CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A006000220001-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
15
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 1, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 23, 1961
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A006000220001-0.pdf908.92 KB
Body: 
00F0Zx/Z/ 25X1 Approved For Re sT;GP/2S:K T00975AQ000220001-0 25X1 23 October 1961 Copy No. H N MEN State Dept. revie4 R 5 I f Qf Release 2002/10/22: CIA-RDP79T00975A006000220001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000220001-0 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000220001-0 j Approved For Re ase 2002/10/22: CIA-RDP79T00975A 00220001-0 25X1 23 October 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 1. Dominican Republic: Armed forces increase pressure for action against opposition. (Page i) 2. Situation in the Congo. (Page i) 3. France-Algeria: France is strengthening security forces in Paris and Algeria; resumption of official negotiations with PAG may soon be announced. (Page ti) 6. Ruanda-Urundi: New flare-up of tribal violence in Ruanda. (Page i v) I N 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000220001-0 25X1 n___________~ r___ n ____ nnnn.w Winn _ i+ln fl nn-inTnnn e nianna~nnnnnnn A n CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 23 October 1961 DAILY BRIEF E 25X1 /)a 25X1 Dominican Republic: The antigovernment rioting that began on 16 October in the capital and spread. to several other Dominican cities has increased pressure in the armed forces for wholesale action against the opposition. In the early stages of the rioting, police showed unaccustomed re- straint, but there has since been some bloodshed. The fact that gangs of thugs identified with the previous regime have participated in action against the rioters brings another po- tentially explosive element to the situation. According to the American consul general, the rioters are mostly revolu- tionary-minded youths acting without centralized direction. Leaders of the university students' federation as well as of the major opposition groups are taking no public part in the disorders, and. the consul general sees no evidence that they are clandestinely supporting the rioters. 25X1 In this disturbed climate, the government plans to take its long-deferred action against the pro-Castro Popular Democratic Movement by deporting key members of the group. If this ac- tion is intentionally or unintentionally extended to other elements Congo: UN headquarters in New York has instructed its representatives in the Congo to ratify the cease-fire protocol which was worked out last week in UN-Katanga negotiations, ac- cording to Under Secretary Bunched However, the UN has stiu- lated that the agreement be construed as having no implications) -.1 ;ice Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000220001-0 Approved For R A@Q000022000 X1 j j j j j j 1 .beyond the immediate military situation in Katanga. UN j S j 25X1 25X1 25X1 acceptance is also contingent on an understanding that the protocol must not contravene UN resolutions and must not affect the territorial limits of the Congo as previously un- derstood by the UN. The latter stipulation apparently is an effort to dispel any impression that the cease-fire is a de facto recognition of Katanga's independence. Bunche made no mention of the UN's policy should central government forces invade Katanga, a sore point in the negotiations last week. Bunche said that Adoula had accepted the protocol on these terms. The Katangans, however, who have been using the cease-fire negotiations to further their pretensions to in- dependence and who remain confident of their military superi- ority, are unlikely to agree to these restrictions. 1 (According to Bunche, Tshombd's emissaries to Leopold- vile-have reiterated earlier Katangan demands for political autonomy within a Congolese economic and customs union. Bunche expressed the hope that this was a "bargaining posi- tion" and would be received as such by the Adoula government. Congolese officials in Leopoldville, however, have no confi- dence in Tshombd's good faith and are unlikeI to enter negotia- tions with him on such unfavorable terms. -11 demonstrate its influence over the Moslem population taining 1 November as its target date for an all-out effort to The provisional Algerian government (PAG) appears to be mad forced in both Paris and. Algeria in anticipation of new violence France-Algeria: French security forces are being rein- 25X1 25X1 "A" 23 Oct 61 DAILY BRIEF ii j 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000220001-0 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000220001-0 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000220001-0 25X1 ~nnm~inrl F D 1 aim 2nn~i1nn~ . rIA-DIID]OTf1110 d]5 Q ~O11f111 J1 Approved For R Q~000220001-0 2-0 Room 25X1 25X1 25X1 Meanwhile, ere are indications that..resumption of official negotia- tions may soon be announced. . Although the PAG may feel that successful mass demonstrations will strengthen its nego- 25X1 tiating position, the negotiations can hardly proceed smoothly 25X1 if large-scale clashes develop between Moslems and Euro- peans or if the security forces intervene in strength. 25X1 (Backup, Page 1) 25X1 9 ME IN. 25X1 23 Oct 61 DAILY BRIEF Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000220001-0 25X1 Approved Fo Release 2002/10/22: CIA-RDP79TO09 5AW00220001-0 Ruanda-Urundio new flare-up of tribal violence on Oc- 25X1 25X1 tober in the Ruanda area of the Belgian trust territory of Ruanda- Urundi has increased the danger of the "generalized anarchy" en- visioned recently by the Belgian political affairs officer in Usum-, bura. He believes that in such a situation, the 2, 500 Belgian security forces in the trust territory would be unable to maintain control because of their small numbers, the difficult terrain, and communications problems. In Urundi, the extremist leader elected to replace the moderate premier assassinated earlier this month may embark on a hostile policy toward Belgium and Ruanda. (Backup, Page 3) 23 Oct 61 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000220001-0 ~~~~~~...~~.~~~~.~~~~ ~ j j 0 25X1 A d F R 2002/10/22 CIARDP79T0097 AO 000220001 pprove or ase Q` - 25X1 23 Oct 61 DAILY BRIEF V 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000220001-0 Approved For 9 OW 00220001-0 France-Algeria PAG preparations for 1 November--the anniversary of the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954--appear to be well along. Ac- cording to Moslem sources of the American Consulate in Algiers, word is being spread for the Moslems to gather in three pre- dominantly Moslem quarters in the city, locations which will make it easier for the rebel leaders to control the demonstra- tions and display their influence over the Moslem population. Although the PAG maintains that the demonstrations are intended to be peaceful, European extremists probably hope to provoke clashes in the belief that large-scale fi tin now would impede new attempts to negotiate a settlement. This week's mass Moslem demonstrations in France aroused indignation, shock, and fear throughout the metropole. The Amer- ican Embassy in Paris estimates that these events will make more remote the possibility of achieving De Gaulle's aim of creating an independent Algerian state willing to cooperate with France and. to guarantee minority rights. Moreover, by hastening the growth of anti-Algerian prejudice among metropolitan French- men, the Parisian disorders will make it easier for the OAS to find additional support in the army, especially among the draftees. Speaking about the possibility of renewing formal negotiations on 18October, a French representative at the UN indicated that PAG demands for sovereignty over the Sahara were still causing difficulties. He said the PAG is asking Paris to make a statement in effect saying the French "were sorry they had ever mentioned the Sahara and would not raise the problem againo' In a public statement on 20 October, Premier Debr6 announced that France would be prepared to yield the Sahara and its oil to an independ- ent Algeria under certain conditions. The Algiers apartment of an American oil geologist was bombed on 20 October, presumably by OAS terrorists. Press reports that 25X1 25X1 25X1 23 Oct 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000220001-0 Approved For R - se 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 00220001-0 the recent US-PAG conversations in Tunis dealt extensively with the question of foreign petroleum interests in the Sahara have aroused suspicion among French rightists that American oil interests were making a deal with the PAG. 25X1 25X1 25X1 23 Oct 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000220001-0 Approved FJr Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T0097?AOQ $00220001-0 Situation in Ruanda-Urundi The coming to power of a tribal extremist in Urundi and the outbreak of tribal violence in Ruanda suggest that Ruanda- Urundi will become a growing problem for both Belgium and the United Nations. The new Urundi premier, Tutsi extremist Andre Muhirwa, is likely to eliminate non-Tutsi representation from his cabinet and to pursue a tough policy toward the Hutu peasant majority of Urundi's population and the Hutu government of neighboring Ruanda. Furthermore, Muhirwa, who has been in contact with General Lundula and radical forces in the Stanley- ville area of the Congo, will probably favor the pan-Africanism and anticolonialism of the radical African states. The new violence in Ruanda apparently is mainly instigated by u u leaders who desire to drive as many Tutsis as possible from Ruanda. Some Tutsi extremist bands are countering with their own violence, hoping to get UN invalidation of Ruanda's 25 September election. Even before the present violence, close to 10,000 Tutsi tribesmen had taken refuge in Uganda--recently some 500 refugees daily were counted by British officials--and many others sought safety in Urundi or in religious missions. Violence has been occurring in Ruanda for several months, and the area has been unstable since early 1960 when the ruling Tut- sis were overthrown by a Belgian-supported Hutu revolt. Ruanda-Urundi's problems are due for consideration in No- vember by the General Assembly. Although there has been dis- cussion of independence for the territory next April, there is growing agitation in UN circles for a longer period. of trustee- ship to prepare the area for independence. The Haitian chairman of the UN commission which visited Ruanda-Urundi last Septem- ber believes that independence should. be delayed some five or six years, during which time Belgium, while remaining behind the scenes, would turn over political responsibility to the Africans 23 Oct 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000220001-0 25X1 Approved For PAOOWO0220001-0 but would control economic and. social services. He said that it was a poor country with no promising resources except coffee, and added he "had never encountered so many backward 25X1 people." 25X1 25X1 23 Oct 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000220001-0 25X1 Approved For ReI ase 2002/10/22: CIA-RDP79T00975A00 0 -0220001-0 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President Military Representative of the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Director, International Cooperation Administration The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000220001-0 ~/~i~s~i~iii.~iiiiiiiii~i~i~io~ PjI 9 75A006000220001-0 ;~ Approv or Releas~?~10/S ECi