CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A006200050001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 25, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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25 January 1962
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
CONTENTS
2. East Germany. Parliament enacts conscription, tenta-
tively approves customs law. (Page it)
3. Dominican Republic. Communist activity intensifies with
return of exiles. (Page it)
4. Indonesia:, Communists using Sukarno's call for volunteers
to penetrate armed forces. (.Page it t)
5. Iran: Shah asks Bakhtiar, former intelligence. chief, to
leave country. (Page t v)
8. USSR. Official statistics on Soviet industrial performance
in 1961. (Page v)
9. Bulgaria: Bulgarian Stalinists may challenge party leader-
ship at party congress in August. (Page v)
10. France-Algeria. High French officials, indicate virtual
agreement reached with Algerian rebels. (Page vi)
11. Conclusions of the Special USIB Subcommittee on Berlin
Situation. (Page vii)
12. Watch Committee Conclusions. (Page tx)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
25 January 1962
DAILY BRIEF
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. *East. Germany: During its one-day session on 24 Jan-
uary the East German parliament enacted universal. military
conscription and tentatively approved a new customs law. De-
fense. Minister Heinz Hoffmann.told the parliament that con-
scription would begin "sometime this year:' According to
press reports, it is to go into effect on 1 March.
The new customs law, when finally enacted, will affect
the, importation of all foreign goods. In his: speech to the
parliament introducing the bill, however, Foreign Trade Min-
ister Julius Balkow denied that it would mean levying duties
on. goods from West Germany. The Ulbricht regime presum-
ably hopes thereby not to disrupt interzonal trade. The cus-
toms law reaffirms the standard East German position.that
West Berlin is a separate, legal and political. entity, "located
in the, customs and sovereign territory" of East Germany, and
provides that the movement of goods to and from the. city
eventually must be "settled within the framework of treaty
arrangements:' Balkow demanded that in the, meantime the
Allies prevent the application of the. West German customs
law in West Berlin and advised.the West Berlin Senat to es-
tablish its own customs administration.
11 1
j X
I
On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the. United
States Intelligence Board on . 24 January reached the . following
conclusion concerning Berlin.`
Communist military activity and recent Soviet actions in
the immediate Berlin area do not suggest that the Communists 25X1
expect to risk military confrontation over Berlin in the imme-
diate fut
Dominican Republic. Communist activity is being intensi-
fied with the return to the Dominican Republic of Communist
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exiles and their sympathizers. Maximo Lopez Molina, the
pro-Communist secretary general of the Dominican Popular
Movement (MPD), arrived in Santo Domingo on 21 January
and, in a radio address on the following day, called for "a
true agrarian reform" and a severing of "the ties that join
us to US imperialism;' Other Communist and leftist exiles
reportedly will return on 25 January--some of them from
Cuba--and are to form a new MPD central committee. The
new MPD program is to include. efforts to obtain control of
the labor movement, indoctrination of peasants on Cuban
agricultural reforms, and agitation for the formation of a
"government of national, unity:' The MPD already is re-
ported to have gained some support from the 14th of June
party, which has recently been deserted by most of its mod-
erates and now is under extreme leftist leadership.
*The government, which is dominated by the large and
generally moderate National Civic Union, is aware of these
leftist activities, but has been hesitant to risk popular dem-
onstrations by nrohibitine the return of exiles at this time.
Indonesia:
ere as een a significant in-
25X1 crease in Communist party activity, both overt and covert,
since Sukarno's 19 December appeal to the nation to "mobi-
lize" for a military campaign to take West New Guinea. The
party regards military preparations, including Sukarno's call
for volunteers, as an excellent opportunity both for penetra-
tion of the armed forces and for military training. It has long
tried to subvert the military services, which are under non-
Communist leadership, and to develop its own militar . rm--
25X1 either within the national armed forces or outside them
25X1 Backup, Page 3)
n the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the
United States, Intelligence Board on 24. Jan ary reached the
following conclusion concerning Indonesia:
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Guinea will increase the likelihood of air or naval incidentsfl
on. favorable terms with the Dutch. Intensified Indonesian
and Dutch patrolling activities in areas adjacent to West New
Indonesia will continue military preparations to attack
WeGuinea while concurrently hoping for negotiations
NewG
11
Iran. At the request of Prime Minister All m ni9 the
Shah has equested. General. Timur Bakhtiar, former chief
of the National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK),
to leave Iran on the grounds that his presence aggravated the
situation caused by the three days. of student rioting against
the Amini government. Bakhtiar has agreed to go and plans
to leave for Switzerland shortly. Although Bakhtiar has con-
tinued to maintain friendly contact with nationalist elements,
there is no evidence that he was involved in the recent dis- 25X1
turbances. Bakhtiar feels that the Shah has no desire to put
reforms into effect and that Amini, lacking a personal follow-
ing, can not resist pressure from the Shah and the vested
erests around the Court.
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USSR: The official summary of the statistical. report on
the.ach evievi ements of the Soviet economy in 1961 states that in-
dustrial output--which was slightly behind plan at midyear--
exceeded its annual. target and made good progress toward 1965
goals. The consumer, however, had a relatively poor year;
despite claims of the second-best grain harvest in history, agri-
cultural output is still little if at all ahead of 1958, which is the
base year of the, current plan, and goals were not met in hous-
ing and the manufacture of consumer goods. The. increase in
investment was well below that achieved in recent years. De-
fects in planning and management are at least in part respon-
sible for the shortcomings, although the possibility that resources
were transferred to the military or to the: armaments industries
25X1 cannot be discounted. (Backhp,Page 5) (Chart)
Bulgaria: Bulgaria's pro-Khrushchev leadership may face
challenge from the Stalinist wing of the Bulgarian Communist
party in the. next six months prior to the party's eighth congress
in August.
Vulko erven. ov, leader of Bulgaria's s Stalinist faction
25X1 within the party, reportedly told the central committee last No-
vember, "I. am a disciplined Communist, but at the party con-
gress... we will see who is. right:' At the November session
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has undertaken a deliberate campaign to destroy the high es-
teem in which, he is still held both inside.and outside the party.
the Zhivkov leadership launched its latest de-Stalinization
campaign, which has cost Chervenko his memberhip on the
politburo and his post of deputy premier. Chervenko is still
a.member of the central committee. Since then the regime
/r3r
*Fr1ance-Algeria.,)High French officials including De Gaulle
himself have recent y"'expressed the view that virtual agree-
ment has beenreached with the provisional Algerian govern-
ment (PAG) on all major issues involved in an Algerian settle-
ment, and appear to be setting mid-February as a "deadline"
for the PAG to signify its accord. PAG officials, however,
have not confirmed any such agreement, They assert that they
have made their maximum concessions and take the position
that the next move is up to Paris. There are indications they
may once again be considering a referral of the entire situation
.to their cumbersome parent body, the National Revolutionary
Council. Meanwhile, success or failure of the intensified 25X1
French effort to control terrorism in Algeria and smash the
.Secret Army Organization will probably be the key factor in
any PAG decision as to-wjlether De Gaulle could implement any
aareement the PAG siansf I
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CONCLUSIONS OF SPECIAL USIB SUBCOMMITTEE
ON BERLIN SITUATION
.0
The. United States Intelligence Board has approved .the fol-
lowing conclusions reached by its Special Berlin Subcommittee
which reviewed the situation for the period 10 through 24 January
1962:
1. During its meeting of 24 January, the Volkskammer
introduced a new customs law and enacted a bill providing for
military conscription. The customs law underlines the Ul-
bricht regime's claims to sovereignty and when implemented
will put an end to the treatment of all Germany as one. customs
area. It emphasizes the regime's contention that West Berlin
is a separate juridical entity, located within East German ter-
ritory, and must no longer be included in the West German
customs area. The USSR has already challenged the. legality
of West Berlin's inclusion in West German trade agreements
with third countries. The conscription law sets up the ma-
chinery for regular military conscription and should avoid the
type of disruption caused by last fall's expansion of the East
German military forces from 143,500 to 164,000 men, includ-
ing uniformed security troops, through "voluntary" enlistment.
Tv" le ntat' the 1 ' 1 ft t to Nat
m
ion of a
' 1 D f C
e
ions
p
w is
a ense oun-
e
e o
cil.
making their presence visible along the sector and zonal bor-
ders of West Berlin, and appear to have improved their posi-
M1 to take immediate control o
er de
lo
t
pmen
v
ve
s
.
a
There is
evidence that Soviet
ersonnel have estab -
0
.
p
lished a headquarters of undetermined echelon at Thaelmann
Platz, approximately five blocks north of Friedrichstrasse;
b. There are recurring reports of Soviet foot patrols
along the borders;
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c. West Berlin is ringed at the sector-zonal border
by approximately 100 observation towers-Pat least some of
which are manned by Soviet personnel;
d. Soviet personnel have been observed adjacent to
the. sector border at the Bornholmer.S-Bahn station at the
French Sector and at the zonal border of Lichterfelde in the
US Sector, where. a tower overlooks the training area. at the
US McNair Barracks;
e. Other observation posts reportedly have been es-
tablished in buildings overlooking the sector crossing points
and the major East - West Berlin thoroughfares.
3. We believe that the USSR is still interested in continu-
ing the. talks in Moscow. There are indications that in the
event of an impasse in these discussions, the USSR would try
to develop new channels such as direct talks with Chancellor
Adenauer or Prime Minister Macmillan, or further talks with
.the US at a high level. At any rate, we expect the USSR to use
the next several weeks for probing Western firmness before
deciding on new moves on the Berlin scene or steps toward a
separate treaty with East Germany. Soviet preference for a
negotiated settlement is strongly suggested by a vigorous at-
tack in Pravda last week on the opponents of "peaceful coex-
istence," which specifically justified the value of high-level con-
tacts with the West. A public lecturer in Moscow on 21 January
stated flatly that a resolution of the West Berlin problem by ne-
gotiations was clearly preferable to proceeding with a German
peace treaty.
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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS
gs by its Watch ommittee, the United
On the basis of findin
States Intelligence Board concludes that
Nn Sinn=Soviet bloc country intends deliberately to initiate
direct military action in the immediate future
BERLIN: warried on Page ii of Daily Brie
SOUTH VIETNAM: Although counteractions by government
forces have recently shown some success, the Viet Cong con-
tinues.its high rate of subversive and small-scale military ac-
tivity and retains its capability to conduct large-scale attacks 25X1
on pre-selected targets in some areas of the country at any time
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Indonesian Communist Activity Increases
Communist party chairman Aidit is reported to have
sec?etly ordered the party cadre to exploit Sukarno's call
for "mobilization" by intensifying efforts to penetrate all
organizations, including the armed forces. On 23 Decem-
ber, following Sukarno's call for volunteers for military
service, Aidit announced that 2,000,000 Communists were
ready at any time. The secretary general of the Communist
youth movement claimed in mid-January that 100,000 mem-
bers of his organization had registered as volunteers and
that more would follow. Aidit has publicly thanked Sukarno
for the opportunity given Indonesia youth to acquire train-
ing for the West New Guinea struggle
(The army is trying to channel the registration of volun-
teers through the military services where they can be screened.
Communist leaders, however, are pushing for registration
through national front and other civilian organizations here
the party will have better opportunities for penetrate.
n the. absence of official restraints, the Communist prop-
aganda machine has become vociferously active since the Dutch-
Indonesian naval incident on 15 January. Various Communist
leaders, organizations, and publications have demanded that
Indonesia not negotiate with the Dutch but attack them in West
New Guinea. These demands have come from the. country's
largest labor federation, SOBSI; the largest peasant organiza-
tion, BTI; the official. Communist daily Harian Rakjat, and the
pro-Communist daily Bintang Timur,
Despite continued military preparations, the emphasis in
Djakarta appears to have shifted toward working for a nego-
tiated settlement. In speaking of the 15 January incident,
Sukarno's. military spokesman, General Jani, on 23 Januar
warned against the possibility that the enemy was trying to
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SOVIET ECONOMIC SITUATION
- SELECTED INDICATORS -
I
P
--j
ncrease
ercentage
~---
1960
19
61
1962
ACTUAL PLAN
7 YEAR PLAN
ACTUAL PLA
N
ACTUAL
PLAN
60 over 59
61 over 60 62
over 61
1962-65
Pig Iron - (Million Metric Tons)
46.8 51.
2
50.9
56
8.8
8.7
10.0
9.2
Steel (Million Metric Tons)
65 71.
3
70.7
76.9
8.8
8.7
8.7
7.9
Oil (Million Metric Tons)
148 164
166
183+
14.1
12.1
10.2
9.6
Gas (Billion Cubic Meters)
47 59.
7
60.9
72.4
26.5
27.0
29.6
25.3
Electric Power (Billion Kilowatt Hours.),
292.3 327
327
366
10.2
11.8
11.9
12.3
Cement (Million Metric Tons)
45.5 51
50.9
57+
17.2
11.8
11.9
13.5
Mineral Fertilizers (Million Metric Tons)'
13.9 15.
3
15.3
17.2
7.7
10.0
12.4
230
1961
1962
*Annual average for years remaining
PERCENTAGE INCREASES
PLA
N
ACTUAL
PLAN
Gross Industrial Production 10 8.8 9.2 8.1
Group A (Heavy industry) 10.9 9.5 10.+ 8.8
Group B (Light industry) 7+ 6.9 6.6 6.6
Labor Productivity (Industry) 5.3 6.0 4+ 5.6
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25 Jan 62 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Chart Page
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/provoke an impulsive act on our part:' He said the "impor-
tant thing is to _Mintain preparedness while awaiting subse-
quent commands,"?
No non-Communist military or civilian leader, however,
is li`tely to demand moderation from the Communists on the
New Guinea issue. The army, in particular, must act circum-
spectly in dealing with volunteers lest it give the Communists
grounds for a complaint to Sukarno of discrimination;
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Soviet Plan Fulfillment in 1961
While the pattern thus far in the Seven-Year. Plan is one
of slightly slowing rates of growth, the overfulfillment in
heavy industry (group A) thus far would enable the economy
to meet the 1965 target even with a considerable. reduction
in the heavy industrial growth rate. The food industry and
other light industries (group B), however, failed to meet the
.1961 target and must perform at a slightly higher rate in the.
future if the goals. projected for 1965 are to be met.
The summary provides only sparse information on the in-
vestment program, which has been the subject of considerable
attention in the Soviet press since Khrushchev at the party con-
gress pointed to the growing problem of spreading resources
among too many construction projects and to the growing back-
log of uncompleted construction. The announced investment
figure for 1961 includes investment in areas of the. economy
not covered in earlier Soviet reports on investment for the year.
It shows a 5.5-percent increase over 1960, compared with an
average increase of about 12 percent ift recent years. Invest-
ment in the chemical, metallurgical, and machine= building in-
dustries, and in food and other light industries, fell far short
of plan.
The 1961 housing goal was underfulfilled by 15 percent.
The total for the first three years of the'Seven-Year Plan is
only a little over a third of the way toward the 1965 objective.
If the 1962 goal is met, annual construction during the remain-
ing years of the plan must average more than a billion square
feet, which is possible only if the industry is given a higher
priority.
Labor productivity rose substantially less than the 6 per-
cent planned, but this was partially offset by an.increase in the
state labor. force to 66,000,000, the level originally set for 1965.
The. increase of 3,950,000 in a year when demobilization was
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suspended reflects greater use of women and students and the
continued conversion of collective farms to state farms.
The USSR claims the second-largest grain harvest in its
history-- 138,000,000 metric tons. However, Soviet grain pro-
duction statistics in recent years have been considerably
higher than the estimates of Western specialists. Our esti-
mate of the grain crop is 115,000,000 tons. Meat production
at state. slaughterhouses dropped 2 to 3 percent in 1961, and
per capital availability of meat may be as much as 10 to 15
percent below the 1959 level. While this decrease causes. no
critical problem from the standpoint of food supply, it more
than justifies the attention Khrushchev has given to agricul-
ture in his recent speeches.
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THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Counsel to the President
Military Representative of the President
The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The Scientific Adviser to the President
The Director of the Budget
The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council
The Director of Intelligence and Research
Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of Defense
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
The
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense
Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of
(International
Security
Affairs)
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
The Director, The Joint Staff
The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Department of Justice
The Attorney General
The Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
The Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
The National Security Agency
The Director
The United States information Agency
The Director
The National Indications Center
The Director
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