CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005700130001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 10, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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10 May 1961
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10 May 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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2. Iran: New prime minister announces cabinet.
(Page tt)
6. Morocco: Labor difficulties at American air bases.
(Page itt)
7. Brazil: Economic agreement with Rumania marks
beginning of trade expansion with bloc, (Page t v)
9. USSR-Berlin: Change of Soviet Berlin, commandants
suggests effort to play down quadripartite functions
in Berlin. (rage v)
10. Conclusions of Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin
Situation. (rage v)
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Iran: :The nine new members of Prime Minister Ali
Amin-iscabinet appear generally less experienced and capable
than their immediate predecessors. All have had some gov-
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and interior, at the insistence of the Shah. Two posts remain
unfilled]. The new appointees, however, probably owe their
primary allegiance to the prime minister rather than to the
Shah.
*On 9 May the Shah dissolved both houses of parliament
and called for new elections under revised electoral laws.
ernment experience, mostly at a rather low level. Two of
them have past histories of ass ciation with the Communists,
although not in recent years. Four ministers were held over
from the previous cabinet, two of them, the ministers of war
(Backup, Page 3)
10 May 61
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with new opportunities to
and all Moroccan political parties
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BRIEF
10 May 61 DAILY
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who have struck three times within a month for higher wages
and other benefits, are reported to be considering new pres-
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Morocco: Moroccan workers at the American air bases ,
sures to gain their objectives. The base union, which is
subordinate to the leftist Moroccan Labor Union, is consider-
ing "embargoing"- -through strikes of transportation workers
--the passage of US military materiel through Casablanca
Such action on the part of the workers would provide the press
port and harassing US military personnel and dependents.
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reiterate their demands for an accelerated withdrawal of
American forces in Morocco, now scheduled for completion
by the end of 1963.
and is scheduled to conduct economic talks with the rest of the
equipment. The Brazilian mission which negotiated this agree-
F/M
ment has also concluded trade pacts with Albania and Bulgaria
Soviet Bloc - Brazil: The Rumanian-Brazilian economic
agreement signed in Bucharest on 5 May marks the beginning
of a significant expansion in bloc economic relations with
Brazil. The five-year trade pact calls for total trade of: at least
$64,000,000 annually--an amount exceeding Brazil's current
trade with any bloc country. In addition, under the agreement
Rumanian trade agencies may grant credits up to a total of
$50,000,000 to finance deliveries of oil and chemical industry
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trade delegation has arrived in Brazil.
I AN
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1 V LVA"Y W .L Li~iL i JJZ .L J:ri 1 V
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sponsibilities deriving from the occupation status of the city.
USSR-Berlin: Mayor General a arov s replacement
Colonel Solovyev as the USSR's Berlin commandant will--un-
less Solovyev is promoted- -reduce the Berlin command to the
level of other Soviet city garrisons in East Germany, which
are customarily headed by colonels. Solovyev's rank and the
circumstances surrounding this shift suggest the USSR is con-
tinuing to dissociate itself from the four-power control mech-
anism in Berlin and may have decided to strip its Berlin
Kommandatura of its special quadripartite functions and re-
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CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
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covered by this report.
2. There have been no significant developments adversely
affecting access to Berlin and East Berlin during the period
The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached
by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situa-
tion for the period 11 April 1961 through 8 May 1961:
1. There are suggestions in Soviet and bloc official
statements that the USSR is preparing the ground for a for-
mal diplomatic initiative on the Berlin problem and that.the
Berlin situation will become increasingly spotlighted in the
coming months. The Soviet call for a resumption of negotia-
tions could come at any time. Khrushchev himself, however,
used a 24 April conversation with West German Ambassador
Kroll to offset any impression that he felt committed to a
showdown on Berlin before the Soviet party congress in Octo-
ber, thereby extending his previously vague but implicit
"deadline" of not waiting for the West German elections in
September.
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New Iranian Cabinet
Prime Minister Amini gave in to the Shah's insistence
tha eneral Naqdi be retained as minister of war and General
Amir-Azizi as minister of the. interior. Both Naqdi and Amir-
Azizi are capable officers with whom Amini feels he can work.
Amini had, however, earlier demanded that he be free to choose
his cabinet without interference; his apparent willingness to
compromise on this point may indicate. the extent to which he
is willing to go to remain prime minister, as well as a reali-
zation that the Shah is not likely to tolerate any interference
with the army. In 1953, the attempt by Mossadeq, then prime
minister, to take over control of the army was a turning point
in his relations with the Shah and one of the major factors
which led to his downfall
(The new minister of justice, Nur ed-Din Alamuti, was
once a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist
Tudeh party, but he claims he broke with that party in 1946.
Minister of Industry Gholam Ali Farivar, although apparently
not a Tudeh member, has supported and been supported by the
Tudeh in the past. Minister of Agriculture Hassan Arsenjani
has been described by various sources as a leftist, but there
is no evidence that he was ever a Tudeh member, and :he has
in the past publicly opposed the Tudeh. Arsenjani has, how-
ever, frequently been associated with groups opposed to the
monarchy The overall composition of the cabinet suggests
an attempt by Amini to establish a balance between.. right and
left and thus prevent the pressure on him from either side
from becoming too strong.
The Iranian constitution requires that elections for a new
parliament must begin within a month after dissolution of the
previous parliament, New elections would give Amini an op-
portunity to establish a parliamentary base of power, He had
earlier been reported reluctant, however, to hold new elections
until he had an opportunity to make some progress in other
areas. The Shah, in his decree, said that a new electoral law
must be drafted before new elections are held, and it is probable
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that the one-month time limit for starting new elections may
be ignored. It is also not clear whether parliament was dis-
solved on the initiative of the Shah or the prime minister. If
the move was made without Amini's consent--which seems
unlikely--a strong reaction from Amini, possibly even his
resignation, can be expected.
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Moroccan Workers at American Bases Consider New
Pressure Tactics
Leaders of the United States Baseworkers' Association,
established in 1956 and affiliated with the left-wing Moroccan
.Labor Union (UMT), have been agitating for several months
for wage increases and other benefits. Their control over
.Moroccan workers at the bases has been demonstrated in a
.series of increasingly effective strikes within the past month.
.A one-hour sit-down strike was held on 7 April when strike
leaders also threatened a demonstration in front of the US
Embassy. Subsequently, on 17 April and 3 and 4 May, 24-
hour and 48-hour strikes were called, absenteeism being
nearly 100 percent on 3 and 4 May.
The US Ennbassy anticipated in late April that the left-
wing National Union of Popular Forces and the UMT, which
have been seeking ways to attack the Moroccan Government,
might use the presence of the American bases and alleged
disregard of workers' rights for a convenient and popular
pretext for a "protest and display of muscle:' Full UMT
support of the base workers could lead to placing a cordon
around the bases to interfere with the water supply and oth-
er contractual services, halting the movement of military
material, or refusing to handle US military shipments
through the port of Casablanca.
The Istiqlal party press, particularly since the announce-
ment early in March that France had speeded up the sched-
ule for evacuation of its troops, has been pressing the gov-
ernment to obtain an accelerated schedule for American
withdrawal. Conversely, however, representatives of the
Istiglal-dominated union on 24 April maintained that wages
and labor relations on the bases were satisfactory and that
baseworkers' demands were only a "reflection of irrespon-
sible leadership."
Although Moroccan officials suggested a year ago that
e schedule for American evacuation might be stepped up)
King Hassan II implied to an American correspondent in
mid-March that the 1959 agreement would stand.
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Bloc Economic Overtures to Brazil
As in all bloc aid programs, details of the Rumanian
credit must be worked out later. The agreement, however,
is the largest credit arrangement ever offered.by Bucharest
and is the first in which Brazil has accepted substantial. eco-
nomic aid from the bloc. The only previous bloc aid to
Brazil has been in the form of medium-term commercial
credits, amounting to less than $4,000,000 to finance Czech
and Polish exports.
Khrushchev, in a.conversation with the head of the
Brazilian trade delegation now in Moscow, stated that the res-
toration of diplomatic relations between the two countries would
provide a "strong stimulus" for a significant expansion of trade.
Since Quadros was inaugurated, Brazil has expanded its diplo-
matic ties with Eastern Europe to include all the satellites ex-
cept East Germany. These countries now are responding fa-
vorably to Brazil's requests for credits, technical assistance,
and expanded trade. The Brazilian mission touring Eastern
Europe is likely to conclude further aid agreements, and Mos-
cow probably will offer a sizable credit to Brazil. if arrange-
ments are made for the eventual exchange of diplomatic repre-
sentatives.
The Chinese Communist trade delegation now in Brazil is
assessing the opportunities for Sino-Brazilian trade. Peiping's
contacts with Latin American countries, except Cuba, have
been extremely limited. Leftist Brazilian Vice President
Goulart reportedly has said he will visit China in June to "for-
malize" the trade contacts being made now. The Chinese prob-
ably envisage the conclusion of a.trade agreement as a prelude
to political recognition.
The initiation of a Soviet bloc aid program in Brazil will
serve to promote bloc interests far better than normal trade
contacts, which in Brazil have not proved particularly success-
ful.. Bloc-Brazilian trade rose moderately last year to nearly
$150,000,000--some 6 percent of Brazil's foreign trade. Poland
and Czechoslovakia accounted for more than half this amount,
while the USSR's share increased to nearly 20 percent. Despite
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the increase, however, the goals of the major trade agree-
ments with the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia were not
met. Any significant expansion of trade depends on the bloc's
willingness to accept greater amounts of coffee, cacao, iron
ore, and other raw materials from Brazil. Bloc credits will
facilitate long-term trade while adjustments are made to ac-
commodate greater bloc purchases of these products.
Brazil's poor prospects for increasing its exports sub-
stantially--accentuated by the world's surplus of coffee--are
prompting the country to explore bloc relations in the hope
of stimulating new markets. Brazil is expected to produce
40,000,000 bags of coffee in the 1961-62 crop year, while
recent exports and internal consumption have come to only
25,000,000 annually.
The Quadros administration is also negotiating for for-
eign aid from the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and
the International Monetary Fund on a far more extensive scale
.than from the bloc. The Brazilian mission which is touring
Eastern Europe has also concluded a trade and aid agreement
with Yugoslavia.
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Soviet Commandant in Berlin Transferred
Maj. Gen. N. F. Zakharov, former Soviet commandant
in Berlin, left the city on 30 April for transfer to an undis-
closed post. He departed without making the usual formal
calls on his opposite numbers. US Commandant Osborne
first learned of Zakharov's departure on 1 May when. an
officer at the Soviet Kommandatura in Karlshorst called to
say that Zakharov would not be able to receive Osborne the
following day. Osborne had wanted to take formal leave prior
to his own departure for another assignment.
Zakharov, who took over the Berlin post in February
1958, had been absent in recent weeks on sick leave. His
political adviser, Lt. Col. Odintsov, also slipped out of
town, apparently in late March, without taking formal
leave of his Western opposite numbers.
Soviet Ambassador Pervukhin in East Berlin presum-
ably would take over certain functions now exercised by
the Soviet commandant- -notably contacts with Western
occupation authorities- -while other functions would be
transferred de facto to East German authorities in East
Berlin. Such a move was foreshadowed last December
when Pervukhin told US Ambassador Dowling that he,
Pervukhin, was solely competent in matters of Soviet-
American interest in Berlin. He further declared that
the Soviet commandant was in. no sense a sector command-
er, , on ~a. par with the US commandant, but was merely
head of the Soviet garrison in East Berlin.
From the USSR's viewpoint, downgrading the com-
mandant's post would tend to underline East Germany's
"sovereignty" over the Soviet sector andmould leyetan-
other step toward the formal incorporation of East Ber-
lin in East Germany. _F I
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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