CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005900370001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 21, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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21. September 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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4. France=Algeria: Rebels to seek resumption of negotia-
tions with French, (Page iv)
5. Ghana, Opposition pressing Nkrumah to limit Ghana's
ties with bloc and influence of leftists in regime. (Page iv)
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7. South Korea: Seoul to propose negotiations aimed at
settling long-standing difficulties with Japan, (Page v)
9. Watch Committee conclusions, (Page vi)
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France=Algeria-.Leaders of the provisional Algerian
government have indicated that the rebels will ask their
Swiss intermediaries to seek a resumption of negotiations
with the French.j Although both sides seem to desire nego-
tiations, there are indications that the rebels do not feel
as much urgency as the French to reach an early settlement.
Rebel leaders have also indicated uncertainty and suspicion
as to the actual extent of De Gaulle's concessions on the
Sahara, and resumed negotiations could founder on this or
other issues.
(Backup, Page
Ghana. Conservative elements of Nkrumah's regime
led by Minister of Health Gbedemah now appear determined
to force a showdown with Nkrumah over Ghana's increasing
ties with the bloc and the growing influence of certain lead-
ers of the regime's left wing, notably Minister for Presiden-
tial Affairs Adamafio. They are also pressing Nkrumah to
eliminate or modify the new tax and forced-savings measures
imposed in July. These measures have been the main cause
of the wave of strikes which began on 4 September and are
continuing despite Nkrumah's recent personal appeal to the
strikers to return to works
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the moderate and extremist factions at a cabinet meeting the
day before apparently ended in. Adamafio's confirmation in
a new position which will give him direct influence over the
implementation of Ghana's ambitious development program.
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21 Sept 61
DAILY BRIEF iv
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South Korea - Japan: The South Xorean military regime,
acting more vigorously than any of its predecessors to nor-
malize relations with Japan, has instructed its minister to
Japan to propose that formal negotiations be opened by 10 Oc-
tober. Seoul has indicated an increasing realization of the
economic benefits of settling its long-standing difficulties with
Tokyo, although distrust of Japanese intentions runs deep.
The Japanese Government has responded cautiously to Seouls
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21 Sept 61
DAILY BRIEF
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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the United
states Intelligence Board concludes that
CNo Sino=Soviet bloc country intends to initiate direct mil=
itary action in the immediate future
iBerlin East Germany: The East German regime appears
to be entering a period consolidation, intensifying sector
and zonal border security and reinforcing its control of the
population. While minor resistance may continue, the regime
has ample means to suppress any serious outbreaks
South Vietnam- Communist guerrilla forces constitute an
increasing military threat and appear to intend to develop a
major base of operations in the plateau area of central South
Vietnam bordering Laos
21 Sept 61
DAILY BRIEF
vi
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Prospects for Resumption of French-Algerian Negotiations
Abdelkadar Chanderli, the
rebel representative in New York, while confirming to US
officials that the PAG would seek to resume negotiations
"whenever the French are ready," added that the PAG did
not expect them to begin much before the end of October.3
CA member of the French delegation to the UN stated
early this month that he had found the Foreign Ministry in
Paris concerned lest the Algerians not agree to early re-
newal of the talks. Minister for Algerian Affairs Joxe told
a US Embassy. official on 13 September that he considered it
might still be possible to resolve the Algerian matter in a
"normal way, by negotiation," but at the time did not think
the rebels were in any hurry to start talks. He also thought,
however, that there is a possibility the rebels may facilitate
French efforts to inaugurate a transition of power in Algeria
by giving the "green light" to Moslems to be appointed to the
proposed provisional executive body. Joxe was somewhat pes-
simistic, partly because he felt that De Gaulle's 5 September
press conference remarks, minimizing the importance of
sovereignty over the Sahara as a negotiating issue, would
"complicate" the French negotiators' task when and if talks
are resumed..
Vice Premier Belkacem Krim admitted to the US ambas-
sador in Tunis on 13 September that De Gaulle's statement on
the Sahara facilitated a resumption of talks, but he indicated
that the rebels were suspicious of De Gaulle's "mystical"
language. Krim said specifically that the PAG must be cer-
tain that "military servitude" or dangers to security are not
hidden in De Gaulle's references to airfields for French com-
munications with Black Africa, or French retention of nuclear_)
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Listing facilities. Chanderli said on 18 September that ar-
rangements could easily be made for civil air activities and
military overflights or refueling privileges, but that if De
Gaulle contemplated maintaining military enclaves in the
Sahara, the PAG would consider its sovereignty involved and
would refuse.]
(Both Krim and Chanderli also indicated that rebel lead-
ers are willing to cooperate on transitional arrangements
for the transfer of power in Algeria, but Chanderli stressed
that this cooperation would be forthcoming onl after success-
ful ne otiations.
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The Situation in Ghana
Gbedemah
=Minister of Agriculture Botsio, who was once Gbedemah's
chief rival for influence within the ruling Convention People's
party (CPP), and Chief Justice Korsah had been aligned with
him in the stormy cabinet session. Aligned with Adamafio
against the Gbedemah group was John Tettegah, the anti-West-
ern head of Ghana's Trades Union Congress (TUC) who has
long been an advocate of expanded ties with the Soviet bloc.
Minister of Transport and Communications Edusei, an oppor-
tunist who recently seemed to be throwing his considerable
influence against the extremists, was said to have remained
neutral.
Gbedemahl also demanded the dismis-
sal of Adamafio and the relaxation of Ghana's preventive
detention act. Some 300 critics of the Nkrumah regime--
mostly leaders of the opposition United party--are presently
imprisoned under this law.
bede-
mah and his allies also argue strongly, at another cabinet
meeting held on 19 September, against acceptance of most of
the aid offers--embracing some 350 separate projects--
Nkrumah is said to have received during his recent lengthy
visit to the bloc.
Nkrumah's appeal to the strikers was contained in a state-
ment issued on 17 September--the day following his return from
the bloc. After announcing the revocation of the limited state
of emergency proclaimed in his absence and the release of all
persons arrested in connection with the strikes, Nkrumah ex-
horted the participants to return to their jobs by the morning
of 19 September. However, hard-core elements of the strike
movement--the railway and harbor workers in the seaport of
Takoradi--refused to yield until Nkrumah gives assurances
that concessions to the workers' demands will be forthcoming.
In the face of this defiance, Nkrumah now appears to be debat-
ing the use of force against the strikers. Such action is almost
certainly being urged by the regime's left-wing leaders, who
have publicly condemned the strike as a "counterrevolutionary"
effort aided by foreign "imperialists:'
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South Korea Seeking Early Settlement With Japan
Vice Foreign Minister Pak Tong-chin implied to US
Minister Green in Seoul on 19 September that Korea sus-
pects Tokyo is not now interested in a settlement. Seoul's
suspicions are based on the assumption that if the Japanese
Government wants agreement, it would prevent opposition
Socialist plans to demonstrate against the negotiations. Pak
also told Green that if the Japanese block a settlement at
this time, Seoul probably will not attempt another rapproche-
ment for some years. South Korea's military leaders are
less restricted by public anti-Japanese sentiment than pre-
vious governments, but they can ill afford to lay themselves
open to charges of selling out Korea's interests to Japan.
The regime probably is prepared to scale down former
demands for repayment of claims and to substitute a conserva-
tion agreement for the "Rhee line"--a line extending between
20 and 200 miles off the Korean coast inside which Seoul has
barred Japanese fishing--providing Tokyo agrees to a settle-
ment that the regime can represent domestically as a diplo-
matic victory.
Pak told Green that former acting president Huh Chung
probably would head the South Korean delegation if Tokyo
agreed to open negotiations. He hoped that the Japanese would
name a negotiator of equal stature, preferably former Prime
Minister Kishi. Huh is a hard bargainer but understands the
limitations within which both sides must negotiate if a settle-
ment is to be concluded. He at one time served in a similar
capacity under Rhee and served as acting chief of state imme-
diately following Rhee's ouster.
The Japanese are resisting the Korean suggestions that
major problems- -property claims and the Rhee fishing line=-
be handled in high-level "political" discussions rather than in
technical committees as heretofore. Any enthusiasm Tokyo
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may have had about expediting an agreement with the South
Korean military regime probably has been dispelled by re-
newed seizures of Japanese fishing vessels and by Seoul's
advance notice that it would seek $800,000,000 in property
claims. The Japanese consider this figure excessive and
are offering $50,000,000 in claims together with an unspeci-
fied amount of "economic cooperation:'
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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