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December 15, 2016
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March 3, 2003
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June 13, 1961
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Approved_ ,%r elealf 04SECiM9TOO P-005700420001-2 0001,/ oe4 25X1 I 13 June 1961 25X1 Copy No. C III 10, --- IM Rd - DIA and DOS review(s) completed. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2 Approved Fo elease 2003/04/17 :CIA-RDP79T00975A00 700420001-2 25X1 13 June 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 25X1 2. Dominican Republic. (Page it) 3. Portugal: Salazar indicates only minor reforms to be introduced in Angola. (Page t t 4. France-Algeria.: Comment on Evian talks. (Page t t t) 5. South Vietnam: Communist guerrillas reportedly plan assassination and kidnaping attempts against American.personnel. (Page ttt) 6. Ethiopia: Discontent among educated minority con- t ) tinues. (Page M) 7. Bolivia: Mounting leftist opposition to government crackdown on Communists. (page t v) 8. Argentina: Frondizi's views on inter-American action re Castro. (Page t v) 11 IN j 25X1 j Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700420001-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2 j Approved F r0eleas 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T 09 A005700420001-25X1 25X1 I subsequent Trujillo-type reprisals.( I on. the air force intelligence unit for security services in place of the notorious Military Intelligence Service, which is being shunted into the background if not dismantled. While the. regime apparently considers it advantageous at the moment to restrain its repressive apparatus, its power to exercise dictatorial con- trol has probably not been seriously affected. Most politically aware Dominicans would consider it foolhardy to avail themselves 25X1 of any nolitical liberties unless concretely guaranteed against Dominican Republic: The US consul in Ciudad Trujillo believes tha General am is Trujillo may be able. to maintain control of the armed forces for some time, despite his great unpopularity with many senior officers during his father's life- time. Ramfis is reported to be advancing air force officers with whom he had. been associated in the past and to be. relying 13 June 61 25X1 DAILY BRIEF ii Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2 j Approved For~r~lease 003/04/17 :CIA-RDP79T0 905700420001-2 25X1 I 01 I 25X1 25X1 25X1 ii MEZ I about 8 June, also got the impression that Portugal plans no .i~ General Stikker, who talked with both Salazar and Nogueira 25X1 Portugal: Salazar told British Foreign Secretary Home in Lisbon in late May that it would not be "right" to proceed now with anything beyond minor reforms in Angola. Home reports that Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira was consider- ing sweeping political and socio-economic changes there, but not until after order had been restored. NATO Secretary .reign Minister Couve de Murville has told Am assador Gavin that French and PAG negotiators at Evian have considered each of the major problems in an Ali gerian settlement, but that the talks were going "a little slowly." Representatives for both sides emphasize the need to continue the talks, but both now seem to be acting on the assumption that the current talks at Evian will recess on 20 June. Acts of vio- ence continue in Algeria and France, and anti - De Gaulle of violence" in the near future to provoke clashes between Europeans in Algeria are reportedly plotting a "major stroke Europeans, Moslems and the French Army] *South Vietnam: [Several recent reports suggest that Amer- ican personnel will increasingly become targets of assassina- tion and kidnaping by the Communist Viet Cong movement. Viet Cong terrorist activities in the vicinity of Saigon are growing, and there are indications that new actions are being planned for the capital itself Ethiopia: The minor reforms so far introduced by the Emperor since the unsuccessful coup attempt against him last December have not satisfied the country's young, educated ele- 25X1 25X1 ment, which has become completely open in its discontent. Con- servative military and civilian leaders, in an effort to consolidate 13 June 61 DAILY BRIEF iii so 25X1 I F I I Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700420001-2 Approved Fo~~~jj~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A%%oO~5070000~~20000001%%2%%~/~%%%%%%//%%%%%%///%%%%%% 25X1 25X1 25X1 their present dominant position, may be formulating lans to forestall a possible move against the Emperoro 25X1 Bolivia: Extreme leftists are trying to force the govern- ment by strikes, which may be accompanied by violence, to release Communist leaders arrested under cover of the gov- ernment-fabricated coup on 6 and 7 June. President Paz has stated that those arrested will not be released before the end of the 90-day state of siege, which began on. 7 June. The Amer- ican charge in La Paz believes that the next few days will be critical. He believes that the government can probably sur- vive if it is willing to use its armed forces, but that the imme- diate danger is that the government's nerve will fail and it may not follow through on its anti-Communist program. D velopment. He has little confidence in the present ability of the Organization of American States to resolve the Cuban problem. Frondizi and Brazil's President Quadros have agreed that they should pool their efforts to help Paraguay and Bolivia, where present conditions are favorable to Castroism. Quadros, how- ever, is reported to oppose Frondizi's summit proposals and bid for leadership role. Argentina - Cuba: In discussing with Ambassador Steven- son inter-American po _discussing regarding the Cuban problem, Pres- ident Frondizi again urged a meeting of the Presidents of the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and possibly Chile to seek agreement on strategy prior to the mid-July meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in Montevideo. Frondizi believes that a common policy must be devised first on economic, social, and political problems before tackling the Communist and Cuban problems. As an alternative to this pro- posal, Frondizi is prepared to travel through Latin America. and undertake leadership of an anti-Communist campaign, pro- vided what he terms the political risk to himself of such action were reduced by US aid in promoting Argentina's economic de- 25X1 13 June 61 DAILY BRIEF iv N 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700420001-2 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2 French-Algerian Talks at Evian The French foreign minister, in talking with Gavin, char- acterized the Evian discussions as "rather limited and academic. " 25X1 the present plan is to recess the Evian 'talks Approved Fo elease 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A00 Similar pessimism is evident 25X1 on 20 June and then engage in "secret talks"- -presumably else- where and possibly at a different. level--to discover whether there is a basis for successful negotiations] The US Embassy in Paris points out that while a break-off at Evian cannot be ex- cluded, spokesmen on both sides have emphasized the need to continue. The first three weeks of talks have been devoted to an ex- position of respective positions.. The PAG has offered Euro- peans in Algeria a choice of Algerian or French citizenship with guarantees as individuals, but the French are seeking built-in institutional guarantees between the Moslem and non- Moslem communities. The French continue their unilateral cease-fire reluctantly in the face of rising FLN terrorism. The PAG refuses to agree to a cease-fire prior to a political settlement, fearing both that a cease-fire order might not be honored by all its own forces, and that it might be interpreted as "weakness." The French maintain that the disposition of the Sahara is a separate and distinct question from an Algerian settlement, while the PAG holds that the Sahara is an integral part of Algeria. France is pushing for a French-Algerian as- sociation with cultural, economic, and defense ties, but the PAG insists that settlement of the nature and extent of Algerian ties with France must follow the determination of Algeria's status. 25X1 25X1 The lack of progress at. Evian has probably reduced the threat of anti - De Gaulle action b European settlers and I military extremists in Algeria. Nevertheless, 'widespread desperation" among European se ers and plotting by the secret army organization, led by,_ fugitive insurgent Generals Salan and. Jouhoud. Disturbances, 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 13 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For'elease 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05T 00420001-2 25X1 [scheduled for mid-June, are reportedly to be coordinated with similar rightist action in France. While another coup attempt seems unlikely at present, major acts of violence aimed at in- creasing the antagonism of the two parties are likely.? 25X1 25X1 13 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2 Approved For Military and Politica e e opmen s in South Vietnam he American army attache in Saigon reports that a French citizen vacationing at the seashore southeast of Saigon was de- tained on 20 May by Viet Cong troops of the "Liberation Front" and told by a courteous, uniformed officer that they were look- ing for Americans. After his money and other valuables were taken, he was told that an American would have been held as a hostage. A second Frenchman boating on the Saigon River the same week end was similarly detained until he identified him- self as French. According to a third French source, the Chi- nese overseer of a French-owned plantation, raided for "trib- ute" on 18 May, was told by the Viet Cong that American in- stallations, homes, and personnel were their chief targets; that these homes and installations were infiltrated by Viet Cong domestics; and that they would kidnap and attempt to poison American children. The overseer was also told that the Viet Cong would soon launch grenade attacks in Saigon on the level of 1951-1954 resident Diem remains convinced of the need to give pri- ority to military measures to combat the Communist guerrilla and subversive threat and normally commits 75 to 85 of the army's 124 battalions to internal security operations or train- ing, As a first step toward adding a contemplated 20,000 men to his 150,000-man force, he has called up 6,000 reservists, and recently the army has been increasingly aggressive and has reportedly inflicted heavy casualties among the Communist guer- rillas. Nevertheless, the estimated strength of the Communist guerrillas continues to increase and their operations have en- compassed a growing area' any Vietnamese observers remain concerned that Diem's re- luctance to give comparable weight to internal reforms will eventually undermine the efforts to shore up the South Vietnam- ese Government. Although the long-postponed government reor- ganization announced in May gives promise of technical improve- ment, a well-regarded Vietnamese foreign service officer told the American Embassy recently that it offers no change from Diem's present authoritarian methods of rule and had convinced] 25X1 25X1 13 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2 Approved For im and several colleagues to resign. Diem is purging some locally disliked rural officials and is permitting some con- trolled opposition political activity, but he maintains that no real liberalization is possible under present circumstances. However, unless tangible improvement is demonstrated, the prospect of prolonged insecurity and continued harsh controls may encourage new plotting against Diem or his government and the growth of sentiment for political accommodation with the Communists? 25X1 25X1 25X1 13 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2 25X1 . Approved F4 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Disaffection and Plotting in Ethiopia Since last December's coup attempt, Emperor Haile Selassie has relied chiefly on conservative officials of proven loyalty and has made few changes to mollify the discontent which led to the uprising. The only major reform to date has been the appointment on 14 April of a prime minister; the Em- peror had previously held this office himself. The Emperor also exhorted government officials not to refer all important matters to the palace. This change has not significantly af- fected the government's lethargy and inefficiency; moreover, civilian morale has deteriorated as a result of a salary cut which the regime decreed in early May to provide funds for a military pay increase. I- I a conservative group in- cluding Defense Minister Merid, interior Minister Abye, and Senate President Asrate Kassa is planning some sort of polit- ical-military action. Merid and Abye were instrumental in the suppression of the December revolt; however, they have little popularity either among the troops or with the populace. The plotters apparently hope to gain control over the Emperor's successor. F _j has them working with Crown Prince Asfa Wossen to depose the Emperor. their aim is to install the Duke of Harar, now in is ear y teens, as crown prince in place of the notoriously weak Asf a Wossen. [Haile Selassie, who has never liked the present crown prince, may be permitting the plotters to continue their activity in order to make certain of Asfa Wossen's involvement F 25X1 25X1 25X1 13 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2 Approved Fo The Bolivian Strikes Twelve thousand workers are reported on strike in La Paz and miners are out in three major areas. The strikers are de- manding that the President release at least the leaders among those arrested since 7 June under cover of the government- fabricated "Communist coup;' Of those under arrest, the two key figures are probably Irineo Pimentel and Federico Escobar, who have for some years been in the forefront of labor agitation, strikes, slowdowns, and featherbedding at the Twentieth Cen- tury mine, Bolivia's largest tin producer. Vice President Lechin, who was recently re-elected chief of the Miners' Federation, is visiting in Venezuela and has been asked by President Paz to return to Bolivia. Paz on 11 June met with members of the Miners' Federation including Lechin's dep- uty, Mario Torres, and apparently discussed the possible release of the labor leaders. Torres told newsmen that President Paz had flatly refused "to give in one millimeter." In.his move against the Communists, President Paz may have been influenced in part by the ambition he has apparently had since his inauguration in August 1960 to crack down on all opposition forces and to re-establish the personal dominance of Bolivian pol- itics which.he exerted during his first term of office in 1952-56. A recent Argentine offer of more than $1,000,000 in food in re- turn for anti-Communist action was probably also influential. The US charge comments that Paz may also have hoped to neutralize key Communists in order to decrease the political risks of raising the price of gasoline. The International Mone- tary Fund has for some time sought a 50-percent increase in the current domestic price of 13 cents per gallon on the widely used 68-octane grade of gasoline. Alternatively, Paz may have thought that action against the Communists would lessen international pressure on the issue of gasoline prices. 13 June 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 8 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05700420001-2 Approved For - 05700420001-2 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005700420001-2 VIX11,11 ii i~i~iZZ, /Z, /ZZZI /Z, /ZZ i~ii'iiiiiiiii i/ n.,..,...... ....J r.. 1-- T~j2A/oC~"TTnnn Ten ne7nnAnnnnA if TOP.-SECRET Approved For Release 2003/ 4/ - 0 70 4 -