CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006000380001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 11, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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11 November 1961
copy No.
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DIA AND DOS review(s) completed.
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11 November 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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.NOTE: Items 1 through 8 appeared to
the Daily Brief for 10 November. Backup
material has been added to this issue.
1. USSR: Gromyko stressed Moscow's readiness for four-
power negotiations on Berlin. (Page. t)
2. Finland: Moscow reportedly gives assurances that USSR
is not seeking bases in Finland. (Page it)
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5~ USSR- Comment on truck-mounted missile displayed in
7 November Moscow parade. (Page M)
t)
6. Laos- Peiping radio warns that large-scale hostilities
may be resumed in Laos. (Page t v)
7. France-Algeria: PAG reportedly "deeply impressed" by
De Gaulle's recent conciliatory statements. (Page t v)
8. Afghanistan- Moscow again trying to exploit Kabul's diffi-
culties with Pakistan. (Page v)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
11 November 1961
DAILY BRIEF
USSR-Berlin: Foreign Minister Gromyko used his in-
formal conversations with the American, British, and West
German ambassadors at a 7 November reception-to under-
score the USSR's readiness for four-power negotiations on
a Berlin settlement. Now that Adenauer has been installed
as chancellor in West Germany and the 22nd party congress
has ended, Moscow apparently intends to step up the pace
of its diplomatic moves in an effort to induce the West to
agree to early negotiations. According to Gromyko, Soviet
Ambassador Smirnov has instructions to meet with Chancel-
lor Adenauer, apparently to resume their mid-August dis-
cussion on Berlin. Khrushchev received the West German
ambassador on 9 November, and Yuriy Zhukov, chairman
of the State Committee on Foreign Cultural Relations, urged
Ambassador Thompson to make arrangements to see Khru-
shchev.\
On the substance of the Berlin and German questions,
Gromy o made no mention of a peace treaty and confirmed
that the negotiations could be limited to the problems of ac-
cess to and the status of West Berlin. While insisting on
demilitarization of West Berlin and termination of the occu-
pation status, Gromyko stated that the USSR was prepared
to provide the "most formal guarantees" that East Germany
would respect an agreement. He was adamant in rejecting
any formal link between Bonn and Berlin, but did indicate
that present financial and economic ties could be maintained.
Backup, Page
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*USSR-Finland_ Soviet officials have reportedly assured
Finnish Foreign Minister Karjalainen, who begins his con-
versations with Foreign Minister Gromyko on 11 November,
that the USSR was not proposing to seek bases in Finland.
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be made on whether to becin forme] consnltntinn
in conversations with several Western ambassa-
dors at a Kremlin reception on 7 November, Gromyko said
he did not see the reason for "all the excitement," since the
Soviet Union had merely asked for consultations with a neigh-
bor. He took this same line with the Finnish ambassador.
Finnish officials have emphasized privately that Karjalainen
will not negotiate or sign anything in Moscow but only "talk
about talking later" with the Soviets. The deputy director for
political affairs in the Finnish Foreign Ministry said that only
after Karjalainen reported back to Helsinki would a decision
11 Nov 61
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USSR: LThe truck-mounted 35- to 40-foot-long cylinder con-
taining a missile, which was displayed publicly for the first time
in the 7 November Moscow parade, generally resembles a cylin-
der mounted on the main deck of a W-class long-range submarine
which was photographed in a shipyard near Murmansk in August.
The similarity tends to confirm the impression that the cylinder
mounted on the submarine is a missile launcher and suggests fur-
ther that the USSR has developed a mobile short-range issile
system intended for use by both ground and naval force
o other W-class submarines in the same yard had sec-
removed from the deck in the same location as the cylinder
tions
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NORTHERN LAOS
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GOVERNMENT (MEO) BASE AREAS
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11 Nov 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Mounting, suggesting that similar installations were in prog-
ress. Initial reports suggest that the cylinder on the submarine
is somewhat smaller than the one in the parade, b?tt,this is sub-
ject to confirmation by detailed photo interpretation.
he approximately 210 W-class units constitute the bulk of
the Soviet submarine force, and the conversion of a number of
these units would be consistent with the increased emphasis
Moscow has laced on submarine missile systems in the last
several years.
Laos: Peiping has given a blunt warning that large-scale
hostilities may be resumed in Laos. According to a 9 Novem-
ber. broadcast from Peiping, the Geneva talks have reached
a point where "no more negotiations are possible:' The choice
now, according to the broadcast, is a coalition government or
"the outbreak of war:' During the past two weeks, the Soviet
representative at Geneva has indicated concern over the dan-
ger of a "renewed outbreak of military action" in Laos and has
repeatedly urged that a coalition government be rapidly formed.
6n-'Laos itself, no progress has been made toward a polit-
ical settlement since 18 October, when Souvanna Phouma re-
ceived King Savang's approval to attempt to form a government.
Souvanna has issued a new call for tripartite talks to be held
in the Plaine des Jarres on 17 November. He has given some
indication, however, that if the Boun Oum government persists
in its opposition to this site, he may be willing to meet again in
Hin Heup, the neutralized site north of Vientiane where agree-
ment on Souvanna as premier was reached by the three princes
earl last month
(Backup, Page (Map)
France-Algeria::; The provisional Algerian government
(PAG) is reportedly "deeply impressed" by De Gaulle's recent
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public statements that the PAG has on its side the sentiments
of the majority of the Algerian population. Ambassador Walms-
ley in Tunis feels that this French admission.has removed a
major obstacle to successful negotiations. The PAG has been
extremely sensitive to past. French allegations that it did not
represent the majority of Algerians.
The US Embassy in Paris points out that European settlers
and the Secret Army Organization (OAS) will derive little com-
fort from the vague references to "guarantees and rights" in
De Gaulle's speeches. The peaceful demonstrations scheduled
by the OAS for this week end may provide the occasion for out-
breaks of violence.
(Backup, Page 5)
Afghanistan-Pakistan-USSR:/ bul has reportedly re-
ceived a Soviet offer to airlift food and other supplies for the
stranded Pushtoon nomads, who are being prevented.by Pak-
istani authorities from migrating to their traditional winter
quarters on the Pakistani plains. The Afghan Government may
accept the offer, since it is worried about its ability to support
the nomads through the winter
Although there have been no first-hand reports on the move-
men s of the 250,000 nomads since the initial group of 7,000 was
turned back at the border in mid-October, additional caravans
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presumably have been gathering along the frontier
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Soviet Officials Comment on Berlin and Party Congress
Soviet officials are seeking to persuade Western repre-
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sentatives that developments at the party congress should be
interpreted as a favorable sign for Western interests, par-
ticularly in regard to Berlin. Yuriy Zhukov, who often claims
to have Khrushchev's confidence in matters of foreign affairs,
told Ambassador Thompson that he hoped President Kennedy
was aware of the significance of the party congress as a.vic-
tory for Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence. Earlier,
on 25 October, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official. claimed that
the "anti party" group had opposed efforts to improve Soviet-
American relations and implied that the renewed attacks on
the group should therefore be regarded by the West as an en-
couraging development
Along this line, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetzov told
the British ambassador on 7 November that he approved of the
interpretation of the party congress given. by the Economist of
21 October. This article saw the withdrawal of the deadline on
a German treaty as a respite for the West which should be used
to probe Soviet intentions and to determine what a solution of
the Berlin problem on a "mutually acceptable basis" means in
Soviet terminology. The article also pictured Khrushchev as
a "man determined to stick to his set cour.se" and the policies
and reforms carried out since Stalin's death. ,
Other Soviet spokesmen have related the congress develop-
Adenauer indicated he would continue the discussion after t
ments directly to Berlin. A TASS correspondent told a West-
ern official that the West now could expect the USSR to propose
new solutions to the Berlin problem in the near future. While
Gromyko gave no indication of any changes in the Soviet posi-
tion, his statement that Smirnov would seek a meeting with
Chancellor Adenauer suggests that the Soviets are undertaking
a more active diplomatic effort to gain Western agreement to
begin negotiations or to continue the exploratory talks begun in
New York and Washington. When Smirnov met with Adenauer
on 16 August, he maintained that the Soviet Union desired a
negotiated settlement on Berlin and would consider any proposals.
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West German elections. Gromyko said, however, that Smirnov,
in renewing his discussions with Adenauer, would definitely not
be carrying an invitation for him to visit Moscow.
Gromyko brought up the question of civilian access to Ber-
lin, istinguishing it from military access and claiming that it
was not covered by an agreement. He asserted that Bonn had
already accepted East German control of West German civil-
ian traffic to Berlin. This line, together with the overtures
for conversations with the new Adenauer government, sug-
gests that Moscow will reiterate its earlier view that the West
Germans should take the initiative with proposals in order to
protect their interests in Berlin.)
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Laotian Developments
Since his audience with King Savang, Souvanna Phouma
ha several times proposed a meeting of Boun Oum, Sou-
phannouvong, and himself at his "capital" on the Plaine des
Jarres. Boun Oum and General Phoumi have repeatedly re-
jected these proposals. Recently, however, Boun Oum has
stated that he would consider going to Hin Heup
J
( The major issue to be considered by the princes at such
a meeting is the composition of the cabinet. The Hin Heup
"formula" called for an eight-member "neutralist" center
group to be flanked by two four-member groups representing
Vientiane and the Pathet Lao respectively. While accepting
this formula in principle, Boun Oum contends that four of the
eight "neutralists" should be drawn from outside Souvanna's
entourage. Souvanna, for his part, appears to have committed
the other seven positions to his Xieng Khouang followers. It is
possible, however, that Souvanna would agree to the admission
of two or three additional, non - Xieng Khouang members to an
expanded center groin
Other thorny problems to be resolved include the distribu-
tion of key portfolios within the cabinet, the demobilization and
integration of the opposing armed forces, and the scheduling of
national elections.
The Chinese Communist warning of 9 November appears to
be not so much a threat to walk out of the Geneva conference as
an effort to strike a note of urgency on the need to exert pres-
sure on Vientiane to accept rebel terms for a coalition govern-
ment.
In a conversation on 7 November with the UK ambassador
in Moscow, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov emphasized
that the Soviet Union wanted a Laotian settlement and had no
desire to get involved in commitments in that part of the world.
Kuznetsov reiterated the Soviet charge that the main difficulty
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in reaching a solution was Vientiane's intransigence in form-
ing a coalition government.
At Geneva, the USSR has come closer to the Western
position on the critical points of voting procedure for and in-
vestigations by the International Control Commission (ICC).
However, the chief Soviet delegate continues to assert that
the general guidelines for the ICC's role in Laos will have to
be based on an arrangement between it and-the Laotian Gov-
ernment. F I
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French-Algerian Negotiations
he Tunisian weekly Afrique Action stated:;on 8. Novem-
ber, in an editorial reportedly concurred in by the PAG's
minister of information Yazid, that secret negotiations now
are under way. The editorial alleged that two members of
the French team that has previously negotiated with the reb-
els left Paris for Switzerland earlier in the week, and con-
cluded that "the current effort to finish the warms more
serious" than in former talks,at Evian and Lugrin.I,
De Gaulle's recent statement that an early solution to
the Algerian problem is possible "if no one puts any prior
conditions, and we put none" may have reflected his concern
that the PAG might demand the release of imprisoned rebel
vice premier Ben Bella before any final settlement is achieved.
Ben Bella and several thousand other Algerian prisoners in
France have been staging a hunger strike since 2 November,
and Yazid has publicly called attention to his government's
"anxiety" about their physical condition.
leaders prefer to postpone decisive action against the govern-
ment until De Gaulle attempts to implement any agreement
In his 8 November speech in Toulon, De Gaulle specific-
ally called on the right-wing extremists to abandon their "un-
healthy dreams" of a French Algeria and join the rest of the
country in backing his policy. Although such statements are
unlikely to placate the OAS, there is some indication that its
negotiated with the rebels.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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