CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A006000460001-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
17
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 9, 2002
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 22, 1961
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A006000460001-4.pdf1.03 MB
Body: 
/i~i~i~i~i~i~i~i~iiiiiiiiiiiii / Approved ForQleas2/2S ~-T~T009706000460001-4 25X1 22 November 1961 Copy No. C 90 25 M-Mou"lin DIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE. / DIA review(s) completed. 0 TOP SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 Approved For ease 2002/10/22: CIA-RDP79T00975A0 6000460001-4 25X1 0 22 November 1961 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN CONTENTS 25X1 2. South Vietnam: Casualty figures for South Vietnamese forces have shown marked increase in past two months. (Page it) 3. USSR: Moscow's agreement to resume negotiations on. nuclear test ban appears primarily motivated by propaganda consid- 25X1 erations. (Page it) 7. France: De Gaulle encountering difficulties in his campaign to gain broader support from armed services. (Page tv) 8. Nonaligned Nations: Talks among Nehru, Nasir, and Tito in Cairo apparently accomplished little other than to maintain outward show of cooperation. (Page t v) 9. Thailand: Government officials increasingly concerned over Communist exploitation of unrest in northeastern provinces. (Page v) 10. Late Item: Communist construct barriers at autobahn check- point, (Page vt) VON Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 Approved Forle se 2002/10/22 :CIA-RDP79T0097 06000460001-85X1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 22 November 1961 25X1 25X1 DAILY BRIEF Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 Approved For ease 2002/10/22: CIA-RDP79T0097 06000460001-4 25X1 25X1 South Vietnam: Casualty figures for South Vietnamese forces in the past two months have shown a striking increase over previous monthly averages. Casualties for the whole of 1961 will probably be about 13,000, almost double last year's total. The greatest increase has been in the number killed, although the figures for wounded, captured, and desertions have also risen significantly. Losses are greatest among civil guard and self-defense forces, but the proportion suf- fered by the regular army is growing. The South Vietnamese Government estimates that Viet Cong casualties in 1961 will be about 18,000, 50 percent above the 1960 figure. The disproportionate increase in the govern- ment casualty rate may be the result of more accurate report- ing by government sources effort to publicize the scale of the Viet Cong en. 25X1 INH USSR: There is no evidence that Moscow intends to change its position on a nuclear test ban agreement when negotiations are resumed in Geneva on 28 November. The USSR's agree- ment to resume negotiations appears primarily intended to off- set the adverse nonbloc reaction to the recent Soviet test series and to place itself in a position to charge that continuation of the US testing program is responsible for the intensification of the nuclear armaments race. The USSR may also propose that the new. round of negotiations be accompanied by a mora- torium on all nuclear testing. The Soviet note drew attention to Khrushchev's remarks during the 7 November Kremlin re- ception at which he warned that "there will be more Soviet tests if the West goes on testing." (Backup, Page 2) 22 Nov 61 DAILY BRIEF 4% 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 .............. Approved Fo lease 2002/10/22: CIA-RDP79TOO97 06000460001-4 25X1 ME// on 25X1 25X1 25X1 France: De Gaulle's present campaign to gain broader suppoFt -from the French armed services- -to be climaxed on 23 November at Strasbourg when he addresses nearly 3 000 officers and noncoms assembled from France, Ger- many, Algeria, and overseas--has apparently not yet pro- duced the desired effect. Officers attending the advanced military schools in Paris, who heard De Gaulle's 14 Novem- ber talk stressing the armed forces' responsibility to the nation and the need for a national nuclear striking force, were reportedly disappointed over his failure to mention Algeria MATO nnd nthpr tonics of interest to them. I I 25 i4ona 1 n tions. The talks held by Nehru, -N-asir, 2 5 X I 25X11111111 Tito in Ciir arently accomplished little o on 19 November app '----A A other than to maintain an outward show of cooperation among, .22 Nov 61 DAILY BRIEF iv 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO06000460001-4 Approved FoAease 2002/10/22: CIA-RDP79T009706000460001-4 BURMA CHINA, Lao Kay > a. PMong /~ ._ ' F` ~.?.v _SY F (` e M Hong Song v r A Tako W ENTIANE a, g t!a ~~ PLAINES DES JARRES LAOS ~~ )KHO PHNOM THAILAND Surin 0 r..` anchanb 0 I)Phet Bu 0 M THAILAND Nanning V I ETNA M DVinh Ha Tinh Thakhek CAMBODIA North Eastern provinces i--?---! 0 miles 100 \ AINAN Pleiku 0 g re rfr t , .:.?' VIETNAM ,,Hue t SOUT 14 Phan Rang VIETNAM S ap Saint Jacques `63/621122 22 Nov 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map Page Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 j 25X1 Approved Fo lease 2002/10/22 :CIA-RDP79T009 $ U60004600U1-4 25X1 25X1 their three countries. 25X1 ON Tito also apparently failed to get the support he desired 25X1 noted only the general need "to strengthen econon,,ic coopera- states. In a speech on 13 November, Tito had called for such a program as the best defense against both Eastern and West- ern economic organizations which, he claimed, threaten the independence of the uncommitted states. However, the com- munique issued at the conclusion of the three leaders' talks for a program of economic cooperation among the nonaligned tion among all countries" Thailand: Thai officials are increasingly concerned over Communist exp oitation of unrest in the northeastern provinces. Communists continue to be very ac- tive despite government a orts to suppress them, andi Readership is being provided by the Pathet Lao. Prime Minister Sarit's reluctance to support the establishment of a neutral regime in Laos is linked to his fear that a neutralist government would facilitate infiltration and subversion in Thai- land and to his knowledge that the population in the northeast feels closer bonds with the residents of the Mekong valley than with Bangkok. 22 Nov 61 DAILY. BRIE F 25X; HO " 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 Approved Fo' lease 2002/10/22 CIA-RDP79T00 740006000460001-4 25X1 25X1 25X1 *Berlin: (information as of 0330 EST) According to re- ports from American officials in Berlin, the Communists have placed steel beams in a zig-zag pattern across the Helmstedt autobahn near the checkpoint at Babelsberg at its eastern end just before it enters West Berlin. The only purpose of this barrier as so far constructed seems to be to slow down traffic. The barrier is reported to be on.the strip between the Soviet and US checkpoints and to have been constructed only on the lane incoming from West Germany. No such barriers have apparently been erected at the western end of the autobahn at Helmstedt. This reported construc- tion is similar to the barriers put in place at the Friedrich- strasse inter-Berlin sector crossing point in connection with recent attempts by the East Berlin police to institute docu- mentary control over official western vehicular traffic when the passengers were in civilian dress. There have been no indications of change in the Commu- nist position that pending a separate treaty or a negotiated settlement, allied access to West Berlin will remain under Soviet control. It is possible that the construction is simply intended as a reminder of the Soviet position that Western "procrastination" on negotiations with the USSR will result in unilateral Soviet action--a separate treaty followed by the turnover of access controls to the East Germans. However, recent actions within the city of Berlin suggest that the Com- munists could be preparing attempts to establish East German control over official Western autobahn travelers proceeding 25X1 West Berlin in civilian dress.- I [1-0- Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 22 Nov 61 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 Approved For R AJ6000460001-4 USSR Agrees to Resume Nuclear Test Talks The Soviet leaders' decision to accept the US-UK pro- posal for an immediate resumption of the Geneva talks probably was based on the assumption that this would pro- vide the most effective forum for exploiting any US decision to undertake atmospheric testing and for counteracting the damaging effects of the Soviet test series on the USSR's image abroad. The TASS statement of 5 November, in re- sponse to President Kennedy's 2 November statement re- garding preparations for US atmospheric testing in the event such measures become necessary, charged that the US "is preparing to resume nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere" The USSR may also believe that the resumption of test talks will enhance its recent moves to impress the West with a more flexible Soviet approach to negotiations on Berlin and Germany. The Soviet note marks some retreat from the position the USSR has maintained since the Vienna meeting between Khru- shchev and President Kennedy in June, in which the Soviet pre- mier contended that the questions of a test ban and general disarmament should be solved "interdependently." Subsequent Soviet pronouncements implied that the nuclear testing issue could be considered only in the context of general and complete disarmament. Although Moscow has now agreed to resume separate negotiations on testing, the Soviet note sought to re- tain the link with general disarmament by observing that the US, Britain, and the USSR have all "proclaimed as their com- mon goal universal and complete disarmament:' It also stated that the USSR's agreement to return to the Geneva talks rests on the assumption that the UN General Assembly in the near future will "adopt a decision on the resumption of negotiations on the whole complex of questions pertaining to general and complete disarmament and on the setting up of an organ in which such negotiations can be conducted:' While the Soviet leaders have found it expedient to resume separate talks on a test ban treaty, they probably will take the position that no final agreement can be concluded unless prog- ress is made in the general disarmament field. This position 25X1 25X1 22 Nov 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 Approved For I ea 5,106000460001-4 was implied in the TASS statement of 5 November which re- affirmed the USSR's readiness to sign a general disarmament treaty, "on the basis of which nuclear weapons tests would also be discontinued once and for all. . . 25X1 25X1 25X1 22 Nov 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 Approved For j4 756000460001-4 Albanian Trade Probes in the West 25X1 25X 25X1 Albanian economic overtures earlier this year to France and Italy, the only two West European countries with which it has diplomatic relations, have had little result. Italian firms have agreed to sell two chemical fertilizer plants-one of which reportedly was originally to have been built by the USSR-- and a cargo ship. However, presumably because of severe economic difficulties and a shortage of hard currencies, Tirana has not yet concluded a 1961-62 trade agreement with Rome. 7Lat i O t b n er, e c o the Albanian minister o trade offered to buy, for cas , grain and hides from Turkey and proposed that a Turkish del- egation visit Albania with a view to a possible Turkish-Albanian trade agreemefttA Apparently there have been no results thus far from the Albanian approaches to Francetr Turkey. World War II--but followed such statements within a few days Albania's grain production in recent years has been low, and, although this year's harvest may be better, Tirana will still have to rely on imports to satisfy its normal. requirements, During the year ending 30 June, Communist China provided about 75 percent of Albania's grain imports, practically all of which Peiping purchased from free world sources. Tirana made an attempt to sound out Washington on diplo- matic relations on 28 July when Liria, organ of a Communist- dominated Albanian emigre group in the US, called for develop- ment of "diplomatic, friendly, and trade relations" with the US. Prior to that, Albanian leaders had occasionally stated their willingness to establish relations with the US--nonexistent since with renewed anti-US propaganda attacks. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 22 Nov 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06000460001-4 Approved For ple se 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T0 974"06000460001-4 THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President Military Representative of the President the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronatuics and Space Administration The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant Secretary of Defense The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006000460001-4