CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006100130001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 8, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

i~i~iZj
Approved For ReI eTOf 1/2SECRITT00975A00 akOO130001-9
25X1
8 December 1961 25X1
O
PY O.
DIA review(s)
completed.
/ TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9
Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9
 Approved For ReI se 2002/10/22 CIA-RDP79T00975 000130001-9
8 December 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
.CONTENTS
The Congo situation. (page i)
25X1
. India-Portugal: Tension continues on Goa border. (Page it i)
6. Tanganyika: British-administered UN trust territory be-
comes independent tomorrow. (Page Lv)
MEN=
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9
 Approver Release 2002/10/22: CIA-RDP791DQ 75AO06100130001-9
UN
2450
? Kamina"{
Kapan/
U N 1390
scattered
Tshombe's Forces
UN
Adoula's and Gizenga's Forces
00 United Nations Forces* K wezidalle EI sa,ethville
Selected road
-i-i- Selected railroad * Does not include support troops
Selected airfield
25X1
8 Dec 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Map Page
Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9
 Approved For -X1
Aonroved For ReRe sse e 2002/10/22 0/22 : ' CIA-RDP79T00975RDP79T00975 0006!001001 3 003000101-?5~5 ~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
8 December 1961
DAILY BRIEF
*Congoo Sporadic fighting continued.in Elisabethville
.through 7 December. UN forces remained in control of
the airport, but UN headquarters on the outskirts of the
city was the scene of heavy fighting. UN jets appear to
have destroyed or grounded Tshombe?s aircraft, but Ka-
tangan. ground fire has damaged a US Air Force transport
and possibly a UN Canberra jet. There continue to be re-
ports of fighting elsewhere in Katanga. The UN claimed on.
7 December to have "cleared out" a Katangan garrison at
Manono; there are unconfirmed reports that the ? UN has also
repulsed a Katangan attack on . the air base at Kamina.
UN officials in the Congo apparently regard the current
fighting as an opportunity to deliver a coup de grace to Ka-
tangan separatism. According to the US Army Attache in
Leopoldville, UN representative Linner has instructed
Brigadier Raja in Elisabethville to disarm all Katangan
soldiers in the Elisabethville and Manono areas. Linner
reportedly has asked New York what he should do if Tshombe
is apprehended by UN forces. Tshombe arrived in Ndola,
Northern Rhodesia, on 7 December and immediately de-
25X1 parted for Elisabethville.by automobile. /He reportedly
crossed into Katanga at the border post o Kasumbalesa,
25X1 about 90 miles northwest of Ndola
Katangan forces reportedly are organizing a white-dominated
I internal Katangan
propaganda has convinced most Katangan soldiers and offi-
cials that their strength is superior to that of the UN forces.
There are rumors in Elisabethville that Rhodesian Prime
Minister Welensky has sent a. sympathetic message to the
Katangan . government, urging it to stand firm against the UN.
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9
Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9
 i 9
, Approved For Re se 2002/10/22 .CIA-RDP79T00975 09"00130001-9 25X1
25X1
-- 25x1
DAILY BRIEF
'general staff" to plan coordinated attacks against key UN 25X1
points such as the airport. Katangan military efforts to All
date show little sign of such central direct' n.
8 Dec 61
ii
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9
 Approved For Re a 2002/10/22: CIA-RDP79T0097 AG 100130001-9 25X1
25X1
25X1
India-Portugal. New Delhi and Lisbon continue to ex-
change charges on the Goa situation, and additional incidents
are likely as tension mounts on the Goa border. New Delhi's
disclaimer of any intention to force the Portuguese out at the
present time has been followed by Nehru's statement that
"there can be no solution to the Portuguese problem except
by the Portuguese Government walking out of Goa:' Portu-
g i s foreign minister has denied as "irresponsible lies"
Indian allegations of brutalities in. Goa and vowed that Por-
tuguese military forces "will do their utmost and more to
defend the, integrity of Portuguese territory." He hinted
Portuguese recourse to the UN in the event of Indian aggres-
sion an f,in addition to a formal appeal to the US for support,
8 Dec. 61
DAILY BRIEF iii
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9
 Approved For Re a 2002/10/22 .CIA-RDP79T0097 0100130001-9 25X1
25X1
.? c. v.^..--4-orl +i+ h . TT n clrnr] T nnnlnn #^ iicn i+ o mnnr] rvffi nraa '1171 %
India to ease the tension.
Tanganyika: The British-administered N trust terri 25X1
tory of anganyika becomes independent on 9 December in
an atmosphere of initial optimism engendered largely by the
apparent ability and moderation of Prime Minister Julius
Nyerere. In contrast to the racial tension and economic un-
certainty in Kenya.and the Rhodesias, and the chaos in the
Congo, Tanganyika appears a model of political and eco-
nomic stability. However, African extremists are already exploiting the African o ulation's lack of understanding for p p g
Nyerere's multiracial policy, and there is discontent in la-
bor circles. The extremists probably will become more in-
fluential once the glow of the independence period has worn
off, and may be able to threaten both Nverere's control and
the stability of the country. Backup, Page 2) 25X1
25X1
SELECTED INTELLIGENCE
REPORTS AND ESTIMATES
(Available during the preceding week)
Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions in the Far
East: Peiping's objectives, foreign policy, and likely courses
of action; probable effect of a Sino-Soviet, it. on Chinese capa-
bilities. U.S.I.B. SNIE 13-3-61. Nov 3O'61!
Situation and prospects in Cuba. estimate of political and
military organization, popularity of Castro's regime, economic
prospects, and probable stability of the regime without Castro.
Table. U.S.I.B. SNIE 8561. 5pp. Nov 28'6
25X1
25X1
8 Dec 61 DAILY BRIEF iv j
j
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9
 25X1 Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9
Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9
 Approved For Re se 2002/10/22: CIA-RDP79T00975A 00130001-9
Tanganyika at Independence
Tanganyika, which Britain. has held successively as a
League of Nations mandate. and a UN trust territory since
1919, has moved to independence with relative smoothness.
In part this was due to the territory?s international status,
as a result of which few Europeans settled permanently; the
white population now numbers about 21,000, most of them
transient civil servants and managers. Thus the racial ten-
sion common to much of east Africa was avoided. Moreover,
the. 9,000,000 Africans are divided into about 120 tribes, none
of which was strong enough to resist the central authority.
These. conditions were ably exploited by Julius Nyerere,
whose Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), founded in
1954, now controls 70 of the 71 seats in the legislature. Nyerere,
who holds a graduate degree from Edinburgh University, has
been prime minister since last May, when Tanganyika received
a new constitution which gave the territory virtually complete
autonomy. He has kept any incipient racialism among his
African followers under control and has turned TANU into a
multiracial organization. Meanwhile, he has maintained po-
litical stability and a slow but steady pace of economic advance.
His ultimate aim is a federation of the east African territories,
possibly including Nyasaland and Ruanda -Urundi as well, but
he apparently realizes that each of the present territories prob-
ably would have to be on its own for a few years before it could
be persuaded to give up its sovereignty to a federation.
Nyerere's ideals of multiracialism and federation are not
understood by the unsophisticated African masses in the.terri-
tory. Moreover, there are extremists- in a dissident wing of
the labor movement, in the tiny, Communist-supported African
National Congress, and amongNyerere's own supporters--who
are willing to exploit this lack of understanding. So far he has
kept these elements under control, reportedly by using methods
reminiscent- of the schoolmaster he. once was. His prestige still.
far outstrips that of any other Tanganyikan; however, the exist-
ence. of an extremist opposition will limit the degree of moderation
8 Dec 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9
 25X1
Approved For Reh
75AOQ ti00130001-9
his government can show on international issues. Ultimately
this opposition, exploiting African racialism, labor discon-
tent, and the growing disillusionment with independence inevi-
table in a country as. poor and unsophisticated as Tan an ika,
may have an, opportunity to undermine his position.
25X1
25X1
8 Dec 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN , Page 3
Approved For Release 2002/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06100130001-9