms
the base of the UNFP. The far superior strength of the UMT,
however, was evident during the separate parades staged by the
two groups in Casablanca and Rabat on May Day. Just prior to
May Day the Rabat regional chief of the UMT informed an em-
bassy official that his organization was "ready for a test of
strength." The King, while apparently unwilling either to en-
dorse the;UGTM or challenge the strength of the UMT, publicly
deplored the division in the ranks of labor and expressed a hope
that next year would see a "rediscovery of unity and harmony."
9 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700120001-5
 Approved Fo Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 700120001-5
Jordanian Reactions to n usayn s Engagement
cng Husayn is not yet aware of the depth of adverse
feeling among the Jordanian people about his betrothal to
Antoinette Gardiner, the daughter of a British military ad-
viser in Jordan. American Embassy personnel have hardly
been able to locate a single Jordanian who approves or is
even neutral regarding the King's decision, Even the simu-
lated public display of well-wishing has fallen short of the
minimum that might be expected as rudimentary courtesy to
the Monarch. Instead, the ambassador reports, "there has
been a relative and pointed silence in the land.
CIn nongovernment circles there is strong criticism of the
government for not having prevented the engagement or re-
signed when the announcement was made. In addition, there
is a general feeling that the King's efforts toward a rapproche-
ment with the UAR were patently deceitful- -an attempt to win
favor with the people before announcing his controversial wed-
ding plan
The US ambassador believes that as the present state of
shock passes, opposition.to Husayn's decision may take more
concrete and collective form. A member of the Baath party
9 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700120001-5
 25X1
Approved Fctm Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 700120001-5
[f Jordan has said that he knows of no present Baath plans
to exploit the situation, but that "of course" the party eventu-
ally will, and. the first occasion might be at the time of the
wedding itself. On 8 May it was announced officially that the
wedding probably will be on or about 25 May, Jordan's Inde-
pendence Day
25X1
9 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700120001-5
 Approved F4
British Labor Party's Defense Policy
Two of Britain's largest trade unions, the 890,000-member
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) and the 354,000-member
Union of Shop, Distributive, and Allied Workers (USDAW) voted
last week ? to support Gaitskell's policy .of continued loyalty to
NATO with the US supplying the nuclear deterrent. Both of these
were among the four major trade unions which voted in favor of
unilateral British nuclear disarmament at the party conference
last October where the Gaitskell policy was defeated by 297,000
in a total vote of 6,381,006
[The American Embassy in London considers it unlikely that
these reversals will affect the unilateral. stand of the Transport
and General Workers Union (TGWU) --Britain's largest--but be-
lieves it could influence the votes of the railwaymen whose "uni-
lateralist" stand last year passed by an extremely narrow. mar-
gin. Last week the union's executive voted to support the Gait-
skell policy. Both the TGWU and the railwaymen will vote on
the issue in Jul
Even if all other unions, Labor party constituencies, and
the a ied Cooperative party reaffirm last year's stands, how-
ever, the AEU and USDAW switch, involving more than a mil-
lion votes, would be more than enough to reverse the votes. to
be taken by the Trades Union Congress and Labor party confer-
ences this fall. This should greatly ease Gaitskell's problems
of keeping the Labor party members in Parliament pledged to
collective security, undercutting the dissident campaign against
him as party leader, and presenting the party as a cohesive
organization
fnother resolution approved by the USDAW may presage
new trouble for Gaitskell, however, and will furnish more am-
munition to the neutralists. This calls for "an end to the need"
for American nuclear bases in. Europe and Britain and opposes
the basing of Polaris missiles in British waters. The official
position of the party leadership states that for the present
British soil must be available for US and NATO bases, with-
out mentioning whether nuclear wea ons should be allowed on
theni7
9 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 9
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700120001-5
 25X1
Approved F elease 2003/04/17 :CIA-RDP79T00975A0 5700120001-5
Venezuela's Economic Problems
Venezuela has suffered four consecutive years of unbal-
anced budgets totaling about $1 billion. The deficit for the
fiscal year ending 30 June may amount'to $300,000,000, or
only about $20,000,000 less than the preceding year. The
government has been largely ineffective in its efforts to halt
the decline of foreign exchange reserves which began in early
1958, and there has been a considerable flight of capital from
Venezuela. Reserves have fallenfrom $1.38 billion at the end
of 1957 to about $600,000,000 at present, and the latter figure
does not account for about $330,000,000 of medium- and short-
term loans for which foreign exchange must eventually be pro-
vided.
The previous minister of finance resigned in March after
only four months in office, largely because he had failed to
obtain cooperation from the rest of the cabinet in his economic
program. he present minister, Andres Otero, who apparent-
ly also has orthodox economic views, advised Ambassador
Sparks last month that he was "alarmed" by the financial con-
ditions he discovered on taking office?
Strong. political considerations are the primary factor in
the Betancourt regime's reluctance to apply austerity measures,
1such as dismissing about 20,000 government employees whom
the finance minister regards as excess The level of unem-
ployment is dangerously high in Caracas--focal point of po-
litical violence since the overthrow of the Perez Jimenez dic-
tatorship in January 1958. Moreover, Betancourt's Democrat-
ic Action party has a socialist program which makes political-
ly inadvisable the application of purely economic remedial meas-
ures in a.number of public economic enterprises, including the
petrochemical and steel institutes, the air, rail, shipping, and
.telephone lines, the hotel chain, and credit organizations. Most
of these run large deficits, possibl exceeding a total of $100, -
000,000 annually. According to the American Em-
bassy in Caracas, the government's agrarian credit bank alone
lost $90,000,000 during the past two years. Nationalist feelings
9 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 10
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700120001-5
 Approved F
about these corporations were indicated by the strong and ex-
tended opposition to the Betancourt-supported contract with a
private foreign firm which assists in management of the gov-
ernment steel. institute.
According to the American Embassy in Caracas, the gov-
ernment's restrictive policies toward the foreign-owned oil
industry, which contributes the bulk of government revenues,
have been partly responsible for the sharp decline in reinvest-
ment in the industry each year since 1958 and have probably
frightened away potential investors in other fields. Betancourt
and his minister of mines and hydrocarbons have frequently
said that no further private development of Venezuelan mineral
and petroleum resources will be permitted. They have also in-
dicated that the government's objective is to extend control over
oil industry operations, including pricing and price discounts
on crude oil sales, and to reach international governmental
agreements on sharing markets and controlling prices with
other major oil exporting countries.
Betancourt's timing of the austerity program is probably
attributable in part to a belief that his regime is in. a stronger
political position than previously after suppressing frequent
leftist violence and rightist plotting during the past eight months.
The. program is also designed to obtain favorable consideration
of a Venezuelan request for extensive US aid, which is under
negotiation. Moreover, Betancourt may have almost exhausted
the financial expedients which have been available to him, and
further recourse to such action would probably have undercut
his moderate and conservative political support, reduced his
ability to apply corrective measures subsequently, and worsened
adverse economic conditions.
25X1
25X1
25X1
9 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 11
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700120001-5
 Approved Foif Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO95700120001-5
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700120001-5
 Approved For eas a/1$ E T0097 5700120001-5
TOP SECRET