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December 14, 2016
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March 31, 2003
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January 20, 1962
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r ii~iiiiiiiiiiiiii i i~ i i i i i~ i i i i i i i ~ 25X1 Approved For F asT*P5/S eT9T00975A9 6200010001-1 20 January 1962 Copy No. C 89 TELLIGE...,- .41 25X1 State Dept. review completed 1.40 Approved For ReleasVQ 5/ T00975A006200010001-1 00 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200010001-1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200010001-1 20 January 1962 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 2 4 25X1 25X1 CONTENTS 1. USSR. Pravda articles suggest further developments in. Soviet . iii"s-pute with Peiping and Tirana. (Page i) 2~ France-Algeria: Negotiations apparently at a point where neither side feels there is room for further compromise. (page t) 3. Latin America: Communists and Castro sympathizers ,planning actions to discredit OAS foreign ministers' meet- ing. (Page t i) 5. Vietnam: Hanoi announces organization of Marxist-Leninist party in South Vietnam. (Page t t t) 7. African Conference, Failureto invite provisional Algerian government results in withdrawal of Casablanca and Tuni- sian participation. (page tv) 8. Laos. (Page v) 25X1 Approved For Re 11 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 20 January 1962 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 USSR: Two recent Pravda articles contain new attacks on the A-M-anians and Chine-s-e-UnTmay foreshadow further. devel- opments in the Soviet-Albanian dispute, such as the severing of Tirana's ties with the Warsaw Pact. They may also be in- tended to impress on the Chinese that continued support for the Albanians might leadto, a break in party relations. The articles also may suggest that Molotov and other members of the anti- party group will be expelled from the Soviet Communist party. 1~ _h1_ France- Algeria:)LBoth the Provisional Algerian government (PAG) and the French appear to feel that secret negotiations have reached fundamental issues on which each -feels there is no room for compromise. would have to be considered I negotiations were at a standstill "for the time being" over French demands for exclusive control of the referendum to be held in Algeria af- ter a cease-fire. F the PAG would rather have negotiations break down than agree to this demand. A French Foreign Ministry official told a US Embassy officer in Paris on 18 January that government circles feel some agreement must be reached within the next-few weeks or "other measures" I the PAG is un- cerfaMin whether to proceed with negotiations in view of its be- lief that the influence of the Secret Army Organization (OAS) is steadily increasing even among conservative Moslem elements in Algeria. PAG suspicions that De Gaulle is either unwilling 25 or unable to control the OAS are unlikely to be dispelled by thqj 0 A Approved For 2663t65t 16 . e1A- 0975AO0620001 0001 -1 25X1 7"' 25X1 Approved For R lease 2003/05/16: CIA-RDP79T00 75A200010001-1 25X1 N rench Government's "determination" to combat the O 25X1 25X1 Backup, Page 2) threat announced after the 17 January cabinet meetin Latin American communists and other elements sym- pathetic to Castro throughout Latin America are seeking to discredit the Organization of American States (OAS) foreign ministers' meeting scheduled to open 22 January in Punta del Este. They are planning strikes, student demonstra- tions, parades, and rallies timed to correspond with the open- ing of the meeting, to demonstrate Latin American solidarity with the Cuban revolution. In Cuba, a series of rallies and demonstrations during the ensuing week will culminate on 28 January in the second meeting of the "National Assembly of the Cuban people," amass rally called to give their "answer" to any decision reached in Punta del Este. The Bolivian Gov- ernment is reported to believe that worker demonstrations in La Paz could reach large proportions, and Argentine Communists may attempt demonstrations in front of the US Embassy in Buenos Aires] Youth groups and students are expected to play a leading role in the activities. Students from Chile, Argentina, Ven- ezuela, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil are expected to join their Uruguayan colleagues in the 97-mile march, which be- gan 17 January, from Montevideo to Punta del Este. The march is being escorted by Uruguayan security police, and is proceeding without incident. The Communists have had difficulty in recruiting marchers and the column of less than 400 is probably a disappointment. ' . [There are no indications that Latin American security forces fear any of the demonstrations will get out of hand. The Montevideo police recognize that Communists and pro-Cast o- ites have a potential to cause serious disturbances, but feel 20 Jan 62 DAILY BRIEF ^i_I,. V as I vI ~I~c ~cu.~c wvv. vv. Iv vI.-.-Iwo . v vqv. v.-.vvvwvv I # # # I- I 20 25X/ // ryry~~ (Ihhis is a real threat only if workPrq already on strike in the Vietnam: To encourage the belief that Communists in South Vietnam are all indigenous patriots, Hanoi has announced .the organization of a separate Marxist-Leninist party in the South. The manifesto of the new "Vietnam People's Revolutionary party," as broadcast from Hanoi on 18 January, repeats the language used by the North Vietnamese Communists to describe the Viet Cong objectives of overthrowing Diem, forming a,coalition gov- ernment in the South, and negotiating "peaceful, reunification" with the North. The hard-core Communist elite, who direct military and political subversion in South Vietnam, will use the new party to control their semi-overt political vehicle, the Na- tional Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. 20 Jan 62 DAILY BRIEF 25X1 ZOA Approved For Release 2003/05/16 :CIA-RDP79T0 975A006200010001-1' 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200010001-1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200010001-1 Approveor Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79175A006200010001-1 KONG LE - PATHET LAO AREAS GOVERNMENT (MEO) BASE AREAS BROAD -TRAIL -TRAIL O ROUTE NUMPU 620116 3 Kam Keut ' 25-X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO06200010001-1 20 Jan 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN D&, p Paige 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200010001-1 Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO06200010001-1 Approved F Pravda Attacks on Molotov and Chinese Communists The two Pravda articles strongly attack Molotov, other members of the antiparty group, and the Albanians and Chi- nese who share their views. An 18 January article by party ideologist P. N. Pospelov, marking the 50th anniversary of. the 1912 Communist party conference in Prague, states that the party will never tolerate either right- or left-wing "liquidators:' The historic significance of the Prague conference, according to Pospelov, was that the party was strengthened when it ex- pelled the Menshevik "liquidators," suggesting by analogy that the antiparty group can expect the same fate. Pospelov also notes that Lenin's way of handling deviation- ist "foreign groups" was to go as far as "a complete organiza- tional rupture:' Another Pravda article of 17 January sharply condemns domestic and foreign "dogmatists" for their opposi- tion to peaceful coexistence and refers, by implication, to the Chinese as "enemies" of Soviet foreign policies, 25X1 Pospelov's article provides a good indication of the sensi- tivity of the Khrushchev leadership to the use, by its opponents, of statements by Lenin to cast doubt on current policies. This is a practice of the Chinese Communists, and also what Molotov apparently did in his letter to the central committee last Octo- ber. The Chinese have indicated that they will not retreat from these positions nor drop their support for the Albanians, even in the face of further Soviet intimidations. 25X1 25X1 Approved For - 010001-1 20 Dec 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 1 For IasP 2003/05/16 - C1D-RnP79T00975fm16200010001-1 rench-Algerian Negotiations Apparently- Approaching Showdown the PAG cannot accept any method under which France alone controls the machinery of the ref- erendum to be conducted during a transitional period, since the PAG feels that in the past, the French.have ensured victory for themselves by manipulation of voting procedures`] I the rebels and the French are lso at odds over when the transitional period would begin. PAG officials are said to desire this immediately after a cease- fire, with.the PAG taking over internal security in Algeria as well as supervision of the referendum. The French want the transitional period.to begin only after the conclusion of formal negotiations following a cease-fire. The rebels reportedly feel they cannot accept this procedure, because should the open ne- gotiations fail they would find themselves with their guerrilla bands dispersed and nothing to show for their concessions. A compromise may be possible whereby the French would acknowl- edge PAG authority over some areas-areas which French secu- rity forces hav for all intents and purposes already surrendered to FLN control, ,The PAG, I has new and grave doubts" abou(the possibility of reaching any workable accord until Paris takes "concrete and public action" against the OAS. the PAG now estimates that at least three fourths of the non-Moslem population in Algeria, along with 20 percent of the Moslems, sympathize with the OAS. The PAG is said to be especially concerned about the "OAS spirit" that is steadily affecting wealthy, reactionary Moslems opposed to the rebels' concept of a socialist Algerian T\The French Foreign Ministry official indicated that it seems im ossible to drag out secret pre-negotiations much longer while the situation in Algeria continues to deteriorate. He still held out hopes that local tension might subside once an agreement be- tween France and the PAG is reache 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 AppFavedFU F Release 20=05f 16 . CIA-REW?MOMA0062000 1000 t--1 20 Dec 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2 Approved Ford THE PRESIDENT The Vice President Executive Offices of the White House Special Counsel to the President Military Representative of the President The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs The Scientific Adviser to the President The Director of the Budget The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration The Department of State The Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council The Director of Intelligence and Research The Treasury Department The Secretary of the Treasury The Under Secretary of the Treasury The Department of Defense The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Army The Secretary of the Navy The Secretary of the Air Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) The Assistant Secretary of Defense The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy Chief of Staff, United States Air Force Chief of Staff, United States Army Commandant, United States Marine Corps U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Commander in Chief, Pacific The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency The Director, The Joint Staff The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Department of Justice The Attorney General The Federal Bureau of Investigation The Director The Atomic Energy Commission The Chairman The National Security Agency The Director The United States Information Agency The Director The National Indications Center The Director Approved Fo 25X1 25X1 Approved For Releas /1 C 00975AO06200010001-1