CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A005900400001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 25, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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25 September 1961
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25 September 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
1. Tunisian Tunisians complain French attempting to im~
pose additional conditions before withdrawing forces
.from Bizerte city. (~-'age i)
3. Communist China ~ Mongolia ~ Japan: Peiping may be
exerting pressure on Ulan Bator against establishing
diplomatic relations with Tokyo. (Page i)
4. India: Comment on low morale of Indian Army units in
.northern frontier areas. (Page ii)
5. West Indies Federationo Trinidad may follow Jamaica
in seceding from federation and may call for renegotiate
tion of defense areas agreement with US. (Page i i)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BU LLETI N
25 September 1961
DAILY BRIEF
in an attempt to break the impasse. He added that he needed
Tunisian The Tunisian Foreign Ministry has expressed
to Ambassador ~'almsley its government's concern over ad~~
ditional conditions France is trying to impose before with
drawing its forces. from. positions outside the Bizerte base
complex. The Tunisians complain that France is demand?
ing a formal document legitimizing indefinite .tenure at the
based Bourguiba admitted to Ambassador Walmsley on
12 September that he had offered France continued .use of
the base on 8 September for the "current dangerous period"
"an equally constructive response" from De Gaulle "in a mat
ter of weeks not months;' or his regime might not survived
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Communist Chin ~~ on
25X1 a M goha ~, Japano A .Japanese Foreign
Ministry mission is on its way to Mongolia to determine whether
Japan should grant dipiomatic recognition, but Peiping may
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d~C
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~xei?ting pressure on Ulan Bator against establishing diplo-
matic relations with Tokyoo The. Mongolian ambassador in
.Warsaw was described by a Japanese diplomat as "very
agitated;' -when asked about Communist China's attitude. The
Chinese probably want Mongolia to insist on the same -stiff
conditions of recognition that Peiping itself maintains, such
as the prior severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Last summer the Chinese Communists reportedly also made
representations to Mongolia against allowin the establish-
ment of a US emba in Ul for
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Kashmir ceasefire line with Pakistan, killing several of its
officersa Another battalion had to be called in to quell the mu-
tiny~ Reports of low morale in frontier areas have recurred
occasionally since mid-1960, when. a Gurkha unit reportedly
Indian despite considerable efforts to improve living con-
ditions an logistics, the Indian Army continues to be plagued
with morale problems along its remote northern frontiers.
C)ne infantry battalion-engaged in frontier duty for more than
three years-?reportedly mutinied on 14 September along the ?~~
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mutinied in Kashmir.. India will continue to deploy its army 25X1
to such generally inhospitable areas as long as its relations
with C
state
West Indies F'~deration: Trinidad's Premier Eric Williams,
wno recently resumed his public attitude of antagonism toward
the United States., has emerged as the. dominant West Indian
leader as a result of Jamaica's decision to secede from the
West Indies Federation. Williams' silence so far on the ref-
erendum result, plus his refusal to meet with Federation
Prime Minister. Adams prior to the latter's departure -for
London on 24 September, has strengthened the impression
of US officials in Trinidad that Williams intends to seek Trin-
idad's independence as soon as possibl~
jA collapse of the Federation as, now constituted offers no
lega basis for preventing implementation of the defense areas
2 5 Sept 61
DAILY BRIEF ii
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/// / ~ / // / / / / / /O / ~ / /O / / ~ ~ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / ~ ~ ~ / / / / / / / O ~ ~ / O ~ ~ / / / / / / / / O ~ / / / / / / / / O ~ ~ / 00 / ~ ~ / / / ~ ~ /O / / / / / / ~ ~ ~ / O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ / O ~ / / / / / / / / / % ~ / / / / / / / / / / ~ ~ / /O / // / / / / % ~ ~ / / / / / / / ~ ~ % ~ / /
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may try to rene otiate the a reement to obtain better terms
for Trinidado 25X1
can- consul. in Port of Spain believes, howevex, that Williams
(Backup, Page 3) 25X1
~Ghanao 1N.krumah's displeasure over what he believes to
be British policy in Africa probably accounts for the abrupt-
ness of his action in dismissing all British officers from com-
mand position in Ghana's military forceso He had probably
been contemplating the move for some time, however, as the
British presence has increasingly been an obstacle to his plans
to accept Soviet military assistance and to play a greater role
in the "African high command" concept of the Casablanca powerso
Nkrumah told a Western economic adviser on 2l September that
he was convinced of British responsibility for Hammarskjold's
death, as well as for the strikes plaguing Ghanao He expressed
concern for his own safety, and said he .intended to eliminate
all foreigners serving in the Ghana government as soon as pos-
sible, and to tighten controls over all foreign businesses in the
countrya Nkrumah has invited British officers to remain in an
advisory capacity, but such a change in their status would in any
event facilitate the radual introduction of Soviet military ad-
visersa (Backup, Page 5)
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25 Sept 61 DAILY BRIEF iii
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The Tunisian Situation
Ambassador Walmsley comments that the impasse now
has .been complicated by "the very dangerous factor" that
Bourguiba .may be proved wrong in having offered on 8 Sep-
tember--after his return from Belgrade-~-to seek settlement
within the Western context, At that time Bourguiba made
clear. that he offered Paris use of the base for the duration
of the Berlin crisis--which he considered would last only
"a few weeks;' Even the most loyal. of Bourguiba's follow-
ers within his Neo-Destour party, however, are in no mood
to wait indefinitely for proof that his pro-Western posture is
correct.
Other sources report that more outspoken .criticism of
Bourguiba is being heard .than at any other. time since Tunisia
obtained independence. If the impasse continues, Walmsley
anticipates that Bourguiba will either have to withdraw his
offer or face the grave threat to his regime of which he warned
on 12 September.
The Foreign Ministry spokesman told Walmsley that talks
were. being carried on in Bizerte on the basis of the Tunisian note
of 31 August, France's reply of 5 September, and Bourguiba's
offer. of 8 Septembero Agreement has been reached on an ex-
change of prisoners, which occurred on 10 September; on a mu~
tual pull-back of both French and Tunisian forces; and on Tuni-
sian guarantees that there would be no interference with commu-
nications between the various components of the base.
Early last week, the French .consul general and the gover-
nor of Bizerte were authorized to work out the details and a
schedule for the pull-back. The Tunisians were then confronted
with a.French draft proces-verbal making no reference to the
notes of 31 August and 5 September. but providing for Tunis to
guarantee noninterference, to promise to permit no demonstra-
tions, and to authorize French military personnel. to circulate
.freely outside the bases
The Tunisian spokesman told Walmsley that demonstrations
were a means of protesting the absence of negotiations, and that
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he feared the appearance of French uniforms might pr?voke
incidents, with Francs holding his government responsiblee
Tunisia, therefore, considers such an "agreement" to legit-
imize both ""servitudes and indefinite tenure at $izerte" with
no prospect--until Paris decides it is ready-of negotiations
for either the temporary use of the base, as, proffered by
Bourguiba, or the reconversion of the base a,nd a calendar
for evacuations
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West Indies Federation
Jamaica's unexpected call in the 19 September referen-
dum for withdrawal from the West Indies Federation and its
expected early move toward separate independence sigz~ifq
the dissolution of the Federation as constituted. The vote is
a severe blow to Jamaican Premier Manley's prestige, for
while he had not made it a matter of confidence, he had per-
. sonally campaigned hard for approval of federation As a
result of opposition. pressure, his cabinet is reported to
have decided on 20 September. to call elections before 31 May
1962, the date the Federation is scheduled to become inde~
pendent.
British Colonial Office officials consider. the Jamaican
voters' decision final and believe they will soon be called bn'.to
work out the details of Jamaica's independence. Both Manley
and opposition leader I3ustamente are expected in London soon
for discussions. ~~hile emphasizing that Trinidad's attitude
is now crucial, British officials apparently see little hope that
without Jamaica, the other nine units comprising the Federa~
Lion can proceed to independence. They also believe it unlikely
that Trinidad would join with the smaller islands in an eastern
Carribean federation. London seems to feel that the most likely
prospect will involve Trinidad's decision to go it alone and that
Erita,in will be left with- three separate groups: Jamaica, Trini~
dad, and the smaller islands.
The smalle~~islands leaders' hope for an early lead from
Trinidad Premier Williams, but US officials feel Williams will
avoid taking a public position on the issue until after his coun-
try's elections scheduled for this fall. As the key figure now in
the "~~/est Indies,- he can afford to bide his time.
~!`he collapse of the Federation also comes at a time when
Williams has already been complaining that Trinidad was being
slighted in the US~Federation I?efense Areas Agreement of Feb
ruary 1961. Williams may now seize. upon Jamaica's departure
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from the Federation as a pretext to denounce..thebase agree-
ment,despite .his commitment to it, in the. hope of securing
more: favorable arrangements. In any event, .his.. views will.
influence local attitudes toward .the agreement even- more. than.
in the past, when he has often shown reat hostility toward-the
Unatted States.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Mi I i tary Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant to Secretary of L'~afense (Special Operations)
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U,S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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