CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005900290001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 12, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

iii
Z
Approved F'ieleas
MP/15ECRFYTT0094005900290001-5
25X1
i2` September 1961
Copy No., C
d 25X1
IMMMISMIENO
aim
review completed
~/Zlzzz,ii i i i i iii iiii iiii i
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05900290001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05900290001-5
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05900290001-5
 25Atproved Fq el~ase 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T0p9 005900290001-5
12 September 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. USSR-Iran: Moscow continues its pressure on Tehran.
(Page i )
2. Afghanistan-Pakistan: Kabul threatens major policy
change toward increased dependence on bloc. (Page i)
3. Dominican Republic: Despite Balaguer's commitment to
democratization, opposition sees regime as incapable of
changing its character. (Page it)
25X1
0 IN:
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005900290001-5
 \\\\~~ ~O~O~ ~~~~ ~o~ moo o~ o~ o~ oo~o~ oo~ o~ o~ ~~ 000 oo\
N
2proved Fie ase 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T0 9005900290001-5
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
12 September 1961
DAILY BRIEF
6 6
25X1
USSR-Iran: Following Khrushchev's threats against NATO
bases in Greece and Italy and the. Soviet. release, of "LENTO
documents" allegedly revealing plans for nuclear war against
the USSR, Moscow has warned Iran that if it remains allied
with the West, it faces nuclear destruction in any East-West
conflict. In an interview with Iranian Prime Minister Amini
on 8 September, Soviet Ambassador Pegov indirectly threat-
ened strong Soviet action unless Iran withdrew from CENTO.
_Qther Soviet diplomats in Iran have reportedly stated that the
SSR will invoke the 1921 Treaty of Friendship- -which Moscow
claims grants the USSR the right to occupy Iran if Soviet secu-
rity is threatened--in order to forestall CENTO aggressi
Moscow probably believes that the Shah's regime is particu-
larly vulnerable to this kind of intimidation and that the gen-
eral increase in East-West tensions provides a favorable op-
portunity for an attempt to weaken the p pro-Western government
25X1
25X1 in Tehran.
25X1
the bloc and with non-Communist countries. Naim implied that
*Afghanistan- Pakistan: fAian Foreign Minister Naim has
told Ambassador Byroa e t a the Afghan Government has de-
cided to close its borders to shipments coming through Pak-
istan, despite Pakistani assurances that transit trade could
continue. Naim indicated that Kabul would reconsider this de-
cision only if Pakistan allowed the reopening of Afghan consulates
and trade offices in Pakistan. Under questioning from Byroade,
Naim admitted that if Afghanistan persisted in this course of
action, it would no longer be able to balance its relations with
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005900290001-5
 . ,Approved F4t+el ase 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T0 9,74005900290001-5 6
gnanistan was resigned to the loss of major American aid
projects, which depend on the transit route through PakisFa
r
j Such a basic change in Afghan policy would make the Kabul
0 25X1 regime almost entirely dependent on the USSR for continuation
of its development programs. Although the Afghans now seem
j
F read to do t i y h s rather than make an a
eal to Pakistan the
25X1
y
pp
, may merely bgy calculating that a strong display of determina-
tion will persuade the US to put the pressure they feel is re- 25X1
aluir. ed. on Pakistan
o in can a ico sp. rest en er co mi
meet to a program o democratization and national conciliation,
the lines of conflict continue to be sharply drawn between the
government's official political machine and responsible elements
of the opposition. Opposition leaders maintain that the regime
is incapable of changing its basic character as proved by the
continued repression and killings of dissidents in the interior.
They warn that US support for even a partial lifting of OAS
sanctions against the re ire would embitter the majority of
Dominicans against the
y~j
f~'Tfi~ OAS subcomm tee, which arrives in the Dominican
Rep`ttblic today to ascertain whether present conditions warrant
the removal of the sanctions, will encounter. demonstrations
designed to show the wide public support for opposition views.
Some oppositionists may attempt to provoke police reprisals to
demonstrate the lack of political freedom in the county
0
12 Sept 61 DAILY BRIEF
(Backup, Page 2)
25X1
M
M
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005900290001-5
 Approved Fq'
Soviet Threats Against CENTO Members
As part of current Soviet intimidation tactics to heighten
world tension against the backdrop of the Berlin crisis, the
USSR is intensifying pressure on CENTO member countries.
The "CENTO documents" were exhibited at a Moscow press
conference on 18 August, and a TASS declaration published
the following day stressed the inevitability of atomic attacks
on Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan in any conflict between a
CENTO nation and the USSR. Moscow said that CENTO plans
for "creating zones of nuclear destruction" by atomic explo-
sions around the territory of the Soviet Union hold important
implications for members of NATO and SEATO as well and
warned that no "atomic shield" can protect aggressors against
the USSR.
25X1
The USSR displayed photostat copies of the documents at
the Soviet Consulate in Istanbul on 8 September, despite objec-
tions from the Turkish Foreign Office.
Pegov's threat to the Iranian prime mister was repeated
in stronger terms by other Soviet officials who advised Iran
here"
not to take lightly" the USSR's concern over Western military
reparations. They stated that unless Iran leaves CENTO, the
oviets wi occupy Iran to eliminate the threat, and that the US,
hich will "not fight for Berlin, would certainly not intervene
Iran regards as void articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Treaty of.
Friendship which provided that the USSR could move troops into
Iran in the event that bases for operations against: the USSR were
25X1
being established on Iranian territory. Tehran has maintained
that these articles applied only at the time and only to Russian
emigres.
Although the Shah is under pressure from Iranian neutral-
ists to loosen his ties with his Western allies he seems deter-
mined to stand up to current Soviet threats.
25X1
25X1
12 Sept 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005900290001-5
 Approved F Release 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975
because of his liberalization program.
The Situation in the Dominican Republic
The government's political machine, the Dominican party
(P 4,evidently hopes at a convention later this month to name
Joaquin Balaguer its candidate for president in the elections
scheduled for next May. Balaguer, generally regarded as a
man of high personal integrity, has been distrusted by many
oppositionists for having'Ibeen a puppet of the late dictator,
though some oppositionists have recently begun to support him
Whether Balaguer will accept the nomination is unknown,
25X1
present role prohibits him from identifying himself with it.
L Balaguer, who stated early last July that leaders of the
pro- astro Dominican Popular Movement (MPD) would soon
be deported, confidentially disclosed to the American consul
late last month that "the military" had blocked the deportations
for "tactical" reasons. In recent weeks, the MPD has opened
a new headquarters and begun publishing a newspaper, while
the killings and other police reprisals against the opposition
have been limited to action against moderate groups, especially
ally close to the opposition National Civic Union, but tha
but 11e has made it clear that, in his opinion, the next govern-
ment should be a coalition and has publicly condemned "reac-
tionaries" in the party and in the government. The Dominican
party, the personal political vehicle of the late dictator for 31
years, is thoroughly discredited among the literate Dominican
public, and recent party rallies have clearly been staged affairs
which have prompted no spontaneity or enthusiasm from the paid
participants. Though the party can still count on.the votes of
large numbers of illiterate and semi-literate rural workers--
possibly even enough to provide a majority of the electorate--
concern for its deteriorating position might be sufficient to
cause party leaders to make the compromises necessary for
securing Balaguer's candidacy. On the other hand, Balaguer
will probably weigh carefully the adverse effects on his own
reputation of being more closely identified with the discredited
Dominican party. He has I Istated that he feels person-
25X1
25X1
12 Sept 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005900290001-5
 25X1
25X1
Approved F- Release 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975
iallo, president of the UCN, told the American consul on
e widely supported National Civic Union (UCN). Dr. Viriato
7 September that MPD leaders had received financial assist-
ance from General Ramf is Trujillo with the understanding that
they would attack the UCN for having "sold out to Yankee im-
perialism." The MPD did, in fact, launch such attacks during
the last week in August. The MPD attacks were quickly re-
peated by the government's press and radio outlet
It was in the context of a 7 September discussion of the
25X1
MPD-leaders that Luis Mercado, president of the Dominican
party, warned the consul that, as "politics is a two-way street,"
failure of the US to support the Dominican Government "would
have to be taken into account" in determining the government's
policies. He said flatly that the US should know that the. overn
ment has no intention of turning power over to the UCN
25X1
25X1
25X1
12 Sept 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO05900290001-5
 Approved Fob- Release 2003/04/17: CIA-RDP79T00975AP005900290001-5
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/04/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005900290001-5
 Approved For F e%ase7W/1SECRI! ('0097 5900290001-5
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
/ TOD SECRET
/
00,
Approved or a ease - -