CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006100180001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 14, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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14 December 1961 /
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14 December 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
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4. Dominican Republic: Largest opposition group apparently
losing some supporters. (Page iv)
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7. USSR-Denmark. Comment on Soviet note protesting es-
tablishment of Baltic Approaches joint command. (Page v)
8. Conclusions of Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin
Situation. (Page vi)
9. Watch Committee Conclusions. (Page viii)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
14 December 1961
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Dominican Republic:~The National Civic Union (UCN),
the largest opposition gr p, appears to be losing some of
its support. Business and professional people, who form the
backbone of the UCN, are showing considerable disillusion-
ment with its leaders for political mismanagement and in-
temperance during the UCN-inspired general strike, which
failed to achieve its objectives. Student groups, on the other
hand, are showing a more pronounced inclination toward
revolutionary action, and the extreme leftist-led 14 June
party (PCJ), which was inactive during the strike, may win
more adherent
o moderate opposition groups, however, have also
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gained influence since the beginning of the strike, and may
be in a position to compete effectively with the PCJ's ex-
tremist leaders if UCN influence continues to decline.
These groups, the moderate leftist Dominicanvolutionar
party and the "30 May group," are both pro-US !
(Backup, Page 1)
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USSR-Denmark: The USSR's note to Denmark protesting
the establishment of a joint Baltic NATO Command with West
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Germany probably is aimed primarily at focusing inter.-
national attention on Soviet allegations of West German mili-
tarism and aggressive intentions and at bringing pressure
on Denmark to delay implementation of the joint command
agreement. Although the Soviet statement warned that Den-
mark's actions "are complicating the situation of Denmark's
neutral neighbors," it does not appear to foreshadow any im-
mediate Soviet moves to revive the demand for military talks
with Finland. The assertion, however, that the USSR; in the
face of West German and Danish "war preparations;" will be
compelled to "adopt the necessary measures"... to safeguard
its own security and that of its allies closely parallels the
arguments Moscow used on 30 October in demanding defense
consultations with Finland. Repetition of this line probably
was intended as a reminder to President Kekkonen of the
"watchdog clause" in the communique he signed with Khru-
shchev on 25 November, which expressed Moscow's "hope"
that Finland "will attentively follow" developments in North-
est
ern Europe and the Baltic and, in case of necessity, su II
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F (Backup, Page 3)
CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached
by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which.reviewed the situa-
tion for the period 29 November through 12 December 1961:
1. During the period under review there have been more
threatening implications in Soviet and East German statements
and indications of preparations to increase pressure on the
Western position in Berlin. We believe, however, that the
USSR will not undertake any action which in the Soviet view
would imperil the possibility of negotiations, particularly
pending the outcome of the consultations among the Western
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powers. Nonetheless this does not exclude harassing tactics
designed to emphasize the consequences of a failure to hold
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East-West negotiations.
2. There is evidence that within the next several weeks
new controls will be instituted along the Berlin sector boundary.
All civilians may be required either to present passports or
obtain visas for entry into East Berlin. Without directly deny-
ing access to Allied military traffic, the East Germans may
attempt to enforce some degree of control designed to face the
West with the alternatives of accepting East Germanregula-
tions or denying themselves access to East Berlin. In this con-
nection, heavy construction at the crossing points to East Ber-
lin seems intended to deter forcible breach of the barriers.
In general we believe that the East Germans will continue to
maintain a state of tension in Berlin and to move gradually to
gain acceptance of the wall as a full-fledged international
frontier.
3. A new development since 30 November has been the
extensive Communist charges that the American troops being
rotated to Berlin are not guaranteed free access because they
are subordinate to NATO command. This new line appears to
be partly for the record to reinforce claims that the "outmoded
occupation in West Berlin" aggravates "international tensions."
However, slowdowns and delays on technical pretexts appear
likely to continue on the autobahn, and temporary restrictions
may be instituted. Recent East German charges of sabotage
against the West Berlin portion of the S-Bahn installations,
and warnings that such action could have serious conse-
quences for Berlin's rail traffic with the outside world, may
also presage institution of some new restrictions on rail
access.
4. The Ulbricht regime continues to be faced with worsen-
ing food and consumer-goods shortages, a lack of raw material,
fuel, and labor for industry, and unrelieved discontent among
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industrial and agricultural workers. Nevertheless, Ulbricht
indicated at the recent central committee plenum that he would
press ahead with a hardline political and economic program.
The regime may be considering the reintroduction of rationing
of essential commodities in the course. of the winter, which,
coupled with increases in selective work norms and prices,
would heighten popular discontent.
WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
aIOn the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the
United States Intelligence Board concludes that:_t
4To Sino-Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initi-
ate direct military action in the immediate futur
BERLIN There are indications the Communists will con-
tinue their pressure on the Western position in Berlin, in-
cluding measures designed to harass and restrict Western ac-
cess and to gain acceptance of the Berlin wall as an international
border. However, their present military activity does. not sug-
gest that they expect these measures will significantly raise
the risk of an early serious military confrontatio4
SOUTH VIETNAM//Viet Cong subversive and military
activity continues at a high rate with no markedly successful
counteractions by government forces.
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Political Situation in Dominican Republic
attitudes of various opposition groups and in the tactics they
are considering, and may result in a change in their relative
strengths. These developments include the failure of the UCN-
inspired general strike to force President Balaguer's resigna-
tion, the collapse on 10 December of negotiations between the
government and the opposition, and the authoritative political
role being played by the military under the leadership of Gener-
al Rodriguez Echevarria. Political moderates have been out-
raged at General Rodriguez' role and disillusioned at Balaguer's
failure to resist military pressure; civilian members of the
cabinet are openly critical of Balaguer's weaknes7
PiQ,Q06100180001-4
/Recent developments are resulting in a shifting in the
dome elements of the UCN are reported planning to break
with UCN President Fiallo and set up a rival organization,
while others are considering preparations for clandestine ac-
tivity if the political impasse continues. A labor federation
formed last summer with UCN guidance, now is seeking to break
away from the organization
& Principal beneficiary of public disillusionment with the
UCN has been the Dominican Revolutionary party (PRD) headed
by Juan Bosch. This moderate leftist party has close ties with
such reformist Latin American leaders as Venezuelan Presi-
dent Betancourt and ex-President Figueres of Costa Rica. Bosch
informed the American consul general on 11 December that the
PRD had gained more than 30,000 new adherents since the be-
ginning of the strike and now has a total registration of 101,000.
This compares with a peak membership claimed by the UCN of
about 250,000 last September. The PRD is the only opposition
party which has agreed publicly to participate in the national
elections planned by Balaguer next May
he "30 May group, " composed of civilians and military
men who were involved in the plot that resulted in Trujillo' 17
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assassination on 30 May, is playing an increasingly significant
role as the public becomes aware of the heretofore unsuspected
wide extent of the plot. Individuals associated with this group
include elements in the military and civilian branches of the
government as well as in the opposition. The group, which.the
American consul general describes as "almost embarrassingly
pro--US," appeals to moderates disturbed by the bombast of the
UCN and the revolutionary climate its actions tend to stimulate.
Leaders of the "30 May group, " who provide a valuable point of
contact between elements in the mutually antagonistic government-
military and opposition groups, are attempting to work out a new
solution to the political impasse.jf
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Danish-Soviet Relations
In view of the Soviet diplomatic offensive in Northern
.'rope over the past several weeks, the Danes in all likeli-
hood anticipated a strong reaction from Moscow after parlia-
ment on 7 December approved the Joint Baltic Command.
The Danish Government pressed ahead on the command pro-
posal in the face of opposition within the governing Social e L.o-
cratic and Radical Liberal parties, and despite Moscow's 30
October note to Finland which singled out the proposed com-
mand as one cause of the alleged heightened tension in North-
ern Europe.
The Soviet charge that this move will "further compli-
cate the positions of Denmark's neutral neighbors" may be
an effort to bring public opinion to bear on the government
to prevent effective implementation of the joint command.
With latent anti-German sentiment a factor, and with the deep
concern in both official and public circles concerning the fu-
ture of Finland and Sweden, the Kampmann government may
well hesitate to undertake any further actions at this time
which Moscow might use as a pretext to renew pressure on
Helsinki and Stockholm. The initial press reaction in Sweden
to this latest Soviet note, however, is that the move was not
unexpected and that this was Denmark's affair..
A reference in the Soviet note to Denmark's easternmost
island of Bornholm repeats charges made over the years by
Moscow that Denmark is violating an understanding of 1946
when Soviet occupation troops withdrew from Bornholm and
Denmark agreed not to permit foreign troops to be stationed
there. The USSR claims that by including Bornholm in one
of the four subordinate commands of the Joint Baltic Command,
Denmark intends to permit the island to be occupied by for-
eign troops.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States Information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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