CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005900140001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 25, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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25 August 1961
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State Dept. review completed
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25 August 1961
Bloc may use refugee "Homeland Day" meetings in West
Berlin as pretext for new moves against West German
access to city. (Page it)
OWN
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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2.
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4.
5.
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7.
8.
South Korea: US ambassador foresees showdown between
General Pak and more radical, younger officers. (Page tit)
France: Saharan Affairs Ministry downgraded and Min=
istry for Repatriated Persons established. (Page iv)
UAR: Discontent prevails among Syrians following govern-
mental reorganization centralizing control in Cairo. (Page iv)
Chile: President Alessandri places major industrial areas
under military control to combat wave of strikes. (Page v)
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West Berlin: A planned meeting in West Berlin of West
German re ugee and expellee groups on 1-3 September may
be the occasion for the imposition of East German measures
to bar West Germans from East Berlin and to refuse passage
at the East - West German border to identifiable participants
in the refugee meeting. Such moves, which would probably be
announced in advance as was the case last year, would violate
last December's understanding between Bonn and the East
Germans, consequently risking a breakoff by West Germany
of interzonal trade. East Germany probably expects that sus-
pension of interzonal trade is inevitable, and hence may at-
tach no great significance to risking such reprisal even before
a peace treaty.
The increasing assertiveness of the East Germans and
the tone of the latest Soviet note suggest that the Communists
are planning to maintain a state of high tension in Berlin and
sustain.the momentum of their recent actions. Thus far, how-
ever, Communist propaganda has not focused on the scheduled
meeting.
The refugee meeting might also be the pretext for follow-
ing the Soviet protest note with increased pressure on the West-
ern civilian airlines to accede to East German controls over
their passengers and cargo; while direct physical interference
with air travel appears unlikely because of risk of provoking
a military clash, the. Soviets may temporarily refuse to guar-
antee the safety of civilian flights during the refugee meeting.
25 Aug 61
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South Korea: /Lt. General Pak Chong-hui is almost cer-
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tainly headed fora showdown "sooner or later" with the radical
young colonels in the Supreme Council for National Reconstruc-
tion, according to Ambassador Berger in Seoul. Pak's appar-
ent willingness to accord moderate treatment to officials of the
former regime and to allow a return to civil government in 1963
is strongly opposed by the colonels. While Pak himself is re-
luctant to agree to complete restoration of civilian authority,
he appears to appreciate the disadvantages of imposing harsh
measures on former officials and prolonging military rule.
Ambassador Berger feels that Pak will be able_ to "educate"
the colonels to accept a moderate course "only up to a point,"
and a showdown will follow. The ambassador notes that secu-
rity boss Colonel Kim Chong-pil, whose mandate extends into
the military as well as the civilian o ulation, is the most dan-
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(Backup, Page 6)
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*France. The chief innovations in the 24 August French
cabinet c ges, creation of a Ministry for Repatriated Per-
sons and downgrading of the Saharan Affairs Ministry, will
probably be attacked by De Gaulle's rightist opponents as evi-
dence of an intention. to "abandon. Algeria:' The changes are
not, however, a major political shake-up such as that follow-
ing the January 1960 Algiers insurrection, when De Gaulle
fired Jacques Soustelle and shifted Pierre Guillaumat from
the Ministry of Armed Forces. While the changes seem un-
likely to stem mounting criticism of Premier Debra, they
are not expected
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UAR: The U consul. in Damascug reports a asir s
recent economic decrees and reorganization of the UAR gov-
ernment have brought to Syrians the realization that they are
now faced with "complete and direct rule from Cairo." The
consul reports that discontent is prevalent among various
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levels of Syrians but adds, "to conclude that revolt is in the
offing could not be justified." There is as yet no sign of ac-
tive disaffection in the army, although Syrian army personnel
are reportedly becoming "increasingly detached from and even
hostile to" the numerous E tian officers serving in Syria.
Chile: The conservative government of President Ales-
sandri has placed Chile's major industrial areas. including
the capital under military control as a result of a strike wave
which effects some 120,000 workers and appears to be spread-
ing. Alessandri is seeking to minimize wage increases to save
his economic stabilization program and prevent further infla-
tion. the Communist-dominated leadership of Chile's national
labor organization is reported to be considering a 48-hour gen-
eral strike call. The labor organization's leadership has little
influence with most individual unions and federations, but can
be expected to exploit the present labor unrest in an effort to
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.25 Aug. 61 DAILY BRIEF
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German Refugee Meeting in West Berlin
Although Mayor Brandt has agreed not to address the
refugee and expellee gatherings and West Berlin officials
have urged participants to exercise restraint and avoid the
question of the "lost territories," the Communists may, as
they did last year, choose to consider. the affair a "provoca-
tion."
East Germany used the meetings last September as a
pretext for imposing restrictions on West German civilian
access to West Berlin. From 30 August to 4 September 1960,
approximately a thousand West German delegates were re-
fused access by rail or highway on grounds that use of access
routes by "West German revanchists and militarists" could
not be tolerated. The East Germans also objected to the use
of the Allied air corridors for transporting "revanchists," but
approximately 700 West Germans were flown to West Berlin
at the, expense of the city government without incident.
On 30 September last year Bonn, citing the interference
with the refugee meeting as well as an East. German decree
of 8 September imposing controls on West German access to
East Berlin, served notice that it would not extend the Inter-
zonal Trade Agreement expiring in December, 1960. The
agreement was renewed only after East Germany had given
guarantees of free movement for all persons and goods to and
within Berlin.
Bonn now would consider any interference with West Ger-
man access. to Berlin a violation of these guarantees.
Chancellor Adenauer warned in a speech on 14 August that
Bonn was considering cancellation of its interzonal trade agree-
ment with East Germany and that there would be a complete
trade embargo of the Communist bloc if the Berlin issue could
not be settled. Although the. East Germans threatened on 15
August to cut off West German freight traffic to West Berlin
if Bonn interrupted interzonal trading, Adenauer warned again
the following day of economic sanctions "in the case of a (future)
move against Berlin."
25 Aug 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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South Korea
Lt. General Pak Chong-hui recently told Ambassador
Berger that he was pleased by President Yuri Po-sun's 15 Au-
gust Liberation Day speech--which generally endorsed Pak's
announced timetable for a return to civilian government in
1963 but which expressed the hope that the period of military
rule could be shortened. Pak went on to say that he was well
aware of Colonel Kim Chong-pills view that the military must
maintain control of the new civilian government and that Kim
"was not alone" in this belief. However, he and others on the
Supreme Council for National Reconstruction understood the
danger inherent in such a development and did not share Kim's
view
/Pak explained that in order to keep his position. flexible he
had been intentionally vague in his announcement regarding who
would draw up the new constitution, draft the election laws, and
determine which politicians would be barred from office. He
said. he was considering an independent public commission or
perhaps even a constitutional assembly to deal with these mat-
ters, but that not all members of the Supreme Council were
ready to accept such a procedure. He hoped to be able to an-
nounce some such solution at the appropriate timei
LKim and the other radical colonels reportedly were infu-
riated by the President's public comments on the need for a
return. to free political processes. Kim stated in early August
that the military must watch any new civilian government for
at least five years "to see that everything is going straight."
He said that the junta was considering such devices as having
one military officer automatically elected from each electoral
district to the new legislature; having the Supreme Council re-
main in office for five years to supervise the performance of
the new government; or placing selected officers in the execu-
tive branches of the government as supervisor
Conflicts over preparation for the return to civilian gov-
ernment can be expected to intensify. Factional divisions within
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the ruling group are blurred, but extensive evidence indicates
that Pak must continually overcome strongly divergent views
in maintaining his leadership.
Pak soon will revise the membership o the Supreme ounce in
an attempt to achieve greater unity within both the ruling junta
and the armed force
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Discontent in Syria
The discontent which Consul General Knight has noted in
Syria is directly attributable to the. recent decrees from Cairo.
Landowners and businessmen were long ago disillusioned by
the regime's socialist tendencies, but were still shocked by the
severity of last month's moves toward government domination
of the entire economy. Old-line politicians in Syria probably
see the new centralization of government as the final blow to
their hopes for local autonomy. The new decrees have also
disturbed the middle class by introducing higher income taxes.
Factory workers are concerned over the elimination of over-
time and production bonuses, but this may be ameliorated by
the regime's plans to initiate profit sharing and worker partic-
ipation in management.
The key to the future relationship between Syria and Egypt
may prove to be Abd al-Hamad Sarraj, the only man generally
considered capable of leading a Syrian separatist movement.
Since the 1958 union, Sarraj has moved progressively upward
from Syria's military security chief to UAR vice president in
charge of internal affairs, a.position assigned him in last week's
government reorganization. Sarraj has dominated Syrian af-
fairs as Nasir's strong-arm lieutenant, At the same time,
Sarraj has reportedly been careful to build personal allegiances
to himself, particularly in the Syrian Army.
Intense speculation is going on over the real role Sarraj will
play from his new headquarters in Cairo, with many observers
interpreting the move as designed by Nasir to neutralize a man
who could no longer be trusted to enforce the regime's. Syrian
policy. INasir privately
stated on 18 August that his reason for changing the cabinet was
to get Sarraj out of SyriJ
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Chilean Government Faced With Spreading Strikes
About a quarter of Chile's organized workers are on strike.
They include such key elements as the railway, steel, and cop-
per workers. High school students throughout the country be-
gan a sympathy strike on 23 August.
The government's ability to cope with the strike situation
is weakened by its recent failure to widen its organized polit-
ical backing. Alessandri, who is supported by a rightist
Conservative-Liberal coalition, sought earlier this month to
persuade the centrist Radical party to join his government.
Negotiations failed as a result of thexight's unwillingness to
agree to agrarian and tax reforms and a general tax increase.
The American copper companies,whose strike-bound mines
normally provide most of Chile's foreign exchange income, are
under increasing harassment. Negotiations are apparently al-
most completed for government sale of 60,000 tons of copper
from these companies to the Soviet Union, despite the reluc-
tance of the American firms. The Chamber of Deputies voted
unanimously at a special session on 22 August to appoint a com-
mittee to look into all the activities of the companies and "de-
termine whether their methods of doing business serve the best
interests of Chile:' Communists and other antigovernment
deputies led the debate, accusing the governing Conservatives
and Liberals of supporting the foreign firms= -a charge denied
by the progovernment legislators.
The government has prepared a bill for submission to Con-
gress in September calling for increases in copper production
and in the capacity of copper smelters in Chile and for improve-
ment in workers' housing, The minister of mines suggested to
US Embassy officials in Santiago on 21 August that the com-
panies should reorganize to become Chilean rather than US
companies in the interest of their public and political relations.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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