CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A005700240001-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
17
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 1, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 23, 1961
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A005700240001-2.pdf819.76 KB
Body: 
i i ii 4 Approved Fgeleas/2S~~1~T00&7005700240001-2 25X1 23 May 1961 25X1 Copy No. C 8 0 IUD Lim man 25X1 State Dept. reviewA uqg etb or Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700240001-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700240001-2 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700240001-2 Aooroved Fd (ease 2002/10/22 CIA-RDP79T00975A0 5700240001-2 23 May 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN j CONTENTS 25X1 2. South Korea. (Page ii) 3. Burma: Government campaign against an and Karen separatist movements. (Page iii) 4. Cyprus: Communist influence in organized labor movement. (Page tit) 5. South Africa: Government taking further security measures in attem t to revent non-white demonstra- p p tions. (Page ii a 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700240001-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700240001-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700240001-2 25X1 E i P j ~nnmvurl F F Rulnacu ~flll~/7 A/70/22 7 : CIA-RDP79T l:14RfIP]QT Approved Release 2002/1 4ZLf1115]flll005700240001~dflllfll _2 91- 25X1 South Korea: South Korea's revolutionary government is still consolidating its power and neutralizing elements which might oppose it. Colonel Kim Chong-pil,who is reported to be the principal adviser of the coup strongman, Major Gener- al Pak Chong-hui, told an American official on 22 May that everyone involved in the new regime has been too busy with internal affairs to pay much attention to relationships with the United States. He asserted that the United States should not be concerned, since the revolutionary leadership was anti- Communist and pro-US. The officer said that this was true despite the resentment engendered by statements of American officials in Seoul on 16 May, which had urged support of the former Chang Myon government CThe adviser to Pak admitted that military command prin- ciples in relation to the UN Command had been violated, but said that the intent was to make the relationship between South Korean military forces and the UN Command as close as in the past. He said the leadership feels that Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Chang To-yong has too many duties in the present arrangement--he is chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, head of the cabinet, and minister of defense--and that a new chief of staff should be ap- pointe Interservice rivalries and tension between the senior and the more numerous junior officers of the revolutionary leader- ship are continuing. The marines and paratroops in Seoul are reported to have refused on 21 May to obey an order by Chang To- on t Backup, age 23 May 61 DAILY BRIEF ii IQ, 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700240001-2 Approved F onroved elease 2002110/22 :CIA-RDP79T0 975A00570024000105700240001-2 2 %~' F elease 2002/10/22 :CIA-RDP79T0 80- 25X1 IWIMA 25X1 25X1 Cyprus: Relations between the Greek and Turkish com- munities remain strained, frith activists on both sides report- edly seeking arms and preparing for a possible breakdown of the Cypriot Agreements which established the present govern- men . These political problems, and chronic economic diffi- culties facing President Makarios' government, have recently 25X1 been compounded by a deteriorating situation in the organized labor movement. A Communist was recently chosen as the workers' representative in the Cypriot delegation to the June conference of the International Labor Organization. Simulta- neously, the island's largest labor federation not already dom nated by the Communists elected as its head an ineffective personality who appears to be falling under Communist influ- ' ence. (Backup, Page 7) Burma: Although there has been an over-all decline in insurgent activity during the past decade, the Shah and Karen separatist movements in the eastern part of the country have gained momentum since U Nu resumed the premiership last year. These movements, which have no strong ties with each other, are suspected by Rangoon of having obtained arms and recruits from the evacuating Chinese Nationalist irregulars. The government reportedly is now planning to expand its cam- 25X1 ai n against them, despite the onset of the rainy season South Africa: The Verwoerd government has increased its security precautions as a result of a continuing threat of non- white strikes and demonstrations. An inter-racial committee heavily infiltrated by Communists, has called on non-European workers to stay at home on 29 and 30 May, in protest against the Union's assumption of republic status on 31 May. The gov- ? K ernment, which earlier had ordered several non-white and liber- al European leaders to refrain from attending political gather- ings, on 19 May imposed a sweeping ban on all meetings until 26 June. Four militia units and a number of Citizen Force units have been called up, and arrests of Black Africans in the last few days probably total more than a thousand. Foreign 25X1 23 May 61 DAILY BRIEF iii 25X1 i% Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700240001-2 Approved Fcel 25X1 00911005700240001-2 Minister Louw recently told Ambassador Satterthwaite that 25X1 25X1 the government hopes these measures will prevent sfiootings such as that at Sharpeville last spring, Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700240001-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700240001-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700240001-2 Approved Fo`%Rele South Korea 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Apprehension appears to be growing among civilians who originally supported the coup or were apathetic to the overthrow of the Chang Myon government over the adoption of increasingly repressive tactics by the revolutionary leaders. to adopt a position of complete endorsement of the new regime and give a distorted picture of American reaction implying that Washington supports the revolution. some 3,000 persons have been arrested, but it is unclear how many are hoodlums and criminals and how many are political offenders. Most newspapers have been forced Meanwhile, new Foreign Minister Kim Hong-il appears to be attempting to allay American concern regarding the 23 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700240001-2 25X1 25X1 Approved Foe ase 2002/10/22: CIA-RDP79T0097 005700240001-2 revolutionary government. At his first press conference Kim gave assurances that the new government's foreign policy will not differ basically from that of the Chang Myon adminis- tration. He added that negotiations would be continued for the normalization of South Korean Japanese relations and that the new regime opposed the "march North" unification policy of the old Rhee government. Kim is a former South Korean am- bassador to Nationalist China and a retired lieutenant general. He is believed to be strongly anti-Communist and to favor an authoritarian government similar to that of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan. 25X1 Peiping's People's Daily, in an editorial of 21 May, claims the US "stage-managed the coup" and labels the coup leaders "fascist." Pyongyang has broadcast reports of atrocities al- legedly perpetrated by US personnel and has depicted the coup as a US-sponsored effort to "force more unbearable calamities on the South Korean eo le." 25X1 25X1 23 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700240001-2 Approved Forease 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975700240001-2 25X1 92 96 100 C H I N A BHUTAN ?V': i 1 S K A C H I N INDIA ( ( STATE r (^ 1 ~1 P AKISTAN r l t , C H I N A ~o ?, ( 1 '~ Zlyi'1~Y MANDALAY ~ HI LL SPE ~~ L I A f C ,r Nl r' e~ti~,t ~? ~;, olvlslo ~i. r ..~ S H ANi STA~~, ?. C . LAOS ~ ! > ti r 9 20 HJRONGA I.,:: - -~ J=~ 20 ~ RAMREE \ K A CHEDIRA I~?- Z l {~; ` f3 :1 I ~ ~~ THAILAND 1 li E N CAL RANGOON. ( y 16 ,,I 'U Ofi 'AiN VfRT i RAY - ^~ . ff 16 PRFPARI: I. BANGKOK ANDAMAN SEA Iz BURMA q ~. 12 MERGUI G('LF / OF AHCHI PI LAGO $ ETHNIC POLITICAL UNITS q 8 1 M KAREN INSURGENT AREA SIA . L k SHAN INSURGENT AREA ? 0 STATUTE MILES 200 Q 31113 ? i 61 0523 91 96 wo 23 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : _ - D - Approved FoAdilb ease 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T009 005700240001-2 Burmese Army to Extend Its Anti-Insurgent Campaign 25X1 25X1 Insurgency in Burma stems primarily from the dislike and distrust of the ethnic minorities in the Burmese highlands for the Burman-dominated government. These groups joined the Burmese Union reluctantly when the British granted inde- pendence in 1948, and the largest minority elements, the Shans, Karens, Kayahs,and Kachins, insisted on separate states drawn along ethnic lines as the price of participation. Since then Rangoon's "Burmanization" policies and the arbi- trary actions of army personnel in the hill country have built up the minority peoples' distaste for the Burmans. In addi- tion to Shan and Karen demands for independence, the non-in- surgent Chin and Arakanese communities--and even the Mons, who are almost entirely absorbed into other ethnic groups-- are demanding statehood for themselves, and the combined minority communities, under the leadership of Burma's for- mer President Sao Shwe Thaike (a Shan prince), are propos- ing a looser federal structure for the Union government. Except among the Shans and Karens, antigovernment mil- itary action has been largely brought under control. The Com- munist forces which revolted in 1947 and 1948 have been re- duced to the status of bandits. The evacuation to Taiwan of over 4,000 Chinese irregulars in April has left a relatively small force of about 1,200 in the country along the Burmese- Thai border. Many of these, although they still reject Bur- mese authority, appear anxious to merge quietly with the local populace. owever, as of early April the Burmese Foreign Office reported that some 500 irregulars had joined the Karen National Defense Organization, and since that time press re- ports of army skirmishes have suggested that Chinese irreg- ulars are collaborating with the insurgents Following General Ne Win's retirement from the prime ministership in April 1960, military pressure against the in- surgents slackened appreciably. Troops were diverted to the China border area on survey and demarcation missions and, later, to the joint campaign with the Chinese Communists against / the Chinese Nationalist irregulars. any of the army's senior-7 23 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700240001-2 25X1 25X1 Approved FoWel 005700240001-2 f --- T officers, who had opposed the return of civilian government, lost their enthusiasm for the struggle against the insurgent The Shan and Karen insurgents took advantage of this respite to regroup and have recently launched strong attacks against overnment-held towns and the Rangoon-Mandalay railway. [The commitment of six of the army's 13 infantry brigades to the suppression of these marauding bands underscores the government's concern with the deterioration of internal secu- rity. However, unless these units are prepared to operate through the rainy season as they did during General Ne Win's administration, the campaign is likel to have little lasting effect 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 23 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700240001-2 25X1 Approved Fo1Ie Cyprus The two basic political problems between the Greek and Turkish communities stem from their leaders' disagreement on implementation of provisions in the Cyprus constitution calling for a 7:3 ratio between Greeks and Turks in the civil service and for separate municipalities for the Turks in the island's five largest cities. The stalemate has caused a sense of frustration within the Turkish community which could lead to more active hostility against the Greek Cypriot majority. Rumors. that members of both communities are smuggling and storing arms and that underground organizations are being formed are causing nervousness. The murder on 13 May of a British citizen in Kyrenia and the subsequent arrest of a former leader of the Greek Cypriot organization EOKA have heightened tension. Both Makarios and the minister of interior, himself a former EOKA leader, immediately denounced the murder. The pos- sibility exists that the act was designed by intransigent former EOKA elements to embarrass the more moderate government. Meanwhile, the government is plagued with substantial unemp oyment and is seeking funds in Britain and the United States for development programs. According to a Greek Cyp- riot weekly newspaper, the government may seek a loan from the USSR if unsuccessful in negotiations with the West The Communists appear to be on the verge of taking over the labor movement. The largest federation on the island is Communist dominated,and it now appears likely that the only other significant Greek Cypriot federation will fall under Com- munist domination or will break into small competing factions. The anti-Communists within the federation and the government were unable to cooperate in supporting an anti-Communist can- didate. 25X1 23 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700240001-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700240001-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700240001-2 Approved Fo Release 2002/10/22: CIA-RDP79T009 05700240001-2 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of.State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700240001-2 Approved ForReleas/2~~11ET00975A005700240001-2 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700240 01--2