CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006100310001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 29, 1961
• Content Type: REPORT

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29 December 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
5. Vietnam: Hanoi may be preparing for open and increased
support of Viet Cong guerrillas. (Page t v)
7. South Korea - Japan, Tokyo appears reluctant to pro-
ceed with crucial phase of negotiations to normalize re-
lations. (Page v)
8. Conclusions of Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin
Situation. (Page v)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
29 December 1961
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Vietnam- North Vietnam may be setting the stage for
more open and extensive support for the Viet Cong. On 22
December, Hanoi broadcast a statement by the National Front
for the Liberation of South Vietnam saying that, "if need be,"
the Front would call for "comprehensive assistance. including
material aid from friendly countries" The Front is the polit-
ical element of the Communist subversive effort in South Viet-
nam, Hanoi has thus far been careful to keep its material
support of the Viet Cong clandestine.
Communist China may be planning some military logis-
tic assistance to North Vietnam; Peiping's minister of defense,
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Marshal Lin Piao, recently pledged "full support" for the 25X1
North Vietnamese and "joint a orts" to defend "the securit
of - ur respective countries"
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requested a meetina on the "political level" to concluge a set-
South Korea - Japan: Tokyo is showing signs of vacilla-
tion as negotiations tonormalize relations with South Korea
approach a crucial stage, according to Ambassador Reischauer.
He believes that Prime Minister Ikeda's party colleagues are
withholding their support, arguing that Japan's economic dif -
ficulties make a costly settlement of South Korea's economic
claims against Japan politically unpalatable at this time. The
Koreans have presented a demand for $1.2 billion. They have,
however, implied a willingness to consider economic assist-
ance in the form of grants to offset part of their demands, and
tlement. I
CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
companied by a generally negative assessment of Western will- 25X1
ingness to negotiate on a "realistic" basis. Within this context
of maintaining pressure on the Westj
I pe USSR expects formal East-V
negotiations on Berlin by F bruary and that if this fails. to occur
The USIB has approved the following conclusions reached
by its Special Berlin Subcommittee which reviewed the situa-
tion for the period 13 through 27 December 1961'
1. There has been no major change in the general Soviet
political position on Berlin during the past two weeks. While
Moscow r~presented the NATO approval of further diplomatic
d-nnfni-fiq on Berlin as a step forward, this line has been ac=
29 Dec 61
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a bloc peace conference is planned for March to sign a treaty
with East Germany.
2. An effort to strengthen Moscow's hand in the.negotia=
tions and to remove the question of East Berlin from the area
of negotiations probably were the primary motives in Soviet
approval of the East German refusal to permit the US polit-
ical adviser in Berlin or General Watson's civilian aides to
enter East Berlin without displaying identification. Since the
Soviet authorities were. obviously aware that the US officials
were proceeding to appointments with their Soviet counterparts,
these moves were a deliberate test of Western reaction to a
further encroachment on the right of official Allied access.
3. East German security precautions in and around West
Berlin continue at a high level. Construction of approximately
one hundred watch towers along the zonal and to a lesser extent
the sector border has been rushed in an apparent effort to im-
prove East German and Soviet capability of observing develop-
ments within the city. Police and border guard detachments
along the Berlin sector border were approximately doubled
over the Christmas weekend--a security measure that will
probably obtain through the holiday period. The East Germans
have continued to subject Allied duty trains en route to and from
West Berlin to harassing delays. Propaganda attacks on use
of the Berlin autobahn by US Army convoys, however, have
diminished. Nevertheless, the regime has reserved the right
to claim compensation for damages caused by military traffic
and may use this excuse to increase the tolls imposed on West
German traffic for use of the autobahn.
4. These steps have been accompanied by a heavy prop-
aganda campaign against West Berlin morale, including the
planting of hints that "something" would happen in the city dur-
ing the holiday period. There are signs of increasing restive-
ness among the West Berlin population and growing concern in
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the business community. People are particularly irate that
families separated by the sector border. cannot get together
during the holidays. The possibility can not be ruled out that
individual West Berliners or groups may take action against
the wall. The West Berlin Senat is understandably reluctant
to use West Berlin police to counter such action but the police
reportedly are keeping a careful watch over such groups, par-
ticularly students. In this psychological atmosphere, any
reasonably credible rumor of possible Western compromise
or of further Western withdrawals would find fertile. ground,
5. The net effect of developments in the Communist air
defenses of East Germany throughout 1961 has been a substan-
tial improvement- -both quantitatively and qualitatively--in the
ability of the USSR and East Germany to support militarily de-
cisions concerning Berlin. F_ I
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Disorders May Erupt in Urundi
The threat of intertribal violence is growing in Urundi
as competing tribal groups turn into rival political parties.
Tutsi Prime Minister Muhirwa, who assumed power.follow-
ing the assassination of Prince Rwagasore last October, has
alienated many Hutu supporters by making his regime in,
creasingly representative only of Tutsi interests. Meanwhile,
Mushatsi-Kareba, whose French wife has Communist sym-
pathies, is organizing the Hutu majority of the population.into
an effective political force.
Any early outbreak of violence would come at a particu=
larly unfortunate time. There is a deteriorating local security
situation--Belgian Army troops are being reduced from more
.than 2,000 men to some 400 even though a reliable African gen-
darmerie is lacking-while confusion and low morale are wide-
spread in the local Belgian administration. Local Belgians
reportedly have not been willing to work closely with leaders
of Urundi's governing party,which campaigned last September
on an anti-Belgian platform and defeated the Belgian-sponsored
party. Furthermore, they are concerned that Brussels will
order a quick reduction in the Belgian administrative force in
view of the imminent de facto ending of the trusteeship.
During recent negotiations in Brussels with representatives
of both Ruanda and Urundi, Belgium worked out arrangements
to give both territories local autonomy early in the new year.
In so doing, Brussels also hopes to send new technical person-
nel to replace those Belgian administrators "who reflect a
colonialist mentality"
Under the plan negotiated with representatives of both Ruanda
and Urundi, the central trusteeship administration is being broken
into separate administrations for Ruanda and Urundi. Belgian
officials would retain only those powers which under the trust
agreement Brussels cannot give up, such as foreign affairs, defense,
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and internal security, as well as overall financial policy.
Brussels hopes by February to place the remaining Belgian
powers under the direction of a special representative of
the Foreign Ministry. Meanwhile, Belgium plans to pro-
vide economic and technical assistance needed by both areas.
Both.Ruanda and Urundi have expressed a desire for eventual
political separation, but have shown a willingness to con-
sider economic and technical cooperation.
The affairs of the trust territory are scheduled for con-
sideration in the United Nations in mid-January, The UN
commission which investigated the September elections and
disorders following them has prepared a report which is not
generally critical of Belgium. However, in view of the failure
of Afro-Asian members of the commission to support Chairman
Dorsinville's personal recommendation to accept the results
of the elections in Ruanda, there may be criticism of Belgium's
role and a demand for new elections in Ruanda, where there
was considerable violence, As a result of tribal fighting in
Ruanda there are close to 200,000 Tutsi tribal refugees in
surrounding areas.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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